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ABSTRACT 
The University of Manchester 
PhD in Bioethics and Medical Jurisprudence 
Paul Charles Snelling 
24
th
 July 2014 
 
Personal responsibility for health: meaning, extent and consequences. 
Like the rest of the western world, the UK faces a significant increase in the 
prevalence of diseases associated with lifestyle. Smoking rates have reduced, but 
increasing obesity has contributed to alarming increases in diabetes. Discovery of the 
correlation between behaviour and poor health has, since the 1970s, resulted in 
public health policies emphasising behaviour change, and personal responsibility; an 
emphasis that survived later research which demonstrated social, genetic and 
psychological determinants on behaviour and health. The latest version of the NHS 
constitution exhorts us to ‘recognise that you can make a significant contribution to 
your own, and your family’s, good health and wellbeing, and take personal 
responsibility for it.’  
 
This thesis seeks to clarify the meaning and extent of personal responsibility for 
health, and at its core are four papers published in peer-reviewed journals. The first 
clarifies the concept concluding that it is best understood in a tripartite conception of 
a moral agent having obligations and being held responsible if he fails to meet them. 
The following two papers discuss the nature of the obligations, using utilitarian 
reasoning and arguments from analogy. First, an exploration of the moral obligations 
for our own health is undertaken via an analysis of the practice of tombstoning, 
jumping from height into water. I conclude that the obligations are of process rather 
than outcome, consisting of an epistemic duty to determine the health related 
consequences of our acts, and a reflective duty to consider these consequences for us 
and for those who share our lives.  Second, following an examination of the moral 
status of blood donation, I conclude that despite its presentation as a praiseworthy 
and supererogatory act, it is more properly regarded as a prima facie obligation, 
supported by arguments from beneficence and justice.  
 
The final paper discusses the final part of the tripartite conception of personal 
responsibility for health: being held responsible. I discuss the nature of blame and 
extend the tombstoning analogy as a way of testing my own intuitions in response to 
an imagined adult son who has undertaken this dangerous activity. I argue that the 
notion of blame is not generally allowed as part of the patient – professional 
relationship, and yet without considering blame, the concept of personal 
responsibility for health is incomplete. I conclude that if the epistemic and reflective 
duties, individually applied, conclude that an obligation is owed, it is owed to those 
within personal relationships, and holding people responsible for their health-
effecting behaviour is also best undertaken within these relationships. 
 
I conclude the thesis by considering the implications for professional practice. 
Inevitably this leads to consideration of the promotion of personal autonomy in 
health care. A more relational account of autonomy is suggested. Facilitating the 
epistemic duty so that individuals are better able to understand the risks of their 
behaviour requires rethinking of the way that health promoting material and 
information are presented. 
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Part I: Introduction 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
 
In 2008, as I started work on this thesis, the American Journal of Clinical Nutrition 
published a large UK study, which recruited over 5000 sets of twins aged between 
the ages of eight and eleven (Wardle et al., 2008).  The study aimed ‘to quantify 
genetic and environmental influences on BMI (Body Mass Index) and central 
adiposity in children growing up during a time of dramatic rises in paediatric 
obesity’ (p. 398), finding that heritability for both BMI and waist circumference was, 
at 77%, substantial. If the editors of the journal had some minor queries about 
methodology and inferences (Musani et al., 2008), they nevertheless commended the 
study, noting that it confirmed the genetic influence of obesity that had been known 
for two decades.
1
  
 
Unusually for a scholarly study, publication was widely discussed on the television 
news (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC], 2008a), and in the print media. 
Reported in The Times, the study’s principal author was quoted as saying: ‘This 
study shows that it is wrong to place all the blame for a child’s excessive weight gain 
on the parents’ (Henderson, 2008). The study did not suggest that all childhood 
obesity was genetically determined, and the comment leaves open the possibility that 
                                                 
1
 And as I complete the thesis six years later, the study has been cited 345 times. 
  Page 12  
some blame might legitimately be attached to the parents of obese children. If these 
complexities are recognised in philosophical analyses (For example, Holm, 2008), 
more popular discussions, even those in broadsheet newspapers, can readily reduce 
the issue to a crude ‘nature-nurture’ dichotomy. Under the title, ‘Face it, fatty, your 
genes are innocent’, a comment article in the Sunday Times included: 
I hate to blithely dismiss a whole swathe of scientific findings but I don’t 
believe a word of this. Fat gene, my foot. Funny how it seems to manifest 
itself only in the prosperous, cake-guzzling, carb-and-sugar-laden West. 
Where are the obese Sudanese toddlers? The porky Ethiopians? [...]You can 
choose to make sacrifices or choose to be lazy and remain fat – and if you 
choose to be lazy and remain fat, then fair enough, but accept that it’s your 
own doing and take responsibility for it. […] Above all, we need to get to 
grips with the fact that fatness is a personal choice, one that can’t be blamed 
on anybody or anything other than our own greedy behaviour’ (Knight, 
2008). 
 
Such strongly expressed views
2
 would perhaps be unlikely in philosophical or health 
journals, but they represent a popular position concerning an individual’s 
responsibility for his health. If he knows that certain behaviour causes or is 
implicated in a certain disease, but continues undertaking the behaviour nonetheless, 
is he not at least partially responsible if he contracts the disease? Is he obliged to 
refrain? And, if there is some responsibility, can smokers be blamed for their 
cancers, alcoholics for their liver cirrhosis, and sexual hedonists for their sexually 
transmitted disease? And, in an environment of scarcity of health care resources, if 
he can justly be blamed for having the disease that his behaviour caused, can it 
follow that this blameworthiness be regarded as a legitimate consideration in 
treatment allocation?  
 
                                                 
2
 And the comment is not entirely disinterested; the author has written books about dieting. 
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There is some public support for the views that these questions imply. In a large 
survey conducted by the King’s Fund (2004), 88% of respondents agreed that 
individuals are responsible for their own health, though more than 40% agreed that 
there are too many factors outside individual control to hold people responsible for 
their own health. A decade earlier, Bowling (1996) reported that 42% of respondents 
among the general public agreed with the statement that ‘People who contribute to 
their own illness – for example through smoking, obesity or excessive drinking – 
should have a lower priority for their health care than others’. A further 15% 
expressed no view on the subject. Radcliffe (2000, p.143) found that ‘approximately 
71% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that preference should be given to 
those individuals whose need for a liver transplant arises as a consequence of 
naturally occurring liver disease rather than their personal behaviour e.g. due to the 
excessive consumption of alcohol’. This issue was highlighted when the footballer 
George Best, known to be a heavy drinker, received a liver transplant in 2002, and 
returned to heavy drinking afterwards causing his death three years later, and has 
remained in the public eye; a typical comment from 2009 was reported in the 
Observer newspaper:  
Eunice Booker, whose 26-year-old daughter, Kirstie, died in a car crash in 
2006, said: "I find it offensive that one in four of the livers donated go to 
alcoholics. If there are two people side by side wanting a liver, and both have 
the right tissue match, and one is an alcoholic and one isn't, there's no contest 
- you take the one who's not an alcoholic, they are more entitled" (Doward 
and Campbell, 2009). 
 
Later studies and reviews have demonstrated that public support for deprioritising 
those deemed to have caused their disease remains a popular view, though never a 
majority one (Dolan et al., 2005), inconsistently held (Mason et al., 2011) and 
difficult (for focus group participants) to sustain logically (Baker et al., 2010).  
Unsurprisingly perhaps, Ubel et al. (1999, 2001) found in a US study that smokers 
  Page 14  
discriminated less against those deemed to have contributed to their need for organ 
transplantation.  
 
It might be expected that prioritising decisions are at least influenced if not 
determined by the system of health care that requires them. In the UK, the large 
majority of health care is provided through direct taxation by the National Health 
Service (NHS),
3
 and so money spent on treating preventable illnesses is denied to 
others. Official government policy documents on health often highlight the financial 
costs of various behaviours.
4
 Over the last 100 years lifespans have increased 
significantly
5
 as has funding both as a total amount and proportion of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP).
6
 Cause of death has changed from predominantly 
infectious diseases to cancer, cardiovascular and degenerative diseases, all of which 
are influenced by individual behaviour. Fourteen behaviours are estimated to cause 
over 40% of cancer (Parkin et al., 2011) with tobacco smoking by far the largest. 
Despite recent falls in prevalence, over 20% of the population smoke regularly, of 
whom two thirds report wanting to give up (Health and Social Care Information 
Centre, 2013). Nearly a quarter of adults drink more than the lower risk guidelines, 
considerably more than half are either overweight or obese, and more than 60% of 
adults fail to meet physical activity guidance (Department of Health [DH], 2010a). 
Debate about personal responsibility for health in the UK is inevitably undertaken in 
                                                 
3
 The Office for National Statistics give the figures for health care expenditure for 2011 as £142.8 
billion of which £118.3 billion (82.8%) was publically funded (Payne, 2011). 
4
 For example, the coalition government’s  ‘Our Health and Wellbeing Today’ (DH, 2010a) which 
states that smoking related illness costs the NHS £2.7 billion annually, the same figure as alcohol 
related illness.  
5
 In 1911, life expectancy at birth was 49 for men and 53 for women. In 2010 it was 78 and 82 years 
respectively (Office for National Statistics, 2012).  
6
 A précis lodged at the House of Commons library notes that expenditure has increased from 11.7 to 
121 billion pounds from 1950 to 2011 (adjusted to 2010/11 prices), representing an increase from 3.5 
to 8.2% of GDP (Harker, 2012). 
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the context of a large amount of preventable ill health which costs a good deal of 
money to treat. 
 
Arguments presented as illustrative are from newspapers rather than academic 
journals because these debates are undertaken and policies evolved and settled in the 
public and political arenas; they are political as much as academic moral debates 
(Coggon, 2012).  These arenas do not exclude academic contributions but nor do 
they necessarily value or invite them, and there are significant differences between 
the presentation of academic, public and political debates.  Academic papers are 
longer and require knowledge and skills to engage with, and cost typically £25
7
 for 
access to those without institutional affiliations. Individuals tend to read newspapers 
that represent their political and moral outlook (Stroud, 2010) and so the articles are 
not perhaps intended for critical scrutiny, at least not the level of critical scrutiny 
which characterises academic debate.
8
  
 
In debates in the popular press it is can be difficult to identify lines of argument so 
that they can be formally presented. However, and without claiming that this is a 
formally valid expression, the arguments exemplified by India Knight’s forthright 
dismissal of the scientific findings and the attribution of blame proceed along these 
lines: 
Premise   Health is good, illness is bad. 
 
                                                 
7
 As an example, The Journal of Medical Ethics charges £24 for one day access to an article. Some 
newspapers charge for on line usage but they can be read free at public libraries. 
8
 Garber (2001, p. 34) explains the difference between journalists and academics in these terms: ‘The 
difference is rather that the journalist of ideas attempts to explain and describe them, while the scholar 
of ideas attempts to think through them, to enter into and advance an ongoing intellectual discussion. 
Every scholarly move is part of a dialogue. To hear only one side of the conversation and take it for 
the whole is almost inevitably to find the current speaker’s contribution unaccountable, dogmatic or 
slightly ridiculous.’ 
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Premise   Certain acts (smoking, drinking, and eating too much) 
cause (are responsible for) ill health.  
 
Premise    These acts are under personal control. 
 
Conclusion   We ought to refrain from undertaking these acts.  
 
Similar arguments can be created within the discipline of public health ethics, which 
interferes in various ways and to different extents with the absolute liberty to 
undertake acts which threaten health. These interventions can be categorised within a 
ladder of intervention, a term introduced by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
(2007), and referred to in UK
9
 government policy (DH, 2010a). The bottom rung of 
the ladder does nothing or monitors the situation and then interventions ascend in 
strength starting with information giving, enabling choice and guiding choice, 
through incentives and disincentives, finally to restricting and eliminating choice. 
Arguments in support of interventions could be presented in this form, with the 
initial premise being very similar to the conclusion of the first argument: 
Premise  Individuals should refrain from undertaking acts which 
threaten health. 
 
Premise   X causes ill health. 
 
Premise   Individuals undertake X. 
 
Premise   Treating ill health caused by X costs a lot of money. 
 
Conclusion  Intervention Y is justified to prevent, reduce or 
discourage X. 
 
As before I do not present this as a formally correct syllogism but it does represent 
the sort of arguments presented in favour of policy and regulation from information 
giving to outright criminalization and anything in between. Examples can be found 
                                                 
9
 HM Government is the government of the UK, but public health policies and the organisation of 
health and social care service differ throughout the UK. This document applies only to England. 
Throughout the thesis, I have made jurisdiction clear where it is important. 
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in recent campaigns and policy debates: A campaign from NHS England exhorts 
patients to seek medical advice about health problems early rather than waiting to 
see if it gets better; the ‘earlier the better’ campaign10 (information giving).  
Government plans to introduce a minimum price for alcohol
11
 in England were 
‘shelved’12 but will be introduced in Scotland13 (disincentives), and there have been 
calls to criminalize what have become known as ‘legal highs’ (restricted choice) 
(Hughes and Winstock, 2012). The type of intervention within the range depends on 
many things: the number of individuals affected and the severity of the harm are 
important, but other considerations like the effectiveness of the intervention and 
wider political factors are also important. I will return to the issue of regulation in 
Chapter 3. 
 
A separate argument, the one stated so vigorously by Mrs. Booker, follows not from 
a moral responsibility to act to preserve health but the desirability to treat ill health 
and the burdens that this places on the health care system:  
Premise   We should refrain from undertaking acts which 
threaten health. 
 
Premise   Health care is collectively provided. 
 
Premise  Individuals who have contributed to their poor health 
are less deserving of the collective resources for health 
care. 
 
Conclusion   (Causal) responsibility for ill health is a valid rationing 
criterion. 
 
                                                 
10
 http://www.england.nhs.uk/2014/01/18/the-earlier-the-better-campaign/  
11
 Secretary of State for the Home Department (2012). Also see Purshouse et al. (2010) and  Black et 
al. (2011) for a scottish study arguing for the effectiveness of the policy. 
12
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-23346532  
13
 Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012. Not yet implemented. 
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I have presented simplified versions of the sorts of arguments that support public 
health policy and ethics in an environment where much of the burden of ill health is 
caused by personal behaviour. This has provoked responses within the health care 
system in terms of regulation of behaviour in an attempt to improve health and is 
discussed in relation to delivery of services, where a popular view deprioritizes 
services to those deemed to have caused their ill health (Buyx, 2008).  Both areas of 
policy and practice are likely to increase in importance as demand on health services 
increases, fuelling anger and anxiety and, most importantly, affecting people’s lives 
in ways that they would not choose.  
 
However, the thesis does not address the legitimacy of either regulation or rationing 
in any great detail, instead addressing a moral issue of fundamental importance that 
precedes both of these important questions: moral responsibility for health – 
exemplified by the claim that we ought to refrain from undertaking acts which 
threaten health. This moral claim serves as a premise for arguments concerned with 
behaviour regulation and prioritizing debates and policies, both of which are 
important and pressing subjects within health care ethics. A claim that I shall 
develop throughout the thesis is that policies about behaviour regulation and 
prioritizing decisions assume that we ought to behave to protect our health rather 
than argue for it. This might be considered surprising given the weight of the 
conclusions that follow from it. A challenge to the assumption that there is a moral 
responsibility to act to preserve health threatens what can be considered orthodox 
health promotion practice, much of which follows from it. If it cannot be 
demonstrated that we ought not to smoke, how is it that such effort is spent on 
dissuading us from doing it?  
  Page 19  
It is possible to present reasons for regulation and prioritising regimes which do not 
rely on the implied or stated normativity of acting so as not to threaten health. 
Procedures for allocating financial resources for particular treatments may simply be 
a matter for contractual arrangements setting out which treatments are available to 
which patients and what exclusion criteria apply. In the United States (US), for 
example, where most health care is provided privately and paid for by insurance 
premiums, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) prohibits the levying of higher premiums 
for those in poor health, but it allows employers, within limits, to link premiums to 
tobacco use, weight and other lifestyle factors (Madison et al., 2013). Almost half of 
States in the US allow employers to refuse jobs to candidates because they smoke 
(Schmidt et al., 2013). When interviewing panels and insurers say that we ought not 
to smoke, it can be construed as a non-moral ought, a hypothetical imperative. You 
ought not to smoke if you want a job or lower premiums. The obligation is 
instrumental and does not depend on the inherent goodness of lower insurance 
premiums. It might be unwise to waste money on higher premiums but we would be 
hard pressed to say that it is immoral. Applied more generally to health, the 
argument would go along these lines: if you want to avoid lung cancer, you ought 
not to smoke. It is possible to conceptualise lung cancer descriptively as non-moral. 
 
Arguments that do not rely on the inherent goodness of health can also be presented 
in favour of regulation of health threatening behaviour. These arguments might be 
politically self-interested or capricious, but are more likely to present in terms of 
wider harms. Avoiding the financial and personal costs of crime is given as a moral 
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reason to regulate drug use,
14
 and one criterion of public health intervention is given 
as: 
[…] the Government will balance the freedoms of individuals and 
organisations with the need to avoid serious harm to others. We will look 
carefully at the strength of the case before deciding to intervene and to what 
extent. This must be based on a rigorous assessment of the evidence about 
health and wider harms, with the potential benefits balanced against the 
social and economic costs to individuals, organisations and wider society 
(DH, 2010a, p.28). 
 
Here the harms to health and wider harms are conflated in a single calculation. 
Clearly this is not considered a problem though the arguments used are very 
different. Mill’s harm principle or something very like it is invoked in preventing 
‘serious’ harms’15 to others, but it explicitly excludes the application of the argument 
to his own health; ‘His own good, either physical or moral, is not sufficient warrant’ 
(Mill 1998 [1859], p.14).  The part of the criterion concerning the prevention of 
harm to others is clearly a moral argument but it does not rely on the intrinsic value 
of health. There can be non-moral arguments and reasons supporting health-
enhancing behaviour, and moral arguments which do not rely on the inherent 
goodness of health, but a central assumption underpinning this thesis is that 
arguments of the sort identified are principally health-related moral arguments, and 
the research questions are moral questions, concerning moral responsibility.  
 
 
 
                                                 
14
 See Healthy Lives, Healthy People (DH, 2010b, p.5). ‘Changing adults’ behaviour could reduce 
premature death […] and saving society the £13.9 billion a year spent on tackling drug fuelled crime.’ 
15
 It is worthy of note that the term ‘serious harm’ is used in the policy document but Mill’s text refers 
only to ‘harm’. This is more than a semantic quibble because it says something about the types of 
harms that stand in need of prevention. Nor can it only be a feature of the use of language separated 
by 150 years because we see similar ambiguity in regulations and laws, for example for 
confidentiality between  professional codes (Nursing and Midwifery Council [NMC], 2008) and DH 
guidance (DH, 2003a). 
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Research questions 
The research questions are implied in the title and addressed directly in part II of the 
thesis. They are: 
(1) What is the meaning of personal responsibility for health? 
(2) What are our obligations in respect of our health? 
(3) What are our obligations in respect of others’ health? 
(4) How can individuals be held responsible for failure in their obligations? 
 
The questions addressed by the thesis concern responsibility for health; and the 
model I propose, and the obligations that I argue for, are independent of any system 
of professional health care. However, the arguments have been formulated within the 
system operating in the UK, and my arguments and conclusions are placed largely in 
this context. Throughout the thesis, I draw attention to contrasts between what I take 
current professional health care practice to be and what it would be if it my 
normative conclusions were embraced, and though these contrasts are not necessary 
for the normative conclusions, they are illustrative and helpful for identifying 
professional challenges. 
 
I have described what I take to be the ‘official’ position relating to health policy, 
resulting in ‘orthodox’ health care professional practice, and this position assumes 
that government policy and professional practice are largely in alignment. This isn’t 
to say that the positions are exactly the same, or that all health care professionals 
practise in the same way, but the underpinning assumptions and general direction are 
consistent in areas important for the thesis. The two most important elements of this 
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position for the normative conclusions of the thesis are in the definition and value of 
health, and in the understanding and promotion of personal autonomy.  
 
I understand, firstly, that the ‘official position’ in health policy regards health 
predominantly in biomedical terms of disease, illness and lifespan. In a sense this is 
a result of the need to measure health so that policies can be evaluated. The position 
also tends to regard health as intrinsically good, tending to oversimplify and to 
assume that individuals have a responsibility to act to protect their health, narrowly 
defined, largely by following health promoting rules.  This is discussed in more 
detail in the thesis, especially in Chapter 2.  
 
My second and related claim is that the ‘official’ position claims to value personal 
autonomy and yet does much to undermine it.  There is a tension in this position 
between health and respecting autonomy, which is a recurring theme throughout the 
thesis. As well as being identified, by many, as the predominant bioethical principle 
(for example, Gillon, 2003), self-determination within medical practice is a clear 
legal right in the UK, resulting in, notably, clear rules and processes in seeking valid 
consent for treatment. 
 
The predominance of personal autonomy has come under increasing critique, 
principally from two directions. Our ability to access and process information has 
been questioned  by social psychology research, resulting in renewed arguments for 
various forms of paternalism ranging from the libertarian paternalism of nudge 
techniques (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008), which manipulate choice, to thoroughgoing 
coercive paternalism (Conly, 2013). In addition, an emphasis on individual rights 
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tends to regard individuals as distinct from their social situation and society, a 
position challenged from, amongst others, communitarianism and more relational 
understandings of autonomy.  What I have characterised as the ‘official’ position 
recognises but fails to resolve the tension so that it both claims personal 
responsibility for health, that people ought to maximise their health, and yet at the 
same time states, unconvincingly as I argue, that  information is presented in order to 
facilitate individual choice. In respect of others’ health, the tension between health 
and autonomy results in donation behaviour being presented as both morally 
obligatory and morally supererogatory.  
 
The account that I develop in the thesis stands in opposition to the ‘official’ position 
as I have characterised it. By regarding health as instrumentally rather than 
intrinsically good, responsibility for health, characterised as obligations in acts rather 
than rules, depends on an individual’s life, their goals and the places that others have 
in it.  Taking account of the interests of others also results in prima facie obligations 
to act for others’ health, most obviously where the gains are significant and the costs 
small, exemplified by some donation behaviour. The primary obligations are to make 
informed individual health related decisions: to enquire about the consequences of 
health-effecting behaviours and to place the risks of these consequences in the 
context of their life, recognising that other people also have a legitimate if not 
determinate interest in our health. The arguments are developed by analogy and 
within a dual level utilitarian framework which requires reflection and knowledge in 
order to maximise utility.  The thesis develops an account of the process of 
determining the moral status of health-effecting behaviour, which can be applied by 
individuals to their own circumstances and life goals. 
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If accepted, this account challenges the current account of responsibility for health 
exemplified by orthodox health promotion and education.  I do not claim that there 
are no such obligations, only that they are of process rather than outcome. Detailed 
exploration of the implications for health policy and professional practice is not 
covered by the research questions, but it is suggested that since the moral status of 
health-effecting behaviour depends, in my account, on individual circumstances, at 
the last compelling reasons are required for regulation of these behaviours.  
Inevitably this will result in a more libertarian regulatory regime than that currently 
operated and would require respecting individual autonomy by providing 
information that facilitates rather than manipulates choice, operated at the levels of 
policy and within patient-professional relationships.  
 
Structure of the thesis 
Part I – Introductory material 
This thesis is presented for the award of PhD in Bioethics and Medical 
Jurisprudence. The structured programme ‘is designed to provide a solid skills basis 
for independent research, and to guide participants steadily towards the completion 
of a structured doctoral thesis, which is based on publishable journal articles and 
book chapters.’16 Unlike a traditional PhD, the original contribution is presented in 
the form of four publishable papers but within the context of a single presented 
thesis.  
 
The thesis is constructed in three parts. The first part consists of background and 
explanatory material. Three chapters follow this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 
                                                 
16
Programme description: http://www.law.manchester.ac.uk/healthcare-ethics-and-law/postgraduate-
research/course-list/course/?code=06250&pg=2  
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introduces the historical and political background of responsibility for health in 
response to changing patterns of disease and also discusses and critiques the 
background to the assumptions presented earlier which together form an argument 
concluding that we ought to refrain from health threatening behaviour. The 
statements that I suggested formed the premises of the popular arguments that I 
critique are common themes throughout the thesis, and so the chapter addresses 
questions of the definition and value of health, group cause and effect, and individual 
control of behaviour. The operationalised conception of responsibility for health in 
the NHS constitution is introduced. 
 
Chapter 3 discusses the connection between legal and moral responsibility. The 
thesis is concerned with moral responsibility and so this chapter primarily sets the 
scene and legal context in which people make moral decisions. Legal prohibition and 
consequent punishment offer self-regarding reasons to avoid proscribed behaviour, 
but it can be argued that there is a moral duty to obey the law. As an example, legal 
regulation of smoking is discussed in some detail, particularly in relation to recent 
contradictory legal cases in England and Scotland concerning the rights of smokers 
in mental health units.  
 
Chapter 4 introduces and explains the philosophical approach taken in the thesis.  In 
a traditional doctoral thesis of 80,000 words, similar in length and form to a book, 
considerable space can be given to developing and defending a theoretical approach, 
and since in its initial presentation at least, a traditional thesis is considered as a 
whole, there can be forward and backward references to the theoretical underpinning 
as well as between individual chapters using it. This is not to say, incidentally, that 
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chapters from ‘traditional’ theses are not adapted and published in peer-reviewed 
journals, as well as transferred into books,
17
 but generally, these publications appear 
after the thesis is examined and passed. The thesis as presented here differs in that 
papers from it have already been published, predating the revision of the 
philosophical approaches chapter so that it is as much post hoc justification for the 
methods used in the published papers than unified guiding theory; more scaffold 
than underpinning foundation.
18
   
 
Papers in bioethical journals rarely have well developed theoretical bases, evidenced 
in an exchange between John Coggon and Hugh McLachlan. Coggon (2008) 
criticises the absence of an indication of an account of morality that McLachlan 
(2008) is committed to in a paper about active and passive euthanasia, and part of 
McLachlan’s (2009,  p.457) response is simply to state that ‘articles published in the 
Journal of Medical Ethics do not normally contain an account of the author’s general 
theory of morality.’19 Theoretical justification and references between the 
papers/chapters in this thesis is similarly undeveloped and to enable the papers to be 
read alone there is some necessarily repetitive scene-setting. 
 
Reflecting its roots in professional relationships (Harris, 2001), much of the 
normative literature in bioethics is directed at health care professionals; and much of 
the literature in public health ethics (a subset of bioethics) relates to coercive 
behaviour regulation of various sorts.  Unusually, much of the normative attention in 
                                                 
17
 Among the books consulted during the writing of this thesis, Brassington (2007a), Mulgan (2001) 
and perhaps most notably, Harris (1980) started their life as PhD theses. 
18
 For this reason, literature reviews which form part of the published papers cannot be updated in the 
light of new research, and this is potentially a problem most tellingly faced by part time students 
whose PhD journey is of longer duration, and also poses challenges for those whose analyses depend 
in part on government policies which are apt to change direction abruptly.  
19
 I have not submitted to the Journal of Medical Ethics but the point has wider resonance. 
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this thesis is directed at individual citizens rather than professional providers of 
health care, individuals and institutions. A normative analysis of the obligations that 
citizens have in respect of their own and others’ health (as I attempt in chapters 6 and 
7) is of a different form to an analysis both of the view about the moral status of the 
acts in question and the responses to them from within professional health care, 
though the extent to which the analyses differ is open to question. This means that 
the philosophical approach concerning the patient-professional relationship is 
arguably more general than usually seen in bioethics papers. The chapter outlines the 
approach taken by the four papers that follow, discussing deductive and inductive 
approaches used and synthesised in the papers which are a combination of analytical 
and normative philosophy. Normative arguments are developed inductively by 
analogy and deductively by application of dual level utilitarianism which is 
introduced and defended. 
 
Part II – Published papers 
The second part of the thesis consists of the four papers which have been published 
in peer reviewed academic journals. The papers in the thesis must form a coherent 
whole, yet were written for slightly different readerships and at different times and 
their initial presentations, including theoretical input, have been written following 
different publication guidelines and rewritten at the behest of peer-reviewers and 
editors in order to fulfil the primary objective of being published. The significance of 
the publication process for the papers is that they must not only be capable being 
read alone, but written in the assumption that they will be. They are presented in a 
sequence slightly different to that in which they were written, so that conceptual 
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analysis precedes two papers on obligations, for own and others’ health, with the 
final paper discussing the consequences of failing to meet them.  
 
Chapter 5 (Paper 1), entitled ‘Saying something interesting about responsibility for 
health’20 was published in the journal Nursing Philosophy on 6th June 2012. 21 The 
journal, published by Wiley, ‘is an international peer reviewed journal for nurses and 
healthcare professionals seeking to articulate a more theoretical basis for their 
practice,
22
 and has an impact factor (2014) of 0.875. The paper is a conceptual 
analysis of responsibility for health and discusses the concept by way of a brief 
analysis of the uses of the word ‘responsibility’ in health care literature, and by 
application of philosophical meaning of responsibility.  The concept is characterised 
as having three constituent parts: (i) a responsible agent (ii) having obligations and 
(iii) being liable to being held responsible in failing to meet them.  Each of these 
areas is problematic within professional health care and it is concluded that 
clarification is urgently needed if it is to retain its place in health policy. Following 
this conceptual discussion, the next two chapters form the normative strand of the 
thesis, discussing, via analogous examples, the nature of obligations to self and 
others.  
 
Chapter 6, entitled ‘What’s wrong with tombstoning and what does this tell us about 
responsibility for health?’ was published23 on 9th April 2014 in the journal Public 
                                                 
20
 The title is a reference to a paper by John Paley (Paley, 1996) which criticised ‘concept analysis’, a 
method of inductive analysis rarely seen outside the nursing literature. In retrospect, I think that a 
more descriptive title (like the others) may have been more advisable. 
21
 Originally submitted on 16
th
 June 2011. Resubmitted following revision on 14
th
 November 2011. 
Accepted on 20
th
 November 2011. 
22
Overview of journal on Wiley website.  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1466-
769X/homepage/ProductInformation.html  
23
 Originally submitted on 21
st
 June 2013. Resubmitted following revision on 3
rd
 January 2014. 
Accepted on 6
th
 March 2014. 
  Page 29  
Health Ethics. Published by Oxford Journals, and with an impact factor of 0.788, the 
journal is ‘is the first peer-reviewed international journal to focus on a systematic 
analysis of the moral problems in public health and preventive medicine.’24 By way 
of an analysis of the practice of tombstoning, that is jumping from a height into 
water, the paper argues that obligations in respect of our health are best understood 
as obligations of process rather than outcome, specifically two obligations or duties. 
First the epistemic duty requires us to seek information about the likely effects of our 
health threatening behaviour. The information gained from meeting the epistemic 
duty then facilitates the reflective duty which obliges individuals to put their health 
threatening behaviour in the wide context of their lives, including the effect that it 
has on those who share them.  
 
Chapter 7 shifts the normative gaze to our obligations in respect of the health of 
others. Entitled ‘Challenging the moral status of blood donation’, it was published in 
Health Care Analysis on 15
th
 September 2012.
25
 Published by Springer and with an 
impact factor of 1.02, the journal ‘promotes debate about the fundamental rationale 
of all aspects of health systems and health care provision […].’26 The paper notes 
that in the UK, blood donation is presented as a supererogatory act, evidenced by 
advertisements and videos aimed at potential donors, and this is contrasted with 
advertisements from India which present blood donation as an obligatory act.  In the 
UK, and in contrast to blood donation, post mortem organ donation is also presented 
as an obligatory act, and yet the arguments are transferable from organ donation to 
blood donation. These arguments, from beneficence and from the wrongness of free 
                                                 
24
 About this journal. http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/phe/about.html  
25
 Originally submitted on 14
th
 March 2011; resubmitted following revision on 14
th
 August 2012; 
accepted on 31
st
 August 2012. 
26
 Description. http://link.springer.com/journal/10728  
  Page 30  
riding are discussed and transferred and it is concluded that blood donation is, prima 
facie, also an obligatory act, but recognised that  presenting it in this light may have 
unintended adverse consequences in terms of donor recruitment. 
 
The concluding chapter in this section is entitled ‘Who can blame who for what and 
how in responsibility for health?’ and was published in the journal Nursing 
Philosophy on 29
th
 May 2014.
27
 The paper argues that holding someone to account 
for their health threatening behaviour amounts to blaming them for it, something that 
is underexplored in the literature on professional health care. The philosophical 
literature on blame is briefly reviewed, and since this partly concerns emotional 
responses to wrongdoing, I discuss my own responses to an imagined adult son when 
I discover that he has been tombstoning. These responses are discussed in response 
to features of moralism, simply understood as the excess of morality. I conclude that 
if there are obligations for health, then individuals are liable to be held responsible 
for failing to meet them, but this is best understood as a proportionate response 
within personal relationships. Blaming attitudes and behaviour remain outside 
professional caring relationships though there is evidence that negative attitudes to 
those perceived to have caused their illness persist. Nurses holding these attitudes are 
invited to reflect on the nature of their patients’ moral agency, the obligation that 
they are holding them to, and whether the standing of the relationship with them is 
such that it includes holding them responsible. All of these areas are problematic, 
and the conclusions provide analytical support for regulatory injunctions concerning 
blaming patients for their diseases and behaviour.   
 
                                                 
27
 Originally submitted 23
rd
 January 2014. Resubmitted following minor revisions on 5
th
 April 2014. 
Accepted 14
th
 April 2014. 
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Part III – Conclusion 
The final chapter of the thesis briefly revisits the papers and considers the 
implications that the epistemic and reflective duties have for health care policy and 
professional health care. It is concluded that facilitating these responsibilities 
inevitably questions current understandings of autonomy in practice. I discuss the 
possible impact of the thesis and the ideas in the papers and what these might mean 
to nursing practice and education. Finally I discuss how the conception of 
responsibility for health as I have presented it can be applied to smoking and nursing 
advocacy, illustrating fundamental quandaries in professional health care. 
 
A note on personal background 
An important consideration before proceeding to the substance of the thesis is to note 
my own personal background. This is important because my intuitions and general 
outlook have been influenced by my experiences over the course of my personal and 
professional life.  I take critical reflection to be central to the enterprise of 
philosophy, and this requires awareness, as far as possible, of how formative 
influences affect our views and actions. Nearing 50 years old, I have been a 
registered nurse for almost half of my life, 15 years in practice in intensive and 
coronary care and general medicine, followed by 10 years in higher education, 
teaching pre and post registration nursing students. My interest in personal 
responsibility for health does not stem from an interest in philosophical puzzles but 
from thinking about whether and how I ought to engage in health promotion in 
conversations with patients and students. Prior to undertaking the programme of 
study that has resulted in the production of this thesis (including while I have been 
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writing it)  I have published papers
28
 mainly on nurse education, including some 
sceptical of nurse regulators and the manner in which assumptions about values are 
accepted uncritically by the profession and translated into regulatory requirements.  
 
The tension between personal autonomy and the apparently problem free view that 
health is intrinsically good and should always be prioritised is immediate and 
compelling when a patient asks to be accompanied outside for a cigarette, or seems 
unwilling or unable to stop smoking after a heart attack. Those unable to stop are 
supported with nicotine replacement therapy; those unwilling regarded as foolish and 
wrong. Thinking about these practical concerns and how I can be a better nurse and 
teacher, rather than merely accepting conventional practice and regulation on these 
and other matters led me here, and also explains why I have discussed professional 
regulation and used it within examples throughout the thesis. It is not just that this is 
the environment that I am versed in and familiar with but also that it matters to 
nurses and patients that these issues are clarified. There has been much public debate 
recently about all graduate preparation of nurses,
29
 but despite what is perceived as 
an expansion and deepening of nursing curricula, little if any time is spent on 
philosophy, apart that is, from spending considerable attention on attempting to 
ensure that the right people enter the profession and that the ‘correct’ values are 
promoted and regulated for, with little justification or critical engagement. This is an 
analysis for another day but it explains why there is quite so much nursing in this 
thesis on bioethics. 
                                                 
28
 An early exploration of uncritical nurse regulation can be found in an analysis of academic freedom 
in nursing and nurse education (Snelling and Lipscomb, 2004), and the latest in a challenge to 
uncritical orthodoxy in nursing practice by way of a critique of intentional rounding (Snelling , 
2013a,b,c). 
29
 Dr Vince Cable, the Business Secretary was the latest in a very long line to deride degree 
preparation of nurses (Morgan, 2013). 
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CHAPTER 2 
Background 
 
The moral questions addressed in this thesis lead to decisions and actions taken by 
agents, professionals and policymakers within a social context; and the social context 
influences the moral questions and the manner in which they are addressed. This 
chapter describes that context. Beginning with a brief discussion of the historical and 
political development of the notion of responsibility for health and health promotion, 
the chapter proceeds to discuss the three premises which were identified as leading 
to the versions of personal responsibility with which I introduced the thesis. In 
discussing the definition and value of health, group and individual causation, and 
individual control and choice, I will identify some of the problems that challenge this 
account.  However complex the factors for disease causation are, it is certainly the 
case that the notion of patients’ duties within responsibility for health is visible in the 
bioethics literature. A more detailed conceptual analysis follows in Chapter 5, but for 
now I will review some of the literature which addresses patients’ duties, and finally 
discuss the way that these duties are presented in the UK within the NHS 
Constitution. 
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Personal responsibility for health: A brief history 
The notion of personal responsibility for health is not new. As Reiser (1985) details, 
opinions about how individual behaviours have affected health and the moral choices 
that follow have been present throughout human history. In ancient Greece for 
example, Galen believed individuals to be blameworthy if they harmed their bodies 
in the face of knowledge to prevent it, and the Pythagorean life required preserving 
health by practicing moderation and self-control using diet, exercise and music 
(Tountas, 2009).  Similar expressions of a moral duty to care for health can be seen 
throughout the middle ages and further, but the actions that followed from this duty 
depended on views about disease causation. Regardless of what was thought to cause 
disease, prior to improvements in sanitation
1
 and nutrition in the 19
th
 century and 
augmented by the discovery and widespread use of antibiotics in the mid-20
th
 
century, the main cause of mortality and morbidity was infections (Bynum, 1988). 
As the threat of infectious disease receded and life expectancy improved, cancers 
and cardiovascular disease became the commonest causes of death,
2
 a process known 
as the epidemiological transition (Wilkinson and Pickett, 2010). Rather than the 
result of a single disease causing organism, these diseases were recognised to be  
multi-factorial (House, 2001), and from the 1960s onwards the language of ‘risk 
factors’ attempted to explain causation, initially in terms of behaviour (Aronowitz, 
1998).
3
  Personal (mis)behaviour became the focus of public health. In 1977, John 
Knowles, an american physician and president of the Rockefeller Foundation wrote 
that: 
                                                 
1
 Readers of the British Medical Journal voted this as the most significant medical advance since 
1840. Second was the discovery of antibiotics (Ferriman, 2007). 
2
 The commonest cause of death for men in 2012 was ischaemic heart disease. In the list of most 
common causes of death, only one, pneumonia and influenza combined can be said to be of infectious 
origin, causing 4.6% of deaths (Office for National Statistics, 2013). 
3
 Doll and Hill first reported the link between lung cancer and smoking in 1956. Their sample 
consisted of 40,000 doctors. 
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[…] over 99 per cent of us are born healthy and made sick as a result of 
personal misbehaviour and environmental conditions. The solution to the 
problem of ill health in modern American society involves individual 
responsibility, in the first instance, and social responsibility through public 
legislative and private voluntary efforts in the second instance. […] I believe 
the idea of a ‘right’ to health should be replaced by the idea of an individual 
moral obligation to preserve one’s own health – a public duty if you will 
(Knowles, 1977, pp.58-9). 
 
This emphasis on both causation of ill health and the associated moral imperative 
resulted in a number of important documents and policies. First, in 1974, the 
Lalonde Report from Canada, in opposition to the idea that health services 
determined health, proposed instead a health field model whereby health was the 
product of a number of factors: biology (including genetic factors), lifestyle, 
environment and health services (Lalonde, 1974). In 1976 the UK Government 
published a discussion paper Prevention and Health-Everybody’s Business (DHSS, 
1976), and in 1979 the US Surgeon General published a report, Healthy People, 
which, using the framework proposed by Lalonde estimated that ‘perhaps as much as 
half of US mortality in 1976 was due to unhealthy behaviour or lifestyle’ (US 
Surgeon General, 1979, p.8).  These documents did not blame all of ill health on 
lifestyle as evidenced by the simplistic model proposed by Lalonde, but as the 
quotation from Healthy People demonstrates, personal behaviour was identified as 
the biggest contributory factor. Minkler (1989) suggested that the major contribution 
made by these documents and policies was to call attention to the major role of 
lifestyle in determining health, justifying an expansion of health promotion (Hubley 
and Copeman, 2013), which emphasised behaviour change and individual 
responsibility for health (Mold and Berridge, 2013). 
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It became apparent, however, that behaviour alone did not explain differences 
between social groups. In the UK, the Black Report (Black et al., 1980) showed that 
life expectancy of the higher social classes was significantly better than those in the 
lower social classes, and that these differences persisted when lifestyle factors were 
accounted for. The report, commissioned by a Labour government, was virtually 
suppressed by the incoming Conservatives (Porter, 1997, Mackenbach, 2010). In an 
introduction, the Secretary of State for Health, Patrick Jenkin, made it clear that he 
was releasing the report for discussion, without any commitment by the government 
to implement its proposals, which included increased spending on welfare and social 
services to reduce poverty. If his justification was financial, it was also clear that the 
Conservative Party in government simply didn’t believe the evidence. In her 
autobiography, Edwina Currie, Health Minister from 1986 to 1988 describes how 
she circulated a paper upon assuming office developing themes ‘incorporating 
conservative philosophies of personal responsibility[…]’ (Currie, 1989, p.5).  She 
denied that health inequality is connected with poverty, blaming poorer health 
suffered by lower social groups firmly on their habits: 
The ‘health gap’ is the result and relic of differences in behaviour over a very 
long period […] Low income by itself is not a major cause of strokes or 
cancer or heart disease – health problems which are mainly found in affluent 
countries. Heavy smoking is a cause, horrible fatty diets are implicated, along 
with lack of exercise in these sedentary days, drinking to excess plays its part 
(Currie, 1989, pp. 24-25). 
 
In 1997, the incoming Labour government turned its attention to investigating 
inequalities in health with the commissioning of an independent inquiry into 
inequalities in health under the chairmanship of Sir Donald Acheson (DH, 1998). 
Again recognising the impact of social factors on the health of poorer people, the 
report recommended a wide range of social policy initiatives to reduce poverty, some 
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of which were subsequently proposed in the government’s response to the report in 
1999 (DH, 1999). As far as the UK was concerned, this was the most extensive 
collection of social policies designed to tackle health inequality, though some had 
other primary purposes (Mackenbeth, 2010). Policies included a national minimum 
wage, higher benefits and pensions and increased spending on health and education. 
 
A further review followed in 2002 (DH, 2002) with a subsequent revised strategy 
(DH, 2003b) which revisited some of the social policies but also emphasised 
strategies to address health-effecting
4
 behaviours. Further reviews and criticism 
followed, resulting in an assessment chaired by Sir Michael Marmot (2010) which 
found that, largely, the targets to reduce inequality had failed. Among the reasons for 
this was that 
attempts to reduce health inequalities have not systematically addressed the 
background causes of ill health and have relied increasingly on tackling more 
proximal causes (such as smoking), through behaviour change programmes 
(Marmot, 2010, p.86). 
 
Other explanatory factors included a failure to implement policies on a large enough 
scale (Mackenbeth, 2011).  It is perhaps the lack of evidence for such policies 
(Bambra et al., 2010) which will inhibit their further implementation, though it is 
likely that ideological and fiscal concerns arrested this ‘remarkable story’ 
(Mackenbeth, 2011, p.573) after the 2010 general election which saw a 
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition reduce public spending in the wake of a 
global economic crisis.  The Health and Social Care Act 2012 passed into law 
                                                 
4
 The difference between affect and effect has caused some vexation. Fowler’s Modern English Usage 
(Oxford, 1999) notes that ‘effect’ is most common as a noun, and ‘affect’ is a verb meaning to ‘have 
an effect on’. But effect is also a verb, meaning ‘to bring about, to cause, to have as a result’. As a 
peer-reviewer for the paper included here as Chapter 8 remarked, both health-affecting and health-
effecting can be used in the sense I am using it here, but rather than attempt to elucidate the difference 
and at the suggestion of the reviewer for the paper, I have used health-effecting throughout. 
  Page 38  
statutory duties on the NHS to have regard to the need to reduce health inequalities, 
and the NHS Constitution states that: 
[the NHS] has a wider social duty to promote equality through the services it 
provides and to pay particular attention to groups or sections of society where 
improvements in health and life expectancy are not keeping pace with the rest 
of the population (NHS, 2013a, p. 3). 
 
There is no elaboration on how these goals are to be met, and given the relative 
failure of social policies under Labour, the chance of the NHS itself having an 
impact is slim. Mackenbach (2010) concludes simply that reducing health 
inequalities is currently beyond our means. The aim is not mentioned in the NHS 
outcomes framework (DH, 2013a). The most recent white paper on public health in 
England claims to take a radical new approach, but retains an emphasis on behaviour 
change, by setting out how the approach will 
reflect the Government’s core values of freedom, fairness and responsibility 
by strengthening self-esteem, confidence and personal responsibility; 
positively promoting healthy behaviours and lifestyles; and adapting the 
environment to make healthy choices easier (DH, 2010b, p.6). 
 
There is recognition that behavioural choice is multi-factorial. Borrowing 
terminology from John-Paul Sartre, Dougherty (1993) identifies the freedom and 
facticity models.  In the freedom model, choices concerning health threatening 
behaviour are freely chosen, and this free choice obliges people to choose to behave 
healthily and be accountable for these choices.  In the facticity model, human 
behaviour emerges ‘from a nexus of factors over which no individual has control’ (p. 
114); individuals are therefore victims rather than authors of their health 
circumstances. Holding them to account for their health threatening behaviour, 
legitimate under the freedom model is, under the facticity model, unjust; a sort of 
double jeopardy where the ill are victimised first by their illnesses and then by being 
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held responsible for them (Harris, 1995). Dougherty goes on, as might be expected, 
to develop themes combining the polarised models. These, however, remain 
focussed on behaviour, and whilst acknowledging that individual behaviour is just 
one of many causes, Dougherty argues that the focus should be maintained on the 
facts that mitigate or remove individual control over health related behaviour. There 
is a nod to community and political action in improving housing and making cars 
safer, but even while accepting that the freedom model is simplistic, the focus on 
removing barriers to behaviour change underplays the role of wider social factors.   
 
Baum and Fisher (2014) argue that behavioural health promotion has not been 
shown to reduce health inequality but that the lack of evidence has not prevented a 
succession of neo-liberal governments from adopting it on ideological grounds, with 
a strong ethos on individualism tending to blame the victim. In a review of policies 
from the World Health Organisation (WHO), The Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), and australasian and western countries, Carter 
et al. (2009) found that many policies acknowledged wider determinants of health, 
but went on to direct action towards behavioural change in specific social groups. 
 
The tension between individual responsibility, causal and moral, and other factors 
can be seen in many other places. Engineering disasters like the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico can be presented as errors by individuals by 
underemphasising commercial and contextual factors creating the environment in 
which individual decisions are taken (Coeckelbergh, 2012). Pollution can be blamed 
on individuals who drop litter, without considering whether an external actor can or 
ought to make their choices easier by providing easily accessible recycling facilities 
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(Fahlquist, 2009).  Food waste is blamed on individuals rather than policies which 
entice over purchase (Evans, 2011).  Debates about the causes of poor care in the 
NHS, most closely examined at Mid Staffordshire NHS Trust (Francis, 2010; 2013) 
can be cast as failures of individual health care professionals or the environment and 
pressure in which they worked (Paley, 2014). Reasonable judgements concerning the 
question of responsibility in these areas, assuming that they result in wrong 
situations worth avoiding, are inevitably found within the range between the extreme 
positions of complete and negligible personal responsibility, and they are likely to be 
as much the result of vested interests as cool philosophical examination. In the 
current examination of factors that lead to poor care, the government has an interest 
in blaming individual failings, by nurses and managers, whereas individual nurses 
and the organisations representing them have an interest in emphasising the 
importance of contextual factors.  At least part of the interest is in avoiding 
uncomfortable personal blame but similarly there is the suspicion that its opposite, 
praise, is sought. India Knight lost a considerable amount of weight and in blaming 
those who fail to do what she did, she invites praise for herself. At the very least she 
is assuming that everyone can do what she did, and what is more that they ought to 
do it, and they are therefore blameworthy if they do not. 
 
Since personal behaviour contributes significantly to health even under a model that 
also emphasises social and other determinants of health, it is the common factor 
which applies to all composite models. The extent to which it is determinate will 
vary according to other factors. The thesis cannot consider in detail the extent to 
which these factors combine in individual cases, changing the nature of our 
obligations to our health.  It is known for example, that rates of giving up smoking 
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are better for those in higher social groups (Jarvis and Wardle, 2005). Poorer people 
find it harder to give up and this may affect the nature of their obligation to try. In 
discussing responsibility for personal choices and behaviour, it should not be 
assumed that the thesis accepts or supports the freedom model, which as I have 
described permeates policymaking and was given thoroughgoing expression by India 
Knight. I characterised the argument as making certain assumptions about the nature 
of health causation and choice and I will return to these themes throughout the thesis. 
The suggested argument was: 
Premise   Health is good, illness is bad.  
 
Premise   Certain acts (smoking, drinking, and eating too much) 
cause (are responsible for) ill health.  
 
Premise    These acts are under personal control. 
 
Conclusion   We ought to refrain from undertaking these acts.  
 
Further premises would be needed to turn this into a formally valid syllogism, but it 
represents a common enough argument, which even as it stands makes value and 
factual assumptions, each of which can be challenged. The assumptions, even 
outside this suggested argument are important foundational issues for public health 
but are rarely questioned. In the next section I will discuss each of the premises in 
turn. 
 
The definition and value of health 
Health is an elusive word and concept, at once descriptive and highly evaluative. We 
can have a healthy bank balance and a healthy sex life, phrases common enough so 
that meaning is clear. In chapter 5 I will argue that understanding of the concept 
‘responsibility for health’ requires thinking specifically about responsibility, but the 
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responsibilities, that is obligations, depend on what we understand health to be. At 
one end of a continuum is Boorse’s (1975, 1977) essentially descriptive account of 
health as the absence of disease, and at the other a wider account which sees health 
as one of many factors contributing to the realisation of life goals. The World Health 
Organisation definition of health,
5
 famously inclusive, is ‘a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or 
infirmity.’ The WHO definition has been criticised (Huber et al., 2011), not least 
because its emphasis on completeness can regard most of us as unhealthy for most of 
the time. Policies directed at improving health require an understanding of what 
health is, since it constitutes the target of their intervention, one that requires to be 
measured. Huber et al. (2012, p.2766) use ‘health as the ability to adapt and to self-
manage’ in their study and Larson (1999) discuss four models; Medical, WHO, 
wellness and environmental.  
 
Since, as I have suggested, the debate is as much as anything a political debate it is 
instructive to examine what the government says about health. Helpfully, this is a 
question addressed directly in Our Health and Wellbeing Today
6
 (DH, 2010a). 
Under the heading, ‘What is health?’, the following is highlighted in a box (p.6):  
We use a broad definition of health that encompasses both physical and 
mental health, as well as wellbeing. This means that we are not only 
interested in whether or not people are ill or have a health condition but also 
in how healthy and well they are. 
 
                                                 
5
 Preamble to the Constitution of the World Health Organization as adopted by the International 
Health Conference, New York, 19-22 June, 1946; signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 
States (Official Records of the World Health Organization, no. 2, p. 100) and entered into force on 7 
April 1948. 
6
 This is a summary of evidence that informed the development of the white paper, Healthy Lives, 
Healthy People. 
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On this account there is an ‘interest’ in the wellness – illness continuum, and in the 
next paragraph (para 2.1, p.6), it is stated that ‘in Healthy Lives, Healthy People we 
take a broad view about what health means. We care about the physical and mental 
wellbeing […].’ Here, health and wellbeing appear to be taken as inclusive in line 
with the WHO definition.  However, the next paragraph (para 2.2, p.6), starts with 
‘Good health and wellbeing brings many benefits for all of us. Healthier people tend 
to be happier […]’, illustrating the separation of health and wellbeing by drawing 
attention to a correlation between them. Elsewhere the document refers to ‘harmful 
lifestyles’, (p.7), and ‘healthy behaviours’ (p.27) and goes on to discuss the narrower 
factors of health related to physical and mental health. The Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) measures health as part of well-being, albeit the constituent part that 
most people ranked as most important: 
How people view their health was the most important factor related to 
personal well-being [...]. People who reported very bad health had much 
lower ratings of life satisfaction, feelings that things were worthwhile, levels 
of happiness and higher ratings of anxiety on average than those who said 
their health was good (Randall et al., 2014, p.14). 
 
These statistics use self-reports of health rather than any objective measure, and it is 
noted that subjective assessments of health matter more to wellbeing than objective 
measures (Oguz et al., 2014; Diener et al., 1999). At an individual level the 
difference in value and well as conceptualisation is illustrated by Lindsay (2010), 
who suggests that among australian youth, health and wellbeing can have divergent 
goals where individuals manage their food and alcohol intake so as to maximise 
wellbeing within valued social practices. Relatedly, in Canada, Dumas et al. (2014) 
described how the health-effecting behaviour of young under privileged women was 
heavily influenced by other factors, principally family and financial responsibilities.   
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It looks like there is ambiguity in the Department of Health’s understanding of what 
health is, captured perhaps in the difference between a definition and a 
conceptualisation. It seems to be taking wellbeing as both part of and separate from 
health. It might be suggested that a response to criticism of indistinct understanding 
and explanation in policy documents, research and academic papers would result in 
every publication spending a great deal of time defining and defending their 
approach, but this of course would be untenable. As will become clear, the normative 
papers in this thesis do not defend a detailed approach to the definition of health. The 
prima facie normativity in respect to others’ health does not require a precise 
definition because health needs, as I will discuss them, are clear, and obligations in 
respect of our own health are clearly articulated in the context of individual lives, 
and the concept of health, evidenced by Lindsay’s subjects, is part of this individual 
approach.  
 
Whilst precise definitions are unnecessary for many discussions, it is useful to keep 
in mind the broad tension in understanding of health. My assumption about the 
‘official’ government understanding is that despite their claims to the contrary, a 
relatively narrow approach is taken which focuses on a medical model and sees 
health gains in easily measurable terms of diseases and life expectancy. Extreme 
interpretations of this view are presented and critiqued by Skrabenek (1995) and 
Fitzgerald (2001), who see the medical profession as a willing partner in the 
enterprise of ‘healthism’,7 where health is valued for its own sake and the 
government regulates and coerces (as far as possible) what it considers to be healthy 
lifestyles. The term ‘health fascism’ is relatively commonplace, and not confined to 
                                                 
7
 According to Skrabanek (1994, p.16), the Lalonde Report was the first healthist document. 
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the popular press (Fitzpatrick and Tinning, 2013, Lefever, 2012). I will discuss this 
more fully in terms of legal regulation in the next chapter and health promotion in 
Chapter 6, where I take a wider approach to health-threatening behaviour. Another 
way of addressing this tension is to claim that the ‘official’ position is that health is 
considered intrinsically good, the end of many public health policies, whereas my 
account relies on health being regarded as an instrumental good,  being just one of 
many means to a wider and individually chosen good life. This tension is more 
important for the orthodox position than the alternative that I argue for because clear 
responsibilities follow from what might be considered a view about the ultimate 
value of something. If the supreme value of health is taken as a starting point for 
arguments and policies that follow, then positions arguing from a different view of 
what health is can simply be regarded as incommensurable and denied rather than 
engaged. The intrinsic goodness of health, narrowly defined, is accepted as self-
evident.  
 
Group cause and effect 
Claims that certain behaviours are wrong because they cause ill health significantly 
simplify causal relationships. Each health threatening behaviour has its own 
relationship with its associated conditions, but its nature is dependent on many 
factors such that the simple statement that X causes Y, understood as an inevitable 
individual causal process is seldom appropriate, and yet this is the simple message 
contained within much health education material. Some habits, like tombstoning, can 
cause serious injury or death during a single episode. Others, like smoking, cause 
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cumulative harm.  Drinking alcohol offers health benefits up to a certain level,
8
 and 
causes incremental cumulative harm only after a certain limit. Eating a ‘wrong’ diet 
causes some harm in some people, though the occasional packet of crisps results in 
nothing but pleasure. The diseases ‘caused’ by these habits are also caused by other 
factors or by none at all. It can be clearly said that a tombstoner’s injury was caused 
by his tombstoning but it cannot be said with the same certainty that a smoker’s heart 
attack was caused by his smoking. He may have suffered it anyway, along with 
many others who suffer heart attacks without ever touching a cigarette. Because of 
the lack of direct causation between habit and illness when we say that we are 
responsible for our health, we cannot fairly mean that we are held responsible for 
(just) having a disease.  However, there clearly is a relationship between certain 
habits and certain conditions which can unequivocally be regarded as a disease, and 
so the concept of responsibility for health is often (but not always) more fruitfully 
conceived as being a responsibility to avoid behaviour that risks certain 
consequences. 
 
Individual control and choice  
The academic paper that introduced the thesis (Wardle et al., 2008), the findings of 
which were ‘blithely dismissed’ by India Knight, reported empirical findings about 
the extent to which genetic factors contributed to obesity.  These influences are 
causal at the group rather than individual level. India Knight is correct insofar as 
genetic influences can be overruled by personal behaviour in respect of diet. A 
genetic predisposition to obesity cannot lead to obesity in the context, for example, 
of a very low calorie diet, and so personal behaviour in this instance is a necessary 
                                                 
8
 For example, Brien at al. (2011) correlated moderate alcohol consumption with improvements in 
biochemical markers, confirming the effect observed with population studies, and see Arranz et al. 
(2012) for a review. 
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condition for obesity.  As Dougherty (1993) noted, similar genetic predispositions 
exert their influence on behaviour rather than metabolism influencing patterns of 
eating which cause obesity. Again it does not follow from the existence of these 
genetic predispositions that an individual affected will inevitably exhibit the 
behaviours that he is predisposed to; there is always the choice, however difficult, to 
overcome inclination to eat. Similar genetic and other biological influences which 
can be overridden can be seen elsewhere, for example in a predisposition to violence 
(Jaffe et al., 2013). Genetic influences act both on behaviour and metabolism, but 
there are many other factors which exert influence over weight gain, including 
physiological factors and an obesogenic environment. The government foresight 
report (Butland et al., 2007) details the factors in an incredibly complex diagram that 
lists over 100 connections, and yet India Knight’s argument is true to the extent that 
obesity requires an individual lifting excess calories to his mouth, an act which if not 
under complete conscious control at all times, is capable of being of being so.  
 
Western societies value personal autonomy and the choices that this allows, but this 
assumes and requires sufficient cognitive capacity in individuals.  It does not require 
that agents choose rationally, only that the capacity for rational choice is present, 
recognised by the Mental Capacity Act 2005,
9
 which assesses procedure rather than 
outcome (Nicolson et al., 2008), and includes as a criterion of assessment that ‘[…] 
the person is able to understand, retain, use and weigh up the information relevant to 
this decision’ (Department for Constitutional affairs, 2007, p.41). The test is used to 
assess capacity to consent to medical and other procedures, and requires information 
to be presented in such a way that it can be understood by the decision maker. 
                                                 
9
 And the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. 
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The problem is that research has consistently shown that, as a species, humans are 
very bad at using calculations to assess risk. We are very poor at understanding the 
statistics used to inform us what our choices are (Gigerenzer, 2014; Gaissmaier and 
Gigerenzer, 2011), and in addition, words like “substantial” and “limited” are used, 
which describe but do not quantify risk. Risk, even low risk, has come to represent a 
harm in itself and what some regard as a harm (inebriation for example) is regarded 
by others as a benefit (Keane, 2009). We unconsciously use a range of psychological 
foibles to defend intuitive judgements and preferences demonstrating that we do not 
exhibit reflective decision making as perhaps we would like to think we do, and 
which supporters of the freedom model of responsibility assume. These foibles, 
though known about for some time, have assumed recent prominence with a number 
of popular books (for example, Kahneman 2011; Haidt, 2012). A relatively recent 
development which has accelerated during the writing of this thesis is the use of so-
called nudge techniques which recognise the psychological foibles and utilises them 
to ‘nudge’ individuals to make choices that are judged (by the nudger) to be in their 
interests.  The term ‘libertarian paternalism’ has been coined (Sunstein and Thaler, 
2003) to describe this process; the ability of individuals to override the nudge and act 
on decisions taken outside the nudging frame allows its advocates to deny that it is 
coercive. Utilising insights from social psychology to manipulate individuals to act 
in a certain way has been a feature of health education and promotion for a number 
of years, and I will explore this in some detail in part II, especially chapter 6. These 
insights have also been used within the retailing and charity sectors for many years 
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). 
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The questions of behavioural, cognitive and neurosciences as well as other 
environmental factors suggest that the ability to act rationally is impeded in most 
people for most of the time. This is not so much a denial of moral agency as a series 
of empirical observations about how we act; moral responsibility is concerned with 
an ability to act on the basis of reasons and is undiminished by these observations 
(Sie and Woulters, 2010), supporting Levy’s (2014) suggestion in relation to 
informed consent, that experts in reasoning should act as informed consent 
specialists, informing patients of their cognitive biases in an attempt to correct 
them.
10
 There remains something of a paradox in understanding of autonomy within 
professional health care which at once assumes capacity by requiring open 
information giving in consent and yet recognises its shortcomings by practicing 
restricted and manipulative information giving within health education and 
promotion. Levy’s suggestions may help to reconcile this tension, but the point to be 
emphasised here is that individual control of behaviour and personal choice are 
complex and problematic, and though moral responsibility is retained despite these 
difficulties, meeting health-effecting obligations, even when they are recognised and 
acknowledged is nowhere near as easy as the freedom model and its proponents like 
India Knight, Edwina Currie and John Knowles assume. 
 
Patients’ duties 
There is a ‘modest’ (English, 2005, p.139) and ‘infrequent’ (Iltis and Rasmussen, 
2005) literature concerning the duties of patients, arriving at the nature of the 
obligation from a number of directions.  Sider and Clements (1984), Draper and 
Sorrell (2002) and Resnik (2005, 2007) attempt in various degrees to ground an 
                                                 
10
 In a response, Trout (2014) goes further and argues instead that we should bias patients to make the 
right decisions guided by their own values.  
  Page 50  
obligation to look after one’s health in the Kantian notion of duty to oneself.  Kant 
regarded the duties to self as so serious that if they were not met one is treating one’s 
self merely as means (Kerstein, 2008). The duty to oneself is prior to duties for 
others (Paton, 1990). If the reasoning on this point is difficult, he regarded the 
conclusion as self-evident: 
Animal immoderation in the enjoyment of food and drink is misuse of the 
means of nourishment; the capacity for the intelligent use of these means is 
weakened through such misuse. The vices under this heading are 
drunkenness and gluttony: when a man is drunk, he is simply like a beast, not 
to be treated as a human being; when he is gorged with food, he is 
temporarily incapacitated for activities which require adroitness and 
deliberation in the use of his powers. It is obvious that to put oneself in such 
a state is to violate a duty to oneself (Kant, 1994 [1797], p. 88). 
 
This passage appears to regard the wrongness of drinking and eating too much in 
terms of the short term effects on the autonomous mind rather than the longer term 
effects that are of more contemporary concern.  This long term health effect may be 
considered analogous to the categories of partial self-murder which are prohibited. In 
practice these duties to oneself are negative duties and offer reasons to avoid certain 
actions which may also be avoided for other reasons. The long term care of your 
body can be regarded as prudential or indirect duties to others, as, for example, when 
an airline pilot owes a duty to his passengers not to get drunk (Timmerman, 2006).  
 
The notion of moderation is central to Aristotelian virtue ethics. The relevant virtue 
is temperance in regard to pleasures, the excess of which is licentiousness. Not all 
pleasures are susceptible to excess; those who gain their pleasure from music or art 
are regarded as neither temperate nor licentious. The virtue of temperance is 
concerned with ‘such pleasures that are shared by animals too (which makes them 
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regarded as low and brutish). These are touch and taste’ (Aristotle, 1955, p.79).  
There is nothing wrong with seeking pleasure, but the 
licentious display excess in every form. They enjoy some things that it is 
wrong to enjoy because they are odious; and where it is right to enjoy 
something, they enjoy it more than is right, or more than is normal […]. 
Clearly, then, excess in respect of pleasures is licentiousness, and a culpable 
thing (Aristotle, 1955, p.78). 
 
In simple modern terminology, Aristotelian morality appears to advocate 
moderation, though some pleasures seem to be regarded as ‘odious’ in themselves.  
There is some circularity in this quotation; he seems to be arguing that it is wrong to 
enjoy wrong things, and he does not say what these ‘pleasures’ are, but it is amusing 
to speculate that among the contemporary targets of health promotion, smoking 
might be regarded as odious and always forbidden and blameworthy while drinking 
and eating are regarded as pleasures to be taken in moderation, because of their bad 
health related consequences: 
Nobody would criticise a person who is blind by nature or as a result of 
disease or injury – he would more likely be an object of pity – but anyone 
would blame a person whose blindness is due to heavy drinking or some 
other self-indulgence (Aristotle, 1955, p.64). 
 
Much of the literature about responsibility for health addresses the idea of obligation 
within the patient-professional relationship, partly in response to the imbalance 
between patients’ rights and their responsibilities. There is clearly significant overlap 
between obligations for (just) health, and responsibilities within the patient-
professional relationship, but there is also some conflation, and it is also the case that 
the rationale for the obligation is seldom fully developed. In 1847, the American 
Medical Association (AMA) published its first code of ethics, which included a 
section on the duties of the patient: 
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The obedience of a patient to the prescriptions of his physician should be 
prompt and implicit. He should never permit his own crude opinions as to 
their fitness, to influence his attention to them. A failure in one particular 
may render an otherwise judicious treatment dangerous, and even fatal. This 
remark is equally applicable to diet, drink, and exercise (AMA, 1847, p.96). 
 
It is an interesting document, illuminative of the social mores of the time, and yet the 
‘obedience’ demanded is based on a jointly held enterprise recognised today by 
patient and physician: the health of the patient. The account that patients have an 
obligation to follow what were commonly referred to as ‘doctors orders’11 is less 
seen, but still present in more recent literature.  Meyer (1992) argues for a duty to 
engage in responsible self-care, and while noting that following the duty is obviously 
self-regarding, it is also a duty owed to others, including health care professionals 
because the professional has a ‘direct interest in the patient’s health’ (1992, p. 551).  
The interest is direct because it does not rely on the physician’s interest in advancing 
her career or knowledge, and the (prima facie) duties are based on prior autonomous 
agreement to the treatment or lifestyle choice.  The obligation appears to be recast as 
a duty to adhere to agreements rather than to be anything more directly concerned 
with health, though Meyer also states that:  
[t]he fact that a patient is too busy or too lazy to care for himself is an offence 
against the patient and the health care professional. This is an offence against 
the health care professional because in order to do his job well he needs 
patient cooperation (1992, p. 552). 
 
The reason why the physician or nurse should be quite so offended is not clear; the 
same argument, based on task performance could equally be made, though less 
forcefully, against a home owner who undermines his landscape gardener by not 
keeping his weeds in check. Meyer’s version of obligation to the health care 
                                                 
11
 This term is still recognised in health care. For example women with heart failure in a Swedish 
study discussed feelings of guilt when failing to comply with ‘doctor’s orders’ (Burstrom et al., 
2012). 
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professional is doubly misplaced in a health care environment largely funded by the 
patient’s own contributions,12 directly or through insurance payments. In these 
systems there is an element of collective purpose, as the total health care costs are 
shared, to some extent, via insurance premiums. However, the notion of drawing 
more directly from pooled resources gives more pressing reasons for an obligation to 
maximise our own health (Gauthier, 2005; Evans, 2007).  
 
Within a system of socialised health care, Evans (2007) argues for a ‘duty’ to uphold 
our own health as far as it is ‘reasonably’ open for him to do so. Additionally, there 
are obligations to make the patient-professional relationship and medical treatment 
as effective as possible and so maximise the opportunities for others to access jointly 
held resources. These include the duty to seek health care responsibly, be truthful 
during consultation, and a duty of ‘compliance’.  It is acknowledged that the duties 
that Evans argues for are unenforceable, but that this does not diminish their 
normative force, which is strong enough that taken together, ‘their fulfilment is 
prima facie a condition of access to healthcare […]’ (2007, p.690).  Woods (2007a) 
make a similar argument that the right of individuals to access health care must be 
‘premised upon a degree of personal responsibility’ (p.722).  Accepting that the 
common good argument is ‘naïve’, Woods draws on Rawls’ (1971) notion of 
primary goods as the prerequisite of any life. Rawls published A Theory of Justice 
before the links between income and health had been developed, just before the rise 
of individually directed health promotion. Health is not recorded as a Rawlsian 
primary good,
13
 but Woods suggests that it should be regarded in this way – and that 
                                                 
12
 Civaner and Arda (2008) conclude that where health services are provided on an ability to pay, 
none of these duties can be properly be regarded as a patient responsibility. 
13
 Others have applied Rawls account of justice to health care.  For example, see Bommier and  
Stecklov (2002). 
  Page 54  
‘therefore we all share a common interest in protecting, preserving and restoring 
health’ (p. 722). Thus the argument that we ought to care for our health so as not to 
draw on commonly held resources to restore it is extended to health itself, that is 
prior to the claiming of health care resources. We should act to maintain health not 
only so to avoid these resource claims but because it is a common good in itself.  
 
In contrast to the Kantian and Aristotelian accounts, these are essentially 
contractarian accounts which recognise that the undoubted value of personal 
autonomy has been overemphasised within the relationship between individuals and 
the health care system. Arguments that we ought to care for our health are other-
regarding to the extent that their normative force relies on avoiding drawing on 
health care resources so that they are available to others.  In caring for our health, for 
whatever reason, by avoiding preventable disease, we are acting in others’ interest. 
We may also be acting in our own interest if we value health above other things.  For 
many people and with respect to much health-effecting behaviour, our actions are 
both self and other-regarding in varying extents. My friends and especially my 
family are affected in many ways by my poor health: because they may be obliged to 
care for me, because I am less able to care for them, and simply because we are 
emotionally upset when we see those who we love suffer. These less tangible other-
regarding reasons to look after my own health are less visible in the bioethics 
literature,
14
 and will be revisited in the papers in part II of the thesis. 
 
It has also been claimed that there are responsibilities on individuals to behave in 
certain ways when they are sick. Writing in the early 1950s, Talcott Parsons 
                                                 
14
 But see Gorovitz (1984) for a robust rebuttal of Sider and Clements (1984).  His account grounds 
obligation in networks of human aspirations and relationships. 
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proposed a number of features of the sick role (Parsons, 1975). On his account the 
patient is not responsible for his illness, which is outside personal control and which 
requires outside support to cure him. He is obliged to try to get well, to seek required 
support, and then co-operate with caregivers. The sick role account was initially very 
popular and provoked a great deal of research, and despite being ‘abandoned’ by 
sociologists (Burnham, 2014), remains highly visible in text books (Williams, 2005; 
and see Clarke, 2010, for an example). The discourse of health replaced that of 
sickness, and as Burnham argues, sociologists were drawn into the ‘prevention 
crusade in which people were blamed for their own illnesses’ (2014, p.79). The 
responsibility to prevent illness represents an extension to Parson’s normative 
expectation of the sick (Greco, 1993, Varul, 2010), and the blamelessness is lost in 
it.  
 
Since the literature on responsibility for health largely concerns patients’ duties in 
the context of professional health care, the final section of this chapter briefly 
discusses these duties from the point of view of the provider of these services.  The 
UK has a highly developed socialised system of health care, often referred to as ‘the 
envy of the world.’15 Despite the growing realisation that the relationship between 
provider and consumer of health care was increasingly asymmetrical, official 
recognition of patients’ duties has only recently been developed. 
 
Codes and declarations – the NHS Constitution 
In England, the NHS Constitution, first published in 2009 and revised in 2013, sets 
out the rights and responsibilities that should characterise the relationships between 
                                                 
15
 For example in the statement issued by the Secretary of State on the occasion of its 65
th
 
anniversary. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/jeremy-hunt-celebrates-65-years-of-the-nhs   
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the NHS and its patients. At over 4000 words and over 16 colourful pages, it is a 
lengthy document, and leaflets explaining the main features in a more accessible 
format are also produced. The document first sets out the principles and values of the 
NHS. Four sections addressed first to patients and then staff follow. The first is 
addressed to patients and the public and details what their rights are. At 5 pages it is 
the longest section, and is addressed to ‘you’, for example ‘You have the right to 
make a claim for judicial review if you think you have been directly affected by an 
unlawful act or decision of an NHS body or local authority’ (NHS, 2013a p.10, 
emphasis in original). The next section is headed ‘Patients and the public – your 
responsibilities’ and is reproduced below: 
The NHS belongs to all of us. There are things that we can all do for 
ourselves and for one another to help it work effectively, and to ensure 
resources are used responsibly. 
 
Patients and the public - your responsibilities (NHS Constitution) 
 
Please recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, 
and your family’s, good health and wellbeing, and take personal 
responsibility for it.  
 
Please register with a GP practice – the main point of access to NHS care 
as commissioned by NHS bodies.  
 
Please treat NHS staff and other patients with respect and recognise that 
violence, or the causing of nuisance or disturbance on NHS premises, could 
result in prosecution. You should recognise that abusive and violent 
behaviour could result in you being refused access to NHS services.  
 
Please provide accurate information about your health, condition and status.  
 
Please keep appointments, or cancel within reasonable time. Receiving 
treatment within the maximum waiting times may be compromised unless 
you do.  
 
Please follow the course of treatment which you have agreed, and talk to 
your clinician if you find this difficult. 
 
Please participate in important public health programmes such as 
vaccination.  
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Please ensure that those closest to you are aware of your wishes about organ 
donation.  
 
Please give feedback – both positive and negative – about your experiences 
and the treatment and care you have received, including any adverse 
reactions you may have had. You can often provide feedback anonymously 
and giving feedback will not affect adversely your care or how you are 
treated. If a family member or someone you are a carer for is a patient and 
unable to provide feedback, you are encouraged to give feedback about their 
experiences on their behalf. Feedback will help to improve NHS services for 
all. 
 
There appears to be some confusion about the moral status of the clauses in the 
constitution. A link to this section on the NHS Choices website
16
 states that the 
constitution covers ‘what you can expect from the NHS, the promises the NHS 
makes to you, and what the NHS needs from you in return.
17
  This suggests a 
contractual nature for the document, as though meeting the provision is required in 
order to exercise the rights. However, the actual clauses are written in the form of a 
series of requests, prefaced by the word ‘please’. It is difficult to see these individual 
requests as responsibilities at all, if the notion of obligation forms part of the 
concept. The initial version of the constitution had the same number of clauses but 
each was prefaced by the more normative ‘You should.’ The change from the 
normative ‘should’ to the requesting ‘please’ was explained as a ‘minor drafting 
change to use less paternalistic wording’ (DH, 2013b, p.19). This seems an 
idiosyncratic use of the concept paternalism as the previous normative expression 
does not constitute an interference with liberty, and many of the provisions are not 
directly concerned with the welfare of the patient.
18
 The proposal that formed the 
basis of the consultation (DH, 2012) did not include this change, and the government 
                                                 
16
 http://www.nhs.uk/choiceintheNHS/Rightsandpledges/NHSConstitution/Pages/Overview.aspx  
17
 As I write this in July 2014, the wording of this section of the NHS choices website erroneously 
refers to the previous version of the constitution. 
18
 See for example Dworkin’s (2010) entry on Paternalism in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of 
Philosophy. 
  Page 58  
response did not elaborate further on whether respondents to the consultation 
objected to its previous tone. The change can be read as a weakening of the 
normative force of the responsibilities, which are consistent throughout despite their 
different objects. Patients are requested not to abuse staff (that is fulfil a legal 
prohibition), make the  patient-professional relationship more efficient by providing 
accurate information, and also contribute to public health as well as their own by 
completing prescribed courses of treatment
19
 and by participating in vaccination.  
 
The clause most pertinent for the subject matter of this thesis is the first, which was 
additionally amended following consultation. The previous version (DH, 2009a) 
stated that ‘Patients should recognise that they can make a significant contribution to 
their own, and their families’, good health and well-being, and take some personal 
responsibility for it’. This version is unclear as to what ‘some’ personal 
responsibility means with the new version being clearer and simpler, though the 
apparent strengthening of the responsibility is diluted by the change from ‘should’ to 
‘please’. 
 
The final two sections of the constitution cover NHS staff and are presented with 
mixed normativity. Commitments that the NHS has to its staff are set out alongside 
legal duties and normative expectations of staff. For example, ‘You have a duty to be 
honest and truthful in applying for a job and in carrying out that job’ describes a 
legal duty, whereas the nature of the relationship with patients is stated as a 
normative target: ‘You should aim to be open with patients, their families, carers or 
representatives, including if anything goes wrong; welcoming and listening to 
                                                 
19
 This is of significant interest in light of growing concerns about antibiotic resistance as outlined by 
WHO (2014). 
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feedback and addressing concerns promptly and in a spirit of co-operation.’ It is not 
stated whether these duties are directed at health professionals or other staff. The 
duties, though written in a document intended for public consumption, go no further, 
for non-professionals, than can be expected to form part of the contract of 
employment.  For health care professionals these duties form part of their 
professional codes of conduct, strengthened in many places by the stronger 
normative word, ‘must’.20  The literature on patient’s duties was partly inspired by 
asymmetry within the relationships between patient and health care providers, 
personal and institutional, but on the analysis provided here, advocates of a 
reworking of these arrangements will need to look much further than the NHS 
constitution for a rebalancing, 
 
Conclusion  
In this chapter I have set out some general problems for the issue of personal 
responsibility for health and the environment in which the debates and health care 
practice is undertaken. The model of fully rational people always behaving rationally 
to maintain health as an intrinsic good has been revealed as being far from the way 
that people live their lives, and yet with some concessions, personal behaviour 
change remains the foundation of health promotion strategy in the western world.  It 
is easy to conclude that it is a normative rather than an empirical model. But for 
many, health, widely understood, can be improved following change in behaviour, 
and so even those of us sceptical of much public health practice concede a role for 
supporting people to change their behaviour.  And, since nearly all of us live within 
community ties of various sorts, drawing from common resources, it is indeed 
                                                 
20
 See for example the NMC Code (2008) Clause 52: You must give a constructive and honest 
response to anyone who complains about the care they have received.  
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sometimes the case that resources used on potentially avoidable treatment are denied 
to others.  For these other-regarding reasons it is plausible to suggest a prima facie 
moral personal responsibility for health, even in the social environment that I have 
outlined, and I will return to this in part II of the thesis. Recognising that appeals to 
personal responsibility for health have not produced desired behaviour change, 
successive governments have used legal means  increasingly robustly to regulate 
individuals’ health-effecting behaviour, and these are the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Legal Context 
 
This thesis is concerned with moral rather than legal responsibility for health but 
moral decisions are made in the context of a legal framework, and complete 
separation of moral and legal responsibility, in the cases that the thesis discusses, is 
only possible if moral decisions are taken in total social isolation, something that is 
neither possible or desirable for most people. I begin the chapter by identifying areas 
where law and morality differ, and discuss two necessary links between them; the 
claim that moral consideration is a necessary but not sufficient condition of legal 
regulation, and that there is a moral responsibility to obey the law.  Using the 
example of potential legal enforcement of wearing a cycle helmet, it is suggested that 
moral and legal responsibility are often confusingly conflated. The remainder of the 
chapter discusses the regulation of smoking to illustrate and evaluate some measures 
utilised by the government to enforce its citizens to fulfil what it considers their 
moral responsibility. 
 
Outright criminalisation is discussed in the light of the liberal presumption in 
western societies, and regulation short of criminalisation is discussed with reference 
to European Union (EU) regulation and the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control (FCTC). Legal challenges by smokers at Rampton Hospital and 
The State Hospital, Carstairs to a de facto total ban on smoking are discussed in 
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some detail. Finally, the lawfulness of smokers being denied treatment for smoking 
related ailments is discussed, and I conclude that guidance and the law exclude this. 
Instances where individuals are required or asked to stop smoking before treatment 
seek justification from forward looking concerns about efficacy of treatment rather 
than backward looking concerns about desert.  
 
Legal and moral responsibility 
In questions both of wrongness and of consequence, there are significant differences 
between moral and legal understandings of responsibility. As Cane (2002, p.15) 
points out, ‘law possesses institutional resources that morality lacks, and these 
enable it to answer detailed questions about responsibility’. Moral considerations 
alone can leave disputes about the wrongness of an act unresolved. There is 
disagreement about the ontological status of moral norms and values, whether it can 
be the case that it is true that something is morally wrong (Wedgewood, 2007, 
Mackie, 1990), and there is, for many, no external moral authority to settle questions 
about the general morality or a specific instance of something. In contrast, political 
and legal institutions, in making, applying and enforcing law, remove ambiguity in 
the final settlement. Disputes about the legality or otherwise of an act need not be 
settled contemporaneously, and this may be a source of frustration to someone 
contemplating undertaking such an act, but nevertheless an authoritative answer as to 
lawfulness will be forthcoming eventually. For example, public and professional 
attitudes in assessing arguments for and against euthanasia change over time even if 
the moral arguments themselves barely do (Emanuel, 1994), though periodic review 
in the UK and elsewhere changes the legal status of assisted dying through 
legislation, case law and prosecution policy.  
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Whether the prohibition or regulation of something is a matter for criminal or civil 
law, failure to observe legal responsibilities is subject to coercion in a way that moral 
responsibilities are not, except where these binary responsibilities coincide. A person 
undertaking an illegal act risks legal sanction as well as moral disapproval and in the 
case of, for example, smoking cannabis, this can involve fines and imprisonment.
1
 
He may also attract moral praise for breaking a law or defying a court order. 
Punishments are levied because smoking cannabis is illegal, not because the Judge 
thinks that it is immoral, though it has been suggested that on occasion Judges adopt 
definitions of legal terms so that they can defend their moral convictions, for 
example in the application for judicial review brought by the murderer Ian Brady, 
who sought removal of a feeding tube (Brazier, 2006).2 
 
Moral considerations are important in debates concerning legal regulation in at least 
two respects. First, though it can be argued that some harm-causing immoral
3
 acts, 
for example marital infidelity, remain unregulated by law,
4
 ‘principles guiding legal 
regulation must include moral judgements’ (Greenawalt, 1995, p. 713). On this 
account, (im)morality is a necessary but not sufficient condition for legal regulation 
of one sort or another; even if the moral judgement is partial and/or contested, legal 
regulation requires moral justification.
5
  This is easier to see where the act threatens 
                                                 
1
 The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 provides for penalties of up to five years imprisonment for 
possession of cannabis and up to 14 years imprisonment for supply.  
2
 If true, it merely means that Judges are the same as everyone else for whom post hoc reasoning tends 
to confirm rather than challenge initial intuitive moral judgements (Haidt, 2012). 
3
 I mean that many people would consider this immoral. 
4
 Adultery remains illegal in a number of US states, though prosecution is rare. In New Hampshire, 
the Senate voted to decriminalise adultery on 19
th
 February 2014, by 268 votes to 29. 
http://legiscan.com/NH/bill/HB1125/2014  In Maryland, adultery is a misdemeanour punishable by a 
$10 fine. http://mgaleg.maryland.gov/webmga/frmStatutesText.aspx?article=gcr&section=10-
501&ext=html&session=2014RS&tab=subject5  
5
 Similar arguments are presented in questions of whether proscribed acts should be legalised. We see 
this in arguments about the legalisation of drugs and also at the end of life, where it can be argued that 
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others’ health, as in debates about prohibiting smoking in public places, and less 
visible where harm is predominantly to the individual’s own health, for example the 
compulsory wearing of cycle helmets (Sheikh et al., 2004 in favour, Hooper and 
Spicer, 2012 against). A significant assumption in this thesis is that lines of 
arguments like those supporting the view that we ought to wear a helmet when 
cycling are usually unarticulated, and to be clear, I mean a moral ought; that wearing 
a helmet when cycling is a moral obligation. Sheikh et al. (p. 263), for example, state 
that:  
It is arguable that individuals have some sort of duty to their fellows of 
taking responsibility for their own health, that sometimes this duty is an 
enforceable one. Interestingly, in more ‘libertarian’ societies, such as the US 
and Australia, compulsory cycle helmet wearing is often a ‘State’ rather than 
a Federal law, in the interests of requiring individuals to be responsible for 
their health, since many of the severely injured will eventually need to use 
the State health safety net. 
 
As I argued in the previous chapter, an argument that there is an obligation to fellow 
citizens so we do not use collective health care resources is common enough, but is 
directed (in US and Australia, anyway) at uninsured cyclists rather than all cyclists. 
But at least the argument is other-regarding, though in the previous paragraph they 
appeal to rationality in terms of self-interest as justification for proposing legal 
enforcement:  
Our argument here is that, in the light of the evidence, most people would 
rationally choose to wear a helmet, and we would all allow that there are 
good social grounds for encouraging cycle helmet wearing. But equally, we 
know that doing what is in our own interest can be hard without external 
encouragement. We recommend legislation as a collectively autonomous 
choice in favour of one kind of external encouragement (Sheikh et al., 2004, 
p. 263). 
 
                                                                                                                                          
euthanasia is morally acceptable in certain cases but should remain illegal. Foot (1977) hints at this, 
and Gillet (1994) argues the point more directly.  
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A second consideration of the links between legal and moral responsibility travels 
the other way – from legal to moral considerations. The question is whether there is a 
moral obligation to obey the law. A behaviour being the subject of legal prohibition 
offers a reason in favour of avoiding it in the sense that if I undertake it (and get 
caught), sanctions follow. The reason is prudential and hypothetical, counting 
against smoking if I want to avoid a fine and a criminal record. A. John Simmons 
suggests that, in addition to this, ‘most of us living in reasonably just societies 
believe that there is a general moral duty to comply with the requirements of valid 
domestic law’ (2005, p.98). The empirical claim embedded in this statement is not 
supported by evidence (it is prefaced by the caveat ‘I think that it is likely true’) and 
is distinct from the moral claim (that we ought to obey the law) that he proceeds to 
reject. Further caveats ‘a reasonably just society’ and ‘valid domestic law’ suggest 
questions in application. Someone denying a moral obligation to follow what he 
regards as an unjust law could cite the very existence of this law to support his view 
that the society is not reasonably just; and the view that the ‘unjust’ law was enacted 
in the first place could question the validity of the system that enacted it. I assume 
that the descriptor ‘valid’ applies to the process of law making rather than individual 
outcomes. If the word ‘valid’ means laws I agree with then the argument would be 
circular; I have a moral duty to follow a law which proscribes something that I 
would not do anyway.  
 
 
The statement that there is a moral obligation to obey the law is more usefully 
directed at those who do not agree with the specific legal provision. I would not 
count myself as one of the majority that Simmons assumes. If helmet wearing was 
legally required, I would comply in order to avoid prosecution rather that out of a 
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moral duty to follow the law.
6
 A less trivial example of the dilemma involved where 
moral and legal responsibility conflict is the issue of assisting suicide, which remains 
illegal in the UK. My suggestion, pace Simmons, is that individuals turning down a 
request from a loved one to assist with their suicide do so either because they think it 
is wrong, or that they fear prosecution. The suggestion that ‘most’, many or even 
some people would refuse a request just because it is illegal,
7
 separate to concerns of 
their moral view of the request or the potential of punishment is open to challenge. 
Jackson et al. (2012) note that many criminal policies assume compliance by the 
threat of sanctions for wrongdoers, but also that supporting evidence for this is 
derived almost exclusively from the US. Their study claimed to be the first of its 
kind in the UK, and found that individuals did regard obeying the law as a moral 
duty. However the examples that they used – buying stolen goods, illegally 
disposing of rubbish, vandalism, and shop lifting – are ‘everyday crimes’ (p. 1062) 
not representative of laws enacted to protect people’s health. Recent case law 
concerning the end of life is partly driven by the need to avoid prosecution. In the 
case recently rejected at the Supreme Court,
8
 it is noted
9
 that Mr Martin’s wife does 
not want any part of bringing about her husband’s death, but does not give a reason. 
It is reported
10
 however, that the earlier and influential case brought by Diane 
                                                 
6
 Increased police presence is known to reduce speeding (Walter et al., 2011). In a Norwegian study, 
drivers reported that increasing the likelihood of being caught would reduce speed more than steeper 
penalties (Ryeng, 2012). 
7
 Whilst assisting suicide remains illegal, the Crown Prosecution Service has issued guidelines about 
prosecuting decisions which mean that prosecution is unlikely in compassionate cases. See Mullock 
(2010) for a review.  
8
 *873R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice. [2013] EWCA Civ 961. 
9
 *873R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice. [2013] EWCA Civ 961. Paragraph 
10. 
10
 *873R. (on the application of Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice. [2013] EWCA Civ 961. Paragraph 
158. 
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Pretty
11
 was necessary because her husband, though willing to provide assistance to 
end her life, was anxious about the possible consequences of doing so. 
 
Legal and moral responsibilities differ and yet are clearly connected, and often 
conflated. For example, the quotation from Sheikh et al. includes the statement ‘in 
the interests of requiring individuals to be responsible for their health’. If this means 
legally responsible the statement is tautologous, since it amounts to saying that it 
requires individuals to do what they are legally required to do, and so it seems more 
likely that they meant requiring individuals to be morally responsible for their health. 
But this is fallacious, as coercion is a feature of legal responsibility but not moral 
responsibility. If people do what they morally ought to do only because it is required 
to avoid a sanction, then they are not being responsible, or taking moral 
responsibility, not least because lack of liberty restricts their moral agency. If the 
individual takes the view that legal responsibility places a moral responsibility (to 
wear a cycle helmet), he still is not being responsible for his health because the 
obligation that he is meeting is to obey the law, not to wear the helmet. It may not 
even amount to the same thing; meeting a legal obligation may result in the wearing 
of a (just) legally acceptable helmet instead of a better one which he would choose in 
meeting a moral responsibility to protect his cranium.   
 
The discussion illustrates the difficulty in separating legal from moral responsibility, 
and when legal regulation is being considered or enacted it is important to be clear 
about how moral arguments in respect of an act are different from moral arguments 
in respect of regulating the act. In the next chapter I will defend a philosophical 
                                                 
11
 Pretty v the United Kingdom (2002) 35 E.H.R.R. 1.   
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approach that emphasises the importance of acts, whereas legal prohibition tends to 
operate at the level of rules.
12
 The thesis assumes that in many cases, arguments 
about regulation simply accept a conclusion about the wrongness of the acts in 
question rather than arguing for them but often, as in Sheikh et al’s paper, the 
questions are confusingly conflated. This thesis attempts, in part, to avoid this by 
concentrating, in the main, on moral questions concerning health-effecting 
behaviours, but as the threat of law is forever in the background it is useful to 
consider some methods of legal regulation. In the remainder of this chapter these 
issues will be introduced in relation to tobacco smoking, in particular, three 
questions:  Should smoking be criminalised? Should there be regulation short of 
criminalisation? Can discrimination against smokers in deprioritising treatment be 
lawful? 
 
Autonomy, legal paternalism and criminalisation 
Bioethics, at least Anglo-American versions of it, is heavily influenced by the 
primacy of respect for autonomy (Gillon, 1993), evident in case law as well as 
codified, for example, in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. The law is quite clear, as far 
as medical treatment is concerned, that an adult and capacitous person’s 
autonomously
13
 held wishes to refuse treatment cannot lawfully be overruled 
because treatment is considered by medical professionals to be in the interest of the 
                                                 
12
 I say tends to because it is possible to specify rules using terms like ‘without reasonable excuse’.  
13
 In practice there is a range of understandings of autonomy and the situation is far more complex 
than I have presented it (See Coggon, 2007). In Re T (adult refusal of treatment) All ER 649, T 
needed an emergency caesarean section following a road accident.  After a visit from her mother who 
was a devout Jehovah’s Witness, she refused blood transfusion.  Doctors treating her abided by this 
refusal even when she suffered internal bleeding, leading her father to ask the Court to allow a blood 
transfusion against her previous wishes. In granting the application, Donaldson LJ found that a 
combination of her injury, drugs, and pressure from her mother invalidated her consent because her 
refusal was not an autonomous decision. 
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patient, even if this refusal results in death.
14
  The term ‘paternalism’ is regarded as 
pejorative in the context of health care provision, though outright legal prohibition as 
far as treatment is concerned applies only to ‘hard paternalism’, that is when 
treatment is carried out against the wishes of a fully competent and informed patient.  
Health care professionals acting paternalistically in this manner are vulnerable to 
redress under both civil and criminal law (Brazier and Cave, 2011), and by 
professional bodies. ‘Soft paternalism’, by contrast, is characterised by decisions 
taken and treatment performed where there is a less than full understanding, allowing 
the claim at least to be offered that autonomy is not being overridden because the 
person is not fully autonomous (Feinberg, 1984). 
 
It might be considered that the legal rejection of medical paternalism at the 
individual level is the result of an overarching legal principle, anti-paternalism, 
which disallows medical interference, and that this might be extended so that legal 
sanctions cannot be used to coerce autonomous individuals to refrain from 
undertaking something on the ground that it would harm them. The extent to which 
paternalism is considered illegitimate ground for criminal prohibition can be 
questioned. Even Mill would not allow a person to sell himself into slavery, arguing 
that ‘the principle of freedom cannot require that he should be free not to be free’ 
(1998 [1859], p.114), though prohibition in this case may take the form of rendering 
a contract unlawful rather than criminalising selling yourself.  Successful 
                                                 
14
 In a well-known case, doctors refused to disconnect a ventilator from a woman who had withdrawn 
consent, saying that death was preferable to her. She was found to have capacity, and so the 
continuation of treatment was an assault for which she was awarded nominal damages. Instead of 
ordering that the ventilator be switched off, Butler-Sloss LJ ordered that she be transferred to another 
hospital which would comply with her competent refusal. B v An NHS Trust [2002] EWHC 429 
(Fam). 
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prosecution of individuals consenting in private to sexual violence
15
 also threatens 
the liberal presumption (Erin, 2007), though whether this is on paternalistic or 
moralistic grounds is questionable. The standard position against paternalism is that 
of John Stuart Mill in On Liberty, known as the ‘harm principle’: 
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any 
member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral is not a sufficient warrant 
(Mill, 1998 [1859],  p.14). 
 
Mill’s famous claim underpins the position refined by Joel Feinberg in his 
exhaustive and authoritative account The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. His 
version of the harm principle is more nuanced, offering good though not necessarily 
conclusive reasons for criminalisation of an act: 
It is always a good reason in support of penal legislation that it would 
probably be effective in preventing (eliminating, reducing) harm to persons 
other than the actor (the one prohibited from acting) and there is probably no 
other means that is equally effective at no greater costs to other values 
(Feinberg, 1984, p.26). 
 
Feinberg extends the grounds for criminal prohibition to preventing serious offence 
where there are no equally effective means, but concludes that these two reasons 
between them ‘exhaust the class of morally relevant reasons for criminal 
prohibitions’ (Feinberg, 1986, p.x). Though Feinberg wrote about the US rather than 
the UK, his work has resonance across the liberal democracies and, as Erin (2007) 
notes, has been cited by the Law Commission.
16
 
 
However, the apparently simple principle is more complex in practical application. 
Two significant issues are the precise grounds on which coercion is justified and the 
                                                 
15
 R v Brown [1993] 2 All ER 75 (HL). 
16
 Consent in the Criminal Law – A consultation paper published by the Law Commission (1995). 
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extent to which the law and legal process can be used to coerce behaviour,
17
 though 
these are as much political as jurisprudential matters. Feinberg (1984) refers to 
mixed and unmixed paternalism. Mixed paternalism is where a number of 
justifications for criminalisation can be advanced, only some of which are 
paternalistic. Putting aside the position that individuals arguing for criminalisation 
may be unable to articulate their real motivation (or it may not be believed), 
activities of the sort considered for criminalisation can cause a number of harms. 
Tobacco use (1) harms those who undertake the habit, but also (2) harms those who 
love them, or are supported or employed by them, and also (3) harms the rest of 
society because health care costs follow from treating tobacco-related illness. It 
might be argued that in consideration of criminalising anything, a modest variation 
of the doctrine of double effect is being utilised, where the bad effect of 
criminalisation (overriding autonomy) is outweighed, in the final defining criterion,
18
 
by the overall reduction of harm in a utilitarian calculation (Smith, 2002). Similar 
calculations can be made for other health threatening behaviours such as taking 
illegal drugs, where harms for individual users might be more, though for fewer 
people. Wider harm resulting from criminal activity to pay for drugs might relate 
more to the addictive nature of the drug rather than directly harmful effects and 
differ between drugs.   
 
In paradigm cases of criminal activity, it is clear that the state has an interest, on 
behalf of its citizens, to prohibit acts harmful to others and to punish perpetrators. 
Regarding a person as a criminal and, for some crimes, depriving him of his liberty 
                                                 
17
 This could mean coercing abstention (illegal drug use), or coercing compliance (seat belt wearing). 
18
 Webster (2013, p.1046), for example, gives the final criterion for legitimate application of the 
doctrine of double effect (DDE)  as ‘The good achieved must significantly outweigh in proportion the 
harm caused.’ It has been argued that this weighing up undermines non-consequentialist claims for 
the DDE (Snelling, 2004). 
  Page 72  
are among the most serious sanctions that the state can justifiably level at an 
individual and in this respect at least it has been argued that criminalisation should 
be restricted to ‘prohibit behaviour that represents a serious wrong against an 
individual or against some fundamental social value or institution’ (Ashworth and 
Horder, 2013 p.1). Yet we have laws prohibiting the dropping of litter and other 
trivial matters which hardly deserve the opprobrium accompanying conviction for 
more serious offences. Justification for criminalisation should be sought in two 
dimensions (Ashworth and Horder, 2013); where deserved retribution is required, or 
because the very fact that something is criminalised offers a deterrent against 
wrongdoing.  A case that smoking should simply be prohibited would likely rest on 
the second of these justifications.  
 
If the question of criminalisation or regulation of tobacco is a consequentialist 
question, the harms and benefits resulting from criminalisation of tobacco must be 
compared with those resulting if the status quo is maintained (Ashworth and Horder, 
2013). Considerations wider than just health status must be considered; a significant 
harm from criminalising smoking would be a sense that autonomous decision 
making, widely regarded as very valuable, is being overridden, and as Husak (1989) 
notes in relation to illicit drug-taking, benefits derived by users are rarely considered 
in calculations. I return to this point in more detail in Chapter 6. A lesser and yet still 
illiberal proposal is to make it illegal for any person born after a certain date to buy 
cigarettes, first proposed in Singapore in 2010 (Khoo et al., 2010), but also 
considered in Tasmania, Finland and Guernsey (van der Eijk and Porter, 2013). In 
June 2014, the British Medical Association voted to lobby the UK government to 
change the law to implement this proposal (BMA, 2014). 
  Page 73  
There are anomalies within the criminal law. Tobacco use remains lawful, while 
cannabis use is illegal. Utilitarian calculations require evidence so that harms can be 
calculated and compared, and what evidence there is suggests that alcohol and 
tobacco, both legally available, are more harmful than cannabis and LSD, both of 
which are prohibited (Nutt et al., 2007). According to an editorial in The Lancet 
(MacDonald and Das, 2006), the lack of appreciation of evidence by politicians has 
resulted in a classification system that ‘almost defies belief’ (p.559), and it is perhaps 
unsurprising that the principal author of the study into comparative harms, Professor 
David Nutt, was dismissed from his position as Chair of the Advisory Council on the 
Misuse of Drugs after criticising the reclassification of cannabis from class C to class 
B, reversing a decision taken five years previously. This decision, in effect 
increasing the penalties for cannabis use was justified, politically, on the ground that 
evidence was strengthening that cannabis causes schizophrenia, though it has been 
estimated that even for heavy users, over 1000 people would need to be prevented 
from using cannabis to prevent a single case (Hickman et al., 2009). 
 
These decisions demonstrate that questions of prohibition of drugs, including 
tobacco, are as much settled by the pragmatic concerns of electoral politics than by 
legal or political philosophy, influenced by millions of smoking voters and powerful 
commercial interests combining to ensure that there simply is not the political will to 
consider outright prohibition of smoking, or the manufacture or sale of tobacco 
products (West, 2006), not least because if a ban were enacted, it would be 
practically impossible to enforce. In this respect, reference is frequently made to 
prohibition of alcohol in the US between 1920 and 1933. Received wisdom is that 
this was a failure, though recent reappraisal has questioned this simplistic evaluation 
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(Blocker, 2006; Hall, 2010). Results were mixed and harms difficult to compare; the 
harm of reduced personal choice and lack of respect for the law cannot easily be 
compared with what might be considered public health benefits. Incidence of liver 
cirrhosis fell (Dills and Mirron, 2004), but alcohol related and total homicides 
increased (Asbridge and Weerasinghe, 2009). In 2004 the tiny Himalayan country of 
Bhutan became the only country to criminalise tobacco sale and use, but the ban was 
ineffective largely because of a flourishing black market, and was rescinded in 2009 
(National Portal of Bhutan, no date).   
 
Legal regulation short of criminalisation 
The extent to which the harm principle can be used to justify legal regulation short of 
criminalisation presents similar problems. Here, Feinberg and Mill differ. Both argue 
that criminalisation cannot be justified paternalistically and Mill extends this 
argument to other legally coercive measures, including taxation, to reduce use, which 
he regarded as ‘differing only in degree from their entire prohibition’ (1998 [1859], 
p.111). Conversely, Feinberg does not object to taxation of tobacco, seeing the 
difference between taxation and prohibition as one of kind rather than degree, but 
also offers the justification that discouraging smoking benefits society in general, as 
well as smokers in particular (Feinberg, 1984). Taxation policies have been proposed 
as a ‘liberal egalitarian’ approach to holding people responsible for their health-
effecting behaviour, addressing, to varying degrees, the cost of treatment required 
(Cappelen and Norheim, 2005). 
 
WHO considers legislation to be ‘at the heart of effective tobacco control’ (Blanke 
and da Costa e Silva, 2004, p.15), and was the subject, in 2003, of the first WHO 
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international health treaty. The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC)
19
 obliges signatory countries ‘to adopt or strengthen legislation addressing 
tobacco advertising, packaging, sales practices, smuggling, public smoking and 
more’ (Blanke and da Costa e Silva, 2004, p. 46). Significantly, an increase in the 
age at which cigarettes can be purchased, introduced in 2007, decreased smoking in 
16 and 17 year olds by seven percentage points (Fidler and West, 2010), a 
proportional decrease of over 30% (DiFranza, 2010). At the time of the change of 
policy, the UK
20
 was unusual in allowing young people aged 16 years to buy 
cigarettes, and arguments in favour of the change could draw upon considerations of 
children and young people as less than full moral agents.
21
 Inevitably, the success of 
the measure has led to speculation about increasing the age as far as 21
22
 (Fidler and 
West, 2010), though the arguments would have less force applied at legally 
unambiguous adults over 18 years old. Ahmad (2005) proposes a considerable health 
gain from the measure in the US, where significant reductions in alcohol related 
fatalities are claimed following an increase in the minimum legal drinking age to 21 
(Carpenter and Dobkin, 2011).
 23
 
 
The FCTC does not advocate or even mention an outright ban on smoking; its 
objective (Article 3) is ‘[…] to reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of 
tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke’ (WHO, 2003, p.5). Provisions in the 
                                                 
19
 The Convention was signed by the UK government on 16
th
 June 2003, ratified on 16
th
 December 
2004, and entered into force on 27
th
 February 2005. 
20
 The regulatory change applied to England, Scotland and Wales. Northern Ireland followed suit in 
2008. 
21
 See Tiboris (2014) for a discussion on children and diminished moral responsibility. 
22
 On 19
th
 November 2013, The Mayor of New York City signed into local law an amendment to the 
administrative code to increase the age at which cigarettes can be bought to 21. 
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=664290&GUID=4223E26A-7F3F-4B7D-
9E3A-0E3F7B850155&Options=ID|Text|&Search=cigarettes  
23
 The National Minimum Drinking Age Act 1984 reduced federal funding to states which allowed 
the purchase and public consumption of alcohol by those under 21. Precise arrangements vary 
between states. 
  Page 76  
convention intend to reduce both demand and supply. The language is far from 
forthright, Article 6 noting the  
sovereign rights of the parties to determine and establish their taxation 
policies, each party should take account of its national health objectives 
concerning tobacco control and adopt or maintain, as appropriate, measures 
which may include […]’ (WHO, 2003, p. 8). 
 
The lame provisions reflect its voluntary nature; signatory states are not bound by its 
provisions. The language is more directive in areas of reducing demand, such as 
using health warnings, prohibition of misleading promotion, regulation of the 
contents of tobacco products, and notably, banning smoking in public places, which 
can be justified non paternalistically. Like the question of outright criminalisation, 
the ban needs further detailed justification, since it imposes restrictions on smokers, 
and, it can be claimed, infringes their rights, though as Oriola (2009) demonstrates, 
no legal rights for unfettered smoking exist. Though it is accepted that second hand 
smoke causes ill health, there are dissenting interpretations of the evidence (Enstrom  
and Cabat, 2003, and for a subjective exploration see R. Harris, 2004). Bans on 
smoking have been introduced worldwide,
24
 and initial evidence is that they have 
been effective in reducing environmental pollution, improving health (Meyers et al., 
2009), and contributing to a reduction in smoking prevalence (Gallus et al., 2007, 
McNabola and Gill, 2009).  
 
There is no EU legislation on workplace smoking bans, though following 
consultation in 2007, the European Commission produced a Council 
Recommendation calling on member states to adopt laws consistent with the FCTC 
                                                 
24
In the UK, workplace smoking was banned under the provisions of the Health Act, 2006, introduced 
with effect from 1
st
 July 2007. The offense of smoking in a smoke-free place carries a fine of up to 
£200, and the offense of failing to prevent smoking in a smoke-free places carries a fine of up to 
£2,500. 
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(Commission of the European Communities, 2009). EU legislation to regulate 
tobacco use, predating and consistent with the FCTC, is contained principally within 
two directives. The Directive on Tobacco Products (2001) sets limits for tar and 
nicotine in cigarettes, requires warnings on packaging and bans the use of terms such 
as ‘light’ and ‘mild’. The Directive on Tobacco Advertising (2003) extended the ban 
on advertising for tobacco products, which had been banned on television since 
1989. 
  
If workplace smoking bans are justified by the harm principle, and shown also to be 
effective in reducing ill health, it is difficult to see why they should not be extended 
to private cars, especially when they contain children, as have been introduced in 
South Australia, Cyprus, and several American States (Stephenson, 2009; Freeman 
et al., 2008). Public attitudes appear to favour such an extension (Thomson and 
Wilson, 2009). On 29
th
 January 2014 the UK House of Lords passed (by 222 votes to 
197) an enabling amendment to the Children and Families Bill, which allows,
25
 but 
does not require, the Government to make it an offence ‘for any person who drives a 
private vehicle to fail to prevent smoking in the vehicle when a child or children are 
present.’26 As some of their Noble Lords noted in the parliamentary debate, the 
arguments can be further extended to banning smoking in private homes that house 
children, though this would be difficult to enforce without compromising privacy 
(Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2007). The Fostering network (2010) advocates a 
                                                 
25
 Government consultation to enact the provision started on 15
th
 July 2014 and will close on 27
th
 
August 2014. 
26
 Lords Hansard http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201314/ldhansrd/text/140129-0002.htm  
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policy of banning smokers from fostering children under five, and though there is no 
national policy this has been adopted by some local authorities.
27
 
 
Though the supremacy of Mill’s dictum has been challenged for a number of years, 
for example relating to the wearing of bicycle helmets as previously discussed, a 
number of fresh challenges has been, and continues to be, presented in relation to 
smoking and its legal status.  The challenge does not concern whether people can 
lawfully smoke, but where and when they can be lawfully prevented from smoking. 
Where smoking is only permitted in a designated area, most smokers simply move to 
that area when they want to smoke, an option closed to some. NHS policy and 
smoking legislation combined at Rampton hospital to prevent patients from smoking 
at all, resulting in a legal challenge. As a case study in de facto prohibition of 
smoking, and the arguments used in justification, it is instructive to examine it in 
some detail.  
 
The Rampton Smokers: A judicial and policy challenge to Mill 
The Health Act 2006 introduced a number of changes to the NHS but it will be best 
known for changing forever the experiences of smokers in England and Wales.
28
 
From 1
st
 July 2007, smoking was no longer permitted in public places and (in certain 
circumstances) places of work in those areas which are enclosed or substantially 
enclosed. Exemption regulations made under Statutory Instrument allowed smoking 
in designated rooms in certain categories of places including care homes, hospices 
                                                 
27
 For example the Leicestershire County Council policy states that ‘Children under the age of five 
will not be placed with carers who smoke’ http://www.leics.gov.uk/fostering_smoking_policy.pdf  
28
 Smoking in public enclosed spaces had already been outlawed in Scotland under the provisions of 
the Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005 (with effect from 26
th
 March 2006), and in 
Northern Ireland under the provisions of Smoking (Northern Ireland) Order 2006 (with effect from 
30
th
 April 2007). 
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and prisons (regulation 5). Mental health units were afforded temporary exemption 
under regulation 10, but this expired on 1
st
 July 2008. 
 
Prior to the legal ban, the NHS Trust running Rampton Hospital had introduced a 
policy that banned smoking for staff and patients except for individual exemptions 
on clinical grounds. This policy operated both inside and outside hospital owned 
buildings (including Rampton) and came into force from 31
st
 March 2007. From this 
time until after the expiry of the temporary exemption, smoking was no longer 
allowed (but was lawful) inside the hospital. Following the expiry of the exemption 
regulations on 1st July 2008, smoking was unlawful inside the hospital. Throughout 
this period, smoking outside was permitted under the Trust policy in ‘very rare 
cases’, but this could not be enacted at Rampton as smokers were prohibited by 
security considerations from going outside.
29
 Initially then, the Rampton smokers 
were prevented from smoking inside by NHS policy, and then by law. N sought 
judicial review of regulation 10 of the Smoke-Free (Exemption and vehicles) 
Regulations 2007 because it was only a temporary rather than a permanent 
exemption, while E sought judicial review of the Trust policy banning smoking at 
Rampton Hospital. B claimed that the Trust’s policy for exceptions had been applied 
unlawfully inflexibly. The High Court
30
 refused and the case was heard in the Court 
of Appeal on 24
th
 July 2009.  
 
                                                 
29
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 17. B’s case was not 
heard at the Court of Appeal. 
30
 The Queen on the Application of G and Nottinghamshire healthcare NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 
0196 (Admin). 
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The appellants claimed that the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) had 
been breached, specifically articles 8 and 14. Article 8 (Right to respect for private 
life) states that: 
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence. 
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a 
democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, 
for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
The court first considered whether smoking was an activity protected under article 
8(1). Clearly, the article does not simply mean that individuals are always allowed to 
do exactly as they please behind their own front door, and whilst accepting that 
Rampton was the appellants’ home, arguments were presented about the precise 
nature of the home and the nature of the act (smoking). The majority conclusion 
concurred with the High Court: ‘Article 8 does not protect a right to smoke in 
Rampton. The prohibition does not, in such an institution, have a sufficiently adverse 
effect on a patient's physical or moral integrity.’ 31   
 
Judgement about the provisions of article 8(2) was not strictly necessary because 
justification of interference can only be relevant where article 8(1) is engaged, but 
the Court nevertheless offered views about whether it would have applied to the 
smoking ban at the Trust had they ruled otherwise on article 8(1). The majority 
verdict was that the intervention was justified. Article 14 of the EHCR provides that: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall 
be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
                                                 
31
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 51. 
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language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
The appellants’ claim under this article was that discrimination had occurred, under 
the category of ‘other status’, because the exemption regulations provided for an 
indefinite exemption for prisons, care homes and hospices, and only for a temporary 
exemption for mental health units like Rampton. Predictably perhaps, the majority 
judgement was that the Secretary of State had justified the position in light of the 
differences between various places covered by the exemption regulations. The 
judgement runs to 30 pages of complex legal argument and a full discussion lies 
outside the scope of this chapter.
32
 However, a number of points raised in the 
judgement are very relevant to continuing restrictions on smoking and illuminative 
of the relationship between legal and moral responsibility for health. 
 
First is the movement away from policy aims that echo Mill’s justified restriction on 
liberty only to prevent harm to others, and towards the prevention of self-regarding 
harm, narrowly defined. Justification of interference against an Article 8 right can be 
defended to protect the ‘freedoms of others’ but this other-regarding criterion is not 
needed to justify interference for the purpose of the protection of ‘health or morals’. 
The judgement found that the smoking ban introduced at Rampton was necessary for 
the ‘health of both the patients, which of course includes the appellants, and 
others.’33  This necessity was not recognised in respect of the provision of designated 
smoking areas under exemption orders in prisons, care homes or hospices, and as 
Keene LJ noted in a dissenting judgement, neither was it accepted as necessary by 
                                                 
32
 See Coggon (2009a, b) for detailed commentary. 
33
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 71. 
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the Welsh Assembly or Scottish Executive.
34
 He additionally argued that the stated 
aim of the legislation was of ‘protecting people against the risks to health from 
second-hand smoke’,35 and that the ban, after the expiry of the exemption order, was 
disproportionate to meet this legislative aim. On this basis, having accepted smoking 
as engaged by article 8(1), he regarded the ban a disproportionate under 8(2). The 
majority verdict, in contrast, justified the Trust’s ban in the ‘interest of ‘public 
health’,36 as did the High Court37 in noting that the removal of the exemption was 
justified because of the dangers both to smokers and those subject to second hand 
smoke. It is worthy of note that the Court of Appeal found that the ban was 
‘required’ while the High Court merely regarded it as ‘justified’. The High Court38 
also reported that there is evidence of substantial health benefits arising from the 
ban, but this benefit must be to the smokers themselves.  Evidence of health benefits 
to non-smokers is unlikely to have been derived from studying the banning of 
smoking in designated rooms,
39
 but on the effect of stopping smoking more 
generally.  The benefit is clearly to the smokers themselves and must be regarded as 
a paradigm case of ‘hard’ paternalistic intervention. 
 
Second, it was noted in the judgement that the issue of whether Article 8 is engaged 
cannot be decided solely on the question of whether Rampton can be considered the 
appellants’ home, or whether smoking can be considered an activity central to a 
person’s identity or social interaction, but rather a conclusion can only be reached 
                                                 
34
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragrpah 107. 
35
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 105. 
36
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 72. 
37
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 69. 
38
 The Queen on the Application of G and Nottinghamshire healthcare NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 
0196 (Admin). Paragraphs 126 and 127. 
39
 The exemption regulations detailed strict criteria about ventilation and door closing mechanisms to 
prevent smoke escaping. 
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after consideration of all these factors.
40
  The relationship between the nature of what 
is accepted to be a patient’s home and the nature of the act that he wishes to pursue 
in it is such that ‘the less the appellant can rely upon the nature of the place in which 
the activity is pursued, the more he must rely on the proximity of the activity to his 
personal identity or physical and moral integrity.’41  This sentence implies that the 
proximity of an activity to a person is an individual matter, different between people, 
and the policy allowed for flexibility in ‘exceptional circumstances.’42 But the 
personal details of the appellants are not noted in the judgement, and do not appear 
to have been considered by the Court of Appeal.
43
  The judgement noted that 
‘Difficult as it is to judge the importance of smoking to the integrity of a person’s 
identity, it is not in our view, sufficiently close to qualify as an activity meriting the 
protection under article 8.’44 This sentence implies that the judgement as to the 
personal value of smoking applies to everyone, independent of the nature of the 
place in which it is undertaken. Individual circumstances in habit and environment 
do not appear to have been considered, so when the judgement concluded that 
‘Article 8 does not protect a right to smoke in Rampton’,45 it might as well have just 
said that Article 8 does not protect a right to smoke. 
 
The High Court considered whether the exemptions in the Trust policy were 
unlawful because no exceptions had been granted at Rampton. The policy in force at 
the time is detailed in the Court of Appeal judgement allowing some exceptions for 
                                                 
40
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 37. 
41
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 49. 
42
 Noted at Paragraph 15.  The current policy at the Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust (2013) 
states that ‘In circumstances where, by exception, the multi-disciplinary team permits an inpatient to 
choose to smoke, this must be formally recorded in the care plan.’  
43
 There is more detail in the High Court judgement. 
44
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 49. 
45
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 51. 
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‘acute psychiatric state’ and ‘terminal illness’46 which certainly appears to restrict 
opportunities for exemptions. The High Court only considered evidence from a 
consultant psychiatrist, who after noting the resentment felt by B, stated in a report 
that: 
It would be very difficult to argue that giving up smoking by itself could 
have caused him to have these difficulties or that cessation of smoking is the 
critical factor causing him to experience psychological problems. I do not 
believe that permitting B to resume smoking will substantially moderate or 
end his current psychological problems.
 47
 
 
The decision not to grant an exception has been settled by the consultant 
psychiatrist’s view of what happened after the decision was taken, and has been 
recast not as a decision to prevent him smoking, but rather as one of permitting him 
to restart.  It is clear that despite the Court of Appeal stating that the proximity of an 
activity to an individual’s personal identity is material in deciding whether article 
8(1) is engaged, the judgement considered smoking in a general sense.  
 
Third, the judgment noted that the duty of care held by trusts towards its patients 
included a ‘duty to take reasonable steps to prevent patients causing themselves self-
harm.’48 A number of sources is cited in support of this, specifically Paragraph 30 of 
the Safety and Security in Ashworth, Broadmoor and Rampton Hospital Directions 
2000, which requires that the ‘Trust risk assess each patient against a range of factors 
including whether the patient presents a high risk of […] (b) committing suicide or 
self-harming.’49  
 
                                                 
46
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 16. 
47
 The Queen on the Application of G and Nottinghamshire healthcare NHS Trust [2008] EWHC 
0196 (Admin). Paragraph 133. 
48
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795. Paragraph 62. 
49
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_d
h/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4108402.pdf  
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The judgement accepts that smoking is covered under these directions, but there is 
no reason to believe that the directions quoted regard smoking in this manner. The 
word “smoking” does not appear in the directions or the guidance notes50 that 
accompany them. The passage of tobacco into the hospital is restricted but only 
insofar as it is difficult to exclude the possibility of illicit drugs being hidden within, 
something that remains the case in the latest version of the directions and their 
accompanying guidance, published in 2011, two years after the judgement.  In the 
directions, self-harm is considered alongside suicide, implying that it refers to more 
acute episodes of harm such as cutting, rather than the cumulative potential harm 
which characterises smoking. Smoking is a qualitatively different activity from 
suicide. Self-harm is a difficult concept because of the potential to include such a 
vast range of behaviours, but it would be an idiosyncratic understanding of the term 
that includes smoking.  Recent quality standards from National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) (2013b) state that: 
[t]he term self‑harm is used in this quality standard to refer to any act of 
self-poisoning or self‑injury carried out by a person, irrespective of their 
motivation. This commonly involves self‑poisoning with medication or self‑
injury by cutting. Self‑harm is not used to refer to harm arising from 
overeating, body piercing, body tattooing, excessive consumption of alcohol 
or recreational drugs, starvation arising from anorexia nervosa or accidental 
harm to oneself. 
 
It would be difficult to regard smoking as falling within this definition as drinking 
lies outside it, and the Court of Appeal accepted parity between smoking and 
drinking: ‘We don’t think that there is any real distinction between banning alcohol 
and banning smoking at Rampton.’51 In a  substantial article entitled ‘self-harm’ in 
the Lancet, Skegg (2005) does not mention smoking, but states that ‘other self-
                                                 
50
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_d
h/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/documents/digitalasset/dh_4108505.pdf  
51
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795.  Paragraph 71 
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harming behaviours that do not result in tissue damage (for example, exercising to 
hurt oneself or stopping medication with the intention of causing harm) fall beneath 
usual definitions of self-harm’ (Skegg, 2005 p. 1472).  While some authors do 
include smoking, this is restricted to where it is considered ‘excessive’, for example 
McAllister (2003, p. 179): ‘More abstractly, self-harm can include excessive risk 
taking, excessive drinking, smoking or eating, starvation, unprotected sex with 
multiple partners, sado-masochism […].’ 
 
Interpreting the directions cited to justify the Trust preventing smoking by regarding 
it as self-harm would be considered over-zealous extended to other places.  Under 
common law, I am justified in using reasonable force to disarm an individual to 
prevent him from cutting himself, but this does not extend to me snatching a 
cigarette from his lips and extinguishing it, along with a large chunk of his liberty, 
under the heel of my shoe. And if common law justification extends to a duty so far 
as health professionals and organisations are concerned then the nature of patient-
professional relationships will be irrevocably changed, perhaps most for nursing 
which has a duty for advocacy in its professional code (NMC, 2008). 
 
The final area of interest is the role of debate and consultation in Parliament and 
outside about the status of mental health units within the exemption regulations. This 
is not so much a point of law, but of how the law came to be made, significant 
because of the processes inside Parliament but also because it was given some 
importance in the judgements.  The initial position of the Department of Health was 
that mental health units would be afforded the same permanent exemption enjoyed 
by smokers in prisons, hospices and care homes, but this view changed following 
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consultation.  The majority judgement in the Court of Appeal accepted that it would 
have been clear to the Secretary of State and Parliament, that if a person could not go 
outside to smoke, the smoke free legislation might have had the effect of prohibiting 
him from smoking at all.’52 It was also noted that the exemption regulations were 
approved by both Houses of Parliament and scrutinised by the Joint Committee on 
Statutory Instruments.
53
 
 
Initially it appears that there is some democratic mandate for the change in 
exemption regulation which was to prove central in the legal case, but closer scrutiny 
reveals that it is not as clear as suggested.  The report of the consultation states that 
140 responses were received (not the 150 responses that the judgement states) and 
that 65% suggested that there should be no exemption or a time limited exemption. 
Only 20% agreed with an indefinite or broader exemption.
54
  The explanatory note to 
the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
55
 merely noted the change but did not 
explain it, possibly because the role of the Committee excludes a discussion on the 
merits of the provisions it scrutinises.
56
  At a meeting of the Second Delegated 
Legislation Committee on 26
th
 February 2007 the Minister, Caroline Flint, stated that 
the exemption regulations took account of the consultation, and that: 
We deliberated over the issues surrounding mental health units for a 
considerable amount of time. However, I felt that it was right to come down 
                                                 
52
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795.  Paragraph 75 
53
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795.  Paragraph 80. 
54
 Responses from individuals and organisations are analysed together, and so just an additional 63 
letters from individuals would have resulted in a majority of responses against changing the 
permanent exemption to a temporary one. The responses were discussed and reported by the High 
Court and reproduced as an appendix to the report from the Court of Appeal. R (N) v The Secretary of 
State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795.  Paragraph 24 
55
 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2007/765/pdfs/uksiem_20070765_en.pdf  
56
 The website of the JCSI states that ‘The JCSI does not assess the merits of any instrument or the 
underlying policy which is are (sic)  the responsibility of other Parliamentary Committees.’ 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/joint-select/statutory-instruments/role/  
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on the side of moving the mental health sector away from an exemption as 
soon as possible.
57
 
 
The next day, without division or debate, the draft Smoke-free (Exemptions and 
Vehicles) Regulations 2007 were approved in House of Commons. Five motions, 
covering terrorism, public health and children were taken together.
58
  The same day 
in the House of Lords Grand Chamber, Baroness Royal of Blaisdon moved, ‘that the 
Grand Committee do report to the House that it has considered the Smoke-free 
(Exemptions and Vehicles) Regulations 2007’. Again, there was no debate, and nor 
was there when the House of Lords agreed to the regulations on 6
th
 March.
59
 Had 
any of the legislators read the document outlining the responses to the consultation 
(DH, 2006) they would have been aware of a footnote (p.13), inserted in response to 
the Mental Health Commission’s concerns that patients detained under the Mental 
Health Act should not be deprived of the right to smoke. It states that: 
It is important to note that under smoke-free legislation, no individual is 
being deprived of any right to smoke. The laws deal with smoking in 
enclosed and substantially enclosed places, not the right to smoke.  
 
The Judgement noted
60
 that the prohibition of smoking outside is not a consequence 
of the legislation but of the trust’s policy, a fact, I suspect, peripheral to the 
resentment felt by the smokers whose abstinence was enforced by a combination of 
the two. A review of the documents and records does not support the view that the 
Secretary of State and the members of the Houses of Commons and Lords were 
aware of the consequences for the smokers at Rampton of the change to a temporary 
exemption, and it is difficult to see how there is any democratic mandate, as was 
claimed in the judgement, for the measure. 
                                                 
57
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmgeneral/deleg2/070226/70226s01.htm  
58
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmhansrd/cm070227/debtext/70227-0023.htm  
59
 http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200607/ldhansrd/text/70306-0002.htm  
60
 R (N) v The Secretary of State for Health. [2009] EWCA Civ 795.  Paragraph 75. 
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I have identified four causes of concern that indicate a strengthening of prohibition 
of smoking: the emphasis on paternalistic self-regarding reasons for enforcement, the 
move from individual to more general consideration of human rights, judicial and 
policy acceptance of smoking as self-harm contrary to medical conceptualisation, 
and finally judicial misrepresentation of the democratic process. 
 
Four years after the Rampton judgement, a similar case came before Lord Stewart in 
the Court of Session in Scotland,
61
 seeking judicial review of a decision by the State 
Hospitals Board to ban smoking, inside and outside. The claimant, a man with 
schizophrenia, who had been detained for 18 years following some low grade 
disorder offences for which he might have been imprisoned for no more than a few 
months, claimed that the ban breached the EHCR, especially article 8, which had 
proved pivotal in the earlier English case. In this case the EHCR was found to have 
been breached. In fact the Judge reached the decision with some reluctance: 
Insofar as I have allowed the petitioner's application on the merits I have 
done so with a degree of reluctance. It is a perfectly reasonable proposition, 
given contemporary understanding about the effects of tobacco smoking, that 
patients in a hospital should not be permitted to smoke; and I have no cause 
to doubt that the respondents - who have a difficult job to do on behalf of the 
wider community - have throughout been acting in what they genuinely see 
as the best interests of their patients.
62
 
 
This can be read as against the Millian harm principle. Nevertheless his view, pace 
the Court of Appeal, but in agreement, largely, with the dissenting view of Keene LJ 
there, was that article 8(1) was engaged, and that the prohibition could not be 
justified under article 8(2).  In a sentence which seems destined to be much quoted 
he said that: 
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 C M  v The State Hospitals Board for Scotland. 2013 WL 4411375. 
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 C M  v The State Hospitals Board for Scotland. 2013 WL 4411375. Paragraph 5 
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Article 8(2) ECHR authorises interventions which are “necessary in a 
democratic society […] for the protection of health or morals”: it is not a 
warrant for lifestyle fascism.
 63
 
 
Again noting his reluctance, Lord Stewart came to the view that ‘the decision to 
compel the petitioner to stop smoking was flawed in every possible way.’64 
However, it would be unwise for those opposing blanket bans of smoking in 
hospitals and elsewhere to regard this as an unequivocal fillip for their cause. Not 
only was the Judge at pains repeatedly to note his reluctance to find for the claimant, 
he also declined to rule that the smoke free policy was unlawful; it was unlawful 
only insofar ‘that it affected the petitioner’.65 The Scottish Court has taken more care 
than the English Court of Appeal to apply the EHCR to the individual, and though it 
is clear that Lord Stewart’s moral inclination is supportive of the English decision, 
he has been diligent in applying its provisions very carefully to the individual case 
before him. 
 
England was the last of the home nations to adopt a smoking ban in public places. Its 
clear justification was the protection of people from the secondary effects of other 
people’s smoking.  However, in parliamentary and judicial action, England has taken 
up the cause of self-regarding paternalistic smoking bans with greater vigour than 
Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and courts and public bodies, as I have 
demonstrated, have been ready to cast aside Mill’s liberal dictum and use sophistical 
arguments in pursuit of stopping people smoking for their own good. 
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 C M  v The State Hospitals Board for Scotland. 2013 WL 4411375. Paragraph 52 
64
 C M  v The State Hospitals Board for Scotland. 2013 WL 4411375. Paragraph 124 
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 C M  v The State Hospitals Board for Scotland. 2013 WL 4411375. Paragraph 6 
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Lawful consequences of smoking: denying treatment 
I will argue in Chapters 5 and 8 that responsibility is as much about the response to 
those who fail to meet their obligations as it is about the obligations themselves.
66
  In 
an obvious sense, for those breaking the law, for example in smoking in a public 
place, penalties are set out in legislation. Terms of imprisonment can be handed 
down for possession of some illegal drugs. But as we have seen, the prospect of 
criminalising smoking is slim, and so these sorts of penalties do not apply. This is 
not to say that there are no liabilities attached to smoking because it is not 
prohibited; extra taxes can be regarded in this light, a sort of liability blame 
according to Martin’s (2001) account. Other forms of liability can accrue from 
smoking, and while these cannot be said to be part of codified law, they must at least 
be lawful. Of significance for smokers is the suggestion that they should be regarded 
differently if they become ill with a smoking-related disease, specifically in the 
suggestion that they can be given a lower priority than others for medical treatment, 
or even denied treatment altogether. The question of whether smokers should be 
offered coronary artery bypass grafting was the subject of debate in medical journals 
some time ago (Underwood and Bailey, 1993; Shiu, 1993), and has periodically 
resurfaced as a public debate ever since in slightly different guises.
67
 The suggestion 
of denying treatment to those who caused their disease is undoubtedly intuitively 
attractive to some (Samuels, 2006), but it has become a serious suggestion because 
of the financial restrictions placed on a publicly funded health care system. Is denial 
of treatment lawful? 
                                                 
66
 Tadros (2005, p.24) notes the obvious etymological connection between responsibility and the idea 
of a response. 
67
 For example, it was reported that a Primary Care Trust was ‘asking’ patients to give up smoking 
before elective surgery, while stressing that the final decision rests with clinicians. See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/leicestershire/6718439.stm  Another trust reportedly reversed a 
decision not to treat obese patients until they had lost weight. 
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Syrett (2007) noted that there is a paucity of case law relating to the allocation of 
scarce resources. The usual mechanism is application for judicial review of rationing 
decisions (Syrett, 2004), and these are seldom successful, partly because allocation 
decisions of this sort have been considered non-justiciable (King, 2007).  In the case 
of child B, whose father challenged the decision to deny his daughter expensive and 
probably ineffective treatment for leukaemia, Sir Thomas Bingham MR put it like 
this: 
Difficult and agonising judgements have to be made as to how a limited 
budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number 
of patients. That is not a judgement which a court can make.
68
 
 
Though the doctrine of non-justifiability was considered to be under threat from the 
ECHR, there was no increase in successful applications, which remain rare 
(O’Sullivan, 1998). There have been exceptions, but these have been related more to 
the way in which decisions have been made rather than the decision itself. West 
Lancashire Health Authority denied patients gender reassignment surgery but had 
what amounted to a blanket policy that this would not be provided and failed to 
evaluate medical evidence that the patients’ condition was an illness rather than a 
lifestyle choice. The Court of Appeal
69
 found for the patients. 
 
As drug therapy has become more expensive, so more guidance has been produced 
by NICE for local funders
70
 about whether particular drugs should be funded. Where 
drugs have not been found to offer cost effectiveness and therefore have not been 
funded, provision can be made in individual cases based on ‘exceptionality’. This 
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 R v Cambridge Health Authority ex parte B [1995] 2 All ER 129 (CA).  
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 [2000] R v North West Lancashire Health Authority, ex parte A.D.G. 1 WLR 977, CA . 
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 Prior to 31
st
 March 2013 these local organisations were Primary Care Trusts (PCTs). Following 
implementation of the Health and Social care Act 2012, their function was taken over by Clinical 
Commissioning Groups (CCGs). 
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has proved an elusive concept (Ford, 2012) in practical application, and five cancer 
patients have been successful in challenging decisions. Ann Marie Rogers 
successfully challenged a decision by Swindon PCT to deny Herceptin to treat breast 
cancer. The Trust, after claiming that the cost of the treatment was not considered in 
the decision, could not find a rational basis on which the decision was taken.
71
 
 
In these cases justification has not been attempted on the grounds that the patients 
were in some way to blame for their illness. One reason why there has been no 
challenge is that despite occasionally emotive headlines, it is unlikely that any 
resource decision would be taken on these grounds. In what was claimed at the time 
to be the first application for judicial review of a decision concerning resource 
allocation, Mrs Harriott
72
 claimed that she had been refused infertility treatment 
because previous work as a prostitute resulted in her rejection by social services as a 
foster mother. Ruling against the applicant, Schiemann J nevertheless made it clear 
that refusal of treatment on non-medical grounds could be reviewed by the court 
(Brazier and Cave, 2011), and this clarity makes it unlikely that any resource 
allocation decision would be defended on non-medical, backward looking ground 
grounds, that is, on the basis of desert. NICE guidelines state that: 
NICE should not produce guidance that results in care being denied to 
patients with conditions that are, or may have been, dependent on their 
behaviour. However, if the behaviour is likely to continue and can make a 
treatment less clinically effective or cost effective, then it may be appropriate 
to take this into account (NICE, 2008
73
 p. 25). 
   
The relevant principle is: 
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 [2000] R v Swindon NHS Primary Care Trust. 1 EWCA Civ 392 
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 [1988] R v Ethical Committee of St Mary’s Hospital ex parte Harriott 1 FLR 512 
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 This guidance is currently being revised. It predates the Equality Act 2010, and The Act's 
requirements now govern NICE's approach to applying social value principles when considering 
legally protected groups, though the Act doesn’t have anything to say about treatment being denied 
for behaviour caused illness. See also Shah et al. (2013). 
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NICE can recommend that use of an intervention is restricted to a particular 
group of people within the population (for example, people under or over a 
certain age, or women only), but only in certain circumstances. There must 
be clear evidence about the increased effectiveness of the intervention in this 
subgroup or other reasons relating to fairness for society as a whole, or a 
legal requirement to act in this way (NICE 2008 p. 25 principle 7).
74
 
 
It is unclear how the criterion for fairness would operate, but any decision using this 
for justification would almost certainly be challenged. NICE guidance and individual 
funding authorities make clear that where smokers are prioritised lower than non-
smokers it is because smoking results in more complications and longer 
hospitalisation, decreasing the capacity for benefit and increasing cost. That is, 
difference in treatments look forward for their justification. If treatment is prioritised 
on clinical need, and need is understood in terms of capacity to benefit, smokers 
need treatment less.
75
 The decision, though clearly involving rationing, can be cast as 
one of clinical rather than desert consideration, and if requiring patients to stop 
smoking prior to surgery is seen as unjustifiably paternalistic, like the imposition of 
legal regulation it can be regarded as mixed, offering wider benefits. In political 
debate the distinction appears less distinct. In an influential book, The Big Society, 
Jesse Norman MP states (without evidence) that ‘The NHS increasingly looks at 
“lifestyle” factors such as obesity and smoking in deciding whether a given treatment 
is available. These trends can only continue’ (Norman, 2010, p.35).  A King’s Fund 
report about health care rationing (Klein and Maybin, 2012) barely mentions the 
possibility of rationing by desert, and Medical Codes of Practice also outlaw denial 
of treatment based on lifestyle choices. I return to this issue in a little more detail in 
Chapter 8. 
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and Human Rights, which states, at article 3.2 that ‘The interests and welfare of the individual should 
have priority over the sole interest of science or society.’ 
75
 See Syrett (2007) for a discussion on the definition of need so far as it concerns health care 
rationing. 
  Page 95  
Conclusion 
Using criminal and civil law to identify and enforce individual responsibilities in 
regard of health threatening behaviour is a blunt and unwieldy liberty threatening 
instrument. That the current position appears internally inconsistent is largely the 
result of political considerations, where reasoning is not required to the same extent 
as might be expected if a coherent set of principles establishing exactly how 
essentially utilitarian calculations are applied. However, it is the case that worldwide 
legal regulation of tobacco and other harmful substances and behaviours has 
extended in recent years, and that this is likely to continue, to the overall benefit of 
public health, and at the expense of individual liberties. A predominantly publicly 
provided health system may flounder in an uncertain fiscal environment unless 
public expectations are trimmed, and as difficult rationing decisions become more 
common, it is to be expected that legal challenges and scrutiny will become more 
frequent, and hoped that this will clarify the lawful consequences for individuals 
contributing, by their actions, to their poor health. If the supremacy of personal 
autonomy appears to be under increasing challenge (Gauthier, 2000; Walker, 2008), 
there is also a line that cannot be crossed in liberal societies. And though it might be 
argued that the line is receding somewhat, the challenge for those who advocate 
using the law to improve the nation’s health is to advance legal regulation as close to 
the line as possible.  In the next chapter I move from consideration of the legal 
background to provide theoretical and procedural underpinning for the moral 
analyses that will be developed in more detail in Part II of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Philosophical Approaches 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out and defend philosophical approaches to the 
thesis linking the papers into a single coherent account and filling the theoretical 
lacunae left by the publication process.  The papers in the thesis can be considered to 
consist of a combination of analytical and normative philosophy, and the chapter 
considers these approaches in turn. Necessary methodological detail for the 
analytical papers is contained within them, and so discussion here is restricted to the 
difficulties of using documentary sources to illustrate points throughout the thesis. 
The bulk of the chapter will consider the normative approaches used. I first consider 
the role of philosophical bioethics in public debates, and in rejecting the role of 
philosopher as moral expert I nevertheless defend the essentially rationalist approach 
taken. In discussing the application of moral theories generally and specifically 
within bioethics,  I argue that application of moral theory is problematic and that in 
practice, application of this or that single moral theory may be illuminating and 
interesting but is seldom satisfactory as an action guide. Various accounts of moves 
to de-emphasise, modify or amalgamate orthodox moral theories are briefly 
introduced, and I argue that a theoretical approach remains of interest and value, 
especially so where the prospect of consensus is lacking. 
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Deductive and inductive approaches are then introduced. In choosing a broad form 
of two level utilitarianism as the principal normative basis of the papers it is 
acknowledged that final justification for the choice is inevitably question begging, 
but I offer normative and empirical reasons for suggesting that it is a plausible moral 
theory capable of being used widely. I then proceed to explain my use of case studies 
and analogies in the papers and their use within inductive argument. 
 
Analytical approach 
Where they are significant, analytical approaches and critiques of established 
methods are detailed within the papers, notably the first, which critiques the method 
of concept analysis. Many of the analytical points made in the thesis refer to various 
forms of documents and other public output, including policy documents, 
professional codes of conduct, health promotion material, television advertisements, 
social media sites and news coverage. As presented here the materials are not the 
focus of analysis; the papers do not intend to offer an analysis, for example, of how 
television advertisements present the moral status of blood donation. This approach 
would call for a more detailed examination of how advertisements came to be made 
and presented, including perhaps details of when and how often they were screened, 
and an evaluation of their effectiveness both in representing the chosen moral 
position and in recruiting blood donors. Similar points can be made about analysis of 
policy documents. The papers use the materials more loosely to illustrate points 
made and they cannot be said to be following any particular method of documentary 
or discourse analysis (Abbott et al., 2004).  
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The use of these materials calls for some caution, but room and focus within the 
published papers rarely allows this to be detailed. It is easy to assume that documents 
and other materials mean exactly what they say when subjecting them to detailed 
analysis more appropriate to academic papers where the use of language can be 
taken to be measured and precise. This would perhaps be a level of scrutiny too far; a 
scrutiny that the documents were not written to be able to withstand. However, the 
documents were written to be read by someone, their intended audience if not 
academics, and they must mean something, but it would involve a large amount of 
second guessing and supposition or perhaps interrogation of the usually anonymous 
authors to get to the precise meaning. In some cases I maintain that meaning, in the 
form of action guidance, is very difficult to discern from documents, and this is 
discussed in more detail in relation to health promotion in Chapter 6. In other cases, 
loose language has the potential to confuse intended readers and this is seen even in 
quasi-legal standard documents from health care profession regulators. For example, 
the Standards for Medicines Management published by the Nursing and Midwifery 
Council (NMC) states that ‘Students must never administer or supply medicinal 
products without direct supervision’, and then proceeds (on the same page) to state 
that ‘As students progress through their training, their supervision may become 
increasingly indirect […].’ (NMC, 2007, p.33; Fullbrook-Scanlon, 2010. Emphasis 
added). Similar NMC documents relating to educational standards state that nursing 
practice both ‘must’ and ‘should’ be based on evidence. (NMC, 2010; Snelling, 
2013c). These two examples are regulatory, action requiring rather than action 
guiding, but are self-contradictory and ambiguous and it is difficult to believe that 
the authors intended them to be understood in that light. 
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My interpretation of documentary and other sources used in analyses presented make 
no general assumptions about their literal meaning or their intention or effect and it 
is acknowledged that their nature is such that they can present a partial and 
superficial representation of the ‘reality they purport to describe’ (Abbott et al., 
2004, p.260). All that can be said about their use in the papers, without detailed 
methodological justification which would be required were they the focus of the 
analyses, is that I consider that the inferences are well drawn and explained and thus 
open to, and inviting of, critique. 
 
Normative approach: bioethics and public discussion 
This thesis considers personal responsibility for health; its meaning, extent and 
consequences. Each of these areas inhabits a slightly different moral environment, 
though common to all is morality in the general sense, defined by Gert (2005, p.14) 
as: 
an informal public system applying to all rational persons, governing 
behaviour that affects others, and includes what are commonly known as the 
moral rules ideals and virtues and has the lessening of evil or harm as its 
goal. 
 
I take it that morality resides in the effects that actions have on other people. Part of 
the challenge of enquiry in this area is a tendency within bioethics to regard health 
related decisions as being solely within the domain of the individual, with personal 
choice of health related behaviours being maximally considered in the light of 
consequences for the individual, and for others only minimally or not at all. In 
Anglo-American bioethics, respect for autonomy is frequently presented as the 
overriding bioethical principle
1
 (Gillon, 2003), and it is easy to regard personal 
                                                 
1
 Though not by Beauchamp and Childress. 
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choices in respect of our own and others’ health simply as following the principle. 
On this account personal choices might even be considered outside morality 
altogether with views to the contrary being disparaged as paternalistic or, even 
worse, moralistic (Driver, 2005).  
 
In this general sense morality does not only provide a guide for an agent’s own 
behaviour but rather a guide that rational persons suggest that others also should 
follow: ‘We want people to believe us and we want them to change their behaviour 
as a result’ (Brassington, 2007a, p.1 emphasis in original). Implied by a general 
(philosophical) argument that something is morally obligatory is the normative 
expectation that I ought to do it, and what’s more that others in similar situations 
ought to do it as well. There should be a direct link, that is, between an analysis of 
the moral status of something and real life engagement with moral agents, and there 
are at least two possible ways to do this.  
 
Public discussion (1): moral expertise 
The first is for the moral philosopher or other authority to arrive at a considered 
position and then to manipulate or otherwise persuade others to follow it. David 
Hume identified two versions of philosophy, the easy and the abstruse, and the easy 
version appears to present the philosopher as moral expert (Archard, 2011,
2
 Priaulx, 
2013), seeking to ‘bend our hearts to the love of probity and true honour (Hume, 
2007 [1748], p.5). The more abstruse philosopher seeks a more detailed and 
objective analysis ‘though their speculations seem abstract, and even unintelligible to 
common readers’ (p.4). Contemporary adherents of Hume’s ‘easy’ philosophy are 
                                                 
2
 Archard (2011) says that Peter Singer is a notable exception to the view that philosophers are not 
moral experts. 
  Page 102  
likely to look to insights from psychology to ‘allur[e] us into the paths of 
virtue…direct[ing] our steps in these paths.’ (p.5). Notable in this regard is the book 
Nudge by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) which has been enthusiastically adopted by the 
UK Government in public health and other policies.
3
   
 
There is a number of arguments against the moral expertise approach; two are 
particularly relevant to the philosophical approach of this thesis. The first is that 
moral philosophers
4
 are no better than the rest of us in formulating and then 
following moral judgements and rules. Dickenson (2000) identified value differences 
between bioethicists and professional health care practitioners, and Schwitzgebel and 
Rust (2009, 2014) have demonstrated that the moral behaviour of university teachers 
of ethics is broadly no better than their non-philosophical peers. In Chapters 6 and 7, 
I argue that there are obligations to our own and others’ health but they are not 
presented by my claiming expertise and then seeking to persuade, cajole, manipulate 
or coerce the public to follow my injunctions on the ground that I possess moral 
expertise.  My normative conclusions largely stand in opposition to established 
views which emphasise prescribable and proscribable health-effecting acts rather 
than processes, which I will discuss in chapter 6.  
 
A second argument opposes this sort of approach as being paternalist, such as the 
libertarian paternalism of Sunstein and Thaler’s (2003) paper from which the book 
Nudge was developed.  Paternalism applied to individual patients within professional 
health care is not generally supported in the UK, though the approach within 
collective public health is more prevalent and apparently more acceptable. I cannot 
                                                 
3
 There is a behavioural insight team inside the Cabinet Office (2010, 2011). See Yeung (2012) and 
Quigley (2013) for further discussion. 
4
 The same point applies to other groups tempted to tell us what to do. 
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discuss this in detail here, but what I mean is that public health measures such as 
water fluoridation are advocated and lawfully implemented whereas a similar lack of 
consent for ingestion of a therapeutic substance by an individual patient would not 
be allowed outside specific mental health treatment legislation.
5
 Mitchell (2005) 
suggests that libertarian paternalism, which uses the framing of messages so that 
they are more likely to be accepted, relies on the ‘cognitive limitation’ (p.1245) of 
the libertarian, and that therefore, ‘it is often wise to make intuitively appealing 
arguments rather than drab, analytical arguments when trying to persuade others’ 
(p.1277). The challenge for anyone trying to discuss bioethics with the public, but 
not resorting to paternalism, is to avoid making the analytical arguments drab. That 
is what I have tried to do. 
 
Public discussion (2): arguments 
Paternalistic imposition or manipulation of values or conclusions is difficult in a 
number of ways, but this leaves largely unresolved the problem of how to engage in 
discussion with the public about both policies and individual choices which require 
philosophical thinking. Real variations in opinion and behaviour can result from 
differences between or within moral theories which can best be considered esoteric 
and probably irrelevant by many people thinking about their own and others’ moral 
behaviour. But if Brassington’s observation about the purpose of moral debate is 
correct, then engaging forms of public discussion are needed. This can be achieved 
in a number of ways, through independent bodies such as the Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics
6
 as well as by regulators, like the Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
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 See Cross and Carton (2003) for a critical review of water fluoridation. 
6
 The Council’s terms of references require that it ‘..make arrangements for examining and reporting 
on such questions with a view to promoting public understanding and discussion.’ (Nuffield Council 
on Bioethics, 2013). 
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Authority (Moore, 2010) who also aim to increase public understanding.
7
 An 
important distinction between these bodies and ‘official’ health promoting public 
discussion and persuasion is that these bodies are not necessarily arguing for 
anything, but aiming to educate and to inform. This is not to say that public 
discussion about ethical issues in general as well as bioethics generally cannot or 
should not argue for something, but that if a particular normative stance is taken, 
based on theoretical lines of reasoning, then the arguments should be couched in 
such a way as to make them accessible. This is especially the case where the aim of 
the normative stance is to convince people to alter their behaviour, based on an 
understanding of the arguments rather than simply their outcomes. It is the difference 
between persuading people to stop smoking by emotional means using graphic 
imagery (Hume’s easy philosopher) and helping them see the arguments why first of 
all smoking is a moral matter and then by helping them work out for themselves 
whether it is something that, all things considered, they ought not to do (Hume’s 
abstruse philosopher). If this is the case, Brassington’s suggestion is more usefully 
directed at the process of moral thinking rather than its outcome, and I shall explore 
this in more detail in Chapter 6.   
 
A further way that the normative arguments attempt to relate to everyday life is in 
occasional references to common morality, a highly nuanced construction with both 
normative and empirical elements. For a concept rooted in the belief that there are 
universal values, there seems to be considerable disagreement about their scope. 
Beauchamp and Childress (2013) whose principles of biomedical ethics is probably 
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 The HFEA (2013) strives to ‘ inform patient choice, securely hold personal data, and maximise 
public understanding (of available and developing treatments, embryology research, and the HFEA 
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the most influential bioethical book of the last generation
8
 defend duties grounded 
from common morality, whereas the author of a popular and extensive theory, 
Bernhard Gert (2008) denies any positive duties from common morality, regarding 
its role as the lesser and negative avoidance of rule violation.
9
 Terms relating in 
various ways to pretheoretical morality include common morality (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2013; Gert, 2004), common-sense
10
 morality (Slote, 1974; Hooker, 2000a; 
Portmore, 1998, 2011), and ordinary morality (Kagan, 1989; Rajczi, 2009). Common 
morality can refer to universal values (Bok, 2002), and also intuitively held 
processes of deliberation (Sidgwick, 1907, and see Greene, 2013 on the empirical 
evidence on how we think morally). The papers in the thesis refer to common 
morality as part of an attempt to narrow the theory-practice gap in practical ethics, 
usually in an attempt to ameliorate the strict injunctions of moral theory, and in 
doing so I intend to simplify things rather than follow any particular account. 
 
Rationality as the basis of the philosophical approach 
This thesis addresses normative questions concerning responsibility for health, that 
is, what are our obligations in respect of our own and others’ health? The answers to 
these normative questions can be arrived in a number of ways.  In addressing the 
genetic challenge, Matti Häyry (2010) identifies three approaches to bioethics.  The 
first, exemplified by John Harris and Jonathon Glover, emphasises transparent and 
clearly rational arguments. The second approach, typified by Leon Kass and Michael 
Sandel, proceeds from a position opposed to analytical philosophy, and regards 
                                                 
8
 Now in its seventh edition, it first appeared in 1977. The principles are also afforded a degree of 
official recognition in ‘Social Value Judgements: principles for the development of NICE guidance’ 
(NICE, 2008). ‘These so-called ‘four principles’ have been adopted by NICE because they provide a 
simple, accessible, and culturally neutral approach that encompasses most of the moral issues that 
arise in healthcare’ (NICE, 2008, p.8). 
9
 See Arras (2009) for a discussion. 
10
 With and without the hyphen. 
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moral problems to require holistic examination including appeals to emotional 
responses.  The third approach, as proposed by Jürgen Habermas and Ronald Green 
sits between the outlying two.  Häyry’s principal justification for the view that none 
of these approaches alone is sufficient is that there is considerable support for all of 
them, and so a single position, however convincingly argued and presented, simply 
will not be accepted by everyone. He proposes a nonconfrontational notion of 
rationality: 
A decision is rational insofar as it is based on beliefs that form a coherent 
whole and are consistent with how things are in the world; and is aimed at 
optimising the immediate or long-term entities that matter (Häyry, 2010, 
p.43). 
 
On the face of it, this nonconfrontational approach is uncontroversial, but there is a 
danger that it can be taken to imply a dichotomy between rational and non-rational. 
Häyry doesn’t intend this, and in elaborating on the elements of his proposal he talks 
of rationality being neither black nor white but in shades of grey. The irrational end 
of the spectrum can be found where decisions are based on beliefs that have ‘no 
regard to how things are in the world around us (2010, p.45. Italics in original), and 
this, Häyry claims, is very rarely the case in bioethical disputes.  This can be taken to 
mean that outside these rare cases, disputes or opinions are rational to some extent, 
and so a rational analysis is nearly always of direct interest. Häyry’s clarification 
referred to bioethical disputes, and it is probably true when applied to disputes 
within the academic discipline of bioethics, that is between bioethicists. It is difficult 
to argue with Häyry when he says that ‘very few philosophical ethicists would like 
to be labelled as “irrational” […]’ (2010, p.43). 
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It might not be quite so simple where the discussion (let us say this instead of 
dispute) is between ethicists and members of the public. As I discussed in Chapter 2, 
empirical evidence suggests
11
 that it is over-simplistic to suggest that individuals 
behave on the sole basis of rationality, independent of all other factors that influence 
behaviour, but nor does it mean that all decisions are made irrationally.  I do not 
propose to attempt an answer to the question of whether all individuals can make 
rational behaviour choices. Some people are capable of and willing to make 
decisions based on rationality and some are not. Others, I suspect, are capable but 
unwilling, still others willing but incapable. It is known that ethical decisions are 
arrived at (sometimes) through non rational and emotional processes (Rogerson et 
al., 2011; Haidt, 2012), an observation that contributed to Gilligan’s (1982) critique 
of Kohlberg’s research on moral development and the development of feminist care 
ethics (Kuhse, 1997) .
12
  
 
Despite the shortcomings of rationality as the basis for moral thinking, and 
especially its apparent lack of universal appeal, I will largely be taking a rational 
approach to the normative questions presented, and not only arguing that there are 
obligations in respect of our own and others’ health, but that these can be decided 
using a largely rational decision making process. In light of the shortcomings it 
might be suggested that this is a doomed enterprise, but there are good reasons for 
not only wanting to persist with it, but also for arguing that it has value. Some, if not 
all, people will engage rationally, and more importantly, it does not follow from 
observations that many people do not appear to make fully rational decisions about 
their health-effecting behaviour that all rationality is absent from consideration, or 
                                                 
11
 See Greene (2013) for a recent and accessible overview. 
12
 See You et al. (2011) for a meta-analysis of the difference in moral sensitivity between men and 
women. They found wide variation and an average effect size of 0.25. 
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that it ought to be. There is no objective external measure of an irrational decision, 
and the requirement to allow people to make what others may regard as unwise (and 
possibly irrational
13
) decisions is legally protected, for example in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005, where the test is on the process and ability of decision making 
rather than its outcome. A further argument in favour of the value of rationality is 
that it is part of the utilitarian process: an acceptance that morality ought to be 
directed at increasing welfare requires some sort of calculation and this requires both 
evidence and rationality, but it is important that these are grounded so far as is 
possible in people’s real lives and experiences14 if the processes that I will be 
arguing for have a genuine chance of influencing behaviour. This experience will 
involve emotional attachments and elements of behaviour that others may regard as 
irrational. However, as is also suggested in the realm of clinical decision making, 
emotions fulfil a role not necessarily antithetical to objective reasoning (Marcum, 
2013). Hayry’s understanding of rationality sets a low bar and is capable of also 
including emotions that inevitably characterise the interpersonal relationships that 
will form the backdrop of my normative analysis. My analysis is rational to the 
extent that even accepting an emotional element, most individuals remain capable of 
acting on the basis of reasons, and are held to account, at least in law, on this basis. 
 
Juthe (2005) suggests four different types of arguments; deductive, inductive, 
adbuctive and analogy. In biomedical ethics the first two arguments have been 
discussed, influentially, by Beauchamp and Childress, as top-down (deductive) and 
bottom-up (inductive). The thesis uses both, as well as a case study and analogy.  
 
                                                 
13
 Stauch (1995) makes the distinction between non rational and irrational. 
14
 See Russell Hardin’s (1988) Morality within the Limits of Reason. 
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Deductive arguments: moral theory 
A problem for any deductive approach to ethics is determining the starting point, 
what the theory is and what it requires, exactly.  Not only are original texts of 
standard moral theories interpreted and reinterpreted, they were written in distant 
times. Sterba’s (2005) book The Triumph of Practice over Theory in Ethics begins 
with modern critiques of Aristotle’s slaves, Kant’s racism, and Mill’s colonialism, 
and the theories themselves have forked repeatedly through the centuries resembling 
not so much single accounts, as upturned trees whose distal branches, though 
connected to a unifying methodological trunk, now grow in quite different 
directions. For utilitarianism, acts or rules can be used as the level of calculation and 
differences in what, exactly, should be maximised and how may result in 
contradictory action-guiding calculations all of which could claim to be ‘utilitarian.’ 
 
The tenets of utilitarianism and Kantianism appear in fundamental opposition yet 
there are authoritative accounts which claim theoretical foundations for health care 
ethics from each. Häyry (2007, p.60) claims that ‘some elements of utilitarianism are 
taken for granted in today’s health policies and medical ethics’, especially perhaps in 
regard to justice: ‘In one sense all approaches to justice in health-care provision are 
utilitarian’ (Häyry, 2002, p.53). Heubel and Biller-Andorno (2005, p.5) claim that ‘in 
modern medical ethics the influence of Kantian moral theory is obvious.’ 
Contemporary nursing ethics has a strong Aristotelian and care ethics pedigree 
(Armstrong, 2007; Sellman, 2011), and professional codes of ethics
15
 are themselves 
based on both rule utilitarian and Kantian frameworks (L’Etang, 1992; Starr, 
                                                 
15
 The extent to which codes of ethics reflect morality is questionable, and nursing codes of practice 
have been accused of being unethical (See Pattison, 2001; Pattison and Wainwright, 2010). 
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1983)
16
. Hämäläinen (2009) suggests that moral theories enrich each other and there 
are also in the literature many attempts at reconciling or combining traditional moral 
theories. Sterba (2005), for example combines Kantian and Aristotelian approaches 
in opposition to utilitarianism. From nursing ethics, Paley (2002) offers an 
interpretation of Kant compatible with the ethics of care, Hare (1997) and Ridge 
(2009) offer partial reconciliation between Kantianism and consequentialism, and 
Alexander (2008) argues that nearly all deontologists’ views collapse into 
consequentialism at and beyond a certain threshold.
17
 Finally, Driver (2001) offers 
an account combining virtue ethics with consequentialism. In short, every standard 
moral theory is apparently capable of being combined with each of the others. 
 
For Sterba (2005, p. 28), ‘morality as compromise’ is situated at some point on the 
spectrum between egoism and altruism, borrowing from both, with the weighting 
depending on the quality and strength of the reasons for acting in your own or in 
others’ interests. In formulating this approach, and particularly in its response to 
egoism, Sterba accepts that it leans more heavily towards a Kantian understanding of 
obligation, though goes on to recast the principal argument into an Aristotelian 
framework. Ultimately his position, stated right at the beginning of his book, is that: 
[t]he traditional theories of ethics, be they Aristotelian, Kantian, Millian, or 
whatever, have come to be revised and reformed in such a way that at least in 
their most morally defensible formulations they no longer differ in the 
practical requirements they endorse  (Sterba, 2005, p.1).   
 
Though the meaning seems straightforward, an immediate question is raised by what 
is meant by ‘most morally defensible formulations’ of moral theories. A compromise 
                                                 
16
 These cited examples are from Business ethics, but the arguments can be transferred to health care 
ethics. 
17
 ‘A threshold deontologist is one who believes that certain acts cannot be justified by their 
consequences  unless those consequences reach or surpass some threshold point of compellingness’. 
Almost all deontologists admit to being threshold deontologists (Alexander, 2008, p.85). 
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position which does not recognise the supremacy of moral theory is extended to 
bioethics by Durante (2009) who suggests that those arguing from one particular 
theory pay insufficient attention to cultural differences and the moral diversity that 
characterises modern society. These differences seem especially difficult when the 
moral position taken is from religious conviction, whose adherents often regard 
fundamental principles as absolute truths rather than reasoned preferences.
18
 If these 
principles preclude meaningful discussion on matters where different viewpoints 
fundamentally conflict, in for example, the moral status of the human embryo, they 
also provide areas where consensus and/or compromise is possible, in for example 
the methodology of clinical pragmatism (Fins et al., 1997). 
 
Many ethical problems in health care have solutions that are the same whichever 
theory (if any) is used, even if the underlying principles or methodologies conflict, 
and this is a clear feature and claimed advantage of a popular method of ethical 
analysis in healthcare. Principlism, most clearly associated with the work of 
Beauchamp and Childress, argues that its titular principles can be derived from all of 
the major moral theories. In moving from the specific to the general, ultimate 
justification might be required from a moral theory, but most questions can be settled 
by reference to lower order principles and rules, founded in common morality and 
rendering overly theoretical approaches superfluous.  Supporters and critics of 
principlism have engaged in vociferous exchanges for a generation, and as far as the 
de-emphasis of moral theory is concerned, a significant critique (Clouser and Gert, 
1990) is that following and respecting the principle of respect for autonomy may 
                                                 
18
 For an interesting discussion on the role of religion in bioethics see Stempsey (2011). He argues 
that despite its roots in theology, bioethics as a discipline has marginalised religious considerations, 
and offers some areas, including solidarity and dignity where a renewed religious viewpoint may 
enrich bioethical debate.  
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lead to defensible action, but agents following the principle will not know why 
respecting autonomy is generally a good thing, and this means that exceptions to the 
principle, or giving priority to other principles in certain circumstances may present 
problems in justification.  
 
I have briefly sketched some methods employed in response to the inadequacy of 
utilising a single moral theory; that in practice moral theories often require the same 
things, and that there is room for compromise and reconciliation between competing 
theories. Additionally the observation that often more than one position is ethically 
justified, and that there must be room in an account of morality for ‘the possibility of 
progress’ (Scanlon, 1992, p.6) and changing our mind argue against the adoption of a 
single moral theory. However, there at least two reasons for wanting to persist with 
some sort of theoretical account.  First, notwithstanding that agreement is often 
possible, it is not always possible, and the greater the possible divergence between 
theoretical positions in specific application, the greater the need for a theoretical 
justification. This can make reconciliation problematic, leading to the second point; 
that some sort of theoretical justification is required if we are to avoid falling into the 
capricious territory of intuitionism
19
 and moral relativism.  
 
Philosophical approach: broad dual level utilitarianism 
The thesis will take a broad form of dual level utilitarianism as its principal 
theoretical basis. In support of this I offer empirical and normative justification, 
though these are tentative and imprecise, and it is acknowledged that the influences 
of moral decision making are many and varied. The thesis does not consider the 
                                                 
19
 Despite its central place in the method of reflective equilibrium, empirical research in psychology 
and the neurosciences led Singer (2005) to question the influential role that intuition has in ethical 
decision making.  
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place of religion, gender, occupation, religiosity or any other factor in influencing 
how individuals make ethical decisions even though, for many, these considerations 
are decisive.  Much of the empirical research on moral reasoning is undertaken in 
specific fields, for example in business ethics
20
 and health care ethics (for example 
Goethels et al., 2013, Deshpande, 2009) which are not immediately transferable to a 
wider population, for a number of reasons including the nature and frequency of 
ethical decisions in professional practice, the presence of ethics in professional 
curricula, professional accountability, the use of influential codes of conduct and the 
development of models of ethical decision making (Park, 2012).   
 
Empirical justification 
Utilitarianism can be seen throughout bioethics. The move towards an evidence base 
for health care requires an assessment of the consequences of interventions, and if 
there could also be a Kantian response to this at the level of individual patients, the 
utilitarian foundation is more secure at the institutional level of socialised health 
care, for example in statements of purpose of the NHS, and in resource allocation. 
The NHS constitution in England (DH, 2013b, p.4)  states as one of its principles 
that ‘The NHS is committed to providing best value for taxpayers’ money and the 
most effective, fair and sustainable use of finite resources.’  Funding allocation by 
use of Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) is an attempt to get the most benefit for 
each health care pound spent, and in many features this is close to institutionalised 
utilitarianism – even though serious concerns are raised in relation to its fairness in 
regard to particular illnesses.
21
 
 
                                                 
20
 For detailed reviews of the literature from 1996-2003 see O’Fallon and Butterfield (2005), and from 
2004-2011, see Craft (2012). 
21
 See, for example, Garau et al. (2011) in relation to the difficulties in using QALYs in cancer. 
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Perhaps the most famous thought experiment in ethics is the trolley problem, first 
posed by Philippa Foot in 1967.
22
 In the first version, a runaway trolley is hurtling 
uncontrolled down a track towards five people who cannot escape and who will 
inevitably be killed if the trolley continues unchecked. However, the trolley will pass 
a side track before hitting the five men, but there is a single person on this track who 
will be killed if the trolley is diverted. An onlooker stands by a switch. If he does 
nothing, five will die; if he diverts the trolley along the side track, one will die. What 
should he do?  In a second version there is no switch and no possibility of diversion 
but there is a fat
23
 man standing by the track. His weight is such that if he was on the 
track the trolley would be stopped, saving the five but at the expense of his own life. 
An onlooker stands behind him as the trolley approaches. Should he push the fat man 
onto the track? Academically undertaken tests and large scale media experiments 
consistently show that about 80% are in favour of diverting the train, but only a 
quarter would push the fat man onto the track (Edmunds, 2014).  Further nuanced 
versions of the original have been developed, some of which suggest caution in their 
use (Rai and Hoyloak, 2010), and the consistent findings suggest that subjects use 
utilitarian reasoning but only up to a point.
24
 
 
Lanteri et al. (2008) suggest that individuals rationalise intuitive decisions 
retrospectively, and in their study on the trolley problem more people indicated that 
flicking the switch and pushing the fat man were permissible rather than obligatory, 
a position difficult to reconcile with most forms of utilitarianism. Experiments 
concern individual cases of moral judgement, but not morality in any general sense 
                                                 
22
 For an excellent and accessible discussion see Edmunds (2014). 
23
 More recent versions use the more inclusive device of an onlooker wearing a backpack (Greene, 
2013). 
24
 It is worthy of note  that the trolley problem was introduced in a paper about the doctrine of double 
effect, but it has become frequently useful for teasing out reasoning involved in ethical decisions.  
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(Abend, 2013), and are as likely to identify incoherence of our intuitions as any clear 
pattern of moral decision making (Nelkin, 2007). It is important to keep in mind 
Hume’s famous observation that you cannot derive an ought from an is, but 
nevertheless the empirical findings about how individuals make decisions are useful 
in the sense that they provide evidence that normative positions based on utilitarian 
calculations are unlikely to be rejected as hopelessly implausible. 
 
Normative justification 
Normatively, choosing a utilitarian approach over its rivals inevitably begs the 
question.  Arguments that conclude that it is superior to its rivals assume the features 
that define it.   Gert (2005) argues that right at the very beginning of Utilitarianism, 
Mill conflates the greatest good (summum bonum) with morality.  There can be no 
justification for this, the principle standing at the pinnacle of a system where specific 
moral rules and principles are justified with reference to more general ones. At this 
level an argument in support of the summum bonum becomes merely an assertion, a 
first order principle which is both exceptionless (Schneewind, 2009), and incapable 
of further justification apart from what can be rather bemused statements such as 
from Takala (2003, p. 448): ‘I cannot understand why these simple general ideas do 
not appeal to everybody’. As Murphy (1994, p.205) states in relation to ultimate 
principles, ‘you pays your money and you take your choice.’ 
 
A preference for utilitarianism must accept that there are critiques of the theory in 
general and more specifically in its bioethical application. General problems include 
that in practice calculations are too difficult (Streumer, 2003), that they require too 
much of agents (Mulgan, 2001), do not account for supererogatory acts within a self-
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other asymmetry (Slote, 1975) and often offer counterintuitive solutions based on 
valuing collective rather than individual rights. It is this latter point that lead Takala 
(2003) to observe that utilitarianism has a bad reputation in bioethics, but this is 
based on what might be considered thoroughgoing accounts, outside Sterba’s view 
of what might counts as a ‘morally defensible formulation.’ It may be that at root of 
what many find objectionable about the bioutilitarianism that Takala criticises are 
ontological assumptions, about personhood for example, rather than the first order 
principle that welfare, however construed, be maximised. Alternatively, it might be 
the consequentialist
25
 view that consequences are the only morally relevant 
consideration which not only makes it unpalatable to many, but also impracticable 
when superimposed on the law and rules such as codes of conduct which must be 
followed by professionals. An understanding that consequences can count, inter alia, 
under the general rubric of ‘broad utilitarianism’ can be further criticised on the 
grounds of imprecision, and of multiple interpretations.  
 
Arguments presented in the normative papers, can be considered to be ‘broadly’ 
consequentialist,
26
 but the level of precision is in need of some explanation. I have 
suggested that detailed deductive application of a precise version of a moral theory is 
not a satisfactory method of discussion with the public about the morality of their 
health-effecting behaviour, even if it is used to arrive at a normative position. 
However, too broad a version of the moral theory risks not fulfilling its function at 
all.  There is a number of considerations about the nature of the theory that are stated 
or implied in the papers which require more detail.  
                                                 
25
 It is standard to regard utilitarianism as a form of consequentialism, though Foot (1985) regards 
consequentialism as what is most wrong about utilitarianism and Jacobson (2008) argues that 
utilitarianism is not consequentialist. I return to this point in chapter 6. 
26
 John Harris, one of the utilitarians taken to task by Takala (2003), refers to himself as ‘broadly 
consequentialist’ (Harris 2004, p. 177).  
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How and what to calculate 
Any version of utilitarianism will need to address at some length what must be 
maximised and how it is calculated, not least because the difficulties with these 
calculations constitute influential objections to utilitarianism as a practical everyday 
morality. In cases like the trolley scenarios the calculations appear simple; five lives 
against one. Other versions of the trolley dilemma could be advanced so that some 
self-sacrifice (apart from the unpleasantness of having to decide) is needed, or that 
the one person whom most people would sacrifice is a daughter or favoured friend, 
and these would likely conclude with different results.
27
 Jacobson states that: 
The failure of the standard interpretation of Mill to account for his 
sentimentalism has led to a profound misreading of his moral theory, which 
makes Mill out to be a predecessor of the most fashionable view in the 
neighborhood of utilitarianism: namely, multilevel maximizing act-
consequentialism (2008, p.160). 
 
I offer this as an example of moral philosophy as an academic puzzle rather than a 
credible action guide for those who are thoughtful but perhaps not philosophical in 
outlook or education. Jacobson mentions the  ‘most fashionable’ type of 
utilitarianism, but as any daughter will confirm, fashion is transitory, bordering on 
the random, and so we can expect this position, assuming that it is justifiable, to 
change over time. In everyday life we know what it is to say that this or that option 
goes better, all things considered, though we may struggle to say exactly what has 
been maximised or how the calculations have been undertaken  or what, exactly, has 
been considered. Objections to the requirements that we ought to seek maximisation, 
and that this requires detailed calculations and comparisons can both be met by the 
notion of satisficing utilitarianism, whereby options which produce enough utility 
                                                 
27
 Kagan (1989) for example notes that ordinary morality forbids violating special obligations to 
family or professional duties even if better consequences follow, all things considered. 
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rather than most utility are allowed.
28
 This might allow individuals to say that a 
calculation has been done whereas what has really been undertaken is to prioritise 
individual enjoyment over harms to everyone else, but this is a problem for all 
utilitarian justification, and can be addressed in how individuals are held to account 
for their decisions. I discuss this in chapter 8. There is some empirical support for the 
view that we are intuitively biased in our own favour (Greene, 2013) and in any case 
the calculations are so subjective that external disinterested review simply is not 
possible, so the most that can be required of any theoretical account is to argue that 
people ought to make a calculation, that it should be as inclusive and unbiased as 
possible and that they should be able to defend their choice of maximised or 
satisficed property.  
 
Act or rule? 
Utilitarianism in its classical formulation regards calculations for each act as 
necessary so that aggregate utility is maximised, whereas recognising difficulties in 
calculations, rule utilitarians formulated rules which maximise utility if followed. 
Both forms attract serious objections. Act utilitarianism requires implausibly detailed 
calculations for every moral act, but perhaps more tellingly, it requires agents to 
perform acts which intuitively individuals think are wrong, like pushing the fat man 
in front of the trolley. So even if threshold deontologists (Alexander, 2008)  may 
find it necessary to kill one innocent man to save a city, this would be done with 
acceptance that it is a wrong act and only because a very high threshold for benefit is 
reached. Act utilitarianism, in its thoroughgoing form, would not see this as a wrong 
but justified act, but a correct act required, at much lower levels of benefit. Portmore 
                                                 
28
 See Jenkins and Nolan (2010), and Bradley (2006) for a critique. 
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(2011) suggests that a murder must be committed if it produces single utile (the 
smallest unit of utility) more than alternative course of action. Most people would 
find this counter-intuitive and using any form of reflective equilibrium would result 
in the theory being rejected. To counter this it has been suggested (Lopez et al., 
2009) that deontological side constraints should restrict the choices available, and in 
contemporary forms of act utilitarianism, genuinely action guiding in a particular 
society, professional codes of conduct and the law
29
 may perform this role. This 
discussion shows once more the difficulty in applying a single moral theory. In 
different ways, deontology and utilitarianism are combined, with each theory 
addressing a fault in the other. 
 
Rule utilitarianism was developed in response to this quandary, and yet it brings its 
own set of problems. Principally, an agent may find himself obtaining less utility by 
following the rule than by calculating utility for an act. It does not follow from a 
claim that we would be hard pushed to calculate utility for all acts that morality 
allows that we calculate none. So a rule, widely accepted, that more utility is 
obtained if people do not lie to each other, would not apply where someone clearly 
bent on murder asks if you know the whereabouts of his intended victim. The rule 
utilitarian forsakes either his chosen theory or maximising utility; or he could specify 
the rule ever further, in which case rule utilitarianism eventually collapses into act 
utilitarianism. This level of analysis causes some problems with health-effecting acts 
because some behaviour, like tombstoning, damages health as the result of a single 
act, while others, like smoking, damage health over time. Health promotion is 
                                                 
29
 I say may because accepting the punishments that the law hands down may also simply form part of 
the calculations.  
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generally a rule based enterprise which occasionally considers individual acts. I 
discuss this further in chapter 6. 
 
R.M. Hare’s dual level account 
R.M.Hare proposed a dual level account in his book Moral Thinking,
30
 offering a 
solution to the debate between act and rule versions of utilitarianism. In everyday 
morality we can be guided by the first level of moral thinking consisting of intuitive 
rules, formed by experiences and moral emotions, constituting a form of rule 
utilitarianism. These prima facie rules are selected by the second level of critical 
thinking which is also required when the intuitive principles conflict. This level of 
thinking, when required, can operate at the level of acts, and the developed account 
combines the features of act and rule utilitarianism. The principles themselves ‘have 
to be selected by critical thinking; if not by our own critical thinking, by that of 
people whom we trust to be able to do it’ (Hare, 1981, p.47). I take this assistance by 
a trusted other to concern the selection and refinement of the prima facie rules rather 
that their application in a calculation of the utility of a particular act as this will 
likely involve some careful weighting of preferences known only to the actor.  There 
is potentially some confusion as to the extent to which the prima facie rules need to 
be universaliseable. If they are universal rules then the formulation will be of the sort 
that ‘people shouldn’t smoke’, whereas an individual is perhaps more likely to refer 
to an intuitive and specific rule that he shouldn’t smoke, or perhaps, recognizing that 
this is problematic for utilitarianism, that ‘he is permitted to smoke.’  
 
                                                 
30
 The account can be seen in earlier papers. For example Hare (1975). 
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The account of moral responsibility for health that will be proposed in Chapter 6 
emphasises obligations in terms of process rather than outcomes, without prescribing 
exactly what the process ought to be. My suggestion is that it be broadly utilitarian 
for the reasons that I have offered, and the discussion about acts and rules is required 
principally because I will be characterising and critiquing health promotion as health 
maximising rule utilitarianism. My proposal stands in opposition to this, and for 
practical purposes it does not really matter at the critical level whether the agent 
specifies universal rules so that they apply to him, or takes an outright act-utilitarian 
approach. Hare’s critical level equates act utilitarian calculations with that kind of 
rule utilitarianism ‘which allows its rules to be of unlimited specificity and which 
therefore is not distinguishable from act utilitarianism (1981, p.43).  Rather than 
tortuous reasoning about acts and rules, what is needed is the moral sensitivity to see 
that health-effecting behaviours as undertaken within a considered version of the 
good life are instances which often cannot be settled simply by following a rule, and 
must also include an awareness of how one’s actions affects others.  This sensitivity 
forms part of many models of ethical decision making and can itself be developed 
and refined by critical reflection (Park, 2012). Critical thinking is required at some 
level of specification in order to meet the responsibility of health that I will propose. 
 
A dual level model might be considered complex but it is consistent with the way 
that our moral decision making is undertaken within professional health care
31
 and 
more generally, empirical research undertaken long after Hare’s work appeared lends 
some support. Much research uses case studies presenting dilemmas like the trolley 
problem, and claims to show that initial judgements tend to be deontological while 
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 For example, decisions about breaking confidentiality require reasoning at the level of each act, and 
the general public interest in maintaining the presumption of confidentiality, that is the maintenance 
of the rule. (DH, 2003a, p.34). 
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later, more considered judgements tend to be utilitarian (Suter and Hertwig, 2011). 
So for the trolley problem, an initial reluctance to divert is countermanded by later 
thought which typically requires diversion but not pushing the fat man. A problem 
with research using these sorts of dilemmas is that the subjects are often presented 
with a binary choice with the assumption that an initial reluctance to kill an innocent 
person represents a deontological judgement. However, it is possible that the 
reasoning resulting in this choice is rule utilitarian rather than deontological, and it 
cannot be assumed that an initial intuitive choice is in favour of (what is interpreted 
as) deontological rather than a rejection of the act utilitarian option (Conway and 
Gawronski, 2013). Other studies have presented the initial response as ‘intuitive’ 
rather than deontological (Feinberg et al., 2012), consistent with Hare’s normative 
theory. The picture is of course much more complex than this and so it is not claimed 
that the evidence demonstrates that Hare’s theory is utilised in practice as he 
presented it, but it adds to the evidence presented earlier suggesting not only the 
plausibility of utilitarian thinking generally, but also the dual level version of it. 
 
I am aware that the discussion on the details of the theory that I propose to utilise 
plays somewhat fast and loose with the requirement for coherence in a theoretical 
account, and that it might be suspected that I am moulding the account so that it fits 
my lower level analyses. I offer three defences to this suggested critique. First, that 
adapting the account so that it fits lower level analyses is what the process of 
reflective equilibrium requires of us where there is conflict.  Second, the account 
could be developed and nuanced further, but that would turn it into a thesis about 
theoretical underpinning of health-effecting behaviour, and so the challenge is to 
provide sufficient detail so that the lower level analyses can have some external 
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justification without overloading the reader or the moral agent with extraneous 
detail. Third, and most important, a fully developed theory that agents ought to make 
this calculation and do it in the way that I stipulate would simply make detailed 
prescriptions about process amounting to the same patronising claim for moral 
expertise which was rejected insofar as it applied to outcomes. My chosen deductive 
approach then can be described as broadly utilitarian, but the real normative thrust is 
to argue that obligations for our own and others’ health do exist and therefore need 
to be identified.  My justification for explaining what they are and how they should 
be calculated is a plausible place to start a discussion – but it is for individuals and 
those affected by their behaviour to agree the extent of the obligations and what the 
response should be should they fail to be delivered. 
 
Inductive arguments: case studies and analogies  
The normative sections of the thesis use examples as a narrative rather than 
argumentative focus. Responsibilities for others’ health are exemplified by blood 
donation, and arguments for responsibility for our own health use the example of 
tombstoning, and in particular a specific tombstoning accident.  Case studies are a 
popular method of argumentation in bioethics but care must be taken to be clear 
about their exact purpose. They can for example be used as a sort of abbreviated 
inductive argument, of the sort ‘A did x which is commonly judged as a good action; 
therefore a general maxim prescribing x is a good maxim’ (Spranzi 2012, p.483).  It 
would be safe to suggest that this is the sort of reasoning encouraged by the makers 
of television advertisements promoting blood and organ donation such as those 
discussed in chapter 7 which use appealing stories, fictional and factual, as 
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normative narratives.
32
 Similar reasoning can be seen in the news and promotional 
videos used to discourage jumping from seaside piers. Even though the normative 
papers in the thesis use the examples in the titles, the reasoning does not proceed 
overtly from them to the supposed general maxim. Deductive arguments are offered 
with the examples as the conclusion. The papers are presented in this form because 
examples are more likely to be engaging for the reader than an abstract philosophical 
argument. The most that can be said, inductively speaking, for the examples is that 
they are also capable of forming part of the process of reflective equilibrium 
whereby theoretical applications are applied and tested against their practical 
conclusions. If these conclusions are at odds with our considered intuitions then the 
theory can be amended to accommodate them. Only in this way can the case studies 
be considered the start of an inductive process, albeit an iterative and explanatory 
one that has concluded before academic papers have been drafted. 
 
I have argued that I have used the stories as examples of applications of deductive 
reasoning from an identified and partially developed moral theory but examples like 
this are clearly capable of being used as steps in more formal inferential reasoning. 
The problem of detail at which I hinted in the discussion about moral theory also 
applies here. I noted in the introductory chapter that theoretical justification is 
seldom detailed in academic papers in the bioethical literature, and this is arguably 
truer for inductive processes than for deductive ones, and it is especially pertinent in 
discussion with a population who live their lives perfectly well without being 
encumbered with concern about whether the stories played out on their television 
sets are examples, parables, metaphors or analogies, and the precise way in which 
                                                 
32
 See Charon and Montello (2002) on the role of narrative in medical ethics. 
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the conclusions that they are being invited to agree with and act upon (I ought to 
register as a blood donor; I ought not jump off a pier into shallow water) form part of 
a sequence of logical reasoning. Too much detail about analogies and case studies 
presented would probably be a disincentive to engage with them, acting against the 
emotional impact which is a strong reason for their use (Spranzi, 2012). However, as 
Trudy Govier (1989) points out these sorts of arguments are also capable of being 
dismissed as being merely rhetorical,
33
 and this might be expected if the analogy or 
metaphor is too outlandish and/or where the domains of reality between the similar 
examples are distant (Kienpointer, 2012).  If ‘reasoning from analogy is an 
extremely controversial and complex form of reasoning’ (Macagno and Walton, 
2009, p.179), it must also be simple and emotionally engaging.  
 
The main analogy in the normative papers is between tombstoning and other health-
effecting behaviours. Even though the thesis a whole relies on deductive reasoning, 
the point and value of this individual paper would be much diminished if the analogy 
is obviously false.  Following a move from the case study to tombstoning in general, 
the argument can be presented in these terms: 
1. Tombstoning can be enjoyable but can also cause harm to the tombstoner 
and others, directly and indirectly. 
2. The potential harm is insufficient to render it always morally forbidden 
because the risk of harm is balanced by it being an enjoyable experience. 
                                                 
33
 I offer as an example the use of the example of a patient drinking water from a flower vase which 
was discussed in Robert Francis QC’s recent enquiries into failings at a NHS hospital. Francis found 
no evidence that the episode occurred. The case is still being used, shorn of its relevant detail in 
political debate. For example in prime Minister’s Questions on 6th November 2013 the Prime Minister 
shouted that ‘I am not going to take lectures from a Government who saw patients drinking out of 
flower vases.’ Hansard  (2013, at column 243) reports the final word as being [interrupted] (Hansard 
(2013) but it is clearly audible on the BBC video clip (BBC, 2013). 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmhansrd/cm131106/debtext/131106-0001.htm 
(last accessed 26th November 2013) 
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3. The moral status of each act of tombstoning requires an analysis of risks 
and harms. 
4. Individuals ought to consider tombstoning in light of its enjoyment and 
the effects on themselves and those around them. 
5. Smoking [for example] is like tombstoning in important respects. 
6. Therefore individuals ought to consider smoking in light of its enjoyment 
and the effects on themselves and those around them. 
 
The argument is presented as applying to smoking but it can also be applied to other 
instances of health-effecting behaviour, so that it can be inferred that: 
Individuals ought to consider their health-effecting behaviour in light of its 
enjoyment and the effects on themselves and those around them. 
 
This is a similar conclusion to one arrived at following a deductive utilitarian process 
using the moral theories and processes discussed earlier, and the equivalence is the 
basis of a claim that reflective equilibrium has been secured. The inductive argument 
is only sound to the extent that the normative duties of reflection required by the 
conclusion of ‘consideration’ of tombstoning can be reasonably inferred from the 
examples as presented, and can only be transferred more widely to the extent that 
other health-effecting behaviours are similar. Similarities and differences between 
smoking and tombstoning can be represented on the table on the following page. 
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Feature Tombstoning Smoking 
Enjoyment Yes Yes, but also simply habitual. 
Preparation Can require travel to pier Not much – going to the shop 
Stratification Yes Perhaps. Evidence unclear. 
Harm to self Single episode Almost exclusively cumulative 
Harm to others 
Mainly indirect (but can be 
direct) 
Mainly indirect (but also direct) 
Addictive Possibly to some extent. Yes 
 
Table 1 – Similarities between tombstoning and smoking. 
The list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. The features ‘enjoyment’ and ‘requires 
preparation’, refer to the way in which the act of smoking a cigarette or tombstoning 
can properly be subject to considered calculation. Smoking a cigarette can be 
performed as an unreflective act requiring no preparation whereas tombstoning 
requires at least a decision, reflective or otherwise, to jump, and often (but not 
always) needs preliminary decisions to go to the pier or cliff.  Stratification refers to 
the possibility of minimising harm; tombstoners can minimise their risk of harm by 
being properly equipped and prepared (following advice from the Royal National 
Lifeboat Institution) and though it seems plausible that the harm caused by smoking 
has a correlative relationship with the amount of cigarettes consumed, ‘official’ 
advice concentrates very firmly on cessation rather than reduction.
34
 Both pastimes 
potentially harm their devotees though the incidence and mechanism are different. 
                                                 
34
 Early data confirmed for example that the risk of lung cancer increases with the number of 
cigarettes smoked (Doll and Peto, 1978). However, Secondary prevention of airway disease is barely 
improved with reduction rather than cessation (Godtfredsen et al., 2002a, b). A Cochrane review 
concluded that it is uncertain how much health benefit there is from cutting down (Stead and 
Lancaster, 2007). 
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More smokers than tombstoners suffer ill health; for smokers it is mainly cumulative 
whereas for tombstoners it is mainly as the result of a single incidence. There are 
direct harms to others from the habits. For smoking these include illness and 
irritation caused by second hand smoke and injuries caused by smoking related fires, 
and for tombstoning, injuries inflicted on fellow tombstoners by jumping on top of 
them. Indirect harms, that is setbacks to interests and emotional distress to the 
friends and families of injured or diseased smokers and tombstoners are similar. 
Addiction is relevant to the analysis because it impairs autonomy and agency which 
are required for (full) moral responsibility. Smoking is clearly addictive, 
tombstoning is not.
35
   
 
It is not suggested that there is a calculus or rubric to settle the question of whether, 
or to what extent the analogies are valid or meaningful. Argument by analogy, 
despite its formal expressions, is an inexact process, most effective when used, as in 
this thesis, together with other kinds of arguments (Kienpointner, 2012). The most 
important question is how persuasive they are; as presented here, I find them 
persuasive but their success as arguments if not as motivators for change, is a 
question for readers rather than the writer. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has detailed the philosophical approaches taken in the remainder of the 
thesis and has aimed to complete the theoretical picture left unfinished by the papers 
which form the original contribution to knowledge of the thesis. I will revisit 
theoretical issues within the papers where necessary. In sketching theoretical 
                                                 
35
 The range of activities which can be regarded as addictive continues to expand. Recent evidence 
claims  sunbathing as an addiction (Fell et al., 2014) 
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approaches that I claim have sufficient empirical and normative justification I hope 
to have steered into the  middle ground between an unwieldy, theory driven 
academic puzzle on the one hand and unreflective, capricious and potentially self-
interested emotionality of the other, and to have used case studies and analogies in 
ways that illuminate rather than manipulate. Greene (2013) argues that, 
fundamentally, utilitarianism is not just a decision making procedure, but is 
concerned with what matters most, what is worth valuing and for what reasons, and I 
offer this as a good aspiration for the papers that follow, taken together.  I am not 
arguing that here is a moral theory that I approve of, and that you ought to follow it. 
Instead what the papers boil down to is saying that here is an account that I think that 
you will recognise, and which offers you a way of working out what your obligations 
are in respect of your health and other people’s health. It is a process that you may 
care to follow, but if you think about it and decide it’s not for you, than at least you 
will have thought, hopefully, about what’s worth valuing and what you ought to do 
to protect it. I will return to this and what it means for professional health care in the 
final chapter of the thesis, but for now, the introductory section is complete. In Part 
II of the thesis I offer analyses of responsibility for health and blame, and normative 
accounts of our obligations in respect of our own and other’s health, all of which 
have been published in peer-reviewed academic journals. 
 
 
  Page 130  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Page 131  
 
Part II: Published Papers. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Saying something interesting about responsibility for health 
 
Abstract 
The concept of responsibility for health is a significant feature of health discourse 
and public health policy, but application of the concept is poorly understood.  This 
paper offers an analysis of the concept in two ways. Following an examination of the 
use of the word ‘responsibility’ in the nursing and wider health literature using three 
examples, the concept of ‘responsibility for health’ as fulfilling a social function is 
discussed with reference to policy documents from the United Kingdom. The 
philosophical literature on moral responsibility is introduced, and in considering two 
versions, reactive attitudes and accountability, it is argued that in application both 
can be regarded, though with different emphasis, as being constituted in three parts: 
(i) a responsible agent (ii) having obligations (responsibilities) and (iii) being 
susceptible to being held responsible (that is blamed) if he fails to meet them. The 
three stage model is consistent with the examples of the word responsibility in use, 
but application to the social function model causes a number of problems for health 
care practice, especially for the reactive attitudes account. Apart from considerable 
problems in stating what exactly the obligations are and how they can be justified; 
and how blame might justly be apportioned and by whom, the very ideas of 
obligation and blame are in conflict with health care systems and professional 
nursing practice which have foundations deeply embedded in the notion of the 
supremacy of personal autonomy. It is concluded that current application of the 
concept of responsibility for health is conceptually incoherent, and if it is to retain its 
place in health policy and discourse, urgent remedy is required. 
 
 
Note on text 
The text of the four published papers that form Part II of the thesis is the same as the 
publisher’s pdf versions which can be found in in the appendix.  There are some very 
minor differences in headings made by publisher’s copy editors, and a small number 
of references have been changed for consistency. 
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Introduction  
It cannot be said that the issue of responsibility for health is new (Reiser, 1985), but 
current fiscal uncertainty, technological advances, and the unrelenting increase in the 
prevalence and incidence of illnesses related to lifestyle combine to give the issue 
renewed significance. Despite this, there is little in the nursing literature about what 
the concept of ‘responsibility for health’ consists of, and why it is so important and 
so difficult. The simple aim of this paper, following Paley (1996), is to ‘say 
something interesting’ about responsibility for health. I offer two analyses of 
‘responsibility’ as applied to professional health care. First, I discuss examples of the 
use of the word ‘responsibility’ found in the nursing and broader literature. Second I 
consider the concept of ‘responsibility for health’ as fulfilling a social function. I 
then turn to the philosophical literature on moral responsibility, and in considering 
two versions, reactive attitudes and accountability, argue that in application both can 
be regarded, though with different emphasis, as being constituted in three parts: (i) a 
responsible agent (ii) having obligations (responsibilities) and (iii) being susceptible 
to being held responsible (that is blamed) if he fails to meet them. The three stage 
model is consistent with the examples in use, but application to the social function 
model causes a number of problems, especially for the reactive attitudes account. 
Apart from considerable problems in stating what exactly the obligations are and 
how they can be justified; and how blame might justly be apportioned and by whom, 
the very ideas of obligation and blame are in conflict within health care systems and 
professional nursing practice which have foundations deeply embedded in the notion 
of the supremacy of personal autonomy.  
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Two concepts, many conceptions 
An obvious starting point is that the term ‘responsibility for health’ contains two 
distinct concepts, responsibility and health, and it might reasonably be suggested that 
combining them will obfuscate analysis. Health is variously understood, famously by 
Boorse (1975, 1977) and Nordenfelt (for example, 1996, 2007). In Boorse’s account 
health is descriptively merely the absence of disease, defined in terms of statistical 
normality, while Nordenfelt’s evaluative account understands health more 
holistically as the ability to realize life goals. These different conceptions can result 
in practical differences in health care all of which could justifiably claim to be 
directed at improving health (Nordenfelt, 1993). Similarly, the concept 
‘responsibility for health’ will differ depending on which account of health is 
utilised. To understand why this potential confusion need not cloud the analysis, it is 
necessary to be clear about the difference between concepts and conceptions.  
 
The distinction is that conceptions lie lower in a vertical continuum between general 
and specific usages of a word. Conceptions offer a more ‘determinate specification’ 
(Miller, 2010, p. 812) of the parent concept, operationalising and applying it. 
Inevitably this means that two or more conceptions can be derived from a single 
concept. Vertically each conception must be consistent with the parent concept or 
they will be conceptions of different concepts, but horizontally, between conceptions 
within a concept, there may be incommensurable differences. Where this happens we 
have, following Gallie (1956) ‘essentially contested concepts’. Gallie had in mind 
artistic and political concepts (Ruben, 2010), but it has been suggested that medicine 
meets the necessary criteria (McKnight, 2010) set out at some length by Gallie. A 
further relevant example is discrimination, used differently by the UK governing 
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bodies of nurses and doctors. Nursing’s professional regulator, the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council (NMC) (2008) states that ‘You must not discriminate in any way 
against those in your care.
1’ The UK medical regulator, the General Medical Council 
(GMC) states that ‘You must not unfairly discriminate […] ’(GMC, 2006 p.10).  
Whilst operationalising a concept fundamental to professional healthcare practice, 
the two regulators have used different conceptions of the same concept; the NMC 
has used the word evaluatively, while in using the word descriptively, the GMC 
requires an evaluative adverb. It is not suggested that doctors treat patients 
differently (though it could be suggested), only that different conceptions of the 
concept ‘discrimination’ have resulted in a position where on application of the verb 
‘to discriminate’ separate from evaluative adverbs, doctors are potentially able to do 
something that nurses are not, that is discriminate fairly (Hellman, 2008; Moreau, 
2010).
2
 
 
Argument about which conception is correct is ultimately futile as each can be 
derived from the parent concept, and this is potentially a problem, though rarely 
acknowledged, for inductive concept analysis methodology which may attempt an 
improbable synthesis between these essentially contested conceptions.
3
 Similarly, 
different conceptions of health are important in operationalising conceptions of 
‘responsibility for health’, but ambiguity is manifested in the conceptions rather than 
the parent concept. Insofar as the task of this paper is to say something interesting 
about the parent concept, rather than any specific operationalising conception, the 
analysis is more fruitfully directed at the concept of ‘responsibility’. The importance 
                                                 
1
 In England and Wales the National Health Service as a whole takes this evaluative line in the NHS 
constitution. 
2
 In English law under the Equality Act 2010 Discrimination requires less favourable treatment 
3
 None of the 1261 ‘hits’ in a BNI and CINAHL search using the term ‘concept analysis’ (1st February 
2011) referenced Gallie’s paper (The number of hits would include some identified twice). 
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of the different conceptions of health lie in determining obligations, outside the 
scope of this paper. 
 
Work required of the concept 
The justification of undertaking an analysis and the methodology employed depends 
on the work the concept is required to do.
4
 One purpose could be to undertake 
concept analysis to explore what responsibility for health (or more broadly 
‘responsibility’ within the health care environment) means to individuals, with the 
aim of arriving at a composite definition which could be used in further research.   
 
Concept Analysis (1): responsibility in use 
Anyone wishing to clarify any concept relevant to nursing practice has a large and 
growing body of work to build upon. Despite substantial critiques from, inter alia, 
Paley (1996), Beckwith et al. (2008) and Risjord (2009), the proliferation of concept 
analyses in nursing journals shows little sign of abatement. It is perhaps surprising 
that many published examples show little appetite for engagement with the 
ontological, epistemological and (perhaps most surprising) methodological problems 
identified in the critiques, following instead a substantially standardised process 
rarely found outside the nursing literature.  Were Walker and Avant’s (2011) concept 
analysis procedure to be followed, the literature, dictionaries and theses would be 
searched towards the aim of arriving at ‘a precise operational definition’ (p. 158); the 
result of answering the empirical question “ how are the words ‘responsibility for 
health’ used”, rather than an analysis of the concepts denoted by the words 
(Wedgwood, 2006). Unfortunately many of the relevant papers found using the term 
                                                 
4
 Walker and Avant (2011, p.160) suggest that it could be a concept that ‘has always bothered you.’ 
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‘responsibility’5 manage to discuss and use the term without saying what it means. 
Three examples illustrate this; adolescent diabetes, women’s magazines, and public 
attitudes to health care policy.
6
 
 
In the US, Anderson et al. (1990) developed a widely used questionnaire to measure 
‘individual family member’s perceptions of who takes responsibility for a broad 
range of diabetes tasks’ (p. 479). The questionnaire asks participants to choose from 
a list of 3 choices against a number of situations or tasks, for example ‘remembering 
the day of clinic appointment.’ The options are: 
1. Parent(s) take or initiate responsibility for this almost all of the time. 
 
2. Parent(s) and child share responsibility for this about equally. 
 
3. Child takes or initiates responsibility for this almost all of the time. 
 
Within the paper, the choices are explained so that ‘the respondent assigned a 1 if the 
parent was predominantly “in charge” (p. 481) of the task’. It should be clear that I 
am not criticising the paper, merely pointing out that the term ‘responsibility’ 
apparently needs no explanation as none was offered to those completing the 
questionnaire. It is assumed that they know what it means, and what is available in 
the text by way of explanation refers in passing to being ‘in charge.’  
 
This paper is one of many analysed in Hanna and Decker’s (2009) concept analysis 
of ‘assuming responsibility for self-care among adolescents with type 1 diabetes.’ 
                                                 
5
 Using the databases, CINAHL and MEDLINE (14
th
 November  2011), there were 11475 ‘hits’ 
searching for ‘responsibility’ in the title, and 1123 ‘hits’ searching for ‘responsibility for health’ in the 
title. A full analysis or categorisation of all sources identified was not undertaken. A partial but 
unsystematic review suggested that many of the papers identified were not relevant to the argument 
presented in this paper.  
6
 The examples were chosen because they illustrate the points I wish to make. I do not claim that these 
papers are in any sense representative. 
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Similarly there is no discussion about what ‘responsibility’ means in the general 
sense. The conclusion of the analysis is that the attributes of assuming responsibility 
include that it is ‘[…] (c) a process with the goal of ownership and (d) a process 
involving autonomy in behaviours and decision making’ (2009, p.101). The model 
case (part of Walker and Avant’s (2011) procedure) offered is a fictional 17 year old 
who says that she ‘will be fully responsible when she is able to be totally 
independent in doing all the diabetes care tasks and being the one who makes the 
decisions about them without any reminders’ (p.102).  Olinder et al. (2011) report a 
grounded theory study utilising interviews with adolescents where responsibility 
emerged as a core category and provided the principal ingredient in a model to 
facilitate the clarification of responsibility. They state that (2011, p.5) ‘A lack of 
responsibility seems to be a main reason for missed bolus doses and insufficient self 
management’, but this has several potential meanings. 
 
Second, in a fascinating account of the discourse about responsibility for health in 
English – Canadian women’s magazines, Roy (2008) shows how the discourse 
reinforces ‘neo-liberal ideas by conceptualising responsibility for one’s health as not 
only something that can be chosen but something that ought to be chosen’ (p. 473). 
The discourses not only cover the familiar path of health promotion, but also urge 
that women be determined in pushing agendas in relationships with physicians and 
to be brave in the face of debilitating illness; ‘constructing continued optimism as an 
important moral obligation, how one with a disease or disability ought to behave (p. 
472).’  In one reviewed article a woman with multiple sclerosis defines responsibility 
as ‘[…] accomplishing the things I wanted in life right now. Today’ (MacLean, 
1999, p. 73, cited in Roy, 2008, p. 471). This seems to be a somewhat idiosyncratic 
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understanding of responsibility, re-emphasising potential pitfalls of inductive 
analysis. The paper generally presents an idealised understanding of responsibility 
promulgated in the magazines which, in claiming robust obligations whilst failing to 
address or even acknowledge barriers to meeting them, might be considered more 
moralistic than moral. The paper does not engage in a discussion about what the 
concept of responsibility means in general, focussing instead on the various 
conceptions presented, but the title resonates with the work on teenagers with 
diabetes; “‘Taking charge of your health”: discourses of responsibility in English-
Canadian women’s magazines’. 
 
Third, in the UK, the King’s Fund (2004) commissioned a survey to assess public 
attitudes to health policy. In the quantitative phase a series of yes/no questions were 
presented. ‘88% …agreed that individuals are responsible for their health’ (2004 p. 
11)
7. However, more than ‘40% agreed that there are too many factors outside 
individual control to hold people responsible for their own health’ (2004 p. 11).  The 
questionnaire does not appear
8
 to explain what is meant by responsibility for their 
health, but the high rate of agreement suggests that respondents understand what is 
meant.  
 
There is no indication in any of three  examples  that the lack of definition or 
explanation of responsibility has caused problems; evidently those who answer the 
questionnaires have something in mind, but the form of the questions and the way 
that they are reported give little indication of what more detailed understandings 
might be. These incomplete understandings, even when they represent everyday 
                                                 
7
 Elsewhere in the published document this figure is given as 89%. 
8
 The actual questionnaire used is not reproduced in the publication. 
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usage make a nuanced inductive concept analysis problematic. I shall return to these 
partial accounts, but for now I turn to a second use of the term, which recognises that 
some concepts have broader social functions (Miller, 2010).   
 
Concept Analysis (2): responsibility as social function. 
The concept ‘responsibility for health’ fulfils an important social function within 
socialised medicine, and is used for example in policy documents to explain 
respective roles within that system.
9
 In this context, clarifying meaning cannot be a 
matter for inductive analysis of partial usage because the concept is required to do 
the work of providing a framework for helping people to understand just what it is 
that they should or must do, and this social function cannot be fulfilled unless the 
recipients of the message understand what having ‘responsibility for health’ requires.  
Inductive analysis of the word ‘responsibility’ in use may give insight into how the 
message is variously received but that does not abolish the need for clarity in its 
transmission.  An objection that it is not for the Government to tell us, for example, 
that we ought not to smoke would be to confuse the global concept of responsibility 
with its determinative conceptions. However, rejecting one or many conceptions 
does not entail rejection of the concept and understanding of the determinative 
conceptions requires a general understanding of the concept. If this is the case, and 
the concept ‘responsibility for health’ does form a social function within socialised10 
medicine, then there should be clarity about what this means. A cursory glance at 
National Health Service documents reveals that this is not the case. 
                                                 
9
 In fact the broad term responsibility is increasingly heard in myriad social and political contexts for 
example in welfare provision (Brown, 2009,  Maltravers. 2007). 
10
 The UK National Health Service is possibly the paradigm case of socialised medicine. The drawing 
on collective resources for treatment might provide a reason for the view that certain health enhancing 
behaviours are morally obligatory, but not the only reasons. I do not mean to suggest that the concept 
responsibility for health has no meaning within private health care systems. 
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The (former) Prime Minister’s11 introduction to the strategy to reduce obesity 
provides a clear statement which illustrates the confusion: 
There should be no doubt that maintaining a healthy weight must be the 
responsibility of individuals first – it is not the role of government to tell 
people how to live their lives and nor would this work (DH, 2008, p. iii). 
 
First the Government tells us what we must do (maintain a healthy weight), and then 
it tells us that it is not their role to tell us how to do it. The relevant clause in the 
NHS constitution
12
 states that:  
You should recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your 
own, and your family’s, good health and well-being, and take some personal 
responsibility for it (DH, 2009a, p.9). 
  
Similar to the literature reviewed earlier, this leaves the meaning of ‘responsibility’ 
open to interpretation, particularly within the phrase ‘some responsibility’, and the 
normative prescription simply requires recognition that a significant contribution is 
possible, and not that it be made. Further explanation is provided in the handbook to 
the constitution.  Entitled ‘what this means in practice’, the clarification is: 
You can talk to your doctor, nurse (including health visitors and midwives) or 
therapist, use NHS Direct (online at www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk or telephone 0845 
4647), or go online at NHS Choices (www.nhs.uk). You can ask about what 
support you might be offered in managing your condition yourself or changing 
to a healthy lifestyle (e.g. stopping smoking, reducing weight, exercise or 
reducing excessive alcohol consumption) (DH, 2010c, p. 67). 
       
This explanatory note falls considerably short of explaining either the nature or the 
details of responsibility,
13
 and by utilising language which hints at information 
giving (you can), the clarification sets a rather different tone than the normative 
clause (you should) in the constitution, and the imperative (must) in the Prime 
Minister’s introduction to a previous document.  Having identified its social 
                                                 
11
 The Prime Minster at the time was Gordon Brown. 
12
 The constitution applies to NHS services in England and Wales. 
13
 the document is addressed to ‘Patients and the public’ 
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function, the guidance fails to guide. The Scottish NHS version initially goes further. 
Under the heading ‘What we expect from you’ it is stated that: 
‘You can help yourself, other patients and NHS Staff if you do the 
following;’ Look after your own health and have a healthy lifestyle. This 
could mean; taking more exercise, eating a balanced diet, stopping smoking, 
not drinking too much alcohol, not using drugs, and using a condom if having 
sex’ (NHS Scotland, 2005, p.15). 
  
Though the heading is stated as an expectation, the language in the text is softer (you 
can help yourself). Similar internal ambiguity is evident in the Report of the Prime 
Minister’s Commission on the future of Nursing and Midwifery in England (2010).  
Recommendation 13 (2010, p.102) includes the statement that: 
Nurses and Midwives must acknowledge that they are seen as role models for 
healthy living and take personal responsibility for their own health (Prime 
Minister’s Commission, 2010, p.102). 
  
The language is declamatory (must), but the proposed draft pledge less so: 
Nurses and midwives, recognising our important role in improving health and 
wellbeing and reducing inequalities, will engage actively in the design, 
monitoring and delivery of services to achieve this. We acknowledge that we 
are seen as role models and will try to live up to this responsibility (Prime 
Minister’s Commission, 2010, p.57). 
 
The response was delayed because of the general election and subsequent change in 
government. Despite the sentiment, expressed by the Minister, that the report ‘does 
not go far enough’ (DH, 2011, p.5) the recommendations noted above will not be 
implemented in full. The section of recommendation 13 requiring that nurses take 
personal responsibility for their own health is ignored; the response is restricted to 
the implementation of the Boorman report (Boorman, 2009), ‘NHS Health and Well-
being’ which recommended a less prescriptive provision of services centred on 
prevention ‘of both work related and lifestyle influenced ill health’ (p. 29). The 
recommended pledge will not be implemented. Instead, ‘Employers need to use the 
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Principles of Nursing Practice as a pledge...’ (DH, 2011 p.6). These Principles, 
developed and published not by the regulator but by the Royal College of Nursing 
(RCN) (Manley et al., 2011), a union representing less than two thirds of registered 
nurses, do not acknowledge nurses as role models in a public health sense. Though 
the Commission’s relevant recommendations will not be implemented, the fact that 
they attracted such wide support from the nursing ‘establishment’ (including the 
Department of Health’s Chief Nursing Officer, the RCN and the NMC) lends them 
considerable authority, and the watered down response, facilitated by the same 
organisations, is further illustrative of the general confusion. 
 
To recap, I have offered two possible accounts of how responsibility for health might 
be understood and analysed. The first account, which could be deepened by 
inductive concept analysis, is or could be theory forming, empirical and stems from 
ordinary usage of the word by members of the public and patients who answered 
questions about responsibility.  It is incomplete rather than inadequate in its 
expression.  The second is theory formed and normative but requires clarification 
and deeper understanding to be effective.  The policy examples demonstrate that the 
concept has a social, action guiding function but there is no clarity about what is 
required and the mixed messages illustrate an account which is as inadequate as it is 
incomplete.  The task for the remainder of this paper is to argue that the two 
accounts I have offered are not incompatible, and that they and other usages of 
‘responsibility’ can be unified under a broader understanding of what responsibility 
for health means, and I proceed by introducing the philosophical literature on 
responsibility. Though this may provide a richer application of both of the accounts I 
have offered, philosophical illumination also reveals incoherence at the heart of 
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health care provision and practice; attempting to avoid this incoherence may be one 
cause of the partial accounts populating the literatures. 
 
The philosophical literature 
Causation 
Causation plays a major part in responsibility. When we say that X was responsible 
for Y, meaning can be restricted to X caused Y. The causal claims can include non-
moral and even inanimate objects. We say that ice was responsible for the collision, 
or the red sock was responsible for the pink washing. When we ask ‘who is 
responsible for the broken window?’ we ask how the window came to be broken. A 
small child throwing a stone is superficially and causally responsible for the broken 
window, but not, in Sie’s (2005) categorisation, deeply morally responsible because 
he is not a moral agent. Causation is also key in the relationship between being 
responsible for a thing and being responsible for our acts and omissions in relation to 
the thing. When we say that we are responsible for our health we cannot mean that 
we are responsible for all aspects for our health at all times. If ill health results from 
being struck by an asteroid, nothing that we did or omitted to do caused the injury. It 
could be said that my omission to be elsewhere was a factor but this is only relevant 
in the deeply morally responsible sense if I knew and understood that I was going to 
get hit, and that therefore I ought to have gone somewhere else to avoid it.  
 
Causative links between actions or omissions and poor outcomes for the things that 
we are responsible for are central to the question of what we ought to do to keep 
well, and why. A group correlation between smoking and heart disease does not 
mean that all heart disease is caused by smoking, or even that the heart disease of 
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smokers was caused by smoking. Smoking, though correlated with heart disease is 
neither necessary not sufficient for individual instances of heart disease. Inevitably 
the devil is in the detail for specific causative factors for specific diseases, but for 
this paper, it is enough to note that discussion about responsibility for health, 
involves deep, moral responsibility as well as superficial causal responsibility, and 
that because of the lack of certainty of individual causation it is not health per se that 
we are responsible for but rather our actions or omissions that threaten or enhance it. 
 
Other forms of responsibility 
H.L.A. Hart (1968) and others (for example, Cane 2002) have pointed out that 
responsibility comes in many forms, for example role responsibility and legal 
responsibility.
14
 It is important to distinguish between the various forms of 
responsibility, especially where they coincide. Consider the various forms of 
responsibility as they relate to Z, a user of heroin. Let us assume that Z has entered 
into an agreement (contract) with the health care team that he will not use heroin, 
and that if he does there is a consequence, say that he will be discharged from a 
rehabilitation unit (Houmanfar et al., 2008). We know that there is a law
15
 
prohibiting the possession of heroin, and so if he is found in possession he is liable to 
prosecution. For quasi-contractual
16
 and legal responsibility we can examine the 
agreement, or identify legislation or case law, and these are clear in defining what Z 
is obliged, contractually or legally to do (or not to do), as well as identifying what 
will happen to him if he fails in this responsibility.  
                                                 
14
 These refer to various sorts of responsibility attached to individuals, but we also talk about 
collective responsibility and responsibility of institutions (Wilmot, 2000; Dubbink and Smith, 2011). 
15
 The Misuse of drugs Act 1971 provides for a maximum sentence of seven years imprisonment for 
possession of a class A drug (including heroin). 
16
 I say quasi-contractual because I do not want to imply that the sort of agreement that I refer to is 
necessarily a legal contract. 
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There may be moral reasons for Z to avoid using heroin (Smith 2002), and no doubt 
these have influenced decisions that have made possession of heroin unlawful and 
the therapeutic contract acceptable. Fines and imprisonment may result from a 
breach of a legal responsibility, and discharge from rehabilitation results from a 
breach of the agreement. That these breaches may also represent moral failure is 
contingent but not necessary.  Moral responsibility differs in at least two respects 
here. First there are no unequivocal moral facts about taking heroin that make it 
absolutely the case that it is immoral.
17
 Many would hold that taking heroin is wrong 
and cite reasons in support, but there is also a view that taking heroin is morally 
permissible. Other health threatening behaviours also attract differing views about 
whether they are morally forbidden, allowed or (in some cases) obligatory or morally 
neutral. It cannot be said that taking heroin is immoral with the same certainty as it 
can be said that possessing heroin is unlawful. Z cannot deny the legal and quasi-
contractual responsibility not to take heroin, but he can take the view that there is 
nothing morally wrong with it.
18
  
 
Second, the consequences for failing to meet legal and contractual responsibilities 
are clearly articulated, but this is not the case when failing to meet a moral 
responsibility. The relationships between an agent, his moral obligations and the 
consequences of not meeting them form the basis of the philosophical concept of 
moral responsibility. Two versions are briefly reviewed; reactive attitudes and 
accountability. 
 
                                                 
17
 This is not the place to discuss whether there can be moral facts or whether, if there can, it is true 
that taking heroin is wrong. 
18
 He cannot deny that the law prohibits possession, but he can argue that it ought not to. The 
relationship between law and ethics is far too complex to discuss in detail here, and I have taken a 
very simple line to make the point. 
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Moral responsibility (1):  Strawson and the reactive attitudes  
You cannot go very far into the philosophical literature on responsibility without 
encountering Peter Strawson’s influential lecture and paper, Freedom and 
Resentment, first published in 1962. The paper’s aim is to argue that our normal 
practices of moral responsibility are ‘underpinned by reasons that are immune to the 
threat posed by determinism’ (Maltravers, 2007 p.34). Determinism is the theory that 
everything that happens is determined by the things that precede it and the natural 
laws of physics. If true, this would effect the way we regard the things that people 
do, for despite our weighing up options and reflecting on our choices (both of which 
are also determined), we only end up doing the things that we would have done. Our 
part in the causal chain is fixed; choice is illusory, we can only do the things that we 
are determined to do. Incompatiblists (Van Inwagen, 1975) argue that if determinism 
is true, we cannot be morally responsible for the things we do.
19
 Compatiblists, like 
Strawson, argue that moral responsibility obtains even if determinism is true. 
 
Fully causal determinism is virtually absent in the literature on autonomy and 
responsibility in health care, possibly because the idea of a fully determined life is so 
difficult to comprehend. There appears to be at least a compatiblist assumption if not 
an outright assumption of the falsity of determinism despite what Wallace (1994, 
p.58) refers to as ‘the seductiveness of incompatiblism’.  Nelkin (2007, and see 
Kane, 2005) cites several influential sources for the view that intuitively we start as 
incompatiblists; ‘we are incompatiblists before we (compatiblists) start studying 
philosophy and talk ourselves out of it (2007, p.244)’. She proceeds to discuss a 
number of areas where intuitions tested empirically are inconsistent, and the view 
                                                 
19
 Here the incompatibility is between freewill and determinism, but since moral responsibility 
requires freewill, moral responsibility and determinism are also incompatible in this account. 
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emerges that that we are instead compatiblists by inclination. In contrast to the 
absence of causal determination in the literature, other less complete forms of 
determination, for example, genetic, social and environmental are highly visible in 
the sense that these influences, whose effect on behaviour is correlated at the societal 
level (Raphael, 2006) can be suggested to threaten and impede moral agency and 
therefore responsibility. The question must be suggested; if our natural inclination (if 
we have one) is to be compatiblist in the matter of causal determinism, must 
consistency require that we also be compatiblist in the matter of genetic, social and 
other determinist mechanisms which fall short of full causation?  This is hinted at in 
the King’s Fund report (2004), which is incompatiblist in its reporting, if not its data. 
Nelkin’s examples of inconsistency in intuitions support the view that individually 
and collectively humans are not as rational or consistent as we may hope or believe 
and this threatens arguments premised on intuition claims and reflective equilibrium 
(and see Sutherland, 1992; Thaler and Sunstein, 2009).  The often repeated view that 
more research is necessary seems for once to be fully justified. 
 
Strawson’s (1962) paper is relevant not so much because of its compatiblist 
emphasis, but rather in the claims about the purposes and nature of moral 
responsibility. Moral responsibility is based on the reactions of other people to our 
character and actions. When we are wronged we feel certain reactive attitudes 
towards wrongdoers; resentment and indignation. Generally people care about what 
others think of them, and wishing to avoid being thought of badly is a powerful 
social regulator of behaviour. The significance of the paper, and those that developed 
the ideas, lies in the view that individuals are responsible for those things that elicit 
the reactive response in the wronged. Being responsible is understood in the fact and 
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process of being held responsible. Strawson was at pains throughout the paper to 
base his views on what he called ‘common places’, what we might consider as 
common morality, something which he says is easy to forget when we are engaged 
in philosophy. Other compatiblists (optimists as he calls them) have argued from 
consequentialist calculation that our practices of holding people responsible operate 
to regulate behaviour in socially useful ways, but that is to over-intellectualise the 
process: 
What is wrong is to forget that those practices, and their reception, the 
reactions to them really are expressions of our moral attitudes and not merely 
devices we calculatingly employ for regulative purposes (Strawson, 1962 
p.93, emphasis in original). 
 
His claims about the practices of holding people morally responsible as well as their 
compatibility with determinism (should it be true) are based on ontological rather 
normative premises. There are exceptions in our practices for those, like children, or 
expressed in the language of the time, an ‘idiot or a moral idiot’ (p.82), and a 
recognition that a lack of intention also ameliorates the reactions.  
 
Such reactive attitudes form part of the fabric of inter-personal relationships, but 
there are also vicarious attitudes felt by individuals not directly affected by 
wrongdoing. Instead of resentment we feel indignant or disapproving. We feel these 
attitudes of those who lie, distinct from and weaker than the resentment that we feel 
against those who lie to or about us.  The moral demand here is that individuals 
should refrain from lying,
20
 but in the general sense, these vicarious attitudes speak 
to the nature of all moral expectation and define them in terms of an emotional 
response: 
                                                 
20
 I put to one side for the moment the issue of whether lying can be justified or even required. 
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But these attitudes of disapprobation and indignation are precisely the 
correlates of the moral demand in the case where the demand is felt to be 
disregarded. The making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes 
(Strawson, 1962 p. 90, emphasis in original). 
 
As the author of a relatively short if very influential paper Strawson left it to others 
to develop the ideas (for example Fischer, 1987, Kahn, 2011)  R. Jay Wallace 
deepened the account in several ways, concluding that:  
It is reasonable to hold agents morally accountable when they possess the 
powers of reflective self control; and when such accountable agents violate 
the obligations to which we hold them they deserve to be blamed for what 
they have done (Wallace, 1994, p. 226).  
 
Wallace (1994) also develops the nature of the obligation that is a necessary feature 
for responsibility in his account. Having the reactive emotions as a justifiable 
response to an action relies on the cause of the emotions having certain moral 
features such that the agent ought not to have done it. Or, he has failed to do 
something that he ought to have done.
21
 An agent can be responsible for a morally 
neutral act; he is a rational candidate for praise or blame even if the act is worthy of 
neither. Whilst retaining the link between the act and a response, Fischer’s (1987) 
account emphasises the features of moral agency which make a person legitimately 
blameable. The extent to which he is held responsible depends on the nature of the 
act he is responsible for. If it is morally neutral, holding him morally responsible is 
inappropriate, even though he is morally responsible for it in light of his moral 
agency.  
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 See Harris (1980) on the equivalence of acts and omissions 
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Moral responsibility (2): the accountability version 
The quotation from Wallace (1994) appears to go some way towards the 
accountability version of responsibility. Korsgaard (1992, p. 306) notes the 
unattractiveness of taking ‘the assessment of others as the starting point in moral 
philosophy’, and Oshana’s (1997) alternative approach avoids working backwards 
from response. On this ‘accountability’ version of responsibility, a person is 
responsible if it is fitting that she give an account for her behaviour. This entails the 
presumptions that the individual has: 
(a) antecedently met the requirements of responsible agency. 
 
(b) has performed some act (or has exhibited some characteristic) of the sort 
subject to certain accepted standards of morality. 
  
 (c) typically has fallen short of these standards (Oshana, 1997, p.77).  
 
Fittingness implies that it is not necessary for the individual actually to give an 
account; it is enough that it is appropriate. Similar to the reactive attitudes approach 
there are exceptions for those who are not full moral agents; we could not ask 
someone with dementia or a small child to account for themselves any more than we 
would appropriately feel resentment towards them. In the case of direct wrongdoing 
it seems clear that an account is owed to the wronged, but it is not so clear to whom 
the account corresponding to vicarious disapproval in the reactive attitudes approach, 
is owed. Regardless of whether the account is actually given, Oshana (1994) claims 
that the approach has the advantage of focussing firmly on the agent and what he has 
done, placing the burden upon the actor, regardless of the reactions of others.  
 
There are clear differences between the reactive attitudes and the accountability 
versions of the nature of moral responsibility. Consider Agent A, undertaking 
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behaviour B which elicits responses C. In the reactive attitudes version, the 
responses (C(ra)) consist of indignation, or objectively, disapprobation from others, a 
consequence of B in the sense that it has occurred after A has undertaken B, and is a 
result of B. A is morally responsible for B because C(ra). In the accountability 
version the process follows the other direction. We say if A has certain properties, 
and B is wrong, then he is liable to consequences (C(a)) in the form of being 
required to give an account. A is responsible for B therefore C(a).  
 
There are many caveats in both versions but for now it is sufficient to draw attention 
to the similarities between the versions of responsibility rather than identify and 
unpick the differences. These similarities do little more than identify the constituent 
parts, but this is enough to expose the inadequacy of the concept in current usage 
within healthcare. These constituent parts or facets (Guttman and Ressler, 2001), are 
a person, an act (or omission), and a reaction or a consequence. Or, a responsible 
agent who has responsibilities, and can be held responsible. These three constituent 
parts are implied in any discussion of any type of responsibility, though the reactive 
attitudes are distinctive features of moral responsibility. 
 
Applying the framework to the case studies 
I considered three examples; teenagers with diabetes, Canadian women’s magazines, 
and the Kings Fund Report. Does the three stage analysis extend understanding in 
these cases? In the first, the teenagers are on the cusp of full moral agency. The 
narrative concerns ‘taking charge’ or accepting responsibility.22 The responsibilities 
are the obligations detailed in the questionnaire, turning up for clinic appointments, 
                                                 
22
 See Waller (2005) on the difference between ‘take-charge’ and ’just deserts responsibility’. 
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remembering to take medication and so on.  Absent from the account is any 
consideration of the consequences of failing to meet the obligations though it seems 
plausible that a teenager neglecting to take medication may be subject to some 
reactive emotions at least from her parents. Olinder et al.  (2011, p.6) briefly 
consider this but only to the extent that ‘nagging and criticism are not wanted. 
Sometimes they just want to be reminded, rather than asked why their blood sugar is 
high.’ The Canadian magazines’ narrative appears to assume moral agency in their 
readers. There is clearly some notion of obligation but little acknowledgement of 
consequences, though the moralist stance employed implies that those failing in their 
obligations will be thought less of.  The King’s Fund report considers and rejects the 
notion of full moral agency, does not engage in any sense in what health related 
obligations might be and seeks to restrict the consequences of failing to meet these 
unspecified obligations on the grounds of incomplete agency.  
 
All we can say from the potential inductive process is that the three stage analysis is 
not inconsistent with the three examples, and it is unclear how the three stage 
analysis could have been arrived at by an empirical study of use of the word 
responsibility.  How does the three stage analysis illuminate the second use of 
responsibility that is its use as an action-guiding concept within health policy? 
 
Applying the framework to health policy 
It is fair to say that there has been some controversy in the application of the political 
concept of personal responsibility in a number of policy areas.  As far as health (and 
welfare) is concerned the notion is perhaps more popular and developed in the 
Anglo-American post war tradition than on the European continent, though it 
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appears to be gaining ground in Europe where, paradoxically perhaps, socialised 
medicine is less developed than in the UK (Schmidt, 2007b, Ter Meulen and Maarse, 
2008). As far as the emphasis on personal responsibility is concerned, policy appears 
to assume agency, is confused in the matter of obligation and has consistently ruled 
out overtly holding patients responsible. We will see that the ground is characterised 
by difficulties and apparent paradoxes problematising each stage of the application 
of the concept. In identifying some of these I assume that despite the rhetoric, 
individuals are not currently held (morally) responsible for their health or their health 
threatening behaviours, and so the question offered for more detailed analysis 
elsewhere is not in what ways are individuals responsible for their health within the 
system of socialised medicine, but why are they not?
23
  We will look briefly at each 
stage in turn. 
 
Moral agency 
Workaday application of autonomy in healthcare understood minimally as a 
commitment to informed consent belies the complexity of the various conceptions 
(Coggon, 2007; Oshana, 1998). Allmark (2008, p. 41) defines individual autonomy 
as ‘the capacity of the individual to make and act upon judgments for which he is 
held morally accountable.’ If this is the case, the result of the equivalence of 
autonomy and accountability (or responsibility) could reasonably be expected to 
conclude that if a patient is considered to be sufficiently autonomous to be allowed 
to buy cream cakes, or to consent to weight reduction medication or surgery, then he 
is also sufficiently autonomous so as to be liable to be held responsible for his eating 
and the obesity which follows, regardless of the multiple factors which influence 
                                                 
23
 I am confident that many of us are held (morally) responsible within close interpersonal 
relationships but this lies outside the inquiry on moral responsibility within socialised medicine. 
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eating behaviour, recognised by the UK government it its foresight report (Butland et 
al., 2007). 
 
Oshana (2002) argues that the solution to this apparent paradox is that the 
equivalence of autonomy and responsibility is mistaken.  A morally responsible 
agent has to be capable of normative competence as well as well as being able to act 
on desires and intentions. She gives the example of two versions of Hitler, the first 
version of which is incapable of recognizing any moral code which prevents him 
ordering genocide. She regards this first version of Hitler as not being a responsible 
agent, different from the second version who does recognise moral reasons for not 
ordering genocide but allows them to be overruled.  Punishment for the first version, 
that is holding responsible, must be justified by solely by referral to the utilitarian
24
 
approaches that Strawson (1962) and others opposed.  This is an extreme example 
perhaps, likely to test the credibility of the reflective equilibrium approach, which 
should capture our
25
 intuitions in clear cases (Fisher and Ravizza, 1998). The obese 
cream cake eater may not acknowledge the second helping as a moral wrong, but 
that does not mean that she is incapable of doing so.  The example of the Hitlers 
makes the point that responsibility requires additional features especially concerning 
rationality, and these additional features do not figure in considerations of deciding 
whether a person is sufficiently autonomous to consent to treatment. In the UK, 
capacity is decided upon by application of tests outlined in the Mental Capacity Act 
2005 which determine ability to understand and retain information and use it to make 
a decision. The rationality of the decision lies outside the process, reflected in Lord 
                                                 
24
 As far as utilitarian accounts are concerned, it is possible to punish an innocent man (in the sense 
that he is not fully morally responsible) in the pursuit of greatest utility. 
25
 I am never sure when philosophers say ‘our’ as in should capture ‘our moral intuitions about clear 
cases’ whether they mean their individual intuitions, or the intuitions of people in general – and if the 
latter what evidentiary support is available. 
  Page 155  
Donaldson’s famous observation that the absolute right to autonomy ‘[…] exists 
notwithstanding that the reasons for making the choice are rational, or irrational 
unknown or even non-existent
26
 (Brazier and Cave, 2011, p.118).  Oshana (2002) 
claims that the error in lumping together autonomy and responsibility stems in part 
from a conflation of the global state of being autonomous with a locally autonomous 
act. The tendency to think of the former as being tied to responsibility results from 
the close ties between the latter and being responsible for the act in question.  
Workaday understanding of autonomy in healthcare very firmly concerns the latter.  
 
Conversely, in discussing moral autonomy Dworkin (1988, p.35) states that ‘A 
person is morally autonomous if and only if he bears the responsibility for the moral 
theory he accepts and the principles he applies.’ And of interest is the view 
expressed in the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural organisation 
[UNESCO] (2008) Bioethics core curriculum
27
 that: 
‘In ethics the notions of autonomy and responsibility are mutually related. 
There is no autonomy without responsibility; beyond responsibility, 
autonomy turns to arbitrarity which means that the person in his/her decisions 
does not take into consideration the interests of others (UNESCO, 2008 p. 
27). 
 
The relationship between responsibility and autonomy is too complex to be 
discussed in depth here, and my aim is simply to argue that there is a prima facie 
case for the view that if a person is considered autonomous then she is also 
responsible. Nevertheless, mainstream bioethics and liberal political opinion 
acknowledges limitations to responsibility for example in genetics (Levitt and 
                                                 
26
 The case was Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 649, CA 
27
 The UK ethics curriculum for medical students includes that students ‘be able to demonstrate a 
critically reflective understanding of the rights and responsibilities of patients and possible 
justifications for limiting their rights’ (Stirrat et al, 2010, p.57).  There is no equivalent curriculum for 
UK nurses. 
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Manson, 2007), the neuroscience of decision making (Burns and Bechara, 2007), and 
the language of addiction wider than drug use (Foddy, 2011), whilst simultaneously 
promoting autonomy in the same persons.  If patients are not held to account for their 
(allegedly) autonomously enacted health threatening behaviour then we must look 
further than moral agency to enquire why. 
 
Obligation  
Williams (2008) argues that philosophers usually discuss responsibility 
retrospectively, that is holding responsible, or consider the features of moral agency. 
Strawson’s (1962) account is premised on the relationship between the agent and the 
response, and the technique of reflective equilibrium testing intuitions about clear 
cases. A clear case, for example tests intuition of, say a cat knocking over a vase. 
Our intuition tells us that we do not hold the cat responsible because it is not a moral 
agent. We have different reactive attitudes and to different extents if a small child 
knocks over the vase or if a passer-by twists her ankle and stumbles into it 
accidentally; we reserve full indignation for an autonomous person acting recklessly, 
or worse, maliciously.  The attitudes we feel tell us something about what we think 
about the agency of the person or the circumstances of the action, whether there was 
coercion, or constraint or just bad luck, or whether the vase was appropriately 
protected by its owner. The purpose of these thought experiments is to test our 
intuitions about moral agency, but there is another explanation for a failure to 
experience the reactive attitudes; the act may be morally neutral, and this seems 
important in an attempt to apply the reactive attitudes account of responsibility to 
health care provision. Many people would fail to feel disapprobation against 
  Page 157  
smokers, not because they doubt agency (though they might), but because they think 
that there is nothing wrong with smoking.  
 
We may conclude from this that the reactive attitudes approach to moral 
responsibility, notwithstanding Strawson’s ontological claims, does not really help in 
understanding the social function of responsibility for health. Understanding 
responsibility as requiring an account is more appropriate in this context because it 
proceeds from moral agency to establishing what it is people are responsible for.  
Individuals owe an account for failing to meet an obligation, but not for acting in a 
morally neutral way.  Responsibility for health requires obligation and this presents 
the major challenge to the use of responsibility in a social function, explaining the 
insipid telling of patient responsibilities seen in the NHS constitution and elsewhere 
(Royal College of Surgeons, 2005). The normative tension at the heart of 
professional health care is between respect for autonomy and responsibility.  
 
Though the emphasis of autonomy in Anglo-American bioethics has been subjected 
to recent critique (for example Woods, 2007b; Walker, 2009; Varelius, 2006), it 
remains predominant (Gillon, 2003; Edwards, 2009), showing little sign of revision 
in at least its workaday understanding. Valuing, promoting and respecting autonomy 
above all else is in direct opposition with the notion of obligation. Dworkin (1988 
p.41) states: 
A moral theory that stresses the supremacy of autonomy will have difficulties 
with the concept of obligation. As the etymology suggests, to be obliged is to 
be bound. And to be bound is to have one’s will restricted. 
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The result of this conflict can be seen throughout health promotion. For example in 
the health warnings on cigarette packets,
28
 which are worded in terms of information 
giving, rather than direct appeals to the moral wrongness of smoking. Of the 14 
messages printed on the back of cigarette packets, 11 are written descriptively, 
offering information, for example, ‘smoking clogs the arteries and causes heart 
attacks and strokes.’ Three are prescriptive. (i) Protect children: don’t make them 
breathe your smoke (ii) Smoking is highly addictive: don’t start and (iii) Get help to 
stop smoking: consult your doctor/pharmacist. At the risk of stretching the point a 
little, (i) merely obliges a smoker to smoke away from children, not to abstain 
altogether, (ii) is apparently addressed to non-smokers and (iii) obliges the smoker to 
get help, rather than stop.  It has been argued that campaigns which set out to educate 
about health are, unlike other forms of education, evaluated not in terms of what 
people know, but in terms of how behaviour changes, because the purpose is an 
unacceptably morally loaded attempt to change health values to those of the educator 
(Allmark and Tod, 2007). The unresolved tension is between the giving of morally 
neutral information in support of autonomous decision making and the attempted 
revision of morally loaded values and associated obligations. 
 
In the case of smoking these values lead to the view that health education should be 
directed at trying to get people to give up smoking, but a full rationale for the view 
that smoking is morally wrong is not offered. Butler’s (1993) account of the moral 
status of smoking is based on harm to others and this also was given as the rationale 
                                                 
28
 The list can be found in annex 1 of Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 5
th
 June 2001. 
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for legislation prohibiting smoking in public places,
29
 and could be offered for the 
child protecting injunction printed on cigarette packets. These other-regarding 
considerations are consistent with Mill’s harm principle, placing justified restrictions 
on autonomy. But putting these to one side, whilst noting the beneficial effects to  
smokers and non smokers of banning smoking in public places (Meyers et al., 2009), 
we are left with self-regarding reasons not to smoke, (or not to take drugs
30
 or eat 
cream cakes), and it is here where the imposition of values threatens autonomous 
decision making. These values are based on a specific conception of health, 
normatively loaded but neither explained nor justified.  
 
A further problem for ‘responsibility for health’ used in the sense of social policy, is 
that even if the issue of having obligations in a general sense in the current 
environment of valorising personal autonomy was accepted for other-regarding 
reasons, there remains the problem of identifying and justifying exactly what the 
obligations are and how they relate to a specific conception of health. A full 
understanding of ‘responsibility for health’ requires detailed acceptance of the 
concept of obligation and detailed justification for its determinative conceptions. 
 
Holding responsible 
Both the reactive attitudes and accountability versions of responsibility require 
engagement with our practices of holding individuals responsible. The reactive 
attitudes account appears to present problems for professional health care because 
                                                 
29
 See for example House of Commons Health Committee 2005, para 41 ‘The justification for the 
principle of a ban is straightforward: workers have a right to be protected from SHS (second hand 
smoke).’ 
30
 In the UK a longstanding  radio programme asks guests to choose what records they would take if 
they were marooned alone on a desert island. They are also allowed a single luxury item. If the guest 
chose a lifetime supply of cigarettes and the means to ignite them would or should health promoters 
attempt dissuasion? 
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health care professionals are required by their professional bodies not to have the 
sorts of attitudes that Strawson claims are definitive of moral responsibility, even of 
its vicarious expression.
31
 The ontological nature of Strawson’s claims (and see 
Stark, 2004) are in tension with the normative and regulatory demands made of 
health professionals, especially noticeable in nursing literature and regulatory 
documentation, for example concerning discrimination discussed earlier. Positive 
emotions, (Scott, 2000) even love (Stickley and Freshwater, 2002), towards patients 
are lauded in the nursing literature; negative ones are not though neither are fully 
under conscious control. Regarding the expression of emotion rather than its 
experience as the morally relevant feature may help but this seems to undermine a 
claim that (positive) emotions are to be cultivated. The NMC Code (2008) requires 
that nurses ‘treat people kindly’, and this similarly leaves unanswered the question of 
whether a nurse can treat someone kindly without being a kind person.
32
   
 
The accountability version of responsibility must engage with the question of if and 
to whom an account is owed.  Just because it is fitting that a person gives an account, 
it does not necessarily follow that an actual account is required or justified (Smith, 
2007), but if there is a reluctance to blame patients for their behaviour, this may be 
because of a narrow application of what blame means. Martin (2001) starts a wider 
categorisation of blame with the simple ascription of wrongdoing to someone who is 
morally accountable. 
 
                                                 
31
 There are studies in the literature which have found these attitudes in nurses (for example Brown, 
2006). 
32
 This is an expression of the familiar debates between act and agent centred approaches to nursing 
ethics. 
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It is the NHS which has told us, the public and its patients that we should take some 
personal responsibility for our health, and this is accepted by many. As the provider 
of potentially avoidable treatments, it seems consistent that the account is owed to 
NHS. If this were the case it would fall to health care professionals employed by the 
NHS to hold people to account, but this seems to fall outside the bounds of patient-
professional relationship (Kelley, 2005). That is not to say that all moral evaluation 
of patient’s behaviour is disallowed. Positive evaluation in terms of praise could 
form part of therapeutic relationship, but negative evaluation, that is blame, is not. 
This therapeutic version of the praise-blame asymmetry is the reverse of that 
observed in empirical studies (Nelkin, 2007; Hindricks, 2008). It would also be 
difficult for a nurse to accept an account from a recalcitrant patient knowing that she 
may bump into him in the smoking area; a problem acknowledged in the Prime 
Minister’s Commission. 
 
The area where tangible consequences
33
 (liability blame in Martin’s (2001) 
categories) for failure to meet health responsibilities is most plausibly defended is in 
the suggestion that persons with alcoholic liver failure be denied liver 
transplantation, or be prioritised lower in the waiting list than those whose disease 
was not caused by drinking. Though it can be argued that the disease of alcoholism 
restricts agency, holding responsible in this manner is defended (Glannon 1998) in 
certain circumstances (Brundy, 2007), or as a ‘tie breaker’ where other 
considerations are equal (Thornton, 2009).  However,  official guidance in the UK 
from the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (2008) states that 
taking past behaviour into account is relevant only insofar as its continuation 
                                                 
33
 This is of course in addition to the health consequences of undertaking the risky behaviour (Harris 
1995).  
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threatens the effectiveness of the proposed treatment. The forward looking nature of 
the official position supports a view that it does not amount to holding responsible, 
instead merely being one of several criteria that predict the effectiveness of the 
treatment.  Even in this apparently clear case where the causal link between 
behaviour and disease is settled and the resource is absolutely rather than relatively 
scarce, the notion of holding patients responsible (at least in this way) is not 
allowed.
34
 
 
Conclusion 
The discourse of personal responsibility for health is prevalent in the UK and 
elsewhere, and is set to remain as behaviour-related ill health continues its 
inexorable increase. The analysis I have offered breaks down the concept into three 
constituent parts; the agent, an obligation and a consequence, and I have argued that 
this overarching approach applies to each of the various incomplete conceptions 
found in the literature.  Regarding responsibility for health as fulfilling a social 
function within professional health care is problematic in all three of these 
constituent parts, most significantly in its occasionally paradoxical relationship with 
personal autonomy, the respect and promotion of which remains the predominant 
moral imperative in Anglo-American bioethics. The analysis offered here remains 
largely at the conceptual level, and more detailed work is required in the application 
of the concept of responsibility for health to professional health care, both socialised 
and private. I suspect that this should and will result in a partial and tentative retreat 
from thoroughgoing respect for autonomy, but at minimum it will require a more 
nuanced public debate about what the healthy life consists in, how it ought to be 
                                                 
34
 For a useful and brief paper categorising the various arguments and counter arguments, see Sharkey 
and Gillam (2010). 
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maintained, and what obligations are owed to whom, for what reasons, and with 
what consequences. Currently responsibility for health is conceptually incoherent 
and if it is to retain its visibility in health policy, this is a situation requiring urgent 
remedy.
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CHAPTER 6 
What’s wrong with tombstoning and what does this tell us 
about responsibility for health? 
 
Abstract 
Using tombstoning (jumping from a height into water) as an analogy, this paper 
claims that public health policies and health promotion tend to assess the moral 
status of activities following a version of health maximising rule utilitarianism, but 
this does not represent common moral experience, not least because it fails to take 
into account the enjoyment that various health effecting habits brings and the 
contribution that this makes to a good life, variously defined. It is proposed that the 
moral status of health threatening activities should instead be defined by a version of 
act utilitarianism where both maximising value and method of calculation are 
decided by individuals. In this account personal responsibility for health is reduced 
to the obligation to undertake calculations effectively, comprising of two duties; 
epistemic and reflective. If there is an individual epistemic duty, it is plausible to 
suggest that health promotion should present information in a way which facilitates 
it, but despite the prevalent language of autonomous choice, discussion of health 
promotion messages for example related to drinking and smoking demonstrates that 
this currently does not happen. Health promotion strategies should seek to encourage 
reflection about the harm our health effecting behaviour causes others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Page 166  
Introduction 
The practice of leaping from rocks or fixed man-made structures into the sea has 
been a recreational activity around coastlines for many years, but recent increasing 
frequency and fatalities
1
 have brought it to popular attention. Organisations like The 
Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) and Royal National Lifeboat 
Institution (RNLI) have issued warnings and information films about the dangers and 
offer advice about how to minimise risks (RNLI, no date). There have been calls to 
ban the activity (Walker, 2007); temporary dispersal orders have been granted at 
least in part to prevent tombstoning (BBC 2011a), and a youth was charged with 
Breaching the Peace following a tombstoning incident which necessitated lifeboat 
rescue (BBC, 2007). Many videos of tombstoning can be found on video sharing 
websites, and it has been suggested that these should be removed or accompanied by 
warnings (Aiken, 2009).  
 
It is clear that many people undertake tombstoning in its various guises, while others 
disapprove of it, and in some cases this results in attempts to discourage, prevent or 
punish tombstoners.  This paper considers the moral status of tombstoning, and by 
analogy, other forms of health threatening behaviour, beginning by analysing the 
reported responses to a tombstoning accident.  Three versions of its moral status are 
identified, all utilitarian in origin, and yet resulting in sharply contrasting 
conclusions because the utility calculations use different variables. Calls to 
disapprove of or to prevent tombstoning are consistent with a notion of responsibility 
for health based on health-maximising rule utilitarianism which does not represent 
the moral reality of tombstoners. An alternative act-utilitarian approach is advanced 
                                                 
1
 The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents (no date)  state that in the five year period 2004 – 
2008 there were 139 incidents which required rescue, including 12 fatalities.  
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using individually selected values and calculations. Responsibility for health, on this 
account, results in moral obligations in process rather than outcome, specifically two 
duties:
2
 the epistemic duty and the reflective duty. These duties are outlined and their 
implication for public health discussed. 
 
The case of Sonny Wells 
Aged 20, Sonny Wells concluded a Sunday afternoon drinking with friends by 
ignoring signs stating ‘No diving – maximum penalty £500’ and  jumping 30 feet off 
the pier at Southsea into just three feet of water. Pulled unconscious from the water 
and airlifted to hospital, his neck was broken in three places, and though surgical 
intervention restored feeling and movement to his hands, he remains paralysed from 
the chest down, permanently confined to a wheelchair. A week after the accident, his 
parents released photographs of him in the Intensive Care Unit as a warning to others 
(BBC 2008b),  and the following month he appeared from his bed in a video, used 
by Hampshire Police to discourage people from tombstoning (BBC 2008c). Further 
videos featuring Sonny were made by the RNLI (no date) and the Dover District 
Community Safety Partnership (2011). Sonny’s mother is quoted as saying that: 
[w]e know that we can't stop all youngsters and adults from tombstoning but 
if we can stop just a few of them from doing it then it would have been 
worthwhile. If they could see Sonny they wouldn't do it. It takes him half an 
hour to get dressed now instead of five minutes because he has to use his 
teeth (BBC, 2011b).  
 
The chairman of the Dover Community Safety Partnership, which funded the video, 
is quoted in the same report: ‘We all must play our part in discouraging this 
dangerous and potentially fatal activity.’  These positions can be contrasted with that 
                                                 
2
 To paraphrase Goodin (1995), responsibilities are to utilitarianism what duties are to deontology. I 
have used the word duties because duties denote actions. 
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presented by RNLI and RoSPA. The websites of both organisations take the 
markedly different line that tombstoning is a high risk activity, and should be 
undertaken having taken steps to understand and minimise the risks. So, for RoSPA, 
the advice is: 
Don’t jump into the unknown. Consider the dangers before you take the plunge: 
 Check for hazards in the water. Rocks or other objects may be submerged 
and difficult to see. 
 
 Check the depth of the water. Remember tides can rise and fall very 
quickly. 
 
 As a rule of thumb, a jump of ten metres requires a depth of at least five 
metres. 
 
 Never jump whilst under the influence of alcohol or drugs. 
 
 Check for access. It may be impossible to get out of the water. 
 
Consider the risks to yourself and others. Conditions can change rapidly – 
young people could be watching and may attempt to mimic the activity. 
And, if you jump when you feel unsafe or pressured, you probably won’t 
enjoy the experience (RoSPA, no date). 
 
These statements are worthy of analysis because they express views about 
tombstoning from the viewpoint of those closest to it - from the parent, the 
tombstoner and the chairman of the local public body - rather than from professional 
bioethicists or politicians. The views about the moral status of tombstoning 
embedded within the statements are grounded in everyday experience, more closely 
allied to common-sense morality than moral or political philosophy.  Archard (2011) 
argues that linkage of theory to common sense morality is inevitable, and that a 
defensible moral theory, which though ‘at some distance from common-sense 
morality’ (2011, p. 124) must at least be consistent with it.  In arguing against the 
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view that philosophers can be considered moral experts,
3
  Archard claims that the 
role of philosophers should properly be that of advising or coaching non-
philosophers, helping them to recognise the value of a better judgement. Brassington 
(2013) defends a role for philosophy and philosophical technique in bioethics, 
though recognises that it is charged that, ‘in respect of private activity, the input of a 
moral philosopher is mere moralising’ (p.22).  
 
There is a significant difference between the outcome of a moral assessment and the 
process which arrived at it, as Archard points out, between the propositional and the 
performative. A philosophical analysis that refers to and builds upon reasoning by 
the actors concerned has the advantage of being readily understood and worthy of 
application; it is more coaching than moralising. However, grounding analysis in the 
common-sense morality of the protagonist is not a full inductive analysis, attempting 
to build a theory from the comments. Utilising a variant of reflective equilibrium 
neither builds nor applies theory; the aim is simply to show that established moral 
theory or at least more structured thinking is consistent with common-sense 
expressions.  
 
The moral appraisal of tombstoning 
It can be argued that everything that we do is a matter for moral appraisal, at least 
because we could be doing something else (Seedhouse, 2009). More realistically, the 
view that tombstoning is an act worthy of or even requiring moral appraisal is 
contained within Gert’s (2005, p.9) ‘correct’ view of morality which, following 
Hobbes, is simply that morality is ‘primarily concerned with the behaviour of people 
                                                 
3
 But see Gordon (2012) for a response. 
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insofar as that behaviour affects others.’ Bernard Williams (1985, p.12) makes a 
similar point. If this is accepted then tombstoning is a moral issue to the extent that it 
affects others and the relevant question becomes, to what extent does it affect others? 
In the video produced by the Dover District Community Safety Partnership, Sonny 
said that: 
[i]t’s not just what it does to you; it’s what it does to your family...your 
friends, and it’s just the way everyone has to live, you know…I have to have 
people on standby, on call, in case things go wrong. It’s not just my life that’s 
changed, their lives changed as well because it all revolves around me (Dover 
District Community Safety Partnership, 2011). 
 
Sonny’s father Robbie Wells is quoted six weeks or so after the accident as saying; 
‘It's just selfish. It's the impact on people around you, not just the injuries; it's the 
years to come’ (BBC, 2008d). The advice from RoSPA and RNLI includes that the 
risks for others should be considered, identifying the possibility of setting a bad 
example to younger people as a special concern. These quotations support the view 
of tombstoning as a morally appraisable activity whose harms lie in its consequences 
especially insofar as they affect others. 
 
Three moral positions 
Illustrated by the comments above, it is possible to identify a number of different 
assessments of the moral status of tombstoning. The first would be that it is wrong 
and should be banned. Sonny passed a notice forbidding diving (BBC, 2008b) on 
pain of being fined a considerable amount of money, and his mother talked of 
‘stopping’ people from doing it. Signs advising, (or requiring – it’s not always clear) 
patrons not to dive into swimming pools are common but this injunction does not 
apply to jumping in, feet first, an activity assumed to be safe enough into three feet 
of water from the edge of a swimming pool but not from a 30 foot pier. It is also not 
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clear whether the prohibition covers diving from the location of the sign or whether 
it covers the whole pier, including the end furthest from the shore where, though 
there will be other dangers, shallow water (the circumstance that injured Sonny) is 
not one of them.  A ban on diving is not a ban on tombstoning itself, only jumping in 
a specified manner (head first) from that particular part of that particular pier. Other 
forms of prevention, such as erecting a barrier or other means of making unsafe 
jumping more difficult, do not appear to have been reported. The intention to prevent 
people from injuring themselves has apparently been treated as justifying the passing 
of by-laws, but as the foregoing nitpickery demonstrates, formulating both a law and 
its justification presents considerable difficulties, not least in the question of whether 
the harm is considered serious enough to warrant criminalisation at all. 
 
The second position is articulated by the Chairman of the Dover Community Safety 
Partnership who, significantly, claims that individuals should be discouraged rather 
than stopped from this undertaking ‘this dangerous and potentially fatal activity.’ 
Detailed inferences cannot be drawn on the basis of the limited information 
available, but the statement is consistent with at least two understandings of the word 
‘discourage’. The first is because of the potential harm caused, that tombstoning is a 
moral wrong, worthy of disapproval as well as discouragement, that is a position 
from tolerance.
4
 The second is that discouragement is merely prudential; in this case 
the discouragement is similar to that which discourages high risk financial 
investments. Given that the wrongness of tombstoning lies in its effects on others, I 
am inclined to assign the former interpretation. The third position is stated outright 
                                                 
4
 This would be a paradigm example of tolerance generally understood as ‘putting up with what you 
oppose’ (McKinnon, 2006, p.3).  Toleration requires disapproval and a failure to stop something 
when you could, but a more modest version might include a failure to attempt to stop that of which 
you disapprove. 
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by RoSPA and the RNLI, and amounts to saying that there is nothing wrong with 
tombstoning, as long as it is undertaken safely; and if the sensible advice offered is 
followed, the risk of possible adverse consequences can be minimised.  
 
These three positions arrive at markedly different conclusions, though the moral 
methodologies share a significant feature, that is they agree that the wrongness of 
tombstoning rests in risk and occurrence of injury. It is not stated or implied 
anywhere that tombstoning is intrinsically wrong.
5
 These positions are all 
consequentialist positions. But a characteristic of the presentation of the morality of 
tombstoning as a consequentialist morality is that it has resulted in three different 
conclusions; that it is wrong and should be prevented, that it is wrong but should not 
be prevented, and that it is permissible.  
 
Utilitarianism, public health, and private morality 
It is widely recognised that the philosophical basis of public health is utilitarianism
6
 
(Holland, 2007; Rothstein, 2004). But this is not to say that a single fully worked up 
utilitarian theory can be applied to all public health issues, calculations made, and 
(morally right) answers revealed, and though I assume that utilitarianism of one sort 
or another provides theoretical underpinning of public health generally, as well as 
                                                 
5
 It could be argued that there is something intrinsically wrong with tombstoning separate from its 
consequences, that it is simply in itself, a worthless thing to do, but this will not be considered further 
here.  
6
 I do not wish to get bogged down in a dispute about whether the term ‘consequentialism’ should be 
used instead of the term ‘utilitarianism’. There is considerable overlap between the terms and 
standardly utilitarianism is the paradigm case of a consequentialist theory. Foot (1985) regards 
consequentialism as what is wrong with utilitarianism, and Jacobsen (2008) argues that there is such a 
thing as non-consequentialist utilitarianism. In his entry in the Stanford Encyclopeadia of Philosophy, 
Sinnett-Armstrong (2012) states that ‘[…] there is no agreement on which theories count as 
consequentialist[…]’ and though its broad meaning is known, shorn of specifying adjectives the 
naked term ‘utilitarianism’ is virtually useless as an action guide. I have used the term 
consequentialist to suggest that the wrongness of tombstoning rests in its consequences and thereafter 
I have used the term utilitarian as it is more likely to denote maximizing processes as I suspect that 
the term ‘utilitarian’ is more readily understood than the term ‘consequentialist’. Certainly the term 
bioutilitarian appears in the bioethical literature but the term ‘bioconsequentialist’ generally does not. 
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the three positions on the moral status of tombstoning, it does not follow that 
tombstoning is a matter for public health ethical analysis at all.  
 
The quotations at the beginning of the paper concerned what ought to be done about 
tombstoning rather that saying that Sonny had acted immorally, but it should not be 
inferred from the absence of public condemnation that tombstoning is regarded by 
those advocating regulation as morally permissible or that it simply is not a matter 
for moral appraisal. It is more plausible to infer an unstated view that tombstoning is 
regarded as morally wrong by those who attempt to prevent it.  As I have argued, and 
as much as any other activity, tombstoning is a moral matter to the extent that it 
affects others, and this assessment of private morality should be prior to any 
consideration that it is a legitimate matter for public health intervention. In place of 
inferences and suspected moralism in transferring public health ethics into the 
private realm (and vice versa), it is suggested that private immorality is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition of something being subject to public health interventions 
of the sort that coerces behaviour to some degree.  
 
At least two problems present themselves with this sequencing. First there is the 
possibility of genuine disagreement about moral status that can apply at the level of 
general rules of action, specified application of the rules, and anywhere in between. 
A simple view that regulations preventing tombstoning are not legitimate because 
tombstoning is a private matter could be rejected as question begging (Coggon, 
2012). An attempt to make anything the subject of public health measures could be 
challenged with the response that the activity is morally permissible and therefore 
should not be regulated.  There is not much unusual in this as political (and 
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philosophical) disagreement forms the daily backdrop to public health dilemmas, but 
it is enough to suggest a revision of the view that private immorality forms a 
necessary condition for something to be a fitting subject for consideration of public 
health measures. This revision would need to be of the form that a plausible defence 
of the view that something is immoral is required, and this must be supported by 
enough people so that political legitimacy for public health measures can be claimed. 
This might be considered imprecise but at the minimum, a defence of a moral 
assessment is required and this in itself would be a considerable advance. 
 
The second problem is one of consistency of moral method.  Because private 
morality assesses the moral status of something and public morality assesses the 
morality, generally, of preventing that something or a response to that something, 
they are doing quite different things. The moral methodology of public health ethics 
does not transfer into the private domain and though this may frustrate those seeking 
a single overarching moral theory, it is an understandable position for many who 
regard moral theory as secondary to moral practice (Sterba, 2005). Even if common 
morality is seen as being rooted in utilitarianism,
7
 the variant which I claim is 
predominantly used in public health causes problems when transferred to the private 
realm. The reason why utilitarianism arrives at such contrasting conclusions in the 
moral assessments of tombstoning is that two of the variables used in the 
calculations are different. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 See Hooker (2000a) on Sidgwick’s Common-sense morality, and Greene (2013) for a review of the 
empirical evidence for dual level utilitarianism. 
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Acts and rules 
In the matter of health threatening behaviour, maximising calculations within public 
health ethics tend to operate at the level of rules rather than acts. There is reluctance 
for public health bodies to label (lawful) behaviours as immoral even as they attempt 
to reduce or prevent them. The reluctance to moralise or to override the greater 
(professed) good of respecting personal autonomy provides reasons why rules rather 
than acts are used because it allows the view to be both implied and inferred that it is 
tombstoning that is wrong rather than my acts of tombstoning or me as a tombstoner.   
The problem for anyone considering going to the pier in order to jump off it is that 
the rules that tell him that he ought not to do it are not his rules. The calculations 
have been formulated elsewhere by an unseen, unknown hand which has not taken 
his circumstances as much into account as they should have. The rule has been 
formulated, he might think, because people jump off the pier casually, after drinking, 
without checking the depth of water and the strength of the currents or who are 
improperly dressed or prepared. None of that applies to me – I’m dressed for it, I’ve 
researched the conditions and have come with support so that if an unforeseen event 
occurs I will be easily rescued. I’m not doing this on a whim; it’s my main 
recreation, what keeps me going through the dreary week, the thought of gleefully 
flying through the air anticipating the invigorating shock of the cold briny sea.  Who 
are you, he might ask, to tell me that I ought not to do it?  His indignation will likely 
deepen when he realises that he’s not being told, with justification, what he ought 
not to do, but rather what he must not do on pain of payment of a hefty fine. He’s no 
anarchist – he really doesn’t want to be in the position of considering breaking what 
he considers an unjust law, he just doesn’t think it applies to him. 
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His utilitarian calculation (and I assume that he does one), differs in at least three 
ways from that used by those arguing from a public health perspective. First, it 
concentrates on each act of jumping, recognising that the advice from RoSPA has 
been followed so that the risks have not only been minimised but also to some extent 
quantified. It’s not an exact calculation, but the binary calculation of risk, that is the 
likelihood and the severity of the general consequences can both be considered, 
without necessarily considering the consequences of the consequences, ad 
absurdum, which has been offered as an objection to act-utilitarianism (Streumer, 
2003). Second, the calculation does what the rules cannot by allowing the individual 
to choose what to maximise, and then to perform the calculation using circumstances 
known only to him. When he has done these things he is able to give an answer not 
to the question of ‘what is wrong with tombstoning?’, but what, if anything, is wrong 
with me tombstoning from this place at this point in time, knowing these 
circumstances about my life. Third, the public health calculation concerns the 
outcomes of regulation, and not merely a moral appraisal of the regulated act or 
pastime. 
 
The maximisation of health 
Public health utilitarianism, including as applied to health threatening behaviour, 
maximises health generally. This health maximisation could be either from a position 
that health is of intrinsic value (in utilitarian terms that it is the ultimate utility to be 
maximised); or it could be a matter of pragmatic calculation because using an 
instrumental account that health is valuable only insofar as it enables or restricts 
other activities contributing to the overall good, however defined and measured is 
just too difficult to calculate in a rule utilitarian approach. I assume that it is more 
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likely to be the former, with health promotion tending to regard health in a narrow 
sense, largely physical, rather than within the World Health Organisation’s famously 
all-encompassing definition. For example, a textbook aimed at nurses and health care 
professionals promotes not information facilitating autonomous choice, but has as a 
key message; ‘Getting people to change their lifestyle requires them to make 
unpalatable changes […]’ (Upton and Thirlaway 2010, p.19,  emphasis added), and 
regards behaviour choices evaluatively: ‘People in the UK have always drunk 
alcohol, sometimes sensibly
8
 and sometimes stupidly […]’ (p.107). 
 
What does this tell us about responsibility for health? 
It will not have escaped many who have read this far that the discussion about the 
instance of tombstoning and the associated responsibilities and views about moral 
status are analogous to other forms of health threatening behaviours, which 
constitute a significant threat to health and are subject to a range of public health 
measures of various sorts, including health promotion. An advantage of using cases 
is that they can be simple and emotionally engaging. Inferential reasoning, implied 
rather than stated can take the form of ‘A did x which is commonly judged as a bad 
action with bad consequences; therefore a general maxim forbidding x is a good 
maxim’ (Adapted from Spranzi, 2012, p.483). A further inferential move from the 
good maxim (of forbidding
9
 tombstoning) to more general responsibility for health 
requires an argument from analogy, a more complex and controversial technique 
(Macagno and Walton, 2009), common in bioethics and applied ethics. 
                                                 
8
 The word ‘sensible’ also appears in UK government documents, for example, Department of Health 
2010, p. 10. 
9
 To be clear, this is a moral maxim; forbidding means that tombstoning is wrong. It does not follow 
that it should be prevented or that sanctions should follow its performance. 
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The concept of responsibility for health forms a significant part of public health 
ethics. Discourse is frequently concerned with the notion of personal responsibility 
for health, and while philosophical analysis can bring clarity to the confused concept, 
much of the debate is political in nature. Despite its many ambiguities the concept 
personal responsibility for health forms part of the NHS constitution,
10
 and is 
accepted by a large number of people (King’s Fund, 2004). There are three parts to 
responsibility for health (Snelling, 2012a): (1) a moral agent having (2) 
responsibilities and (3) liable to be held responsible in failing to meet them.  This 
paper discusses the second part, responsibilities, and in doing so makes some 
assumptions about the nature of moral agency (the first part), and virtually ignores 
the third part (being held responsible). 
 
Dworkin (1988) suggests that there is an essential contradiction between autonomy 
and obligation, and this is certainly the case where autonomy can mean simply the 
supremacy of personal choice and taking responsibility for health can mean doing 
what you are advised to do. However, the concepts of autonomy and obligation are 
not necessarily in conflict; the problem is that in this model obligations are defined 
by others. Obligations understood within an individual moral assessment augment 
rather than contradict personal autonomy, forming the process of moral decision 
making rather that the outcome, externally derived. The obligations are, principally, 
private obligations, and as the objections of the imagined tombstoner show, these are 
formulated in terms of acts rather than rules. In the private domain our responsibility 
                                                 
10
 Under the heading ‘Patients and the public – your responsibilities’ the wording was initially: ‘You 
should recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your own, and your family’s, good 
health and wellbeing, and take some personal responsibility for it.’ In the public consultation just 
concluded, the word ‘some’ is removed so that it reads ‘…and take responsibility for it.’ The 
explanation is that this is a ‘technical amendment – minor drafting change,’ (DH, 2012), though a 
more significant reading could be made. 
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is to use act utilitarianism effectively, and this amounts to two duties: the epistemic 
duty and the reflective duty. These interrelated obligations form our responsibilities 
for health. 
 
Epistemic duty 
The epistemic duty is a duty to seek knowledge, to gather evidence, and at least on 
certain topics, a duty which stands in need of very little justification (Levy 2006). 
The epistemic duty requires moral agents to enquire about the likely effects that their 
behaviour has on their health and its purpose is to enable and facilitate the reflective 
duty. 
 
Reflective duty (1): harms 
The reflective duty requires an individual to place his health threatening action(s) in 
the context not only of his own life but also the lives of others affected by them. This 
includes family and friends but also the wider community if the behaviour has a 
financial or opportunity cost where there is socialised medicine. Several levels of 
reflection require consideration under this duty. The highest level requires deep 
reflection about the meaning of the good life and while the reflective duty 
encourages this it certainly does not require it. It does require, however, some 
consideration of the effect that health threatening behaviour has on others. The 
harms that should be considered fall broadly into three categories.  
1. Direct harms resulting from the activity itself including injuring someone by 
jumping on him while tombstoning, or exposing others to second hand 
tobacco smoke.   
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2. Indirect harms caused not by the activity but by resultant ill health. These can 
be suffered (2a) by those immediately affected by poor health or death, like 
family members who are disadvantaged financially or who are harmed 
emotionally, and are also suffered (2b) by society generally through a number 
of mechanisms including in some cases opportunity costs in lieu of 
treatment.
11
 
 
Reflective duty (2): benefits 
It should be noted first of all that there is claimed to be wide benefit in facilitating 
autonomous choice, and this is a reason why respect for autonomy has become so 
dominant in society generally and particularly so in bioethics. Gillon (2003) among 
others makes this point in defence of respect for autonomy being regarded as ‘first 
among equals’ in the principlist scheme. He explains that enjoyment of eating fatty 
food results in an autonomous decision to carry on eating despite knowing and 
agreeing that giving them up would ‘be better for me’ (p.310). He seems to mean 
here better for his health rather than better for him generally but it appears to be on 
the latter grounds that he determines to continue his indulgence of these ‘delectable’ 
foods. The reflective duty encourages clarity over the issues of benefit to avoid the 
error of conflating what’s good for health and what’s good more generally. Because 
these more general benefits cannot usually be described as ‘health benefits’ they are 
seldom taken into account by health maximising health promoters. When he was 
                                                 
11
 This might be more difficult to apply than might be thought. In a systematic review of the literature 
between 1997 and 2007, Allender et al. (2009) could find only two studies which calculate the 
financial cost of smoking related UK healthcare costs. Updating the figures, they suggest that these 
costs amount to £5.17 billion in 2005 – 6, compared with a figure, from the 2009 budget, of £8.1 
billion raised in tobacco taxation, and a total NHS budget of £86.4 billion (H M Treasury 2009). 
Similarly, alcohol taxation raises £9 billion from alcohol receipts (Collis et al., 2010) and alcohol 
harm costs the NHS approximately £3.5billion annually (National Treatment Agency for Substance 
Misuse, 2013) 
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Secretary of State for Health, Dr John Reid caused a furore when he was reported as 
saying ‘As my mother would put it, people from those lower socio-economic 
categories have very few pleasures in life and one of them they regard as smoking’  
(BBC, 2004). It is of interest that he is reported as saying that the rationale for his 
reluctance to disapprove is that individuals should not be patronised, but 
nevertheless it is a rare acknowledgement that people derive pleasure from smoking 
and drinking and eating, and in some cases this pleasure is more deep rooted, 
forming a part of character, desired or otherwise.  See for example Oliver Reed’s 
quotation that ‘I don't have a drink problem. But if that was the case and doctors told 
me I had to stop I'd like to think I would be brave enough to drink myself into the 
grave’ (Sellars, 2008).12  
 
What might be considered an extreme case of the tensions between risk and pleasure 
is provided by the adventures of Andrew McAuley, who left his wife and small child 
on the Australian shoreline in December 2006 and paddled into the sea fulfilling a 
long held ambition to kayak unaided to New Zealand. Two months later he drowned, 
agonisingly close to reaching his goal. His widow, Vicki McAuley, wrote a book 
detailing their life together as well as the planning and execution of the expedition. 
After paddling out of the bay, Andrew McAuley talks to a bow mounted camera: 
I’m really worried I’m not going to see my wife again, and my little boy. And 
I’m very scared […] I’m very scared. I’ve got a boy who needs his father 
[…] and a wife who needs a husband, and I’m wondering what I’m doing 
here. I’m wondering why I’m doing this, I really am. And I don’t have an 
answer. […] People ask me why, and I love adventure (McAuley, 2010, p.6). 
                                                 
12
 His bravery deserted him in 1987 when he gave up drinking for a year because of kidney problems, 
but nevertheless he died at 61 from a heart attack, an acute episode of a disease known to be 
associated with high levels of alcohol consumption.  There is a line between autonomous choice and 
autonomy-restricting addiction, and Oliver Reed probably stepped over it. This very important point 
is not considered here. 
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These examples of lives defined by adventure or hedonism do not extend to the 
millions of people smoking and drinking and eating more than recommended, but 
they do illustrate that these habits and many others which threaten health can 
contribute to a good life variously defined because they are enjoyable and self-
chosen; something that health promotion aimed solely at changing behaviour fails to 
recognise. Kekes (2008, p.10) states the case eloquently: 
Moralists forget that morality involves not merely a set of commands and 
prohibitions, but also the pursuit of an enjoyable life. No reasonable person 
can deny that we all have responsibilities, but it is just as important to 
recognise that enjoyment must be part of any life that could reasonably be 
called good. 
 
Reflective Duty (3): calculations - act or rule? 
A problem for the comparison of tombstoning with the more general targets of health 
promotion is that health promotion is formulated as rules, whereas the tombstoner 
more readily uses acts in his preferred utilitarian calculations. Although there are 
clear differences in how to calculate right action between acts and rules, Brad 
Hooker (2000b), who has advanced a detailed account of rule utilitarianism, 
concedes that in ordinary morality, not only are the outcomes often the same 
between act and rule utilitarianism, but also the versions agree on how, generally 
speaking, people should go about their day to day moral thinking. As Upton (2011) 
points out, we do best by careful deliberation on acts which require it, but that 
generally the familiar rules ‘with which we have grown up’ (p.435) serve as an 
effective starting point. Such deliberation results in the distance between act and rule 
utilitarianism being less significant in practice than might be expected, confirming 
that a kind of amalgam version is useful and workable as an action guide despite the 
apparently fatal objections to both theories operated alone.  
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It is difficult to be clear about what constitutes an act for the more common targets of 
health promotion. For smoking, and moving from the general to the specific, the act 
could be (at a pinch) being a smoker, or (just) smoking, or smoking a cigarette, or 
even taking a drag from a cigarette. It would be absurd to require a utility calculation 
before each drag or each cigarette, and in any case they would be identical and could 
lead to fallacious reasoning similar to the fallacy of the heap of sand or the fallacy of 
the beard (Clark, 2002): this drag on this cigarette won’t cause me any long term 
harm, therefore neither will the next, nor the next…therefore smoking won’t cause 
me any long term harm. Advocating act utilitarianism for smoking so that it is 
analogous to tombstoning requires the act to be conceptualised more generally, as 
the act of being a smoker; that is the thing (like a single act of tombstoning) that is 
harmful to health. This will apply to established smokers but a different calculus 
would apply to those who have never smoked or those who have smoked and given 
up but are vulnerable to restarting. In these cases the act of lighting or smoking a 
cigarette may lead to the individual (re)turning from a being non-smoker into a 
smoker (that is the thing that is harmful) and so the smoking of a single cigarette or 
perhaps a few cigarettes over the course of an evening assumes a greater significance 
here than for the established smoker. Arriving at a theoretical preference for the level 
of analysis is ambiguous between and within the practical cases of tombstoning and 
smoking, but  accepting, with Hooker (2000b) that in practice the approaches are 
similar, leaves the basic tension unresolved. What is needed is a theory that can 
account for both levels of evaluation. 
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R.M Hare’s dual level account 
Häyry’s view (in 1994) was that R.M.Hare’s dual level account in his book Moral 
Thinking, offered the best solution to the debate between act and rule versions of 
utilitarianism. Generally we can be guided by the intuitive rules which constitute the 
first level of moral thinking, formed by experiences and moral emotions, but 
conforming to a version of general rule-utilitarianism. The second level, acts, 
requires critical thinking that has selected the set of prima facie principles for use in 
intuitive thinking, and also can be employed when the intuitive principles conflict. 
There is potentially some confusion as to the extent to which the prima facie rules 
need to be universaliseable. If they are universal rules then the formulation will be of 
the sort that ‘people shouldn’t smoke’, whereas an individual is more likely to 
formulate a rule in terms of whether ‘he should smoke’,13 or perhaps even 
(recognizing that this is problematic for utilitarianism) that ‘he is permitted to 
smoke.’ Hare’s critical level equates act utilitarian calculations with that kind of rule 
utilitarianism ‘which allows its rules to be of unlimited specificity and which 
therefore is not distinguishable from act-utilitarianism’ (1981, p.43).  For practical 
purposes it does not really matter at the critical level whether the agent specifies 
universal rules so that they apply to his circumstances, or takes an outright act-
utilitarian approach, but both of these approaches stand in opposition to the rules 
generated by orthodox health promotion which are much more general in orientation. 
 
What to maximise and how 
Having reflected on the wider risks and the benefits of the act or the behaviour under 
consideration, utilitarian moral theories require that a calculation be undertaken, 
                                                 
13
 Universalised, this might take the form of everyone in circumstances that are the same as mine 
should smoke (or is permitted to smoke). 
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placing the positive value of the act or behaviour against the potential harm that 
injury or death brings to those affected. The maximised value can be variously 
chosen; health, welfare, utility, preference or happiness, and while difficulty in 
calculation is acknowledged as a significant problem with all utilitarian theories, 
weighing up pros and cons of decisions, and not only in the moral domain, is a 
fundamental part of everyday life. It is clear what is meant when we say that all 
things considered this or that decision is better even though we would be hard 
pressed to show our detailed working out.  
 
A problem with this is that if the decision making process cannot be articulated 
neither can it be scrutinised. In law, decision making processes can be challenged via 
judicial review which can find that decision making processes considered irrelevant 
criteria or failed to consider criteria which they ought to have done, but no appeal 
process exists in the reflective duty. It would be difficult to separate an objection, 
from a person whose objections matter, that the wrong conclusion (that I go 
tombstoning) has been reached, from an objection that the reflective process is 
inadequate (that the interests of my family have not been given sufficient weight). 
This might be a matter for discussion and potentially, blame, but ultimately it is a 
matter for the individual, similar to the question of what property should be 
maximised. Only a person at the centre of the decision knows his own thoughts and 
feelings and is much more able than a disinterested observer to judge the likely
14
 
consequences of his action on those who are affected by it. An attempt to prescribe a 
decision making process is vulnerable to the same moralising critiques as prescribing 
actions, though the defence of moral expertise is probably stronger here. The 
                                                 
14
 Likely rather than actual consequences. A critique of all forms of utilitarianism is that consequences 
are very difficult to predict. Empirical research can diminish the strength of the critique. See Lang 
(2008) on the cluelessness objection. 
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reflective duty requires a process of calculation and recognises that there are many 
ways to perform it. The choice and justification of maximising property and decision 
making procedures are matters for the actor, and he is accountable for them. 
 
At the centre of her grief at losing her husband and father to her child, Vicki 
McAuley was quoted a week after his death as saying: 
These are a few words that I'd like to say to my most wonderful man. To 
have the courage to pursue your dreams and believe that anything is possible 
is a rare gift [...]. You are our hero. You live for adventure. You've just had 
one incredible adventure this time, and we were with you all the way [...] 
Ant, you have taught me how to live (Chandler, 2007). 
 
It would be easy to characterise his behaviour as selfish or reckless, and many 
would. But Vicki McAuley has not because she alone really knows what it meant to 
him, and what it would have meant for him to forgo his ambition. His epistemic and 
reflective duties were performed, and though the result was catastrophic, the decision 
was, as far as process is concerned, moral. Strawson’s (1962) reactive attitudes 
account of responsibility defines the moral status of an act in terms of its provoked 
response, amply demonstrated in the anger of Sonny’s parents and Vicki McAuley’s 
pride; Andrew McAuley met his responsibilities and Sonny Wells did not. 
 
Policy implications 
Autonomy is (purportedly) valorised within western health care systems, and 
autonomous decisions need information, recognised by the need for sufficient 
information for valid consent for care and treatment.  However, illustrated by the 
ready adoption of behavioural insight (Cabinet Office, 2011; Yeung, 2012), current 
practice within health promotion is not to facilitate the epistemic duty, but rather to 
present information in a way designed to persuade people to change their behaviour. 
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Unlike the process of gaining consent for treatment, the value of behaviour change, 
predicated upon the value of health, overrides the value of facilitating autonomous 
decisions. As Allmark and Tod (2007) have pointed out, health education, unlike 
other forms of education is evaluated not in terms of what people know but whether 
behaviour has changed.  
 
For example, the strategy to reduce drinking is skewed away from education and 
towards behaviour change. Putting to one side the fact the evidence upon which the 
recommendations are based will be almost 20 years old by the time a review is 
completed (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2011) current 
guidance, though written for a public audience, is difficult to interpret. A key 
document is ‘Your drinking and you’ (NHS, 2012), which gives the lower risk 
guidelines as ‘No more than 3-4 units on a regular basis’. Clarification is offered for 
the word ‘regular’: ‘Regular in this context means drinking in this way every day or 
most days of the week.’ It is unnecessarily unclear why the daily allowance is given 
as 3-4 units with no indication as to whether it is 3 or 4 units. Of the 22 other 
countries used as comparisons in the House Of Commons Report, only Japan, the 
USA and Portugal (unofficially) use a range rather than a single daily amount. The 
definition of regular could mean four, five, six or seven days a week. None of the 
other countries has this ambiguity, and only Poland uses anything other than a daily 
or a weekly allowance. The guidance (p.2) goes on to state that if you are drinking 
just above the guidelines: 
 Men are twice as likely to get cancer of the mouth, pharynx or larynx (part of 
the neck and throat), while women are 1.7 times as likely.  
 
 Women increase their risk of breast cancer by around 20%.  
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 Men and women are both 1.7 times as likely to develop liver cirrhosis.  
 
 Men are 1.5 times as likely to develop high blood pressure, with women 1.3 
times as likely. 
 
For even higher consumption the same categories, adjusted for increased likelihood 
are given. It is impossible for anyone to make any sort of risk assessment based on 
this information because the likelihoods of developing the diseases highlighted are 
given in relative rather than absolute terms.
15
 The figures are virtually meaningless, 
and in addition the consequences of developing the diseases are not given – my 
blood pressure may be higher, but what does this mean for my health? Calculation of 
risk requires both understanding of the likelihood and the consequences of an 
adverse event occurring.   
 
Information in smoking cessation material is similarly skewed. While there is 
evidence that mass media campaigns have some success in smoking cessation 
(Farelly et al., 2012; Bala et al., 2008), the evidence about how the messages are 
presented is inconclusive. It has been recommended that preference should be given 
to negative messages (Durkin et al., 2012) and there is some evidence to suggest that 
emotionally evocative advertisements work better than descriptive ones (Durkin et 
al., 2009).  Farelly et al.’s (2102) study lumped together emotional and/or graphic 
antismoking advertising and found this category more effective in quitting behaviour 
than comparison advertisements.  The most recent UK advertisement
16
 graphically 
shows a tumour growing on the side of a cigarette as it is being smoked, and while 
this obviously reinforces the proven links between smoking and cancer at the group 
level, like the alcohol information discussed earlier, it does nothing to facilitate 
                                                 
15
 A point given wider discussion in Fitzpatrick’s (2001) celebrated polemic. 
16
 Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-20805059 (last accessed 3rd January 2014) 
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epistemic duty and therefore reflective duty, because risk cannot be calculated.
17
 
Other recent advertisements have invited smokers to consider the effect their habit 
has on others, for example from 2009, the ‘scared and worried’18 campaign showed a 
boy explaining to camera what he was not worried about, but concluded with a shot 
of him with his father smoking a cigarette on a fishing trip: ‘[…] but I am worried 
about my Dad smoking. I’m worried that my dad will die.’ In an emotionally 
challenging way, this advertisement invites the reflective duty, more consistent with 
the responsibilities for health outlined in this paper, highlighting that the wrongness 
of the father’s smoking is in the pain expressed in the boy’s visible concern. In a 
similar vein, an advertisement from Australia
19
 shows a young boy of about 4, 
standing alone in a train station having been separated from his mother. His concern 
turns to distress and as his tears begin the narrator says: ‘if this is how your child 
feels after losing you for a minute, just imagine if they lost you for life.’ 
 
Although of interest, the reworking of mass media campaigns alone will not satisfy 
facilitation of responsibility for health as conceptualised by the epistemic and 
reflective duties. It would require a wholesale shift from ‘getting’ people to change 
their negatively evaluated behaviour to giving them information to enable an 
autonomous decision and encouraging them to consider the interests of others as they 
make it. The most that can be hoped for is that the Government and its agencies 
embark on a fuller justification of its strategies. This may mean a renewed 
commitment with explanation of the operationalization of the concept of autonomous 
                                                 
17
 For a discussion on how these messages can foster autonomy see Barton (2013) 
18
 Available at http://www.theguardian.com/society/video/2009/feb/18/worried-smoking-children (last 
accessed 3rd January 2014) 
19
 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SfAxUpeVhCg (last accessed 3rd January 2014) 
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decision making, and ways of encouraging a more morally reflective life, though this 
is clearly a much bigger issue than health promotion. 
 
This is not to say that regulation and restrictions on unhealthy food availability, or 
tax regimes that increase the price of alcohol and cigarettes are necessarily unethical. 
Though something being a fitting matter for private moral assessment is insufficient 
for it being a proper subject for public morality, this does not mean that the public 
has no interest in behaviour affecting individual health. But at the very least the 
essentially private nature of these behaviours requires public health authorities to 
provide a full explanation for policy interventions seeking regulation. Something 
within the sphere of our individual influence being bad not for us, but our health, 
narrowly defined is not sufficient. Our behaviour causing direct harm to others 
probably is enough, though causing indirect harm probably is not. Financial reasons 
alone present further difficulties in calculation in a system of socialised medicine and 
these provide better reasons for some measures (tax) than for others (bans). 
 
Conclusion (1): what’s wrong with tombstoning? 
The account that I have offered is more aligned to the approach to tombstoning 
advocated by RoSPA and RNLI, and the analysis of this paper shows that it is 
because it focuses upon and facilitates the epistemic duty. Whether individual cases 
of tombstoning can be regarded as morally permissible depends on whether the 
framework of facilitation offered has been followed, and whether there has been 
adequate reflective attention given to the facts. If they have, tombstoning is morally 
defensible. I say defensible rather than permissible because the reflection is subject 
to evaluation and therefore disagreement and so should be regarded as a necessary 
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rather than sufficient condition. A search for ‘people are awesome’20 via the video 
sharing website YouTube further illustrates this. With very few exceptions, the 
people undertaking all manner of daredevil feats, tombstoning, base jumping, 
tightrope walking and extreme cycling are properly prepared and equipped, and it is 
assumed that what might be called this ‘professional’ approach implies that they 
have given the activity serious consideration. It is easy to accept the invitation to 
marvel at the skill, courage, enjoyment and sheer verve of the acrobats. People really 
are awesome. Contrast this with a search for ‘ultimate fails’.21 Amongst the assorted 
pratfalls, confused pets and distracted walking into glass doors are many examples of 
people falling off bikes and skateboards and hurting themselves. Like Sonny Wells, 
most ‘victims’ are ill prepared. There are few helmets or protective pads, and failure 
often is the result of laughingly inadequate preparation though onlookers’ initial 
mirth often fades with the realisation that serious injury may have resulted. What is 
wrong with tombstoning?  Nothing at all, potentially.  
 
Conclusion (2): responsibility for health 
A change in emphasis from responsibility for health as following public health 
advice to a model of responsibility which instead requires private process is closer to 
the espoused predominant value of respecting autonomy. It will require the giving of 
information about health in a more neutral way to facilitate the epistemic duty. The 
major challenge is in the reflective duty, which becomes the principal personal 
responsibility for health. It will remain the case that decision making will be 
influenced by factors outside individual control, but these will be reduced by a more 
reflective approach to deciding what our individual good life consists in and how this 
                                                 
20
 For example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hhKXsLFKYqc (last accessed 3rd January 2014). 
21
 For example http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ujwod-vqyqA (last accessed 3rd January 2014). 
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impacts on those who share our lives. Our responsibilities, that is our obligations, 
will be more clearly identified but not by the state in various guises.  It probably is 
the case that most of us do have moral obligations in respect of our health, and that 
they are largely unfulfilled.  Insufficiently challenged weakness of will in the 
consumption of tobacco and alcohol and all manner of health threatening habits 
possibly are, for many of us, immoral. And though the end results are similar, the 
key difference between this conclusion and the similar, if unstated, one of orthodox 
health promotion, is that this account of responsibility for health is one of individual 
process rather than collective outcome. The only duties we all have in respect of our 
health are the epistemic and reflective duties, though other autonomy-compatible 
responsibilities will follow for many. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Challenging the moral status of blood donation 
 
Abstract 
The World Health Organisation encourages that blood donation becomes voluntary 
and unremunerated, a system already operated in the UK. Drawing on public 
documents and videos, this paper argues that blood donation is regarded and 
presented as altruistic and supererogatory. In advertisements, donation is presented 
as something undertaken for the benefit of others, a matter attracting considerable 
gratitude from recipients and the collecting organisation. It is argued that regarding 
blood donation as an act of supererogation is wrongheaded, and an alternative 
account of blood donation as moral obligation is presented. Two arguments are 
offered in support of this position. First, the principle of beneficence, understood in a 
broad consequentialist framework obliges donation where the benefit to the recipient 
is large and the cost to the donor relatively small. This argument can be applied, with 
differing levels of normativity, to various acts of donation. Second, the wrongness of 
free riding requires individuals to contribute to collective systems from which they 
benefit. Alone and in combination these arguments present moral reasons for 
donation, recognised in communication strategies elsewhere. Research is required to 
evaluate the potential effects on donation of a campaign which presents blood 
donation as moral obligation, but of wider importance is the recognition that other-
regarding considerations in relation to our own as well as others’ health result in a 
range not only of choices but also of obligations. 
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Introduction 
It is a commonplace that health, variously understood, is a good thing and that work 
to protect, maintain and restore it is therefore also good. The responsibility, that is 
the obligation, to meet the demands this principle requires falls to a number of 
individuals and organisations. In the UK, despite the discourse of ‘personal 
responsibility’ for health, moral, legal, and professional obligations to patients and 
the public rest principally with health professionals within socialised medicine. 
Where the notion of personal responsibility is referred to it is predominantly directed 
at individuals’ own health, offering self and other-regarding reasons for action. Self-
regarding reasons take the form, to borrow Kantian terminology, of hypothetical 
imperatives; if you want to be healthy, you ought to undertake this action (or omit 
that action). Categorical imperatives are seen where reasons to protect an 
individual’s health are other-regarding, seen for example in health promotion 
messages which emphasise harm to others, commonly children, that ill health or 
early death of the individual brings.
1
 Outside caring and professional relationships, 
the notion of legal and moral responsibility for others’ health is rarely seen,2 and 
where it is, it requires omissions. Legislation to ban smoking in public places was 
justified in order to protect the health of others (Ferguson, 2011),
3
 recklessly 
infecting someone with HIV is a criminal offence
4
 (Bennett, 2007), and more 
                                                 
1
 A recent NHS advertisement has a boy explaining what he is not worried about. ‘But I am worried 
about Dad smoking. I’m worried that my Dad will die.’ Available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BmUtR8DcMAc&feature=related  
2
 I do not include the obligation to pay taxes which funds, in part, other people’s health care. 
3
 Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005; Health Act 2006.  Justification for the 
legislation was the harm principle as reported in the House of Commons Health Committee report 
(2005), but see also Coggon (2009a, b, 2012) for a discussion of the ban applied to prisoners in 
Rampton Hospital where prisoners’ own health was also a factor. 
4
 See R v. Dica 3 A11 ER 593.  
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mundanely, patients are exhorted not to attend GP surgeries if they think that they 
are infected with swine flu.
5
  
 
The question of moral responsibility to act for other’s health is seldom addressed and 
I shall use the example of blood donation to argue that this responsibility is plausible 
in certain circumstances. Within the broader category of tissue and organ donation, it 
is possible further to distinguish types of acts and their moral statuses, from the 
obligatory to the supererogatory, and though the rule of rescue (McKie and 
Richardson, 2003) and family responsibilities apply and complicate in some 
instances of donation, they are seldom seen in one of the commonest donation acts: 
blood donation.  Using publically available documents and communications 
material, this paper both analyses the moral status presented and offers an alternative 
normative account. I argue that hitherto, blood donation has been regarded in the UK 
and elsewhere as altruistic and supererogatory. I suggest that this position is 
wrongheaded, and instead that blood donation should be regarded as morally 
obligatory for two reasons. First the principle of beneficence makes donation 
obligatory where large health gains by recipients are accrued from relatively small 
costs from donors, and second, fairness and particularly the wrongness of free riding 
obliges those who would accept blood to give, or to offer to give it. The implication 
for advertisements and public awareness is discussed, but perhaps the most 
significant implication of this analysis is to increase the emphasis of the notion of 
obligation, challenging the predominance of individual autonomy in western 
bioethics. 
                                                 
5
 The advice contained in the NHS leaflet was ‘Do not go into your GP surgery or local accident and 
emergency department unless you are advised to do so or you are seriously ill, because you might 
spread the illness to others. Ask a flu friend to go out for you.’ Available at 
http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/
dg_177903.pdf  
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Analytical framework 
The analytical framework utilised in this paper draws upon two distinctions from the 
work of David Hume. First, the separation between the descriptive and the 
normative, the is and the ought, is maintained as far as possible, though in places the 
absolute distinction is difficult to maintain. Second, though not as celebrated as the 
is/ought distinction, Hume (2007 [1748]) also distinguished practical from 
theoretical philosophy.
6
 ‘Theoretical’ philosophy is concerned with explaining 
human nature, whilst the aim of practical philosophers is to explain to people what 
they ought to do, making 
us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our 
sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true 
honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours 
(Hume [1748], 2007 p.5). 
 
In this quotation, practical philosophy is aligned more with the normative than the 
descriptive domain. The key feature is the difference between a reasoned 
philosophical exploration of the moral status of something, in our case blood 
donation, and the way that this is presented to those making donation choices. 
Theoretical philosophy, inter alia, open-mindedly selects and defends a theoretical 
approach, applies it to an issue, anticipates objections and considers alternatives. In 
contrast, A Humean practical philosopher presents arguments and conclusions 
seeking to persuade, to ‘excite the sentiments’, and ‘bend the heart’ of those to 
whom the message is directed.  So in the analytical framework, the normative has at 
least two dimensions, the theoretical and the practical.  Initially at least it is assumed 
that these two parts are consistent, allowing a normative position to be inferred from 
practical presentation, and also that a fully reasoned normative position should result 
                                                 
6
 He actually uses the terms ‘easy’ and ‘abstruse’. 
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in practical presentation reflecting this view. The framework applied to blood 
donation addresses these issues: 
1. Descriptive.  This is primarily an account of why people donate and why they 
do not, analogous to Hume’s theoretical philosopher.7  
2. Normative – theoretical. This consists of an account of the normative status 
of blood donation; whether it is required, or supererogatory or merely 
prudential.
8
   
3. Normative - practical. Communicative strategy principally takes the form of 
media advertisements.  Embedded within the advertisements are messages; 
some subtle and some not so subtle about the moral status of blood donation. 
By their nature, the advertisements are a blunt tool, addressed to all; donors, 
lapsed donors, and non-donors.  Communication with registered donors is 
more individually directed, by letter, text and via social networking media, 
and insofar as the purpose of television advertisements is to raise awareness 
widely, it is most usefully directed at non-donors, offering predominantly 
moral reasons for action, persuasive rather than deliberative in nature. 
Application of these constituent parts differs between nations but there are also 
similarities, coordinated by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and I will use 
                                                 
7
 I do not mean to suggest that individuals choose to donate or not to donate for reasons which are 
exclusively moral (Portmore, 2008). The issue is highly complex, influenced by many social and 
psychological factors. The Theory of Planned Behaviour suggests that moral values are influential in 
determining the attitudes and subjective norms preceding an intention to donate (Ferguson et al., 
2012), but it would be as significant an error to see donation exclusively in terms of moral reasons as 
it would be to ignore them altogether. 
8
 Some, notably those of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, regard blood donation as morally forbidden, but 
I do not consider that here as I am interested in blood donation within a system of therapeutic use of 
blood and blood products which those who regard its use in this way stand outside.  
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their documentation in particular as it is consistent with, but wider than UK
9
 policy. 
To be clear; the paper concerns blood donation practice in the UK, though the 
analysis is transferable to some extent. The analysis is presented in two parts, each 
starting with what I take to be the ‘official position.’ First, descriptive claims are 
discussed and those made by the WHO are presented. It is argued that this position 
predominantly regards donation as altruistic, and this claim is tested and critiqued 
against a brief review of the empirical literature on donor motivation. Second, the 
presented moral status of blood donation is analysed. A full normative account is not 
offered by blood collection agencies in the UK, and so it inferred from UK 
communication material which presents blood donation as an act of supererogation. 
An alternative account of blood donation as moral obligation is outlined, supported 
and illustrated by examples of communication material from blood donation in India 
and organ donation in the UK, both of which are plausibly transferable to blood 
donation.         
 
Part 1: description 
The ‘official’ position 
In 2010 WHO published a framework for action with the aim of ensuring that 100% 
of donations are voluntary, phasing out paid and replacement donations (WHO, 
2010). In using this document as my primary source, it is necessary to quote at some 
length: 
A voluntary non-remunerated blood donor gives blood, plasma or cellular 
components of his or her own free will and receives no payment, either in the 
                                                 
9
 There are separate organisations covering England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, though 
the English organisation also covers North Wales. Unless stated, references are to websites and 
documents from the (english) National Blood Service, part of the NHS Blood and Transplant 
Authority. 
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form of cash or in kind which could be considered a substitute for money 
(WHO, 2010 p.14).  
 
The rationale for the emphasis on voluntary donation is primarily safety:
10
 
Voluntary donors are recognized to be the safest donors because they are 
motivated by altruism and the desire to help others and by a sense of moral 
duty or social responsibility. They have no reasons to withhold information 
about their lifestyles or medical conditions that may make them unsuitable to 
donate blood. They are not placed under any pressure by hospital staff, 
family members or the community to donate blood and they entrust their 
blood donations to be used as needed, rather than for specific patients. The 
only reward they receive is personal satisfaction, self-esteem and pride 
(WHO, 2010, p.18-19).  
 
Having identified voluntary donation as a consequentialist instrumental good, that is 
it is safest, the WHO goes on to claim altruism is what might be considered a 
fundamental principle: 
A blood donation is a “gift of life” that cannot be valued in monetary terms. 
The commercialization of blood donation is in breach of the fundamental 
principle of altruism which voluntary blood donation enshrines (WHO, 2010 
p.19-20). 
 
It is claimed that donors give for altruistic reasons and out of a sense of social 
responsibility: 
Voluntary blood donors donate blood for altruistic reasons and receive no 
reward except personal satisfaction in helping to save lives and improve the 
health of individuals they will never meet. While they choose to donate their 
blood out of a sense of social responsibility, recognition of the importance of 
their individual donations and appreciation by the blood service and wider 
community help to create a sense of belonging to a special group of people 
(WHO, 2010 p. 92).  
 
But there is also recognition that donors have self-interest in giving: 
                                                 
10
 This argument is derived from Titmuss’ (1970) important work. Three arguments for the preference 
of voluntary donation are (1) Commercial supply reduces voluntary donation in the ‘crowding out 
effect’ (2) paid blood is inherently unsafe, and (3) there is a risk of exploitation and harm to poor 
donors who sell blood through economic necessity. Empirical evidence for these positions is scant 
(Farrugia et al., 2010). For a more detailed examination of Titmuss’s work, see Sykora (2009), and 
for a critique see Rapport and Maggs (2002). 
 
  Page 200  
Voluntary blood donors themselves benefit from health education and 
encouragement to maintain healthy lifestyles as well as regular health checks 
and referral for medical care, if needed. Provided that they receive good 
donor care when they donate blood, they feel personal satisfaction and self-
esteem which provides a sense of social engagement and belonging that is 
recognized and valued by the community (WHO, 2010, p. 20). 
 
These quotations are representative of compliant organisations. For example the UK 
Blood Transfusion Service (UKBTS), states simply that  ‘All blood donors in the 
United Kingdom are non-remunerated volunteer donors’ (UKBTS, 2010), and the 
International Society for Blood Transfusion (ISBT) has the requirement for 
voluntary donation as part of its Code of Ethics, and the promotion of altruism as 
one if its aims (ISBT, no date). In the EU, directive 2002/98/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council required member states to encourage voluntary 
donation.
11
  
 
The ‘official’ position: a critique 
There is a tendency both to conflate altruism with voluntary unremunerated 
donation, and to present it as a simple binary choice between the unremunerated and 
remunerated. Both of these tendencies significantly oversimplify, and the 
predominance of the claim to altruism is at the expense of two further positions 
which are nevertheless identified in the WHO (2010) report. First that blood 
donation is prudential and self-interested; that donors’ sense of satisfaction and the 
receipt of other benefits is and should be reasons to donate (Voluntary blood donors 
themselves benefit from health education and encouragement to maintain healthy 
                                                 
11
 The full text of article 20 of directive 2002/98/EC is ‘Member States shall take the necessary 
measures to encourage voluntary and unpaid blood donations with a view to ensuring that blood and 
blood components are in so far as possible provided from such donations.’ (see Farrell, 2006, for a 
review of blood safety in the EU). 
 
  Page 201  
lifestyles as well as regular health checks and referral for medical care, if needed (p. 
20)).   
 
Second, that blood donation forms part of a moral duty or social responsibility ([…] 
motivated by altruism and the desire to help others and by a sense of moral duty or 
social responsibility (p18)). A closer examination of this phrase reveals an important 
moral distinction. I will suggest that the tone of communication and the environment 
in which blood donation operates presents a predominant discourse of 
supererogation, by definition a non-obligatory act ([…] altruism and the desire to 
help others). However the second part of the sentence, preceded by the word ‘and’ 
suggests that donors also have a sense of duty or responsibility and both of these 
words involve the notion of obligation. The sentence appears self-contradictory. One 
possible explanation is that even though blood donors are the subject of the sentence, 
what is meant is that some blood donors see donation as supererogatory and some 
see it as obligatory. But if this is the case there is plenty of untaken opportunity to 
make it clear, and the WHO document refers to donors throughout as a single 
homogenous group.  Noting again the descriptive nature of the claims and the 
absence of an unambiguous statement of the moral status of blood donation, a more 
plausible explanation is that the position is muddled and contradictory.  
 
Free will or legitimate pressure? 
In the light of extensive and continuing philosophical debate about the concept, it is 
noteworthy that the expression ‘free will’ is used; it adds nothing to clarify the term 
‘voluntary’ or the claim that donors ‘…are not placed under any pressure’, and may 
obscure them. The ISTC code of ethics (ISTC, 2000) talks not of pressure but of the 
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absence of coercion, more defensible normatively and empirically. In comparison, 
procedures to obtain valid consent for examination and treatment (see Department of 
Health [DH] for example which uses the term ‘freely’), include the criterion that 
consent must be given ‘without undue influence12 being exerted’ (DH, 2009b p.11).  
Blood donation organisations, for example the American Red Cross (no date), 
actively encourage the recruitment of other donors, influence from friends is given as 
a reason by a significant proportion of donors (Sojka and Sojka, 2008), and research 
has been undertaken to seek the best method of encouraging donors to recruit friends 
(Lemmens et al., 2008).  In making these observations about the language of 
statements made by different organisations, it is not claimed that subtle and 
contestable differences between the concepts influence, pressure and coercion were 
uppermost in the thoughts of either the writers or their intended audience, nor is it 
suggested that there is anything necessarily unethical about recruiting friends or 
allowing peer group and other pressure to influence potential donors. But there is a 
tension between the stated official position that blood donation is voluntary (of their 
own free will) and altruistic, and the recognition that undefined forms of pressure are 
effective, desirable and morally acceptable. Conceptually the claim to altruism 
appears simplistic; can it be supported by empirical research findings? 
 
A very brief review of empirical literature 
I do not offer a full discussion of the many empirical studies which assess donor 
behaviour and motivation. There are a number of reviews (Gillespie and Hillyer, 
2002; Devine et al., 2007; Masser et al., 2008; Goette et al., 2010; Bendall and 
                                                 
12
 Stewart and Lynch (2003, p. 600) report the legal case of Mrs U where undue influence requires 
‘[…] something more than pressure’, but it is unclear whether the DH is using the phrase in a legal or 
everyday sense. 
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Bove, 2011) which discuss factors influencing behaviour. What these and other 
studies show is that the area is much more complex than Titmuss’ altruistic model 
proposes, and this has been apparent for some time. In 1976, for example, Condie et 
al.’s US study showed that social pressure and degree of free rider tendency were 
more important motivators than altruism, and though much of the research since then 
has shown higher levels of altruism in donors, there are a number of methodological 
problems and potential biases in the research which is undertaken largely within 
systems assuming altruistic donation (Buyx, 2009). 
 
Methodological problems reported by Bendall and Bove (2011) include a reliance on 
self-reported surveys which have the potential for social desirability bias. In contrast, 
an Iranian study (Maghsudlu and Nasizadeh, 2011) used physicians to decide on a 
single predominant donating motivation based on donor interviews and found that 
although altruistic reasons were the biggest group at 39.1%, almost as many (38.6%) 
were primarily motivated by self-regarding reasons, including perceived health 
benefits. In this study, undertaken in a religious society, religious beliefs accounted 
for 11.4% of donations. In the US, Gillum and Masters (2010) hypothesised that 
since blood donation is perceived as an altruistic behaviour, and religions commonly 
advocate pro-social behaviour, there would be a correlation between religious 
observance and blood donation. The data, when controlled for socio-demographic 
factors, provided scant evidence for their hypothesis. 
 
Steele et al. (2008) noted that studies use different definitions of altruism and 
measure it in different ways. In their study, instead of asking donors why they 
donate, a large sample (12,064) of donors recruited at blood donor sessions 
  Page 204  
completed previously validated scales for altruism, empathetic concern, and social 
responsibility motivation. There was no significant difference in altruistic behaviour 
score between regular donors and those who subsequently lapsed. Older people had 
progressively higher scores on the altruistic measures, contrary to Maghsudlu and 
Nasizadeh (2011) who found that older people were more likely to donate for self-
regarding reasons. Surveys often report different results than field experiments 
which test actual rather than declared behaviour.  For example, surveys have 
predicted that incentives such as free cholesterol testing will increase donation rates, 
but this has not been confirmed experimentally (Goette et al., 2009; Stutzer and 
Goette, 2010).  
 
In Canada, Hupfer (2006) found that students identified more closely with an 
advertisement emphasising self-interest rather than altruistic messages and in one of 
the few UK papers, Fergusson et al. (2008) found in three studies that motivation 
was more benevolent than altruistic, benefitting both donor and recipient. They claim 
that, though subtle, the shift in emphasis is important because self-interest has not 
been highlighted in recruitment campaigns. Steele et al. (2008, p.51) concluded that 
‘it may be time to try to appeal to self-interest as younger donors appear to respond 
positively to appeals that emphasize how donating blood may help them personally’. 
Research in this area has tended to be quantitative (Arnold and Lane, 2011), though 
it is recognised that qualitative studies can be useful in examining complex 
behaviour. For example, In a Spanish study, Belda Suarez et al. (2004) used 
discourse analysis and found that donors perceived themselves to be the same as 
other donors and non-donors, and only a minority attributed to themselves higher 
awareness and kindness; an image ‘fostered by the institutions responsible for 
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promoting donation’ (2004, p. 1445). It is argued that presenting messages in this 
way may discourage some individuals from donating. 
 
There are a great many difficulties and challenges in researching donor motivation, 
but for now I simply want to make the point that the empirical evidence is 
contradictory and complex, and fails to support the ‘official’ position, which 
acknowledges mixed motivations but is clear that predominantly donation is and 
should be altruistic.   
 
Part 2: normative 
The separation between the empirical and the normative seems quite straightforward 
in terms of factual claims and empirical research findings, though it presents greater 
problems in an analysis of the moral status of blood donation. This is because there 
is little in the way of ‘theoretical’ discussion from blood collection agencies. There 
is, however, ‘practical’ presentation of the moral issues involved in blood and other 
tissue and organ donations, and here I analyse some aspects of these, inferring the 
‘theoretical’ moral position from the practical presentations. 
 
The ‘official position’: supererogation inferred 
The Donor Management Manual produced by DOMAIN (Donor Management in 
Europe
13
) states that: 
‘The effect on recruitment will most likely increase when the recruitment 
messages focuses on these factors. 
• Donating blood is a good thing to do 
• It generates social approval 
                                                 
13
 DOMAIN is a European project that focuses on good donor management. Funded by the European 
Union, 18 blood organisations from 18 countries are members, including the four UK organisations. 
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• It can be easily accomplished: ‘yes, I can be a blood donor’(De Kort, 2010, 
p.90). 
 
The strategy appears without an evidence base, but the prevailing view, that blood 
donation is a good, generating social approval is presented.  The most recent UK
14
 
television advertisement is described below: 
A man stands at the gate of a primary school waiting for his daughter. They 
see each other and smile. An on screen legend fades in: ‘Motorway pile up. 
Thursday 7.52pm’ 
 
A woman is having her hair cut. In close up she is laughing. An on screen 
legend fades in: ‘Chemotherapy starts Monday 10am’. 
 
A man holds an infant in his arms then gently places him in a cot. In a wider 
angle shot it is apparent that there are two cots in the room but the second cot 
is empty. An on screen legend fades in: ‘Liver transplant. Next Tuesday 
7am’. The man wistfully plays with the mobile above the empty cot. 
 
Narrator: Give blood and you can save someone’s life. Today. Please 
don’t leave it to someone else. Type your postcode into 
blood.co.uk.’   
 
The screen fades to the NHS blood transfusion service logo over their 
strapline. ‘Do something amazing.’ 
 
The events that require blood transfusion are situated in the near future, and so 
potential donors can help the individuals by their actions.
15
 The everyday nature of 
the stories could also be designed with the aim of suggesting to the audience that 
they themselves might need blood. But the strap line ‘Do something amazing’ 
supports the WHO position that blood donation is altruistic and praiseworthy.  
 
Supererogation, both as a concept within and outside normative ethical theories is 
underdeveloped and problematic.  Urmson’s seminal essay ‘Saints and Heroes’ 
                                                 
14
 Available at http://www.blood.co.uk/video-audio-leaflets/tv-radio-ads/ ). This advertisement is not 
currently being aired but it remains available on the blood transfusion website  
15
 The previous campaign in the UK used celebrities who identified individuals who had helped them 
or a relative in the past. For example the chef Gordon Ramsay, says that ‘without this man I would 
have died from a ruptured spleen.’ (available at 
http://collection.europarchive.org/tna/20090605173026/http://blood.co.uk/pages/video_06.htm .  
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recognised that the tripartite categorisation of moral acts into the forbidden, the 
obligatory, and the permissible is ‘totally inadequate to the facts of morality’ 
(Urmson 1969, p.60), unlike regulation which operates exclusively within these 
categories (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2011). The problem, for morality if not 
regulation, is that the category consisting of permitted acts includes those of very 
different types, united simply by the properties that they are neither forbidden nor 
obligatory. The category includes acts that are amoral or trivially moral as well as 
morally good acts which exceed that demanded by obligation: the heroic act.
16
  
 
Formally, the necessary properties of a supererogatory act are given by Mellema 
(1991, p. 3). An act is supererogatory if: 
1. It is an act whose performance fulfils no moral duty or obligation 
 
2. It is an act whose performance is morally praiseworthy or meritorious 
 
3. It is an act whose omission is not morally blameworthy. 
 
The relationship between the term and its necessary conditions is circular (Heyd, 
1982) and the conditions apply to individual acts of donation more than donation in a 
general sense. Those whose donation requires overcoming needle phobia or forgoing 
something of value might, for example, be regarded as particularly praiseworthy.  
The principal concern here is whether blood donation is presented as morally 
obligatory or not and since this question forms part of an environment of 
supererogation the status of other elements are also of concern. There is little that 
addresses the normative question directly and so I propose to infer it from documents 
and presentations that are available and in doing so I offer two justifications for the 
                                                 
16
 The webpage of the united States organisation ‘Blood centres for the Pacific’ is 
www.bloodheroes.com  and the system of small rewards for donation in the form of tee shirts and 
restaurant vouchers is known as ‘hero rewards’. 
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logical sleights of hand which follow. First I return to Hume’s two types of 
philosopher and suggest that the practical philosopher need not adhere rigidly to 
logical rules, for his purpose is to engage with an audience to whom the rules are 
largely unknown. Second I can dilute my claim a little so that instead of saying that 
the ‘official’ position is that blood donation is not obligatory, I can say that this 
position is consistent with the evidence rather than it is demonstrated by it. So with 
caveats in place, and with the intention to acknowledge the sleights of hand as they 
occur, how do the necessary features of supererogation apply to blood donation in 
the UK? 
 
The first and third conditions share the important feature of being defined in terms of 
what they are not rather than what they are. There is no evidence that blood donation 
is considered obligatory, and none either that failure to donate is blameworthy. The 
sleight of hand here is to accept the absence of evidence for something as evidence 
of the absence of something. However, it would be surprising if there was a clear 
statement of a moral position in official documents because this is not their purpose, 
but also because there is a clear normative tension in UK healthcare practice between 
any notion of obligation and the predominant moral imperative to respect and 
promote personal autonomy (Snelling, 2012a). 
 
The second condition presents a more difficult challenge. The criterion is positively 
stated and so some evidence must be offered that donation is praiseworthy. I do this 
by offering evidence that donation is praised, and that donors are regarded as an 
appropriate recipient of gratitude, ‘generally the mark of supererogation’ (Heyd, 
1982, p.65).  The sleight of hand here is to suggest that because an act is praised, it is 
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praiseworthy. Gratitude can be appropriately offered for things that we are required 
to do
17
 and care is required when inferring praiseworthiness that the stated praise and 
gratitude do not fall within the category of gratitude offered for an obligatory act.  
 
Gratitude is a positive emotion ‘one feels when another person has intentionally 
given or attempted to give, one something of value’ (Bartlett and deSteno, 2006 
p.139), and can be regarded in at least two ways (McCulloch et al., 2001). First as an 
appropriate response to beneficent behaviour to the extent that it might be considered 
that this response is required in order to avoid being thought ungrateful and second 
as a motivator of pro-social behaviour. Recipients of blood might be expected to feel 
gratitude but unlike the gratitude felt and expressed by patients for the personal care 
they receive from staff caring for them (Mullin, 2011), or the gratitude felt towards 
known donors (Gill and Lowes, 2008) this cannot be expressed to the individual.
18
 
However, gratitude can be felt and expressed by recipients to the pool of donors, and 
this forms part of the regimen of gratitude fostered by blood donation organisations. 
 
In the UK, a video
19
 posted on the webpage of the NHS Blood and Transplant 
Authority (NHSBT) starts by offering thanks from the organisation. A maroon 
background is seen on screen with a bright red heart shape in the centre, with the 
capitalised legend ‘DEEPLY VALUED’. The commentary states: ‘Thank you for 
coming today and for giving blood and platelets. Your contribution is important and 
deeply valued.’ A later section shows a mother sitting with her daughter describing 
                                                 
17
 Driver (1992) argues that it is possible for an obligatory act to be considered praiseworthy, and 
gives some examples to show that some obligatory acts are more praiseworthy than others that are 
supererogatory. 
18
 This is in contrast to acts of donation where the recipient is known or later identified, for example 
living kidney donation. 
19
 Available at http://www.blood.co.uk/video-audio-leaflets/tv-radio-ads/  
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transfusions required following childbirth.  She contrasts those who give to family 
members, which might be expected or required, against those who donate to 
strangers. She says ‘I think that they’re really special people’, echoing the language 
of the WHO report. A further section shows the chief executive of the organisation 
talking to a donor of 140 units: 
Thank you so much for coming along today. I understand you’ve made 
nearly 140 donations? That is fantastic. I’m so grateful because it’s through 
people like yourselves (sic) that Blood and Transplant is able to save so many 
lives, and without you we would not be able to do our job.  
 
During the writing of this paper, I was in communication with NHSBT. I received a 
helpful e mail giving requested information. At the foot of the e mail the writer 
thanked me for the nine donations I have made, having clearly looked me up on a 
database. This is an example of the role of vicarious gratitude as an intended 
motivator of pro-social behaviour, more likely to induce a return to Ledbury 
Community Centre than pointing out that nine donations in 30 years of adult life is a 
pretty meagre return.
20
 This is not a trivial point as it contributes to the general 
milieu of gratitude. Though the emotional gratitude expressed by recipients in the 
video is clearly of a different sort to that expressed by my e mail interlocutor and the 
Chief Executive, it would be a thin account of gratitude expression which regarded it 
solely in terms of a calculation to encourage repeated donation. A more plausible 
account is to regard the emotional response felt by recipients and the vicarious 
gratitude expressed as genuine responses to acts of perceived supererogation, 
expressed simply in the tag line of NHSBT: ‘Do something amazing.’ 
 
 
                                                 
20
 And at the risk of expressing ‘shallow gratitude’ (Baumeister and Ilko, 1995) for the modest 
success of writing this paper, I am happy to thank and acknowledge him in return. 
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An alternative normative position 
In this section an alternative account of the moral status of blood donation is 
advanced in two arguments; those from beneficence and justice.  Examples of 
television advertisements utilising these arguments support the case that they are 
already familiar, though to different audiences or differently applied.  
 
The argument from beneficence 
The principle of beneficence is familiar to healthcare professionals because of its 
inclusion as part of the principles based approach to bioethics (Beauchamp and 
Childress, 2008). One perceived strength of the principles is that they can be derived 
from any of the major moral theories. This theoretical hedging is also a source of 
critique from Clouser and Gert (1990) who argue that the theoretical source of the 
principle of beneficence is Mill and utilitarianism. An act of beneficence is an act 
that helps others, but Beauchamp and Childress (2008) are clear that not all acts of 
beneficence are obligatory and though they take care to root their system in common 
morality, its purpose is to guide action within the special relationships that health 
care professionals have with those in their care. This relationship can make 
benevolent acts obligatory that would be supererogatory in common morality, and 
the same might be said for other special relationships, for example within families. 
As the blood donation video described earlier acknowledges, I am (ordinarily) 
obliged to care for and about my family in ways that I am not for my neighbour or a 
stranger (Smith, 1993). This seems to present a problem for an attempt to define 
blood donation or any other beneficent act towards strangers in terms of obligation. 
Peter Singer has attempted to reset the normative bar in a field that is similar in many 
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ways; charitable donation to developing countries. The formal expression of his 
argument is: 
First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical 
care are bad. 
 
Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from 
happening, without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not 
to do so. 
 
Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and 
death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing 
anything nearly as important. 
 
Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies you are doing 
something wrong (Singer, 2009, p.15-16). 
 
The premises can be rearranged so that they apply to blood donation. The first can be 
restated as ‘suffering and death from lack of donated blood are bad’. The second can 
remain as it is and the third can be similarly amended. The consequentialist 
calculation juxtaposes the benefit of donation against cost. In applying these 
premises, Singer (2009) recognises that the second is vague, but his discussion 
concerns a relatively small monetary sacrifice in return for a large gain in health for 
the poorest in developing countries. For example, he quotes a figure of 
approximately $250 per life saved in a programme to prevent diarrhoea (Singer, 
2009, p.89).  
 
Some advertisements from across the world are robust in presenting an opportunity 
to help an identified individual as morally obligatory.  For example, from India, a 
series of advertisements produced by BBC Media Action
21
 includes one about a girl 
                                                 
21
 BBC Media Action is BBC’s International charity.  It ‘is using media and communication to 
provide access to information and create platforms to enable some of the poorest people in the world 
to take part in community life, and to hold those in power accountable’ 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/what_we_do/governance_and_rights  
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with thalassemia.
22
 The advertisement does not specifically mention weighing of 
costs and benefits, but it obviously invokes an appeal to beneficence:  
Daytime in a coffee shop. A man, about 30 sits alone reading a magazine. A 
girl, aged about 8, pretty, round faced with long black hair approaches. (After 
the initial greeting the script is reproduced from subtitles). 
 
Girl:  ‘Hello Uncle’ 
 
Man:  [Smiles, puts down his magazine and turns to face the 
girl].’Hellooooo.’ 
 
Girl:  ‘I wanted to say thank you to you.’ 
 
Man:  ‘Thank you! For what?’ 
 
Girl:  ‘Actually, you see I have thalassemia.’  
 
Man:   [looks away, perhaps for a parent?] ‘Oh.’ 
 
Girl: And every month an aunty or uncle like you give (sic) blood 
and help me.’ [the camera cuts to the man’s face. His smile is 
dropping] ‘But I don’t know who they are. So, I say thank you 
to everyone. So thank you! 
 
Man:  ‘But I have never donated blood.’ 
 
Girl:  [she wrinkles her nose] ‘Hmmm’. [Pause. Then she smiles] 
Never mind. Next time? Bye! [she turns and walks away]. 
 
Man: ‘Bye’. [His smile fades further and he watches pensively as 
the girl approaches another table]. 
 
Narrator: Donate blood from the age of 18. You can save someone’s 
life. 
 
The screen fades to a picture of a hanging bag of blood, with the bulleted 
legend: ‘You can donate blood every three months. Make sure it is a licensed 
and registered blood bank. Does not cause weakness.’23  
 
The final scene is of the girl now being held up by the man who is standing in 
front of a building. They are wearing different sets of clothes, so presumably 
this is after a donation. The man is looking at the girl. 
 
Girl:  [smiling] ‘Try it!’ 
 
                                                 
22
 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhoPEUXFcT4  
23
 Thanks to Dr Sabita Menon for the translation. 
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Man:  [Turns to face camera] ‘It feels good’. 
 
I am not suggesting that presentation of blood donation is this way is a central 
feature of the campaign. Other advertisements in the series present other 
perspectives, not least reassurance that blood donation does not cause weakness. The 
sleight of hand here is to attempt to transfer this advertisement from India to the UK, 
where blood transfusion services are very different.  India aspires to voluntary 
unremunerated blood donation, but about 45% of blood for transfusion is collected 
from family or replacement donors (National Aids Control programme, 2007), and 
there are a number of web-based organisations which assist patients and their 
relatives in their search for suitable donors.
24
 It is estimated that 50% of blood comes 
from paid donations, and only 5% of voluntary donors are repeat donors (Pal et al., 
2011). Ramani et al. (2007, p.259) state that  ‘[…] blood-transfusion services in 
India are a highly-fragmented mix of competing independent and hospital-based 
blood-banks, serving the needs of urban populations.’  The Central Drugs Standard 
Control Organisation website
25
 reports that there were 2517 licenced blood banks as 
of July 2011, of which 973 were government operated and 1544 were private, and 
Pal et al. (2011) estimated that in total, 34% of blood banks were unlicensed. The 
advertisement would have been seen only by those with access to television and who 
had a number of options for donation, including being paid and being directly asked 
by the girl’s relatives. This makes donation motivation and the relationship between 
donor and recipient significantly different than in the UK. However, the non-
financial costs and benefits of donation are similar, and the arguments implied and 
                                                 
24
 For example, see http://www.friends2support.org/  
25
 Using data from the Ministry of health and Family Welfare. http://cdsco.nic.in/html/BloodList.html  
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emotions shown in the advertisement are applicable elsewhere, albeit with slight 
modification, and so the advertisement is worthy of analysis. 
 
There are similarities and differences between the UK and Indian advertisements. 
Costs to donors are not discussed in detail, so it must be assumed that these are 
understood by potential donors at least in broad terms; the mild pain and 
inconvenience and possibly feeling slightly unwell are placed against the benefit 
gained by the recipient, which is always significant and frequently lifesaving.  Both 
invite donation to save an identified person’s26 life. The Indian advertisement thanks 
the donor (albeit mistakenly) retrospectively while the UK one looks to future 
donations. In the Indian advertisement, there is identification and focus on the donor, 
absent from the UK advertisement which focuses exclusively on recipients. 
Interestingly the final words in the Indian advertisement, spoken by the man are self-
regarding, a reference to well-known phenomenon that individuals feel a sense of 
satisfaction after donation.
27
 The significant difference is the suggestion from India, 
framed in the wrinkle of an innocent nose that failure to donate, for this individual, is 
blameworthy, that is donation is something he ought to have done.   
 
The very notion of supererogation is a problem for consequentialism.
28
 If greater 
overall benefit is obtained by donation, then that is what we ought to do. If greater 
                                                 
26
 And of course it is no accident that the individual is an appealing child. Singer (2009) discusses 
studies which show that the propensity to donate money is increased when the focus is on one rather 
than many beneficiaries, and of course the opposite effect was well known in perhaps apocryphal 
quotation attributed to Stalin; ‘The death of one man is a tragedy. The death of millions is a statistic.’ 
27
 An advertisement feature from Florida includes an interview with a doctor who suggests that blood 
donors have a reduced risk of cancer. The suggestion is that blood donors tend to be individuals who 
also consult their doctors more often, but the clear implication is a causal effect between giving blood 
and reduced chance of contracting cancer. Even if a more generous interpretation is allowed, this film 
remains a direct claim of the personal benefits of blood donation. (available at 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8MNmeLaVLdM ) 
28
 And for Kantianism  (see Baron ,1987). 
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overall benefit is obtained by not donating then we ought not to do it. The 
supererogatory position presented by the UK advertisement, that donation is neither 
obligatory nor forbidden cannot easily be reconciled with consequentialist 
calculations, even of the everyday sort implied. Because of its everyday nature, 
theoretical precision in the definition of what is being maximised and how is not 
necessary especially as the balancing is clearly significantly asymmetrical; the 
asymmetry between costs and benefits also addresses a common objection to 
consequentialism, that it demands too much (New, 1974; Mulgan, 2001).  
Application of a broadly consequentialist approach regards blood donation as 
morally obligatory, recognised in the Indian if not the UK advertisement. 
 
The argument from justice: the wrongness of free riding 
Famously, Hart (1955) and Rawls (1971) argue, from fairness, that there is an 
obligation to contribute to collective goods that we benefit from, that is we ought not 
‘free ride’ on the collective actions of others.  The free rider argument is invoked 
elsewhere within bioethics, for example in the debates between Harris (2005) and 
Chan and Harris (2009) in favour, and Brassington (2007b, 2011) against, 
concerning obligation to support and participate in medical research, and also by 
John (2011) in the question of vaccination. Subtly different versions are applied in 
individual circumstances according to costs of contribution, and the nature and 
extent of benefit. An advertisement in the UK utilises the free riding problem in 
presenting organ donation as obligatory.
29
 
A woman about 45 years sits comfortably on her legs in an armchair. Her 
teenaged son is on the sofa next to her. She looks at him and smiles then 
turns her attention back to the television which is out of shot and from where 
                                                 
29
 Available at http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/adverts_and_video/adverts_and_video.jsp   
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comes the sound of laughter. The boy is also laughing. The camera focuses 
on his elbow; he absentmindedly scratches it and when he removes his hand 
an intravenous cannula is revealed. 
 
Commentary: If someone you love is offered a lifesaving organ, what would 
you do? 
 
The boy’s breathing becomes laboured and he coughs. A drip stand appears 
behind the sofa and a bag of intravenous fluid appears connected to the 
cannula. The mother watches the television apparently unaware of the 
transformation. 
 
Commentary: Nothing? 
 
The boy’s hand rests on the sofa arm. Its colour changes from pink to grey. 
The fingers become clubbed. 
 
Commentary: Nearly all of us would take an organ but most of us put off 
registering as a donor. 
 
In close up, his healthily bright eye becomes, after a weary blink, bloodshot 
and dilated. He sinks back in the sofa rubbing his face unveiling oxygen 
cannulae and the paraphernalia of acute illness behind him; oxygen bottle and 
bleeping monitors. His mother turns to him and her smile fades. 
 
Commentary: If  you believe in organ donation, prove it. 
 
Screen legend: Three people who need a transplant die every day. 
 
Commentary: Register now. [on screen is a screen capture of 
www.organdonation.nhs.uk  The cursor moves to the on screen button 
marked ‘register now’] 
 
Organ donation provides a singular case of the free riding problem. Specifically the 
contribution requested by the advertisement is simply that individuals sign up to the 
organ donation register, but despite the provisions of the Human Tissue Act 2004,
30
 
which state that removal of organs for transplantation is lawful if the deceased gave 
appropriate consent (for example via the organ donation register), in practice 
permission is required from relatives (Institute of Innovation and Improvement, 
2010, and see Shaw, 2012). Where consent of the patient to post mortem donation 
                                                 
30
 And the Human Tissue (Scotland ) Act 2006. 
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has not been given because, for example, in common with 70% of the population, the 
organ donor register has not been signed, he can avoid being a considered a free rider 
if his relatives consent to donation on his behalf.
31
 Alternatively if while alive the 
potential donor has avoided free riding by signing the register, this can be overridden 
by his relatives refusing donation and in this case the accusation of free riding might 
be more justly aimed at the relatives. Genuine free riding in this case would be 
restricted to those who would accept an organ but have ensured that their wish not to 
donate an organ is known and therefore likely to be acted upon.
32
 
 
It has been argued to derive an obligation to contribute from the fact of obtaining a 
benefit commits the is/ought fallacy (Hardin, 2007), and further standard objections 
to the wrongness of free riding are provided by Nozick (1974). The strongest 
objection is to systems enforcing contribution, but this is not the case either for blood 
or organ donation.
33
  A further objection is the cost to an individual in doing his 
share must be outweighed by the benefits of the actions of others. The cost/benefit 
ratio differs between organs, blood and other acts of donation, and benefits are 
stratified.  Almost everyone benefits to some extent from the system of blood and 
organ donation. Though only recipients receive life saving benefits, these are 
dependent on the existence of the system of potential benefits and so they require the 
lesser benefit to many, and the lesser benefit to the many exists only so that greater 
benefit to a few recipients is possible.  So when calculating benefits to the individual 
                                                 
31
 The free riding of the dead person is retrospective, that is the claim is that he would have accepted 
an organ. 
32
 It is this latter provision which forms the minimal normative expectation in the NHS Constitution 
(DH, 2009a) ‘You should ensure that those closest to you are aware of your wishes about organ 
donation’. 
33
 A thin version of this would be presumed consent, currently in force in some countries and being 
introduced in Wales (Edwards, 2008). True enforceability would mean removal of organs even in the 
face of refusal to consent from relatives and prior to death from the deceased. This is seldom 
suggested; but see Fabre (2006). 
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of the collective system, it makes no sense to consider only actual benefits to the 
many.  The gain to individuals must be assumed to be derived from potential rather 
than actual benefit, and since this is significant, the cost/benefit objection is met. 
Nozick also objects that it is wrong to give benefits to patients and then demand 
payment; that is moral obligations cannot accrue in lieu of unrequested benefits. It is 
the case that individuals do not ask for the potential benefit of blood or organ receipt, 
but this is not so where individuals seek and consent to receiving organs or blood.  
Nozick’s objections to the principle of fairness, particularly the need to avoid free 
riding can be answered. 
 
Despite the singularity of its application to organ donation, it is clear that the free 
rider argument is used in the advertisement. Though the actual words are expressed 
in the hypothetical, ‘if you believe in organ donation…’ this is nearly everyone. The 
normativity is unambiguous; you ought to donate your organs. There are differences 
between the application of the free rider problem to organ donation and blood 
donation,  not only in the calculations for cost and benefit but also in process, 
principally because of the nature of contributing an organ post mortem and the 
decision making processes involved.  Blood donation is closer to standard accounts 
of free riding (Cullity, 1995), complicated by stratified benefit.   However, there do 
not appear to be any material features of the system of blood donation to distinguish 
it from the system of post mortem organ donation such that the free riding argument 
applies to the latter and not the former.
34
 If this is the case, then it is concluded that if 
                                                 
34
 In order to prevent free-riding Jarvis (1995) offered the ‘modest proposal’ that only those 
individuals signed up as organ donors should be eligible to receive them. A more modest version of 
this modest proposal, that those willing to donate should be prioritised for receipt (Eaton 1998, Trotter 
2008) avoids the potential to waste organs, and has attracted, in the US, some public support (Spital 
2004), and was enacted in Israel in 2008 (Lavee et al., 2010). 
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the need to avoid free riding is a reason to make organ donation morally obligatory, 
it must also make blood donation morally obligatory.
35
 
 
Arguments extended 
In contrast to the ‘official’ position, I have examined two familiar arguments that 
blood donation is a morally obligatory act. The first based on the duty to assist others 
applies to all adults, and the second, based on the moral obligation to avoid free-
riding applies only to those who would accept blood.  Both of these arguments rely, 
though in different ways, on weighing up costs and benefits. For the broadly 
consequentialist beneficence argument, this calculation includes benefits for others, 
and for the free–riding argument, in order to meet Nozick’s objections, the 
calculation is restricted to self-regarding benefits. Both of these arguments can be 
applied to donation of other tissues. For beneficence, acts become less obligatory and 
increasingly supererogatory as the costs and risks to the donor increase. The free 
rider argument will not apply where the donor has no chance of ever being a 
recipient, for example, sperm donation. The level of normativity can be represented 
on a table (see table 2, pp. 224-5) where acts are more obligatory at the top and more 
supererogatory descending down the table. The table is for illustrative purposes only 
and the ordering is open to challenge, but as a heuristic device it is helpful in 
stratifying calculations. It is consistent with the view (O’Neill, 1996, p.207-208) that 
supererogation ‘…is measured by that which is required: in supererogatory action 
the ordinary measures of duty rather than the categories of duty are exceeded 
(emphasis in original). On this account, different acts of donation amount to different 
                                                 
35
 There is heightened interest in the concept of solidarity, and the arguments from beneficence and 
justice that I have offered could be presented within this framework. Further analysis is warranted 
elsewhere (see Reichlin, 2011; Prainswick and Buyx, 2011). 
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amounts of the same thing, rather than different kinds of things. The question is at 
what point on the scale does donation change from being obligatory to 
supererogatory. At present, the ‘official line’ appears to be drawn between post 
mortem organ donation and blood donation, and the argument of this paper is that it 
should be drawn lower, at least under blood donation, and probably a lot lower than 
that, and especially where the need to avoid free riding applies.
36
 
 
There remains the question of the specific features and extent of the obligation to 
donate blood. Clearly, ought implies can, and so the obligation cannot apply to those 
who have received blood
37
 or, for example, have had a tattoo in the last four 
months.
38
 The obligation is to give blood if you can, or to offer to give blood. To say 
that you ought to give blood is to suggest a number of distinct obligations 
(Zimmerman, 1996). Since it is more than sixteen weeks since I last gave blood, 
ought I travel to Gloucester to give again, or can it wait until the mobile unit comes 
to my small town next month? What if on that day I cannot attend because I have 
promised to take my neighbour to visit her sick relative?  I would say that it is 
clearly a moral ought rather than a non moral ought, but beyond that there is no need 
for further analysis here. There are many contingencies and the normativity of each 
potential act of donation must be evaluated in the light of its circumstances. My 
analysis concerns being a blood donor generally rather than considering each 
                                                 
36
 In the US in 1978, a man dying from leukaemia asked a judge to compel his cousin to donate bone 
marrow to save his life, and in refusing the request the judge left the cousin in no doubt that his 
refusal was ‘morally indefensible’ (Steinbock, 1980). Regarding the act of donation of bone marrow 
as an obligation presents some difficulties, not least because, as in this case, of the complications of 
the Rule of Rescue (McKie and Richardson, 2003) and family obligations. 
37
 The full list is available at http://www.blood.co.uk/can-i-give-blood/who-cant-give-blood/  
38
 It would be going too far to suggest that you ought not have a tattoo because it interferes with your 
opportunity to donate.   
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opportunity or act of donation. 
39
 Following Zimmerman (1996)
40
  the obligation is 
best regarded as prima facie, but in any case the importance of the arguments 
presented rests in their conclusion that blood donation is obligatory at all rather than 
in any specific sense.   
 
Advertisements, nudges and a threat to the framework 
The most important purpose of an advertising campaign is to increase and maintain 
the numbers of donations. Eligible individuals can, of course, decline to give blood, 
but the temptation to make it clear that they are not acting in a morally acceptable 
way must be tempered by the possibility that this will be widely regarded as 
moralistic rather than moral, reducing rather than increasing donation. In this case it 
would be a plausible position, though apparently paradoxical, to maintain that on 
consequentialist grounds blood donation is morally obligatory, but that 
advertisements should continue to present it as supererogatory. This would present 
some problems for the analytical framework utilised in this paper 
 
First, the assumption that there is, or should be, consistency between the theoretical 
and practical expression of the moral status of blood donation is challenged 
questioning the normative inferred from the descriptive. However a critique of this 
method and findings does not invalidate the ‘alternative’ moral status of blood 
donation which can stand outside the framework if necessary. A more serious 
critique would be that focussing on the most effective presentation renders an 
analysis of moral status of donation redundant. Nagel (1970) perceived ethics as a 
                                                 
39
 This analysis will differ for different acts of donation.  Signing up to the bone marrow donation 
register will be of little value if I find a trivial reason not donate on the one occasion in 20 years when 
I am asked to make good on my intentions. 
40
 Who followed W.D. Ross (1930). 
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branch of psychology, but even if the relative importance of moral philosophy was to 
retreat in the face of insights from psychology and neuroscience, it does not follow 
that philosophical analysis is of no value at all.  
In other fields, negative marketing has been found more likely to result in self-
protection and inaction (for example, Brennan and Binney, 2010) and studies cited 
earlier suggested that advertisements should emphasise self-regarding rather than 
other regarding reasons to donate. The role of psychological framing is influential; 
popularised by Thaler and Sunstein’s (2009) book, ‘Nudge’ which has become ‘an 
instant classic’ (Coggon, 2012, p.12), behavioural insight has become an important 
part of UK public health policy
41
 (Cabinet office, 2010; 2011), claiming some 
success in, for example, required choice for organ donation, and reducing missed 
appointments by simple behavioural interventions (Cabinet Office 2011, Martin et 
al., 2012).
42
  Despite the claims made for framing, a recent review by the Cochrane 
Library (Akl et al., 2011) found very little evidence of its effectiveness.  
 
Further research into the practical applications of framing and nudging applied to 
blood and organ donation may yield interesting and useful insights. However, though 
important, the significance of TV advertisements and other public presentation is not 
restricted to the narrow matter of procuring the most blood.
43
 Placed in the wider 
                                                 
41
 According to the Cabinet Office (2011, p.4) the cabinet office team has ‘strong links’ to Professor 
Richard Thaler, co-author of ‘Nudge’. 
42
 There are however, differences in the stated motivations between its theory and practice. The UK 
Government’s aim is to find ‘intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable people to make better 
choices for themselves’ (Cabinet Office, 2011 p.9), which sits uneasily with Thaler and Sunstein’s 
(2009, p.40) view that ‘framing works because people tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision 
makers.’ 
43
 There are seldom media stories explaining that treatment has to be curtailed because of insufficient 
supply, so it is assumed that despite occasional pressure the current system, including the 
advertisements, meets the needs placed upon it, though blood donation organisations would doubtless 
prefer the problem of having too many donors rather than too few (Carter et al., 2011).  As I write this 
there is some concern about the potential for shortages over the olympic summer resulting in more 
targeted approaches to individual donors. 
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context of the role of autonomy and choice related to health enhancing and 
threatening behaviour, highlighting the normativity of blood donation could serve to 
emphasise the general notion that health is a legitimate matter for public concern, 
and that other-regarding considerations in relation to others’ health as well as our 
own result in a range not only of choices but of obligations. As I have shown, 
presenting donation in this light is already a feature of blood donation advertisements 
overseas, and organ donation advertisements from the UK. 
 
Conclusion 
Western bioethics reveres personal autonomy and its facilitation above all else. 
However, if the concept of responsibility for health is to be meaningfully 
operationalized in an age of alarming increase of lifestyle induced ill health, the 
notion and extent of obligation must be defined, justified and defended. This remains 
problematic for self-regarding reasons for action, more so for normative 
consideration of other-regarding acts which are seen as mere supplicants at the feet 
of the personal autonomy god. I have argued that individuals have other-regarding 
responsibilities for other’s health, where the cost is small and the benefit large, and 
where the imperative to avoid moral free riding is clear. Blood donation is a 
paradigm example of pro-social behaviour which has hitherto been regarded and 
presented as altruistic and supererogatory.  However, application of arguments from 
beneficence and justice challenge this established moral status, recognised in part by 
somewhat inconsistent communicative strategies.  Offering blood for donation for 
the benefit of others is a moral obligation, and in the absence of evidence of an 
unintended deleterious effect, this should be made visible and unambiguous in public 
discussions, documents and advertisements 
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Table 2.  Costs and benefits of acts of tissue donation (overleaf).
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Table 2.  Costs and benefits of acts of tissue donation  
 
Act Costs to donor Benefits to recipient  Free rider 
argument? 
Notes 
Samples for 
research 
Very little. Time perhaps, or minor 
tissue extraction. Or perhaps no 
cost at all. 
 
New drugs and treatments 
improve treatments 
yes  
Cadaveric 
organ 
donation 
Thinking about mortality. 
10 minutes to sign register with 
regular updating, and discussion 
with relatives. 
Organ donation saves 
(heart) and improves 
(cornea) many identified 
lives.  
Yes. Presented in 
advertisements 
17,751,795 people on organ 
donation register.
1
 
Official NHS position – 
obligatory. Consent rate 
65%
2
 
 
Blood 
donation  
About an hour of  donors time 
Slight pain around needle site 
Occasional transient feeling slightly 
unwell  
 
Many lives saved and 
morbidity improved 
Wide indirect benefit from 
knowing that blood is 
available if needed 
Yes.  1.4m donors
 
 in 2010
3
 2m 
units donated.  
Platelet 
donation 
More frequent donation than blood. 
Requires connection to apheresis 
machine. Takes approximately 90 
minutes. 
 
Lifesaving and life 
prolonging  
Yes 14500 platelet donors
4 
                                                 
1
 March 2011 figure http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/statistics/statistics.asp  
2
 http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/annualreview/pdf/nhsbt_annual_review_2010-2011.pdf  
3
 http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/annualreview/blood_components/  
4
 June 2012. Personal communication from Gareth Humphries, NHSBT. 
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Bone 
marrow 
donation 
(stem cell 
donation) 
Registering as a donor 
If required, daily injections for five 
days followed by collection via 
blood. A few days time needed for 
donation. Occasionally a minor 
procedure under general anaesthetic  
To an individual recipient – 
chance of cure from an 
otherwise fatal disease. 
Yes. More than 770000 on 
registers. 750 donations to 
unrelated recipients in 
2009.
5
 
Egg donation  Minor procedure involving general 
anaesthetic, some pain 
 
Potentially life changing to 
childless couples 
No 1258 donors in 2010
6
 
Sperm 
donation 
Weekly visits to clinics, tests, 
interviews 
Possibility of offspring contact after 
18 years 
Potentially life changing to 
childless couples 
No 480 donors in 2010
7
 
Live organ 
donation 
Major operation  
Possibility of needing both kidneys 
later (e.g. trauma to remaining 
kidney).  
Risk of death in operation (1 in 
3000 for kidney donation
8
) 
Potentially lifesaving to 
identified recipient 
Not at present. A 
narrower 
argument from 
reciprocity may 
apply. 
1045 living donations in 
2010. 60 altruistic donations 
(including paired 
donations)
9
 
Note:  
This table is for illustrative purposes only. It has not included benefits to donors, such as the ‘warm glow’ of altruism. Donation of bone marrow and live organs to 
relatives may have special value to donors. 
                                                 
5
 http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/pdf/uk_stem_cell_strategic_forum_report.pdf  Existing registers are to be amalgamated into a single register managed by the Antony 
Nolan trust 
6
 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/3411.html includes both those who donate all their eggs in a treatment cycle (non-patient egg donors) and those who share their eggs with 
up to two recipients (egg share donors) 
7
 http://www.hfea.gov.uk/3411.html  
8
 http://www.organdonation.nhs.uk/ukt/how_to_become_a_donor/living_kidney_donation/pdf/living_kidney_donation.pdf  
9
 http://www.nhsbt.nhs.uk/annualreview/organ_donation_transplantation/focus_living_donation.asp  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Who can blame who for what and how in responsibility for 
health? 
 
Abstract 
This paper starts by introducing a tripartite conception of responsibility for health 
consisting of a moral agent having moral responsibilities and being held 
responsible, that is blamed, for failing to meet them and proceeds to a brief 
discussion of the nature of blame, noting difficulties in agency and obligation 
when the concept is applied to health threatening behaviours.  Insights about the 
obligations that we hold people to and the extent of their moral agency are 
revealed by interrogating our blaming behaviour, and to facilitate this my own 
blaming attitudes and actions are analysed in respect of an imagined adult son 
who seeks thrills by jumping from a pier into the sea, an activity common around 
coastlines and intended to be analogous in varying degrees to a range of health 
threatening behaviours. I consider my responses to this imagined act in relation 
to some features of moralism, the excess of morality, concluding that blame can 
be justified when it is proportionate and within interpersonal relationships. There 
is evidence that some nurses hold negative blaming attitudes towards groups of 
patients considered to have caused or contributed to their illness, but this is not 
justified, not only because of impaired agency, but because if there is 
responsibility for health, associated obligations are owed to those who share our 
lives, and it is those people who are entitled to hold individuals responsible.  
Nurses who hold negative blaming attitudes towards groups of patients are 
invited to identify the status of moral agency, the precise natures of their (failed) 
obligations and of the patient / nurse relationship. It is concluded that reflection 
on these matters, and the difference between justified blame and moralism 
demonstrates that blaming behaviour in the context of professional health care is 
built on nothing stronger than prejudice.  
 
 
 
 
  Page 230  
Introduction 
The concept of personal responsibility for health forms part of the political and 
philosophical landscape of professional health care, and yet it is poorly 
understood. Responsibility can be presented as a tripartite concept consisting of 
(1) a moral agent having (2) responsibilities understood as obligations and (3) 
being held responsible for them, that is being blamed in failing to meet them 
(Snelling, 2012a). Each of these areas is problematic when the concept 
responsibility is applied to health, specifically to health-effecting behaviours.  
Moral agency, or at least the capacity for autonomous decision making, is 
assumed in professional health care, and yet is inhibited in much health 
threatening behaviour not only by so-called weakness of will (Kennett, 2001) but 
also by developing insights into behaviour from neuroscience and psychology.  
Obligations related to health and health related behaviours are stated or implied 
in official documents like the National Health Service (NHS) constitution which 
asks that patients:  
Please recognise that you can make a significant contribution to your 
own, and your family’s, good health and wellbeing, and take personal 
responsibility for it (NHS, 2013a, p.11).
1
 
 
This leaves unclear what exactly the ‘significant contribution’ is and what taking 
personal responsibility for it entails. Finally, when we say that we hold someone 
responsible for something, for an action or an omission, what we generally mean 
is that we blame her for it (Smith, 2007), but despite being as ‘common as water’ 
                                                 
1
 The initial version of this clause of the NHS constitution stated that: ‘You should recognise that 
you can make a significant contribution to your own, and your family’s, good health and well-
being, and take some personal responsibility for it’ (DH, 2009a). It is interesting because the 
latter version reduced the normative force of the clause by changing the normative ‘should’ to the 
merely  requesting ‘please’ at the same time as strengthening taking responsibility by amending 
the ambiguous ‘take some personal responsibility’ to the clearer ‘take responsibility.’ See 
Schmidt (2009) on personal responsibility for health and the NHS constitution.  
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(Sher, 2006, p.vii), performing a necessary role in our moral experiences, blame 
is under-examined within professional health care.  Recent events demonstrate 
that when things go wrong
2
 nurses, managers and politicians are capable of 
blaming each other and being blamed, but blaming patients for causing their 
illnesses remains outside professional health care, even when outcomes are 
similarly poor.  
 
This paper considers the nature of blame as part of personal responsibility for 
health.  I will begin by briefly discussing the nature of blame and its application 
to health-effecting behaviours where both moral agency and moral obligation are 
problematic. Despite this, it is clear that we do sometimes blame others for 
behaviour that threatens health, and in order to interrogate this I question my own 
blaming behaviours in the case of my imagined adult son who has jumped off a 
pier into the sea, an activity known as tombstoning and which functions as an 
analogy for other health threatening behaviours. Questioning my own intuitions 
and imagined feelings in this case in relation to some features of moralism, the 
excess of morality, concludes that my blaming practices are proportionate. A 
discussion of the appropriateness of health care institutions and practitioners 
blaming patients for their health threatening behaviour follows. It is noted that 
Codes of Professional Conduct do not permit this, though refraining from 
blaming patients because of fear of being blamed for unprofessional moralism 
requires an impoverished understanding of compassionate nursing. The paper 
concludes by arguing that a critical reflective analysis of an instinctive and 
                                                 
2
 In the UK there has been a series of high profile failures of hospitals followed by investigations 
inevitably leading for public calls for accountability. The Keogh review into the quality of care in 
14 hospitals identified as a common theme (Keogh, 2013, p.5) ‘the imbalance that exists around 
the use of transparency for the purpose of accountability and blame rather than support and 
improvement’. See also Cooke (2012) on blame in nursing and health care.  
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emotional blaming attitude, which exists in places within the nursing profession, 
will challenge assumptions that health threatening behaviours are wrong, that 
patients are always fully morally responsible, and that nurses stand in such a 
relationship to patients that blaming is permitted, providing support for 
regulatory injunctions against blaming patients for their choices. 
 
The nature of blame 
Though there is a deep and necessary connection between the three constituent 
parts of responsibility, they can to different extents be considered separately. We 
can conceive of the notion of a full moral agent, probably counting ourselves 
among their number, whilst recognising difficulties where moral agency is 
compromised. We can also make some sense of the notion of a health related 
obligation separate to issues of agency and blame. At a simple level, a claim 
could be advanced that we ought not to smoke cigarettes, that smoking is morally 
wrong. We know what this means and what sorts of arguments are required to 
defend a claim about the moral status of smoking. However, the notion of blame 
is more difficult to conceive of in isolation because we have to blame someone 
for something in a certain manner. It is not so much a unidirectional and rational 
process from agent through (failed) obligation to justified blame, as a complex 
bidirectional and often emotional interaction between the elements. We do not, 
initially at least, generally consider the extent of moral agency and the nature of 
an unmet obligation in order to arrive at a considered blaming regime. When we 
blame someone we make assumptions about unmet obligations and moral 
agency, apportioning blame to agents as a reaction which can be revised in the 
light of information about agency and intention. 
  Page 233  
Blame defies simple definition, but can be considered as a range of responses to 
perceived wrongdoing by a responsible agent.  Strawson’s (1962) celebrated 
paper, Freedom and Resentment, developed by many (notably Wallace, 1994), 
conceptualised blame as a range of reactive attitudes we feel in response to 
others’ acts, omissions or character. We feel indignant or resentment if someone 
wrongs us and more objectively we disapprove if the wrongdoing does not 
directly affect us. Martin’s (1991) typology of blame starts with the simple 
judgement blame, the attribution of a morally wrong act to a morally accountable 
agent. Attitude blame consists of negative attitudes and emotions including the 
sort that Strawson described. Martin’s third category is censure blame, 
constituting acts of ‘public criticism […] to include all verbal and physical 
expressions, from snide remarks and hostile denunciations to shunning and other 
body language’ (1991, p.96).  Finally, the fourth category is liability blame, 
involving costs in the form of penalties and punishments.  Care is required here 
not to conflate moral responsibility with other forms of responsibility such as 
contractual responsibility which more clearly assigns penalties and can do so 
outside any notion of moral responsibility.   
 
There are two ideas generally encompassed within understanding of blame 
(Scanlon, 2008): assessment and sanction. In Martin’s scheme, judgement and 
attitude comprise assessment and censure and liability comprise sanction. The 
component parts are variously expressed elsewhere though are not exactly 
coterminous. Coates and Tognazzini (2013) refer to blame and expressed blame; 
or we can refer to an initial backward-looking, emotional or cognitive assessment 
in contrast to a forward-looking response which follows. Or we can refer to a 
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person being blameworthy if we think or believe that he has done a wrong thing 
that can be attributed to him, and blamed if some action on the part of the blamer 
follows. Linguistic confusion is apparent here because on the accounts that I 
have offered - judgement and attitude / censure and liability; blameworthy / 
blamed; assessment / sanction; blame / expressed blame - the word “blame” can 
mean either or both component parts. For clarity I will follow Scanlon’s 
nomenclature, assessment and sanction.  There are two obvious differences in 
these orientations: control and purpose.  
 
Assessment blame can respond emotionally to what has happened and this part of 
it at least is generally not under conscious control. We feel anger, irritation and 
resentment, we do not think them. It is possible that there is no outward 
manifestation of these emotional blaming reactions, or there may be some 
unconscious facial grimacing or suchlike which can communicate disapproval to 
the supposed transgressor and everyone else.  In contrast, sanction blame takes 
these assessments and acts upon then them in a variety of ways including 
Martin’s categories, censure and liability. These acts are under conscious control, 
or at least they are more capable of being so than immediate reactions. We 
choose to remonstrate with someone we think has wronged us, or to use this 
wrong as justification for a further act of liability or even retribution. Policies 
that define sanction blame are considered, capable of critique and defence. Some 
examples of sanction blame, uttering a hasty rebuke to someone knocking over a 
drink, may be more of a reflex action than a considered one, but nevertheless this 
is under conscious control. If instead of remonstrating we were to threaten or 
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punch someone who spilt our drink, saying that it was a reflex would certainly 
not be considered sufficient defence in law.   
 
The second difference is purpose. At a general level it is claimed that there is an 
evolutionary purpose for morality (Machery and Mallon, 2010), and the reactive 
responses we feel are part of this. As, generally, we care what people think of us, 
we want to avoid being thought badly of and this has a powerful effect on social 
cohesion, encouraging observation of societal norms.  Similarly we want to be 
thought well of. We may seek to avoid these negative assessments but they are 
confirmed and enhanced by expressions of displeasure, privately or in public.  
Individual acts of blaming reinforce the sentiments as a forward looking 
deterrent in a number of ways; by persuading the transgressor not to repeat his 
bad act, and as a warning and motivation to others. It is not suggested that all acts 
of blame are devised and undertaken having carefully considered their purpose, 
but it is possible; and having stated a purpose, efficacy can be considered and in 
some cases evaluated. For example, Callaghan (2013, p.39) argues for 
‘stigmatization lite’ against obesity as part of a series of measures designed to 
make obesity socially unacceptable, with the aim of reducing its prevalence.  
This may have some effect on preventing obesity, but it does not appear to have 
an effect of those already obese. Sutin and Terracciano (2013) found that 
perceptions of discrimination are likely to have the opposite effect.
3
  
 
The relationship between the elements is complex. Strawsonian reactive attitudes 
or more considered judgements of the moral status of an act might be considered 
                                                 
3
 See also Schafer and  Ferraro (2011). 
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prior to and necessary for sanction blame, but the component parts do not 
necessarily have to exist together. Negative reactions can be felt or judgement 
made but a choice can be made not to voice them; an agent may be blameworthy 
but not (outwardly) blamed. Alternatively, acts of sanction can be performed in 
the absence of a reactive emotion or a judgement of wrongdoing in pursuit of an 
overall aim. Having a purpose which can be evaluated tends to a utilitarian 
account of considered blaming behaviour, stated boldly by Smart (1973, p.49-
50): 
A utilitarian must therefore learn to control his acts of praise and 
dispraise, thus perhaps concealing his approval of an action when he 
thinks that the expression of such approval might have bad effects and 
perhaps even praising actions of which he doesn’t really approve. 
 
On Smart’s thoroughgoing version of utilitarian blame it does not follow from it 
being right to blame someone that that person is blameworthy (Arpaly, 2000); 
and seeking a purpose for our blaming actions does not commit us to a 
thoroughgoing  utilitarian account of blame, much less a utilitarian morality.  
Blaming someone who is not blameworthy may simply be a malicious or self-
serving act. 
 
Blame is clearly a phenomenon which is both complex and wide ranging, and yet 
similar to other concepts like responsibility and autonomy it stands in need of an 
everyday understanding because it forms such a central part of moral life. 
Additionally, within professional health care, an understanding of blame is 
needed if only so it can be avoided.  In the literature of health promotion, for 
example, victim blaming is often raised only so that it can be dismissed with no 
explanation. Downie et al. (1996, p.31) simply state that ‘care should be taken to 
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avoid victim blaming’, and Holland (2007) notes that the problem with making 
behaviour modification the focus of health promotion is that it ‘smacks of victim 
blaming’, indicating that even the suggestion of blaming is problematic.  Draft 
guidance from the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) on 
managing overweight and obesity in adults (2013a, p.6) recommends that 
‘dialogue is respectful and non-blaming.’ 
 
Blame is often paired with what is considered to be its opposite, praise. There are 
clear similarities between processes and elements of praise and blame, but there 
is no similar restriction on praising patients within professional health care. It 
might be considered that since praise and blame both generally relate to a process 
of assessment, that it is the expression of blame rather than any notion of moral 
assessment which is outlawed in health promotion.  The NICE draft guidance 
recommends that health professionals be trained to provide ‘support and 
encouragement’ rather than praise, though there is clearly some overlap.  Praise 
certainly does follow from blood donation (Snelling, 2012b), and in the UK a 
nurse
4
 was recently honoured for whistleblowing about poor care, both activities 
which might be regarded as obligatory rather than praiseworthy. 
 
 
Thus far I have discussed the features of blame rather than its justification. I take 
it as axiomatic that justified sanction blame requires the attribution of a wrong 
act to a moral agent, and so it can be objected to on the grounds that the agent is 
not morally responsible, or that the act or omission is not morally wrong. These 
conditions are both problematic within responsibility for health. 
                                                 
4
 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-25549054  
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Moral agency   
Unlike the issue of capacity for decision making, which in practical application 
at least requires an binary assessment of capacity, blame depends in varying 
degrees on moral agency with full blame being reserved for those with full 
agency - that is being fully morally responsible. We blame people differently, or 
not at all, depending on their level of agency. A nurse in an emergency 
department assaulted by a person with dementia would regard her assailant 
differently from someone who assaulted her while drunk, differently again from 
someone who was simply impatient or frustrated.  Individuals with dementia are 
not blameworthy, those who are simply frustrated are. Those who are inebriated 
may not have capacity as defined in the Mental Capacity Act but may still be 
regarded as blameworthy for an assault while drunk because they decided to get 
drunk in the first place.
5
 A person confused because of a urinary tract infection 
may not be blameworthy for an assault, but a person with diabetes equally 
confused because of hypoglycaemia may be to some extent; he might have been 
able and obliged to prevent the hypoglycaemia.
6
  
 
Attribution of acts to agents can be further reduced in the case of health-effecting 
behaviours in a number of ways. For example, smoking cigarettes is widely 
acknowledged to be an addiction, a state of affairs defined by impaired control 
(Kranzler and Li, 2008) and which results in breaking an addiction being widely 
regarded as praiseworthy.  It could be said of course that an individual’s first 
cigarettes are smoked from choice before the addiction that will bind him to his 
                                                 
5
 It could be that the response would be different if it was a dependent rather than an infrequent 
drinker. 
6
 See Rumbold and Wasik (2013), for discussion of a case where a man who managed his 
diabetes well was convicted of causing death by dangerous driving following an unheralded 
hypoglycaemic episode. Also, Rumbold (2013) on the legal defence of automatism.  
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habit takes hold, but in many cases considerable peer and marketing pressure 
influences choice especially in younger people. Some smokers started smoking 
before the dangers were fully known to them.  Similarly, obesity and overeating 
can be characterised as addictive behaviour (Gearhardt et al., 2012). It is clear 
that it is more difficult than might have been expected to attribute agency to 
behaviour and thence to ill health, and that this impedes holding people 
responsible for their health. 
 
The problems of moral agency extend to all people for all acts. Attribution of 
responsibility for an act to an actor has hitherto been regarded in discussions 
about free will and determinism in terms of whether he could have done 
otherwise, though the ‘new compatiblists’ regard this as the ability to decide on 
the basis of reasons (Sie and Wouters, 2010).  The continuing position of 
respecting autonomy as the predominant principle of bioethics may need 
increasingly robust defence in light of the challenges from behavioural, cognitive 
and neurosciences (Sie and Wouters 2010), and the view that, particularly when 
future and current desires are concerned, different versions of autonomy can 
coexist (Coggon, 2007). That the simplistic image of individuals as free and 
autonomous choosers is increasingly being accepted as questionable is 
demonstrated by the use of choice architecture based on behavioural insight 
(Cabinet Office 2011, Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) as well as the presentation of 
health promotion information in a way that does little to facilitate personal 
autonomy, and much to manipulate choice (Snelling, 2014a). 
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Holding individuals responsible for their health status 
To say that we are responsible for our health could be read to imply that health 
per se is the thing that we are responsible for, that we have failed in our 
responsibility if our health is bad. It cannot follow that being well per se is a 
moral obligation. Likewise, being ill cannot be morally forbidden, even if it is 
considered to be a moral harm, because the range of acts and omissions relating 
to health is not fully determinative of a person’s health status, regardless of how 
health is defined. The famously all-encompassing World Health Organisation 
(WHO) definition that health ‘is a state of complete physical, mental and social 
well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity’7 is inconsistent 
with a simplistic version of ‘personal’ responsibility for health. Not only are 
many of the determinants of physical and mental health (environmental, social, 
genetic, luck and the availability of good health care) outside personal control, 
but physical and mental health, understood in terms of the absence of disease are 
but one part of health widely conceived following the WHO model or something 
like it. Personal behaviour can contribute to poor health and good health, even on 
the wide model, but not to the extent that discourse on personal responsibility 
implies; a narrower conception which tends to regard health as the absence of 
disease and personal behavioural influences on health as overriding. Under a 
narrow, disease reducing, life lengthening approach, behaviour that threatens 
health is wrong; under a wider health and wellbeing approach it might not be if it 
contributes to wellbeing in other ways. 
 
                                                 
7
 For example http://www.who.int/suggestions/faq/en/  
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Simple binary distinctions nearly always oversimplify but are useful heuristic 
devices and can identify the polar extremes of a continuum whilst 
acknowledging that the truth (if there can be one) lies in between.  But for both 
positions, the moral appraisal of health-effecting acts and omissions is only 
necessary because they threaten our health. There is little necessarily wrong with 
smoking, for example – it is wrong insofar as it harms others and harms our 
health. It would be unjust to hold someone morally responsible for a state of 
affairs (poor health), unless he is also causally responsible for it. A problem for 
smoking and drinking more than we are told is good for us, is that there is no 
necessary connection between smoking and poor health. This does not deny at a 
population level a causal relationship between smoking and heart disease (which 
would be foolish given the weight of evidence); but at an individual level, 
smoking is neither necessary nor sufficient condition for (say) having a heart 
attack, much less smoking this or that cigarette. Many smokers die in old age 
having never suffered a heart attack, and many never-smokers suffer heart 
attacks.  And some smokers who have suffered a heart attack would have had 
one anyway, had they never smoked. The heart attack cannot be attributed solely 
to smoking and hence to the agent. Other diseases or disabilities can be attributed 
to acts or habits more readily, but even here it does not follow despite clearer 
lines of causality that illness-causing behaviour is necessarily wrong. It may, for 
example, have been undertaken in the pursuit of a higher value. A fireman 
burned rescuing someone from a fire would be praised, whereas a smoker 
similarly injured in a fire caused by smoking in bed would be blamed. Smoking 
or drinking to excess may contribute so much to an individual’s conception of his 
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own wellbeing, that he is prepared to take the risk of contracting the diseases that 
his habit may contribute to. 
 
The concept of personal responsibility for health is beset with difficulties and 
inconsistencies. The problems of moral agency, the ambiguous and individual 
value of health and often uncertain causal links between health threatening 
behaviours and an individual’s poor health (narrowly defined), make it difficult 
to identify each person’s obligations in respect of his health. It would be easy to 
dismiss the very idea that we can be morally responsible for our health, and 
therefore we cannot justly be held responsible for it, but this would negate the 
proven group correlations between behaviour and health, which most people 
value highly. Given the link between a failure to meet an obligation and being 
blamed for it, one way to interrogate the obligations that we have in respect of 
our health is to examine the way that we react to individuals who may have 
failed in them, that is how we blame them.  
 
Methodological and reflective interlude 
Philosophy can be seen, by some, as something of a puzzle divorced from 
personal or professional experiences  and the need or desire to change them, and 
perhaps this is especially the case in the philosophy of an essentially practical 
profession like nursing, whose very existence in the academy is questioned 
(Thompson, 2009). Books and papers in academic philosophical journals use a 
variety of methods to link their normative or empirical claims to everyday life 
including testing outcomes of analysis against intuitions. In applied analysis, 
factual claims are often made, as I did at beginning of this paper. Scanlon, for 
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example (2008, p.123) states: ‘This account seems to me to fit in with much of 
what we say about blame…’, but it is not always clear what is meant by this sort 
of statement; whether embedded in the ‘we’, is an empirical claim involving 
more than one person, a few, a majority or nearly everyone.  An uncontroversial 
explanation would be that a claim is being made here about plausible rather than 
actual facts. 
 
Seeking a psychological explanation for blaming behaviour starts by asking not 
why, but how we blame. As Korsgaard (1992) suggests, there does seem to be 
something unappealing about taking the assessment of others as the starting 
point, but on the reactive attitudes account of blame that is exactly what we do. 
The developing field of experimental philosophy (Alexander, 2012) offers some 
insight in establishing how we blame but this does not of course settle the 
question of how we ought to blame.  When presented with an abstract scenario 
presenting information about determinism, people tend towards incompatiblism, 
a position that is reversed when concrete emotional examples are used in 
experiments (Nicholls, 2011). It is also argued that incompatiblist intuitions are 
explained by errors in popular understanding of what determinism is (Murray 
and Nahmias, 2012), which, when addressed result in compatiblist views.
8
 These 
experiments concerned causal determinism, more complete than the partial 
determinism influencing health and behaviour. If the philosophical work on 
blame is still in its ‘infancy’ (Coates and Tognazzini, 2013, p.3), the issues of 
free will and determinism are less discussed today than in Strawson’s founding 
                                                 
8
 For an excellent overview of asymmetries in blaming behaviour, see Knobe and Doris (2010). 
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essay with contemporary work being more inclined to address the psychology 
and significance of blame within moral life (Coates and Tognazzini, 2013). 
 
A blameworthy and analogous tombstoning son 
The necessity for blaming judgements forming part of an overall understanding 
of responsibility for health does more than offer an opportunity for introspection, 
it probably requires it, and in pursuit of this I have interrogated my intuition in a 
case involving health-effecting behaviour. I imagine that my (adult) son has 
jumped thirty feet from a pier into the sea after enjoying a lunchtime drink. The 
activity of tombstoning has been subject to disapproval and regulation but also 
has been defended as an enjoyable outdoor activity whose risks can be minimised 
(Snelling, 2014a). It can be regarded as analogous to the whole range of health 
threatening behaviours that are the standard targets of health promotion and 
regulation. There are similarities and differences between all these activities; in 
the level of enjoyment, addictive nature, the requirements for preparation, 
whether harm is accumulated or the result of a single instance, and the extent of 
wider societal harms. The discussions about blaming my son can be transferred 
to varying degrees to other sons and daughters, fathers and mothers, spouses, 
friends, neighbours, acquaintances and other individuals more inclined, perhaps, 
to a more sedentary lifestyle, a ‘poor’ diet, ‘excessive’ drinking, and smoking. 
 
I think that I would feel some disapproving emotions upon hearing of his 
behaviour, but even after detailed consultation with the thesaurus it is difficult to 
capture what these feeling would be. I would feel, I think, disappointment and 
exasperation, cross and concerned that he has put himself at risk. The episode 
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and the provoked emotions seem to fall between the categories of reactive 
attitude given by Strawson.  The harm to me is minimal and there is no intent, so 
resentment seems too strong a response.  But the dispassionate and uninvolved 
disapproval of the objective reaction does not capture the special feelings I would 
have in virtue of the relationship I have with my son, though I may simply 
disapprove of unknown others doing the same thing in another seaside town. 
There would be a feeling that he had done something that was wrong as well as 
unwise, and of course overwhelming relief that he hadn’t been hurt. The next 
time I saw him I would certainly explain in no uncertain terms why I am cross 
and why he should not repeat it. 
 
What would I feel had he been harmed? The act that provoked my negative 
reaction is the same; what would be extra here is that moral luck would have 
frowned upon him instead of smiled. Now knowing of his injury if I retain the 
blaming stance (or even if it is deepened) in light of the injury would I be 
blaming the victim? Robbennolt’s (2000) systematic review confirmed that we 
are more likely to apportion blame for the same act when the consequences are 
severe. Thankfully these are imagined reactions, but Sonny Wells’ parents had to 
face this exact issue when their son was paralysed in an accident after jumping 
from Southsea pier into three feet of water. Sonny and his parents made videos 
after the accident to publicise the dangers; his mother spoke of ‘stopping’ (BBC, 
2011b) others from doing what Sonny had done, and his father spoke of Sonny’s 
‘selfishness’ (BBC, 2008d) in seeking his post drinking excitement in such a 
disastrous way.   
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My instinctive reactions to my imagined tombstoning son suggest that I am 
blaming him and in large measure this guides an account of justified blame 
consistent with my intuitions. Having carefully considered my blaming 
judgements and sanctions, though not against an external and objective measure, 
I think that my reactions are proportionate. Fairly to blame not only requires that 
the blamed person is a responsible agent, but also that he has failed in an 
obligation, that the blamer stands in an appropriate relationship to the actor and 
that the blame is proportionate. Failure in any of these areas renders the blamer 
blameworthy, guilty of the ‘vice’ of moralism9 (Taylor, 2011). 
 
Simply, moralism is the excess of morality.  Like many things which are defined 
in terms of ‘excess’ it can be difficult to draw the line, and those on the wrong 
side of it, or deemed to be or accused of being on the wrong side of it may want 
to redraw the line or even deny that there is one. Moralism takes many forms 
(Driver, 2005) some of which apply to the case under consideration.  
 
The nature of the obligation 
Moralism is overly demanding, regarding the supererogatory as obligatory, the 
permissible as forbidden.  My concern and displeasure upon hearing of my son 
tombstoning must be based on an implicit assumption that the blaming stance 
that I have taken means that I think that he has done something wrong, but it is 
not immediately clear what it is. Tombstoning (and cream cakes and cigarettes 
and drinking too much) does threaten health but it is also undertaken in pursuit of 
an individual notion of the good life. Or at least I would hope that it is. If I found 
                                                 
9
 In a similar vein, Watson (2013) discusses judgmentalism, but points out that 
nonjudgementalism can be considered a vice.  
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out that my son had jumped just because everyone else had, or just to impress a 
girl or a gang of lads, my reaction would be more severe than had he made a cool 
calculation about the benefits and risks involved. The obligation that I hold him 
to, and blame him for not meeting is one of process rather than outcome 
(Snelling, 2014a). In arguing that the moral status of tombstoning is not linked to 
an absolute view that it is wrong I hope to escape the charge that I am regarding 
the sometimes permissible as always forbidden, that I place too much emphasis 
on impersonal and universalisable moral precepts, seeing them away from their 
lived experience. Blaming my son, initially by means of an emotional reaction, 
invites me to reflect upon and assess exactly what it is that he has done wrong. 
 
The nature of the relationship 
There appears to be something of a paradox between two positions that are taken 
to be standard in ethical analysis. First that ethics is everyone’s business, that we 
have at least minimal obligations to other people just because they are people. 
Many health care scandals in recent years have arisen and continued because 
people knew what was happening and yet did not intervene.
10
  Yet, ‘minding our 
own business’ is widely considered a virtue (Radzik, 2012), and as every parent 
knows, you admonish other people’s children very rarely and only with good 
reason and great caution. Understanding whether you are situated such that an 
intervention, including taking the public blaming stance is permitted or even 
obligatory, or an act of moralism is an important part of our everyday moral 
fabric. Partly it is concerned with the nature of the act which is objected to; the 
                                                 
10
 In the UK, the ‘official’ nursing response to highly visible episodes of very poor care was the  
‘Compassion in practice’ strategy which includes 6Cs, including  Courage, [which] enables us to 
do the right thing for the people we care for, to speak up when we have concerns[…]’ 
(Cummings and Bennett, 2012) 
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more serious the moral transgression, the stronger the justification or obligation 
to intervene, but generally this must be tempered by the nature of the relationship 
or the standing that the blamer has to the blamed (Bell, 2013; Watson, 2013). 
 
A full account of friendship or kinship is not required for friends or relatives to 
understand that at least reciprocated emotional ties and feelings allow open moral 
appraisal that would be considered self-righteous undertaken by a stranger or an 
acquaintance.  Friendship and kinship may require the outward expression of 
such moral appraisal in order to conserve the relationship, but repeated blaming 
behaviour even in the presence of repeated wrongdoing would probably threaten 
it.  We can make sense of general rules and categories of friendships but they are 
best considered unique, such that, as Williams claims: 
Both parties must, in order to sustain their relationship, find a mutually 
agreeable way to deal with whatever wrongs one or both of them 
perceive. […] the standing involved is not quite the authority to hold 
responsible, but rather to share responsibility (emphasis in original) 
(Williams, 2013, p. 11). 
 
This is not restricted to the wrongs the friends do each other, but also applies to 
more general wrongs. It is significant that Williams suggests that the purpose is 
sustaining the friendship rather than preventing or compensating for a wrong act.  
But this may not be possible; Scanlon defines blame it in terms of impairment of 
a relationship: ‘to claim that a person is blameworthy for an action is to claim 
that the action shows something about the agent’s attitudes towards others that 
impairs the relationships that others can have with him.’ (Scanlon, 2008, p. 128).  
 
The imagined relationship that I have with my adult son is of a different order, 
though of course it need not be. In the case of a strong relationship at least, it is 
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easier to conceive of the notion of shared lives and responsibility.  It is not just 
that the relationship is such that my obligations to him would result in my caring 
for him if he was injured, impeding my ability to realise my own life ambitions. 
It is substantially that emotionally at least, his interests, success and pain are 
shared with me and it is this stake that each of us has in the other’s life that partly 
settles the obligations in the first place and then makes it allowable for each of us 
to hold the other responsible.
11
 Those outside our relationship would need 
compelling justification to blame at all. 
 
The nature and purpose of the blaming behaviour 
Blaming appropriately requires proportionality and consistency
12
 within if not 
between relationships.  The concern that I would feel would proceed to a stronger 
and considered remonstration that for his sake and mine, that he should not 
repeat the behaviour unless he has undertaken reflective calculations on risk and 
benefit.  My purpose here is to encourage that he makes the calculations rather 
than to prevent him from undertaking the activity. If he considers that he has 
done this it is open for me to disagree and regard him unfavourably as a result, 
but this is likely to represent an attempted imposition of my values upon him, 
something that could be considered moralistic. My expressed crossness as to the 
wrongness of his action and the inadequate reasoning that preceded it seems 
enough to do what I require of it, and I would be justified I think, if I reminded 
him of his obligations the next time he went out on a sunny day. But it probably 
                                                 
11
 I don’t claim that the relationship between a father and his adult son is or should be 
symmetrical. 
12
 This is more objective in law in sentencing guidelines with associated appeals by the convicted 
if the sentence is considered too harsh, or by the Attorney General if too lenient.‘The Sentencing 
Council for England and Wales promotes greater consistency in sentencing, whilst maintaining 
the independence of the judiciary’ available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/  
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would not be justified if stronger expressions of sanction blame were used – if I 
used surveillance to monitor his activity, or withheld what would normally be his 
due if he continued, or at the extreme sought to prevent him from going out at all 
or to pick and choose his friends and activities for him. It could be argued that 
some of these actions are not properly regarded as blaming actions, but in any 
event my repeated or prolonged censure or the imposition of strong sanctions in 
respect of his behaviour would probably fail in their intended purpose, and 
worse, cause such resentment that the nature of the relationship would be 
impaired. I would be blamed, and not only by him, for excessive blaming. 
 
If his repeated tombstoning resulted in an injury, my immediate and unreflective 
emotions would probably be similar if not deeper than I would have experienced 
previously, exacerbated no doubt by his failure to heed my pleas. This might 
extend to unconscious expression of this attitude in what would be a highly 
emotional hospital visit. On reflection, it would be clear to me that the 
considered and expressed blame I previously subjected him to has failed, that 
what I was trying to prevent has materialised and so further sanction blame 
would serve no forward looking purpose in changing my son’s behaviour. It 
might be argued, similarly to Callaghan in relation to obesity, that even though 
there is no prospect for purposeful blaming in this individual case, it nevertheless 
is justified or required pour encourager les autres. In effect this is what Sonny 
Well’s father did in giving the interview cited earlier. The difference is that 
Callaghan seeks prevention of obesity through individuals wishing to avoid 
stigma, whereas the stated intention of both Sonny and his father is to educate 
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others (BBC, 2008d) in the midst of what must have been a devastating and 
deeply emotional time for the family.  
 
The examples of what I regard as justified blame offered in this paper have 
highlighted that unless the moral wrong is severe, blaming attitudes and 
behaviour are best justified proportionately and within interpersonal 
relationships. Within the criteria identified, some variables admit to wide 
gradation and subjective interpretation, diminishing the prospect of a simple and 
generalised account of justified blame.  Consulting my intuitions in an 
emotionally driven case has helped identify some features of justified blaming 
which can be considered rather than applied elsewhere.  There are analogies to be 
found between my blaming my imagined tombstoning son and the apportion of 
blame elsewhere, but the normative force of comparisons often lies in differences 
rather than similarities between cases (Mertes and Pennings, 2010). These 
differences can only be identified on considered reflection, which, it is to be 
hoped, forms a significant part of professional health care.  What I have 
considered this far is how individuals may be blamed for failures in relation to 
their responsibility for health and I conclude the paper by considering whether 
the blaming stance can legitimately be taken within professional health care. 
 
Blaming and health care practice: institutions 
In England it is the NHS, via its constitution, which sets the normative ‘request’ 
that people accept responsibility for their health, and it is implied in policy 
documents concerning the health of the nation and the role that behaviour has 
upon it.  We can conceive of such a thing as institutional blaming, but this is 
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more meaningful in contractual or legal responsibility, as this is restricted to 
considered sanction blame.  The socialised nature of most health care in the UK, 
and the constant pressure placed upon it, means that there are opportunity costs 
for every intervention, so that wasting the time of health care professionals, for 
example by not turning up to an appointment, risks not only poorer health 
outcomes for the individual but also missed opportunities to improve the health 
of others.
13
  Fees for cancellation of appointments are made in some places,
14
 but 
generally despite setting the expectation it is difficult for the NHS as an 
institution to hold individuals responsible for their health threatening behaviour.   
 
One way in which this could be considered is in institutional policies which exact 
sanction  blame, for example in denying treatment to smokers for lung or heart 
disease on the grounds that the patients have caused the disease themselves and 
so are less entitled than ‘blameless’ patients. There is some discussion in the 
literature about the ethics of denying or de-prioritising treatment to individuals 
(normally categorised into groups) deemed to be responsible for their poor 
health
15
 though currently policy is that this cannot be considered.  Public 
attitudes have been reported in favour.
16
  As well as identifying procedural 
problems, Harris (1995) argues that this would constitute double jeopardy by 
                                                 
13
 According to the Health and Social Care Information Centre (2012) there were 6.7 million 
missed appointments in the year to September 2012, representing 7.3% of all appointments. It is 
claimed that this costs hospitals £600 million per year (Dr Foster Intelligence, no date). It is 
worthy of note that Section 5 of the Criminal Law Act makes it an offense to cause wasteful 
employment of the police, and the Fire and Rescue Services Act makes raising a false fire alarm 
also unlawful. 
14
 Fees for missed appointments are allowed by dentists in Scotland, but not in England. See 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/2011/01/25085008/1  and  
http://www.nhs.uk/chq/Pages/1789.aspx?CategoryID=74  According to the King’s Fund, the 
extension of this measure has public support (Galea et al., 2013). 
15
 For example: Buyx (2008), Feiring (2008), Sharkey and Gillam (2010), Buyx and Prainsack 
(2012).  In addition, research funding (US) for lung cancer is considerably lower per death. See 
Wilson (2013) for a discussion. 
16
 For example in the US Gollust and Lynch (2011), and see Bowling (1996). 
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punishing people twice; once by them contracting a disease linked to their habit, 
and then again by refusal to treat it. It may look sometimes that overweight 
people, for example, are being prioritised minimally or even denied treatment, 
but care is always taken to defend decisions on the basis of forward looking 
considerations outside desert, that is, outcomes are poorer.
17
 It seems clear that in 
an increasingly litigious environment any attempt to deny treatment or to reduce 
its priority on the basis of desert would be likely to be resisted by individual 
patients and their advocates making open discussion and clear policy making 
key. In contrast, using positive desert as an acknowledged criterion for advanced 
priority seems less problematic to policy makers. In 2007 the UK government 
made it clear that service veterans should be afforded priority for conditions 
caused by military service, whilst attempting to retain priority for clinical need 
(Donaldson, 2010), and the recent strategy document from National Health 
Service Blood and Transplant (2013) recommends a national discussion about 
prioritising prior registered donors for receipt of organs (Jarvis, 1995), as is 
already law in Israel (Lavee et al., 2010).  
 
Blaming and health care practice: health care practitioners 
Blaming is more likely to be undertaken by individual health professionals, 
through both assessment and sanction. Research over many decades and in many 
countries has found that a persistent minority of nurses hold negative attitudes to 
groups of patients, for example to substance misusers (Howard and Chung 
2000a, b), obese people (Poon and Tarrant, 2009; Mold and Forbes, 2013) and 
people who self-harm (McAllister et al.,  2002; Saunders et al., 2012). Negative 
                                                 
17
 See for example http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/southern_counties/4717764.stm . And see 
Salih and Sutton (2013) for a review. 
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attitudes may contribute to feelings of stigmatisation for example in lung cancer 
(Chambers et al., 2012) obesity (Puhl and Heuer, 2009; Creel and Tillman, 2011) 
and HIV (Nyblade et al., 2009). All of these conditions are to large extent caused 
by personal behaviour. Holding blaming attitudes and acting upon them is clearly 
identified as being unprofessional by the UK nursing regulator, the Nursing and 
Midwifery Council (NMC) (2008) which states in its professional code that: 
 You must treat people as individuals and respect their dignity  
 
 You must not discriminate in any way against those in your care  
 
 You must treat people kindly and considerately18 (NMC, 2008, p.2).19 
 
These statements appear to rule out disapproval and blame, because to do so 
would not (arguably) be respecting dignity, might result in discrimination, and 
would not be treating people kindly or considerately.  The medical code of 
practice in the UK deals with the issue of blame more directly: 
You must not refuse or delay treatment because you believe that a 
patient’s actions or lifestyle have contributed to their condition (General 
Medical Council [GMC], 2013, p. 19). 
 
As if to emphasise the importance this is re-stated on the following page: 
You must not unfairly discriminate against patients or colleagues by 
allowing your personal views* to affect your professional relationships or 
the treatment you provide or arrange. You should challenge colleagues if 
their behaviour does not comply with this guidance (GMC, 2013, p.20). 
 
The * is elaborated upon in a footnote: ‘This includes your views about a 
patient’s or colleague’s lifestyle, culture or their social or economic status […].’  
 
                                                 
18
 Of interest is the corresponding clause in the General Medical Council document ‘Good 
Medical Practice’ is You must be polite and considerate (my italics) (GMC 2013, p. 16). 
19
 Addressing the issue more directly, the previous version of the Code of conduct stated that  
‘you are personally accountable for ensuring that you promote and protect the interests and 
dignity of patients and clients irrespective of…lifestyle’ (NMC, 2004a). 
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The NMC Code also requires that nurses advocate for their patients; MacDonald 
(2007) goes so far as arguing that it is a universally held moral obligation. 
Advocacy itself is contested and complex, but it is clearly connected with 
arguing for personal choice.
20
 If a patient wants to stop smoking or lose weight 
then blaming him within the professional relationship is very unlikely to 
facilitate it; and if he does not want to change his behaviour, then blaming him is 
the opposite of advocating for his self-determination.  
 
But it would be a thin and ironic compassion that dissuaded health care 
professionals from unprofessional blaming simply for fear of being blamed. The 
injunctions from professional bodies cover sanction blame only, and it is possible 
that individual practitioners retain blaming assessments whilst being careful to 
avoid giving them outward expression. This behaviour complies with the letter of 
the codes, and yet falls short of what most people take a good nurse to be; an 
account which includes reference to character as well as acts (Sellman, 2011), 
requiring open-mindedness (Sellman, 2003) in challenging their attitudes. A 
good nurse not only follows the Code’s injunctions against discrimination but 
also understands why she should.
21
 
 
An initial critical interrogation of any emotional or unconsidered response should 
start with asking what, exactly, the person has done wrong such that they are 
blameworthy for doing it. This requires detailed thinking about the nature of 
obligation in relation to their own and others’ health. Simply uncritically 
                                                 
20
 See for example the NMC’s Guidance for the Care of Older People (2009). 
21
 This argument is strikingly similar to Clouser and Gert’s (1990) much cited critique of ethical 
principlism. Practitioners respect autonomy because the principle tells them to but without 
theoretical justification, they do not know why they should. 
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accepting the mantra that health is an intrinsic good to be prioritised and 
valorised above all else is insufficient and it provides a challengeable initial 
premise from which procedurally correct but nevertheless similarly criticisable 
conclusions follow, and stands in tension with a further valorised principle in 
health care, the supremacy of personal autonomy.  If a case can be made that a 
wrong act has been undertaken, consideration is also needed as to the extent to 
which it can be attributed to the agent, and health care professionals are in a 
better place than the public (or at least they should be) to understand the social, 
genetic and pathological determinants of health and behaviour.  
 
If the case of attribution can be made then it may be that the agent is 
blameworthy, but it does not follow from this that blame by any health care 
practitioner is justified because the standing of the relationship does not allow it. 
Patients are simply not accountable to health care professionals. Justified blame 
of sorts does contribute to close relationships as I have described, but the albeit 
emotional and caring relationship that can characterise professional nursing 
excludes blaming attitudes. The relationships are fundamentally asymmetrical 
and blame is as illegitimate within them as it is within similarly asymmetrical but 
more hierarchical relationships between doctors and patients.  While I would 
consider it appropriate that my injured tombstoning son may apologise for his 
actions, any apology would be offered to me because I (and certain others) would 
be ourselves be harmed in light of the harm to him, but it would make no sense 
for him to apologise to his carers, apart perhaps from a cursory apology more 
associated with politeness rather than genuine moral behaviour.
22
 Similarly, it 
                                                 
22
 See Smith (2005) for a detailed analysis of apology. 
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makes no sense for him to seek forgiveness from the nurse for his actions (Allais, 
2008).  
 
Finally, brief mention is needed where it might be appropriate for health care 
staff to blame patients, where the wrongdoing is to them directly, when patients 
are violent and abusive towards them. Though the relationship is asymmetrical, it 
isn’t that asymmetrical, and it seems perfectly reasonable for nurses to feel the 
resentment that would characterise an assault outside professional health care. 
Much of the incidence and literature about violence to health care staff occurs 
within mental health services and accident units and here the question of 
impaired moral agency may be expected to lessen the force of the reactive 
attitudes. As far as sanction blame is concerned in addition to standard options to 
prosecute abusers through the criminal law system, the Handbook to the NHS 
Constitution makes it clear that though violent and abusive patients can be 
expected to be denied treatment by local policies, these ‘should reflect that 
violent and abusive patients can only be denied access to NHS services if it is 
clinically appropriate to do so […]’ (NHS 2013b, p.88). As an example, the 
policy from the University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Trust (2012) states that 
denial of treatment lasts for a year, excludes emergency treatment, and that 
arrangements are made to transfer care elsewhere. 
 
Conclusion 
To deny that people cannot be held responsible for their health-effecting 
decisions is to deny that there is such a thing as responsibility for health, to say 
that there are no health related obligations.  However, obligations for individuals’ 
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own health are best understood and defined within interpersonal relationships 
and derive their strength from mutual obligations within shared interests and 
individual versions of the good life. This must mean that the obligations for each 
of us are individual in strength and, importantly, direction. We owe obligations 
of various sorts and in varying strengths to those who share our lives, and it is to 
these companions that we owe an account, because we fail them when we fail to 
meet our obligations.  There are blameworthy acts in relation to responsibility for 
health and taking the blaming stance within and as part of interpersonal 
relationships may be justified if proportionate.  
 
This account inevitably results in inconsistency because of variety in 
relationships and accounts of the good life, and this means that there can be no 
universaliseable rules beloved by over-zealous health promoters (Fitzgerald, 
2001). Analysing the features of health related obligations and of justified 
blaming should explain why there is no place, in this account, for the notion of 
nurses and other health care professionals blaming patients for their health-
effecting behaviour by their attitude and/or actions. At the risk of perpetrating an 
‘education reflex’ (Paley, 2007), an appropriate response to the minority blaming 
attitudes and behaviour in respect of individuals deemed to have caused their 
own poor health and not fully deserving of health care is to mount an education 
challenge which will expose the simplistic ‘philosophy’ of much professional 
health care practice which values health for itself rather as part of a good life 
chosen according to the (allegedly) overriding principle of respect for personal 
autonomy. The challenge is first to identify what, exactly, individuals are doing 
wrong by undertaking behaviour that harms their health, and the extent to which 
  Page 259  
it can be attributed to them.  A further examination of the nature of the 
relationships in professional health care and of the difference between justified 
blame and moralism will help practitioners to the view that the reactive emotions 
and their consequent blaming behaviours are built on nothing stronger than 
prejudice.  
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Part III: Conclusion 
CHAPTER 9 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis I have attempted to set out the nature of our personal responsibility 
for health.  I noted throughout that currently there is inconsistency both within 
and between the constituent parts that I identified in Chapter 5, according to what 
I referred to, loosely, as ‘official’ understandings. In a sense the thesis is 
presented as a response to this environment; one in which certain assumptions 
about health dominate discourse, characterised by various tensions between and 
within two highly valuable things: health and autonomy.  Despite their 
protestations to the contrary I tend to the view that policymakers and many 
health professionals regard and present health in a reductionist and overtly 
normative rather than a holistic sense and that this results in a range of measures 
and prescriptions applied to citizens with little thought or understanding as to 
their own conceptions of health. In applying population-level measures and 
health-promoting rules to enhance this vision of health, individual autonomy 
takes a subordinate role. This is perhaps inevitable with many public health 
interventions where measures cannot be individualised, for example in water 
fluoridation. However, there are other areas of health promotion where, as I have 
indicated, personal responsibility for health can be supported. The thesis attempts 
to contribute to redressing this imbalance of valuing health over autonomy by 
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proposing an outline of a unified account of responsibility for health, which 
recognises that there is such a thing as responsibility for health, but argues that it 
is not captured or represented in the current conceptualisation. The account 
requires a great deal of filling out; it much bigger than a PhD thesis. I have not 
for example, discussed the duties in any detail or offered any suggestions about 
their strength and direction or how they can be calculated. Importantly, the 
magnitude of the argument from an obligation to avoid using health care 
resources is in need of greater analysis, and other obligations, for example those 
concerning communicable diseases have not been considered. 
 
In this concluding chapter I will first give a brief summary of the main themes of 
the thesis before discussing in more depth how my normative conclusions, the 
epistemic and reflective duties, are challenged in current practice, I will discuss 
the prospects for the papers presented as the core of the thesis making a 
contribution to the various debates that follow from challenges to what I have 
presented as orthodox professional health care. I acknowledge that the normative 
messages, addressed to the public as well as health care professionals and 
policymakers are unlikely to be received or influential just by being published in 
academic journals, and ways of engaging the public and nurses are briefly 
discussed. I conclude that the epistemic and reflective duties as I have set them 
out also apply to health care professionals, and debate within professional health 
care about personal responsibility for health is important in their education and 
practice. 
 
 
  Page 263  
Summary of the thesis 
I argued that the notion of responsibility for health as currently conceptualised 
tends too much to a collective model of public health by articulating an account 
that obliges individuals to follow health related advice. This account is 
prescriptive, though it claims otherwise in dressing its injunctions in the apparel 
of autonomy and the illusion of choice.  But critique of responsibility for health 
as I presented it is not outright rejection of the notion, which can be better 
understood in its constituent parts of a moral agent having obligations and being 
held to account for them. Understood like this, responsibility in respect of health 
is the same as responsibility in respect of other valuable things; the strength and 
direction of the obligation depends on the importance that one gives to health in 
the context of individual lives. 
 
As one moves away from rule based reasoning to reasoning that emphasises acts, 
the importance of the individual actor is heightened, because he or she is the only 
one able to make necessary judgements. Conceptualising responsibility for health 
more in the light of individual circumstances and values inevitably changes its 
nature from judgements about simply whether to follow a rule to calculating right 
action. The responsibility has changed from outcome to process. There is such a 
thing as a moral obligation to look after our health, and for many it involves the 
sorts of things that we are exhorted to do by established practice in health 
promotion. But these obligations are not owed to the State, nor in the main to 
ourselves, but principally to those who share our lives and have an interest in 
them.  Though not owed to it, the obligations may still be mediated by the State 
in some degree because our actions are in many cases not fully autonomous, and 
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along with similar actions by others, have an impact on very many other citizens. 
Most obviously this is seen and presented where health care resources are needed 
to treat diseases contracted through individual behaviour, but this element of 
obligation, even if one accepts that it is there, can be over-emphasised. On the 
account that I have offered, our obligations are to establish what the effects of 
our behaviours are on our own and others’ health and wellbeing and, having done 
this, to make a reflective decision about whether it is permitted or forbidden to 
behave in that way. As I argued in chapter 4, my preference is for a dual level 
utilitarian approach to making this judgement, which I suggested was consistent 
with evidence of how we reason in practice. This means that the obligations are 
not the same for everyone, and this alone puts it at odds with health-maximising 
rules. The reasoning I have employed also concludes that we have obligations for 
others’ health and wellbeing. These need not be stringent obligations, but as I 
have presented them in relation to blood donation they can be material in 
mandating action.  
 
The final element of the three part concept is holding people responsible for their 
actions, something that, as I have explored, is central to understanding 
responsibility and which is played out daily in almost countless news stories and 
personal interactions and yet is underexplored in health care. My account does 
not attempt, as professional health care regulators do, simply to outlaw blaming 
practices, but instead situates them alongside the obligations largely within 
personal relationships. To deny that individuals cannot be held responsible is to 
deny that they have any responsibility at all.  
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At the start of the thesis I suggested that moral responsibility for health is 
important because it is prior to public health policy, that is regulation and 
treatment allocation decisions require an account of the moral status of the thing 
that they are proposing to regulate or deny treatment for.  This is a reason for the 
moral status of health-effecting behaviours to be challenged but the conclusions 
that I reached concerning the nature of the obligations also exist independently of 
any system of health care delivery. However, the obligations are inevitably 
framed within the context of professional health care and the system in which it 
operates and in the next section I consider how the duties I set out are 
problematic within current professional practice. 
 
A challenge to current practice: epistemic duty 
There are significant problems for the epistemic and reflective duties as I have 
presented them, many related to the philosophical and operationalised 
understanding of autonomy.  Owens and Cribb (2013) argue that much of the 
discussion of autonomy in bioethics is related to procedural autonomy, that is the 
capacity for making choices, and we see this, as I suggested in Chapters 2, 3 and 
4, in procedures to determine capacity for decisions. There is a tension in the 
‘official’ version of autonomy as I have characterised it. In bioethics, autonomy 
is often seen, as in the principlist scheme, as primus inter pares (Gillon, 2003). 
For example, it is emphasised in moral questions at the end of life, successfully 
(as far as the law is concerned) when applied to refusal of treatment, and 
unsuccessfully in requests for assisted dying.  But at the same time as it is 
revered within bioethics, it is undermined in public health ethics, in at least two 
ways.  Most clearly is the straightforward restriction on the ability to undertake 
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chosen actions that operate in different ways, exemplified by the intervention 
ladder developed by the Nuffield Council on Bioethics, discussed in Chapter 1. 
More importantly for the themes in this thesis, however, is the undermining of 
autonomy in the presentation of information, which I discussed briefly in chapter 
6. 
 
The epistemic duty could potentially be understood so that it is each individual’s 
responsibility to seek information from all the sources available to him, but this 
would ordinarily be too onerous
1
 and probably not possible for most individuals. 
The duty is principally to those who share his life, and so the context in which 
this relationship operates also defines the amount and level of information 
required. More important is the correlative duty on behalf of the State and 
professional health education and promotion to provide the required information 
in a way that can be easily understood.  Our unwillingness, inability and/or 
disinclination to access and process information is a problem with procedural 
versions of autonomy. If the concern for supporting personal decision making is 
genuine, we need to challenge, in Owen’s and Cribb’s (2013) suggestion, the 
dichotomy between pure information giving and the perils of controlling. As I 
suggested in chapter 6, much health promoting material is designed to lead 
people to desired conclusions rather than to give them information useful for 
autonomous decision making. 
 
The developing field of health literacy offers a potential solution to the problem 
of the difficulty of individuals being unable to process data upon which to base 
                                                 
1
 As Prainsack and Buyx (2011) suggest, in an extreme form of ‘responsibilisation’, a responsible 
individual actively seeks to learn about as many risks as possible so as to take precautions against 
them. 
  Page 267  
their decisions. The World Health Organisation defines and explains health 
literacy following a broad and inclusive definition developed in 2012 by the 
European Health Literacy Consortium: 
Health literacy is linked to literacy and entails people’s knowledge, 
motivation and competence to access, understand, appraise and apply 
health information in order to make judgements and take decisions in 
everyday life concerning health care, disease prevention and health 
promotion to maintain or improve quality of life during the life course 
(WHO, 2013, p.4). 
 
This definition illustrates the dilemma between health and autonomy; even 
though the overall aim is to maintain or improve quality of life during the life 
course, the purpose is to enable decision-making, open to the possibility that 
decisions will be made to undertake activities which WHO would rather we did 
not. The definition understands health literacy simply in terms of using 
information in health promoting ways, echoing the observation made by Allmark 
and Tod (2007) that I discussed in Chapter 6 about the purposes and evaluation 
of health education; the aim of increasing health literacy attempts to ‘get’ (Upton 
and Thirlaway, 2010) people to change their habits rather than make well 
informed decisions about their life. In this case at least, autonomy is subsumed to 
health - a narrowly and centrally defined version of health.  
 
Gerd Gigerenzer (2014, and Gigerenzer et al., 2008) offers an alternative to the 
view that inability to understand complex information justifies or even requires 
libertarian paternalism of various sorts, by suggesting that statistics can be 
presented in ways that are more meaningfully understood. He describes studies 
undertaken to assess understanding of statistics by doctors who routinely discuss 
screening choices with patients, finding that the number correctly able to identify 
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(from a list of four options) the chance of a positive mammogram predicting the 
presence of cancer
2
 is, at 20%, less than would be expected from random choice. 
He demonstrates how screening companies in the USA have manipulated 
statistics to make their product more attractive,
3
 and also that presenting 
information in terms of natural frequencies and death rates rather than as relative 
risks and survival rates can significantly improve understanding and therefore 
informed decision making. This information can be presented on accessible cards 
for patient use. Gigerenzer’s work has mainly concentrated on the risks and 
benefits of screening but exactly the same statistical explanations can be used in 
information about the risks of smoking and drinking and other health-effecting 
behaviour. Similar information about the absolute risk associated with smoking 
has been produced in an academic journal (Woloshin et al., 2008) but this has 
not, generally, been used by health educators. 
 
Gigerenzer et al. (2008) start their paper with a story about how the statistics on 
prostate cancer survival were misused by the New York mayor Rudy Giuliani, 
who contrasted a survival rate of 82% in the US with a 44% survival rate in 
England, ‘under socialized medicine’ (Gigerenzer et al., 2008, p.53). The authors 
of the paper were generous in ascribing the error to the statistic being 
misunderstood
4
 rather than a deliberate intention to mislead for political 
purposes. In the UK we have seen the Chairman of the UK Statistics Authority 
                                                 
2
 The question required interpretation of commonly used statistics about the efficiency of 
screening.  
3
 In the UK where screening is undertaken by the NHS, financial incentives are not so marked. 
However, financial incentives for GPs have been used in the past and been found to be correlated 
with uptake (Lester et al., 2010). 
4
 The error is committed by confusing five year survival rates with death rates.  Screening 
programmes detect cancers, including non-progressive ones, earlier, and so the survival rate is 
skewed because it counts sub clinical cancers which never would have caused death, as well as 
staring the five year survival ‘clock’ earlier.  
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confirm that statistics have been misapplied to give the impression that real-
terms NHS funding has been maintained when in fact it had been cut
5
 (BBC, 
2012) and as I write this in July 2014, the Prime Minister was challenged by the 
House of Commons Library for misusing statistics about waiting time in accident 
and emergency departments.
6
 Similar questions of bias can be levelled at the way 
that statistics are used in health promotion, even where the goal of enabling 
choice is claimed. In the case of Mayor Giuliani and the doctors in Gigerenzer et 
al.’s study, it is plausible to suggest that a lack of knowledge is at the heart of the 
misleading presentation, but it would be difficult to apply this explanation to 
health promoting material which is written by specialists in the full knowledge 
that it is misleading and therefore cannot respect a person’s autonomy. If an 
individual’s epistemic duty as I have suggested it is to have any meaning at all in 
professional health care then radical change in the way that information is 
presented will be required so that it supports rather than undermines autonomous 
decision making. Developing the concept of health literacy, but without the 
institutionalised value driven bias, will support the epistemic duty but without 
this development, it is difficult to see how the epistemic duty as I have presented 
it can have any practical meaning at all.  
 
A challenge to current practice: reflective duty 
There are clear links from the epistemic duty to the reflective duty. Knowledge is 
necessary for reflection. Neither is enforceable, though the epistemic duty is, as I 
                                                 
5
 Misapplication of statistics by politicians of all shades is barely a surprise. There is lengthy page 
on the UK Statistics Authority webpage which details numerous disputes between politicians 
with the Chairman, currently (July 2014) Sir Andrew Dilnot, adjudicating in the squabbles. 
http://www.statisticsauthority.gov.uk/reports---correspondence/correspondence/index.html  
6
 The blog can be found at http://commonslibraryblog.com/2014/07/03/have-ae-waiting-times-
fallen/  After an initial posting it was removed and when it reappeared, though the analysis was 
unchanged, some comments about the Prime Minister’s use of statistics had been removed. 
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have discussed, relatively easy to facilitate. As I discussed in Chapter 6, the 
reflective duty as I have described it is comprised of a number of elements. The 
harms of health-effecting behaviour can be considered in the light of sufficient 
and unbiased information. However, the value placed on the activity and the 
appraisal of the effects on connected others can only be realised by an individual 
within relationships.  
 
Hieronymi (2014) argues that reflection is required as a pre-requisite of 
relationships that ‘constitute us as morally responsible’ (2014, p. 41), forming 
part of a relational account of autonomy (MacKenzie, 2008). This account of 
autonomy sees individuals as free choosers but also recognises that they are 
socially situated, having values that are, to some extent, defined by personal 
relations and interdependency (Christman, 2004). The account is associated with 
feminist philosophy, but general dissatisfaction with an overly individualistic 
understanding of respect for autonomy can also be found in communitarian 
critique (Gauthier, 2000). However much bioethicists and others bemoan the 
(over)emphasis on individual rights in health care and the insularity that this 
implies and fosters, practical steps to address this are difficult. It is not possible 
to force people to take information into account or require them to consider the 
effects that their behaviour and its possible consequences have on others. Public 
health measures that ‘compensate’ collective health care through extra taxation 
ameliorate this to some extent. For example, as I discussed in chapter 3, 
Cappelen and Norheim (2005) argued for increased taxation of tobacco as a 
‘liberal egalitarian’ way to raise funds to pay for increased costs of health care 
for smokers. A campaign to tax sugary drinks is probably more important for 
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health gains than income generation
7
 and is supported by the Academy of 
Medical Royal Colleges (2013).
8
 Noticing price differentials between drinks and 
noting a public and political debate which would precede such a move might 
encourage people to consider the financial impact of their food choices, but it is 
unlikely to encourage consideration of the effects that their food choices has on 
those close to them.  
 
There is some engagement by health care professionals with relational autonomy 
in professional health care, but this has tended to involve procedures for 
informed consent, and is wary rather than supportive of the social situation of 
individuals. The Department of Health’s reference guide to consent (DH, 2009b) 
recognises that individuals do not decide alone, but this concerns the context of 
coercive relationships and the possibility of ‘undue influence’, and the remedy is 
simply for health care professionals to ‘arrange to see the person on their own in 
order to establish that the decision is truly their own’ (DH, 2009, p.11). This 
appears to be a very thin but perhaps inevitable solution. In a more detailed 
exploration of informed consent and relational autonomy, Stoljar (2011) points 
out that some oppressive social practices can undermine autonomy and her 
conclusions are similarly non-specific; providers should be alert to social 
conditions and take ‘positive steps to counteract’ (p. 383) the effects of 
internalized norms, including encouraging ‘imaginative reflection on different 
options’ (p.383). A more relational version of autonomy so far as health care 
decisions are concerned can be encouraged but there is need for great caution as 
well. This is best performed within individual episodes of care where the health 
                                                 
7
 Briggs et al. (2013) calculate a reduction in obesity of 180,000 people and tax revenue of £276 
million following the introduction of a 20% ‘sugar tax’. 
8
 See Mytton et al. (2012) for a review of the evidence and examples of policy in other countries. 
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professional knows the patient, but as I indicated in Chapters 6 and 7, general 
health promoting material can refer to other-regarding considerations.  
 
Neil Levy (2014) also notes the values of liberal individualism but does so more 
approvingly.  His suggestion to constrain autonomy to some extent is based on 
the fallibility of human reasoning which I have discussed throughout the thesis, 
especially in chapter 4. He suggests employing informed consent specialists who 
can correct the psychological illusions that characterise decision making. These 
specialists might even express their disagreement with a decision where it does 
not represent the patient’s previously expressed values. Rather than just ensuring 
that patients have ‘sufficient information’ (whatever that means) to make a 
decision, we ‘should tell patients when we think their decisions are distorted by 
cognitive illusions or when they are misapplying their values’ (Levy, 2014, 
p.300). This discussion may take the form of ‘rational persuasion’ which can 
itself, in certain circumstances, be considered paternalistic (Tsai, 2014), and 
Levy’s suggestion is consistent with ideas of relational autonomy, though more 
structured and for different reasons. In considering whether the action is 
consistent with his values the patient must first reflect on what those values are.  
 
These suggestions are worthy of consideration and further philosophical and 
empirical investigation as a way to encourage the reflective duty, which must 
navigate between recognising the value of a social construction of self which 
encourages individuals to consider the effects of their actions on others, and over 
valuing it, which has implications in confidentiality and oppression. Family 
centred care is a concept more at home within children’s health care than adults, 
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though there may be scope to extend this cautiously. For example the King’s 
Fund recently released a patient and family centred care toolkit (Kings Fund, 
2014) to support service development. As Rhodes (1998) concluded in relation to 
genetic information, there are moral responsibilities towards others and yet 
overriding this when these responsibilities are unmet is problematic and should 
be undertaken only exceptionally (Juth, 2014). The reflective duty can also be 
encouraged using mass marketing approaches as I described in relation to 
smoking in Chapter 6, where other-regarding considerations in relation to health-
effecting behaviours can be emphasised. Similarly, reflection can be encouraged 
in relation to blood donation and other tissue donation behaviours as I discussed 
in Chapter 7.  However, requiring a reflective duty, even if we wanted to,  
presents challenges for professional health care but these can be met to some 
extent on an individual level for certain patients in certain circumstances, though 
as I have discussed, open and unbiased discussion seems unlikely in an 
environment of misleading information and value-laden assumptions about 
health.   
 
Potential impact of the thesis 
There are implications for public health ethics in the normative conclusions of 
my thesis, and it is to be hoped that policymakers may use the work and the ideas 
in it to inform if not direct their responses to the undoubted challenges that 
confront us. A liberal presumption of light-touch regulation is consistent with 
accepting the nature of responsibility for health as I have presented it, but it does 
not stand in opposition to all regulation or collective action in pursuit of public 
health. It is neither possible nor desirable to attempt to separate public and 
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private notions of health so that they are distinct entities. But it does mean that 
the tension between autonomous choice and health-increasing policies should be 
examined in more detail. I do not mean by this that there should be more debate 
and learned arguments in the academic press, but rather that these debates and 
the assumptions about health and disease which underpin them should be the 
focus of greater public discussion. There has recently been a call for a national 
debate about the funding of the NHS expressed in the a letter to The Times 
newspaper (Oldham et al., 2014) signed by, amongst others, the heads of the 
medical and nursing Royal Colleges that concluded ‘We believe the route is an 
all-party mandated, independently conducted "national conversation" on the 
scope, provision and funding of health and social care.’ The authors called on 
political leaders to assist this proposal but there is no detail on how it should be 
done. A national debate on funding and provision of health care would assist 
reflection on responsibility for health, more so if the debate encompassed 
philosophical questions about the value of health and autonomy. 
 
Having spent a good deal of time and energy arriving at the conclusion that we 
ought to be more thoughtful, it is helpful to consider how this thesis and the 
papers and points within it may contribute to increasing thoughtfulness in the 
ways that I advocate.  It would be an extreme form of academic arrogance which 
imagined that just because a paper has been published in an academic journal 
that some sort of cascade will magically get the message to those to whom it is 
directed and once there, result in increased reflection.
9
 But, in line with 
                                                 
9
 The impact of academic research is part of its overall assessment within the Research 
Excellence Framework (REF), which is assessed, inter alia, by whether public awareness of a 
health risk or benefit has been raised, public engagement or involvement in research has 
improved or public behaviour has changed (HEFCE, 2012, p.52). The papers presented in this 
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Brassington’s suggestion about the concerns of philosophy, if I think that my 
moral claims have value then I am obliged in some sense to try and support 
people to engage and agree with them.
10
 
 
As far as the normative conclusions relating to organ donation is concerned, it 
might be expected that donation organisations would take the lead in 
encouraging reflection on donation practice, and so they do via advertisements  
as I discussed in Chapter 6. Public discussion about the moral status of donation 
can also be encouraged through universities. On 20
th
 March 2012 I made a brief 
presentation at a public event at the Manchester Library
11
 and some educational 
material for use in schools based in part on the paper has been produced.
12
 So I 
can say that there has been some public discussion about the ideas in my work 
though it is so far limited, and engaging in public discussion remains an aim for 
future work.  
 
For the normative conclusions in respect of our own health public discussion is 
probably best achieved within professional health care education. Public 
discussion about health policy and promotion is always welcome but there is a 
danger that conclusions similar to my own would be unsupported by the current 
infrastructure of health promotion and education. A patient might, for example, 
decide that he wants more information about absolute risk but find that outside 
inaccessible academic texts it is unavailable. Perhaps of more immediate concern 
                                                                                                                                    
thesis as chapter 5 and 7 were submitted to the 2014 REF by my current employer, The 
University of Worcester. 
10
 Brassington (2007, p.1) says that philosophy is ‘about getting people to change their 
behaviour’, echoing the language (though not the method) of nursing texts on health promotion 
which I criticised in Chapter 6.  
11
 http://events.manchester.ac.uk/event/event:x3c-gy5tuu7c-54yxsa/  
12
 http://www.isei.manchester.ac.uk/research/wellcome75/  
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is how the ideas developed in the thesis can influence nursing philosophy and 
practice.  
 
Nursing Philosophy (journal and activity) 
Two of the papers (Chapters 5 and 8) in the thesis were published in the journal 
Nursing Philosophy.  This is an academic journal associated with the 
International Philosophy of Nursing Society (IPONS), a society which has as one 
of its aims ‘to conduct and support philosophical inquiry in a manner that 
informs and engages with health care practice, theory, research, education and 
policy from national and international perspectives’.13 The papers published there 
seem to me to fulfil the aims of the Society in this respect at least. In Chapter 8, I 
noted that there is a persistent minority of nurses holding negative views of 
groups of people of whom they disapprove. I suggested that the patient-nurse 
relationship does not allow this and invited nurses to reflect on the nature of the 
failed obligations that they are holding patients responsible for. I cannot see any 
objection to this invitation, but acknowledge that the prospect of it being met is 
slim. I suspect that few of the nurses holding negative views of certain patient 
behaviour read Nursing Philosophy. 
 
Reading and writing for the journal Nursing Philosophy cannot but set one to 
considering the ways in which detailed philosophical thinking can advance 
nursing practice. A normative claim that nurses ought to understand what 
responsibility for health consists of, in all its guises and complexities, follows 
from a claim that it is of central importance to nursing practice because it speaks 
                                                 
13
 http://www.ipons.co.uk/  
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to the patient-nurse relationship. It was this search for understanding that initially 
led me to the philosophical literature on responsibility. What I found in a small 
section of the vast literature were some central themes and broad concepts, not of 
all which seemed to me to have direct relevance to my practice as a nurse and 
then an educator. I would not want to claim that nurses looking to philosophy to 
improve and enrich their practice must seek to instrumentalise all of what they 
find there, but it has always seemed to me that the practice of nursing philosophy 
(or philosophy of nursing) has separate and necessary elements from the practice 
of (just) philosophy. These elements include a practical and potentially action 
guiding purpose, arguably given more purpose by a nurse looking to philosophy 
to improve his practice than by a philosopher looking to inform and then to  
influence nursing practice from outside. Dickenson (2000) found that health care 
professionals and ethicists tend to look at the same problems from different 
directions, often arriving at different conclusions.  
 
I argued that nurses ought to understand what responsibility for health consists 
of, and buried in this claim is the implication that what I mean is that all nurses 
ought to understand what responsibility for health consists of. If this was not the 
case I would be required to explain which nurses are burdened with my 
normative expectations and which are not. Perhaps I mean that that all good 
nurses ought to understand, but I could couple this with the claim that all nurses 
ought to seek to become good nurses and I appear to be back at square one. 
Certainly I mean that all registered nurses ought to understand, and that includes 
young men and women, relatively inexperienced in life and nursing having just 
completed an undergraduate preparation course. Given this, I do not think that I 
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can extend my claim that all nurses should understand what responsibility for 
health means to the claim that they should be familiar with or even aware of the 
extensive philosophical literature on responsibility. I certainly would not make 
this claim for myself six years after embarking on the PhD. However, a critical 
and thoughtful outlook is required if nurses are to challenge the simplistic 
versions of health and health promotion which I have described in this thesis. 
 
A return to a smoking patient: advocacy and autonomy 
It is not so much that nurses, especially student nurses, do not possess the 
capacity for thinking deeply about responsibility for health; rather that the 
environment is set against it. Unlike other health care professions, nursing claims 
for itself a role as patient advocate, set out clearly in the Code: 
You must act as an advocate for those in your care, helping them to 
access relevant health and social care, information and support (NMC, 
2008, p.3). 
 
Yet there are contested versions of advocacy consistent with the versions of 
responsibility for health which I have presented in this thesis. An understanding 
of advocacy as acting in the best interests of the patient (Spence, 2011) can be at 
odds with a model of advocacy which is concerned with a 
nurse actively supporting patients in relation to their rights and choices, 
clarifying their healthcare decisions in support of their informed decision-
making and protecting basic human rights such as autonomy (Cole et al., 
2014, p. 2). 
 
These conceptions of advocacy can be examined in relation to the problem of a 
nurse trying to decide what to do when a patient asks for her support so that he 
can have a cigarette with which I concluded the introductory chapter. Recently 
issued NICE guidance on smoking cessation in acute, maternity and mental 
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health services   recommends ‘ensuring there are no designated smoking areas, 
no exceptions for particular groups, and no staff-supervised or staff-facilitated 
smoking breaks for people using secondary care services.’ (2013c, p. 6). The 
document discusses benefits of smoking cessation and despite claims that the 
health of visitors to the units will benefit, it is smokers’ health that they are 
seeking to improve using ‘strong leadership and management’ to ensure 
‘compliance’.   I discussed the legal challenge to smoking at Rampton Hospital 
in Chapter 3, and noted that the consultant psychiatrist supported the 
continuation of the ban after the expiry of the exemption order. The legal 
judgement noted in several places that patients should be prevented from 
smoking for their own good. The Royal College of Nursing also supported 
banning smoking in psychiatric hospitals at the House of Commons select 
committee hearings,
14
 and again in a written response to the consultation 
concerning the Health Bill in 2006, stating that the ‘RCN believes this cultural 
norm [of widespread smoking] should not be allowed to perpetuate as it 
contributes to the poor health outcomes and life expectancy commonly seen in 
this group’ (RCN, 2006). In the tension between advocating for health and 
advocating for choice, the RCN very clearly takes the former route, consistent 
with the ‘official’ conception of responsibility for health. This is in opposition to 
Cole et al.’s definition of advocacy which emphasises the nurse supporting the 
patient’s choices rather than what she thinks is good for him. The NMC 
requirement for advocacy is apparently capable of being interpreted either way, 
indicative of the practical choice that has to be made by professionals between 
advocating for a ban or advocating for choice. 
                                                 
14
 The transcripts can be found here 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmselect/cmhealth/485/5111704.htm  
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My suggestion throughout the thesis has been that before we seek to prevent our 
patients from smoking, or support others in this endeavour, we should ask 
ourselves, what, exactly, he is doing wrong by smoking, and through my 
examination of the arguments I have concluded that that decision is a matter for 
him. He may be doing something wrong, but if he is, it is for those who share his 
life to hold him responsible for it. Reflecting on the different conceptions of 
responsibility for health as I have presented them results in contradictory action 
guidance for nurses, and while it is clear that not all registered nurses in the UK 
will have the same view, from the point of the view of the patient who wants a 
cigarette, having two nurses on his ward who are prepared to advocate for him in 
completely different ways seems odd. The rightness or otherwise of allowing him 
to go outside to smoke, or accompanying him while he does it is open to debate 
which should consider the points raised in this thesis. The vagaries of the nursing 
duty rota should not be one of them. 
 
Our role as health professionals, as I see it, is to support his reflective duty, and 
especially his epistemic duty but also to show epistemic humility. As Atkins puts 
it: ‘It is in recognition of the fact that we cannot experience from another’s 
perspective that we normally refrain from judging what will make another’s life 
good for them (Atkins, 2000, p.75, emphasis in original). Starting an enquiry 
about personal responsibility for health has ended up discussing the way that this 
responsibility is understood by professionals, and how it relates to various 
conceptions of autonomy. Currently, we say that we are supporting autonomous 
choice but we do much to subvert it, and we tend to treat our patients as isolated 
individuals instead of socially situated members of various communities.  This 
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tension captures important quandaries at the heart of professional health care. If 
we want to people to be personally responsible for their health then we need to 
give them the tools to do it, and accept their informed decisions when they have 
made them. My role as a nurse educator who has had the privilege of studying 
these quandaries is to encourage and facilitate students’ learning to meet their 
own epistemic and reflective duties so that they, in turn, can contribute to 
resolving them. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The central theme of the thesis is the extent of an individual’s responsibility for 
his health, and how can he be blamed if he fails to meet these responsibilities. By 
drawing on a number of philosophical, legal and professional literatures I have 
concluded that his only obligations are to enquire about the effects of his health 
threatening behaviour and then to use this knowledge to work out for himself 
how to weigh his own interests in pursuing his own version of a good life against 
the interests of others who are affected by it. Minimally, this includes everyone 
who also draws upon health care resources, but this argument can be 
overemphasised. Maximally this includes those who are directly affected because 
lives are shared; if there are obligations, they are owed in the main to these 
people and consequently it is they who can hold us to account. 
 
My answer stands at odds with the orthodoxy and values within current health 
care practice, which may change in line with further discoveries about how 
people act, how health care is funded, and how societal values change in a world 
which, as I am apt to tell my children, will be subject to major challenges in the 
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coming years.  All of these areas will be subject to further detailed analysis, and 
as important, public and political debate which may make the conclusions I have 
arrived at look simplistic and naïve as I look back on them in the years to come. I 
hope to continue to contribute to these debates as academic, teacher, nurse, voter, 
and father; and though the papers which form the core of the thesis have not had 
a significant impact (yet) on these vitally important debates, they have 
nevertheless contributed to a growing and diverse literature as well as having a 
significant formative impact on my own intellectual development. For that, at 
least, I am very grateful.   
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Abstract The concept of responsibility for health is a significant feature of health
discourse and public health policy,but application of the concept is poorly
understood. This paper offers an analysis of the concept in two ways.
Following an examination of the use of the word ‘responsibility’ in the
nursing and wider health literature using three examples, the concept of
‘responsibility for health’ as fulfilling a social function is discussed with
reference to policy documents from the UK.The philosophical literature
on moral responsibility is introduced, and in considering two versions,
reactive attitudes and accountability, it is argued that in application both
can be regarded, though with different emphasis, as being constituted in
three parts: (i) a responsible agent; (ii) having obligations (responsibili-
ties); and (iii) being susceptible to being held responsible (that is blamed)
if he fails to meet them. The three-stage model is consistent with the
examples of the word responsibility in use, but application to the social
function model causes a number of problems for healthcare practice,
especially for the reactive attitudes account. Apart from considerable
problems in stating what exactly the obligations are and how they can be
justified; and how blame might justly be apportioned and by whom, the
very ideas of obligation and blame are in conflict within healthcare
systems and professional nursing practice which have foundations deeply
embedded in the notion of the supremacy of personal autonomy. It is
concluded that current application of the concept of responsibility for
health is conceptually incoherent, and if it is to retain its place in health
policy and discourse, urgent remedy is required.
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Introduction
It cannot be said that the issue of responsibility
for health is new (Reiser, 1985), but current fiscal
uncertainty, technological advances, and the unre-
lenting increase in the prevalence and incidence of
illnesses related to lifestyle combine to give the issue
renewed significance. Despite this, there is little in
the nursing literature about what the concept of
‘responsibility for health’ consists of, and why it is so
important and so difficult. The simple aim of this
paper, following Paley (1996), is to ‘say something
interesting’ about responsibility for health. I offer
two analyses of ‘responsibility’ as applied to
professional health care. First, I discuss examples of
the use of the word ‘responsibility’ found in the
nursing and broader literature. Second, I consider
the concept of ‘responsibility for health’ as fulfilling
a social function. I then turn to the philosophical
literature on moral responsibility, and in consi-
dering two versions, reactive attitudes and account-
ability, argue that in application both can be
regarded, though with different emphasis, as being
constituted in three parts: (i) a responsible agent;
(ii) having obligations (responsibilities); and (iii)
being susceptible to being held responsible (that
is blamed) if he fails to meet them. The three-
stage model is consistent with the examples in use,
but application to the social function model causes a
number of problems, especially for the reactive
attitudes account. Apart from considerable problems
in stating what exactly the obligations are and how
they can be justified; and how blame might justly
be apportioned and by whom, the very ideas of
obligation and blame are in conflict within
healthcare systems and professional nursing prac-
tice which have foundations deeply embedded
in the notion of the supremacy of personal
autonomy.
Two concepts, many conceptions
An obvious starting point is that the term ‘responsi-
bility for health’ contains two distinct concepts,
responsibility and health, and it might reasonably be
suggested that combining them will obfuscate analy-
sis. Health is variously understood, famously by
Boorse (1975, 1977) and Nordenfelt (e.g. 1996, 2007).
In Boorse’s account health is descriptively merely the
absence of disease, defined in terms of statistical nor-
mality, while Nordenfelt’s evaluative account under-
stands health more holistically as the ability to realize
life goals. These different conceptions can result in
practical differences in health care all of which could
justifiably claim to be directed at improving health
(Nordenfelt, 1993). Similarly, the concept ‘responsibil-
ity for health’ will differ depending on which account
of health is utilized. To understand why this potential
confusion need not cloud the analysis, it is necessary
to be clear about the difference between concepts and
conceptions.
The distinction is that conceptions lie lower in a
vertical continuum between general and specific
usages of a word. Conceptions offer a more ‘determi-
nate specification’ (Miller, 2010, p. 812) of the parent
concept, operationalizing and applying it. Inevitably
this means that two or more conceptions can be
derived from a single concept.Vertically each concep-
tion must be consistent with the parent concept or
they will be conceptions of different concepts, but
horizontally, between conceptions within a concept,
there may be incommensurable differences. Where
this happens we have, following Gallie (1956), ‘essen-
tially contested concepts’. Gallie had in mind artistic
and political concepts (Ruben, 2010), but it has been
suggested that medicine meets the necessary criteria
(McKnight, 2003) set out at some length by Gallie.A
further relevant example is discrimination, used dif-
ferently by the UK governing bodies of nurses and
doctors. Nursing’s professional regulator, the Nursing
and Midwifery Council (NMC) (2008), states that
‘You must not discriminate in any way against those
in your care.’1 The UK medical regulator, the General
Medical Council (GMC), states that ‘You must not
unfairly discriminate . . .’ (GMC, 2006, p. 10). While
operationalizing a concept fundamental to profes-
sional healthcare practice, the two regulators have
used different conceptions of the same concept; the
NMC has used the word evaluatively, while in using
1In England and Wales the National Health Service as a whole
takes this evaluative line in the NHS constitution.
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the word descriptively, the GMC requires an evalua-
tive adverb. It is not suggested that doctors treat
patients differently (although it could be suggested),
only that different conceptions of the concept ‘dis-
crimination’ have resulted in a position where on
application of the verb ‘to discriminate’ separate from
evaluative adverbs, doctors are potentially able to do
something that nurses are not, that is discriminate
fairly (Hellman, 2008; Moreau, 2010).2
Argument about which conception is correct is ulti-
mately futile as each can be derived from the parent
concept, and this is potentially a problem, though
rarely acknowledged, for inductive concept analysis
methodology which may attempt an improbable syn-
thesis between these essentially contested concep-
tions.3 Similarly, different conceptions of health are
important in operationalizing conceptions of ‘respon-
sibility for health’, but ambiguity is manifested in the
conceptions rather than the parent concept. Insofar as
the task of this paper is to say something interesting
about the parent concept, rather than any specific
operationalizing conception, the analysis is more
fruitfully directed at the concept of ‘responsibility’.
The importance of the different conceptions of health
lies in determining obligations, outside the scope of
this paper.
Work required of the concept
The justification of undertaking an analysis and the
methodology employed depends on the work the
concept is required to do.4 One purpose could be to
undertake concept analysis to explore what responsi-
bility for health (or more broadly ‘responsibility’
within the healthcare environment) means to indi-
viduals, with the aim of arriving at a composite defi-
nition which could be used in further research.
Concept analysis (1): Responsibility in use
Anyone wishing to clarify any concept relevant to
nursing practice has a large and growing body of work
to build upon.Despite substantial critiques from, inter
alia, Paley (1996), Beckwith et al. (2008), and Risjord
(2009), the proliferation of concept analyses in
nursing journals shows little sign of abatement. It is
perhaps surprising that many published examples
show little appetite for engagement with the ontologi-
cal, epistemological, and (perhaps most surprising)
methodological problems identified in the critiques,
following instead a substantially standardized process
rarely found outside the nursing literature. Were
Walker & Avant’s (2011) concept analysis procedure
to be followed, the literature, dictionaries, and theses
would be searched towards the aim of arriving at ‘a
precise operational definition’ (p. 158); the result of
answering the empirical question ‘how are the words
“responsibility for health”used’, rather than an analy-
sis of the concepts denoted by the words (Wedgwood,
2006). Unfortunately many of the relevant papers
found using the term ‘responsibility’5 manage to
discuss and use the termwithout saying what it means.
Three examples illustrate this: adolescent diabetes,
women’s magazines, and public attitudes to health-
care policy.6
In the USA, Anderson et al. (1990) developed a
widely used questionnaire to measure ‘individual
family member’s perceptions of who takes responsi-
bility for a broad range of diabetes tasks’ (p. 479).The
questionnaire asks participants to choose from a list
of three choices against a number of situations or
tasks, for example ‘remembering the day of clinic
appointment’. The options are:
2In English law under the Equality Act 2010 discrimination
requires less favourable treatment.
3None of the 1261 ‘hits’ in a BNI and CINHAIL search (1 Febru-
ary 2011) using the term ‘concept analysis’ referenced Gallie’s
paper (The number of hits would include some identified twice).
4Walker &Avant (2011, p. 160) suggest that it could be a concept
that ‘has always bothered you’.
5Using the databases, CINHAIL and MEDLINE (14 November
2011), there were 11 475 ‘hits’ searching for ‘responsibility’ in the
title, and 1123 ‘hits’ searching for ‘responsibility for health’ in the
title.A full analysis or categorization of all sources identified was
not undertaken. A partial but unsystematic review suggested
that many of the papers identified were not relevant to the
argument presented in this paper.
6The examples were chosen because they illustrate the points I
wish to make. I do not claim that these papers are in any sense
representative.
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1 Parent(s) take or initiate responsibility for this
almost all of the time
2 Parent(s) and child share responsibility for this
about equally
3 Child takes or initiates responsibility for this almost
all of the time.
Within the paper, the choices are explained so that
‘the respondent assigned a 1 if the parent was pre-
dominantly ‘in charge’ (p. 481) of the task. It should
be clear that I am not criticizing the paper, merely
pointing out that the term ‘responsibility’ apparently
needs no explanation as none was offered to those
completing the questionnaire. It is assumed that they
know what it means, and what is available in the text
by way of explanation refers in passing to being ‘in
charge’.
This paper is one of many analysed in Hanna &
Decker’s (2009) concept analysis of ‘assuming respon-
sibility for self-care among adolescents with type 1
diabetes’. Similarly there is no discussion about what
‘responsibility’ means in the general sense. The con-
clusion of the analysis is that the attributes of assum-
ing responsibility include that it is ‘. . . (c) a process
with the goal of ownership and (d) a process involving
autonomy in behaviours and decision making’ (2009,
p. 101). The model case (part of Walker & Avant’s
(2011) procedure) offered is a fictional 17-year-old
who says that she ‘will be fully responsible when she is
able to be totally independent in doing all the diabe-
tes care tasks and being the one who makes the deci-
sions about them without any reminders’ (p. 102).
Olinder et al. (2011) report a grounded theory study
utilizing interviews with adolescents where responsi-
bility emerged as a core category and provided the
principal ingredient in a model to facilitate the clari-
fication of responsibility.They state that (2011, p. 5) ‘A
lack of responsibility seems to be a main reason for
missed bolus doses and insufficient self management’,
but this has several potential meanings.
Second, in a fascinating account of the discourse
about responsibility for health in English–Canadian
women’s magazines, Roy (2008) shows how the dis-
course reinforces ‘neo-liberal ideas by conceptualis-
ing responsibility for one’s health as not only
something that can be chosen but something that
ought to be chosen’ (p. 473). The discourses not only
cover the familiar path of health promotion, but also
urge that women be determined in pushing agendas in
relationships with physicians and to be brave in the
face of debilitating illness: ‘constructing continued
optimism as an important moral obligation, how one
with a disease or disability ought to behave’ (p. 472).
In one reviewed article a woman with multiple scle-
rosis defines responsibility as ‘. . . accomplishing the
things I wanted in life right now. Today’ (MacLean,
1999, p. 73, cited in Roy, 2008, p. 471).This seems to be
a somewhat idiosyncratic understanding of responsi-
bility, re-emphasizing potential pitfalls of inductive
analysis. The paper generally presents an idealized
understanding of responsibility promulgated in the
magazines which, in claiming robust obligations while
failing to address or even acknowledge barriers to
meeting them, might be considered more moralistic
than moral.The paper does not engage in a discussion
about what the concept of responsibility means in
general, focusing instead on the various conceptions
presented, but the title resonates with the work on
teenagers with diabetes – ‘ “Taking charge of your
health”: discourses of responsibility in English–
Canadian women’s magazines’.
Third, in the UK, the King’s Fund (2004) commis-
sioned a survey to assess public attitudes to health
policy. In the quantitative phase a series of yes/no
questions were presented. ‘88% . . . agreed that indi-
viduals are responsible for their health’ (2004, p. 11).7
However, more than ‘40% agreed that there are too
many factors outside individual control to hold
people responsible for their own health’ (2004, p. 11).
The questionnaire does not appear8 to explain what is
meant by responsibility for their health, but the high
rate of agreement suggests that respondents under-
stand what is meant.
There is no indication in any of three examples that
the lack of definition or explanation of responsibility
has caused problems; evidently those who answer the
questionnaires have something in mind, but the form
7Elsewhere in the published document this figure is given as
89%.
8The actual questionnaire used is not reproduced in the
publication.
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of the questions and the way that they are reported
give little indication of what more detailed under-
standings might be.These incomplete understandings,
even when they represent everyday usage, make a
nuanced inductive concept analysis problematic. I
shall return to these partial accounts, but for now I
turn to a second use of the term,which recognizes that
some concepts have broader social functions (Miller,
2010).
Concept analysis (2): Responsibility as
social function
The concept ‘responsibility for health’ fulfils an
important social function within socialized medicine,
and is used for example in policy documents to
explain respective roles within that system.9 In this
context, clarifying meaning cannot be a matter for
inductive analysis of partial usage because the
concept is required to do the work of providing a
framework for helping people to understand just
what it is that they should or must do, and this social
function cannot be fulfilled unless the recipients of
the message understand what having ‘responsibility
for health’ requires. Inductive analysis of the word
‘responsibility’ in use may give insight into how the
message is variously received but that does not
abolish the need for clarity in its transmission. An
objection that it is not for the Government to tell us,
for example, that we ought not to smoke would be to
confuse the global concept of responsibility with its
determinative conceptions. However, rejecting one or
many conceptions does not entail rejection of the
concept and understanding of the determinative con-
ceptions requires a general understanding of the
concept. If this is the case, and the concept ‘responsi-
bility for health’ does form a social function within
socialized10 medicine, then there should be clarity
about what this means. A cursory glance at National
Health Service (NHS) documents reveals that this is
not the case.
The (former) Prime Minister’s11 introduction to the
strategy to reduce obesity provides a clear statement
which illustrates the confusion:
There should be no doubt that maintaining a healthy weight
must be the responsibility of individuals first – it is not the
role of government to tell people how to live their lives and
nor would this work. (Department of Health, 2008, p. iii)
First, the Government tells us what we must do
(maintain a healthy weight), and then it tells us that it
is not their role to tell us how to do it. The relevant
clause in the NHS constitution12 states that:
You should recognise that you can make a significant con-
tribution to your own, and your family’s, good health and
well-being, and take some personal responsibility for it.
(Department of Health, 2009, p. 9)
Similar to the literature reviewed earlier, this leaves
the meaning of ‘responsibility’ open to interpretation,
particularly within the phrase ‘some responsibility’,
and the normative prescription simply requires rec-
ognition that a significant contribution is possible, and
not that it be made.Further explanation is provided in
the handbook to the constitution. Entitled ‘what this
means in practice’, the clarification is:
You can talk to your doctor, nurse (including health visitors
and midwives) or therapist, use NHS Direct (online at
www.nhsdirect.nhs.uk or telephone 0845 4647), or go online
at NHS Choices (www.nhs.uk). You can ask about what
support you might be offered in managing your condition
yourself or changing to a healthy lifestyle (e.g. stopping
smoking, reducing weight, exercise or reducing excessive
alcohol consumption). (Department of Health, 2010, p. 67)
This explanatory note falls considerably short of
explaining either the nature or the details of respon-
9In fact the broad term responsibility is increasingly heard in
myriad social and political contexts, for example in welfare pro-
vision (Maltravers, 2007; Brown, 2009).
10The UK National Health Service is possibly the paradigm case
of socialized medicine. The drawing on collective resources for
treatment might provide a reason for the view that certain
health-enhancing behaviours are morally obligatory, but not the
only reasons. I do not mean to suggest that the concept respon-
sibility for health has no meaning within private healthcare
systems.
11The Prime Minster at the time was Gordon Brown.
12The constitution applies to NHS services in England andWales.
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sibility,13 and by utilizing language which hints at
information giving (you can), the clarification sets a
rather different tone than the normative clause (you
should) in the constitution, and the imperative (must)
in the Prime Minister’s introduction to a previous
document. Having identified its social function, the
guidance fails to guide.The Scottish NHS version ini-
tially goes further. Under the heading ‘What we
expect from you’ it is stated that:
You can help yourself, other patients and NHS Staff if you
do the following. Look after your own health and have a
healthy lifestyle. This could mean: taking more exercise,
eating a balanced diet, stopping smoking, not drinking too
much alcohol, not using drugs, and using a condom if having
sex. (NHS Scotland, 2006, p. 15)
Although the heading is stated as an expectation,
the language in the text is softer (you can help your-
self). Similar internal ambiguity is evident in the
Report of the Prime Minister’s Commission on the
Future of Nursing and Midwifery in England (2010).
Recommendation 13 (2010, p. 102) includes the state-
ment that:
Nurses and Midwives must acknowledge that they are seen
as role models for healthy living and take personal respon-
sibility for their own health. (Prime Minister’s Commis-
sion on the Future of Nursing and Midwifery in England,
2010, p. 102)
The language is declamatory (must), but the pro-
posed draft pledge less so:
Nurses and midwives, recognising our important role in
improving health and wellbeing and reducing inequalities,
will engage actively in the design,monitoring and delivery of
services to achieve this.We acknowledge that we are seen as
role models and will try to live up to this responsibility.
(Prime Minister’s Commission on the Future of Nursing and
Midwifery in England, 2010, p. 57)
The response was delayed because of the general
election and subsequent change in government.
Despite the sentiment, expressed by the Minister,
that the report ‘does not go far enough’ (Depart-
ment of Health, 2011, p. 5), the recommendations
noted above will not be implemented in full. The
section of recommendation 13 requiring that nurses
take personal responsibility for their own health is
ignored; the response is restricted to the implemen-
tation of the Boorman report (Boorman, 2009)
‘NHS Health and Well-being’, which recommended
a less prescriptive provision of services centred on
prevention ‘of both work related and lifestyle influ-
enced ill health’ (p. 29). The recommended pledge
will not be implemented. Instead, ‘Employers need
to use the Principles of Nursing Practice as a
pledge . . .’ (Department of Health, 2011, p. 6). These
Principles, developed and published not by the regu-
lator but by the Royal College of Nursing (RCN)
(Manley et al., 2011), a union representing less than
two-thirds of registered nurses, do not acknowledge
nurses as role models in a public health sense.
Although the Commission’s relevant recommenda-
tions will not be implemented, the fact that they
attracted such wide support from the nursing ‘estab-
lishment’ (including the Department of Health’s
Chief Nursing Officer, the RCN, and the NMC)
lends them considerable authority, and the watered
down response, facilitated by the same organiza-
tions, is further illustrative of the general confusion.
To recap, I have offered two possible accounts of
how responsibility for health might be understood
and analysed. The first account, which could be deep-
ened by inductive concept analysis, is or could be
theory-forming, empirical and stems from ordinary
usage of the word by members of the public and
patients who answered questions about responsibility.
It is incomplete rather than inadequate in its expres-
sion. The second is theory-formed and normative but
requires clarification and deeper understanding to be
effective. The policy examples demonstrate that the
concept has a social, action-guiding function but there
is no clarity about what is required and the mixed
messages illustrate an account which is as inadequate
as it is incomplete. The task for the remainder of this
paper is to argue that the two accounts I have offered
are not incompatible, and that they and other usages
of ‘responsibility’ can be unified under a broader
understanding of what responsibility for health
means, and I proceed by introducing the philosophical
literature on responsibility. Although this may13The document is addressed to ‘Patients and the public’.
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provide a richer application of both of the accounts I
have offered, philosophical illumination also reveals
incoherence at the heart of healthcare provision and
practice; attempting to avoid this incoherence may be
one cause of the partial accounts populating the
literatures.
The philosophical literature
Causation
Causation plays a major part in responsibility. When
we say that X was responsible for Y, meaning can be
restricted to X causedY.The causal claims can include
non-moral and even inanimate objects. We say that
ice was responsible for the collision, or the red sock
was responsible for the pink washing. When we ask
‘who is responsible for the broken window?’, we ask
how the window came to be broken. A small child
throwing a stone is superficially and causally respon-
sible for the broken window, but not, in Sie’s (2005)
categorization, deeply morally responsible because he
is not a moral agent. Causation is also key in the
relationship between being responsible for a thing
and being responsible for our acts and omissions in
relation to the thing.When we say that we are respon-
sible for our health we cannot mean that we are
responsible for all aspects for our health at all times. If
ill health results from being struck by an asteroid,
nothing that we did or omitted to do caused the injury.
It could be said that my omission to be elsewhere was
a factor but this is only relevant in the deeply morally
responsible sense if I knew and understood that I was
going to get hit, and that therefore I ought to have
gone somewhere else to avoid it.
Causative links between actions or omissions and
poor outcomes for the things that we are responsible
for are central to the question of what we ought to do
to keep well, and why. A group correlation between
smoking and heart disease does not mean that all
heart disease is caused by smoking, or even that the
heart disease of smokers was caused by smoking.
Smoking, though correlated with heart disease, is
neither necessary not sufficient for individual in-
stances of heart disease. Inevitably the devil is in the
detail for specific causative factors for specific dis-
eases, but for this paper, it is enough to note that
discussion about responsibility for health involves
deep, moral responsibility as well as superficial causal
responsibility, and that because of the lack of cer-
tainty of individual causation it is not health per se
that we are responsible for but rather our actions or
omissions that threaten or enhance it.
Other forms of responsibility
H.L.A. Hart (1968) and others (e.g. Cane, 2002) have
pointed out that responsibility comes in many forms,
for example role responsibility and legal responsibil-
ity.14 It is important to distinguish between the various
forms of responsibility, especially where they coin-
cide. Consider the various forms of responsibility as
they relate to Z, a user of heroin. Let us assume that
Z has entered into an agreement (contract) with the
healthcare team that he will not use heroin, and that if
he does there is a consequence, say that he will be
discharged from a rehabilitation unit (Houmanfar
et al., 2009).We know that there is a law15 prohibiting
the possession of heroin, and so if he is found in
possession he is liable to prosecution. For quasi-
contractual16 and legal responsibility we can examine
the agreement, or identify legislation or case law, and
these are clear in defining what Z is obliged, contrac-
tually or legally to do (or not to do), as well as iden-
tifying what will happen to him if he fails in this
responsibility.
There may be moral reasons for Z to avoid using
heroin (Smith, 2002), and no doubt these have influ-
enced decisions that have made possession of heroin
unlawful and the therapeutic contract acceptable.
Fines and imprisonment may result from a breach of
a legal responsibility, and discharge from rehabilita-
14These refer to various sorts of responsibility attached to indi-
viduals, but we also talk about collective responsibility and
responsibility of institutions (Wilmot, 2000; Dubbink & Smith,
2011).
15The Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 provides for a maximum sen-
tence of 7 years’ imprisonment for possession of a class A drug
(including heroin).
16I say quasi-contractual because I do not want to imply that the
sort of agreement that I refer to is necessarily a legal contract.
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tion results from a breach of the agreement. That
these breaches may also represent moral failure is
contingent but not necessary. Moral responsibility
differs in at least two respects here. First, there are no
unequivocal moral facts about taking heroin that
make it absolutely the case that it is immoral.17 Many
would hold that taking heroin is wrong and cite
reasons in support, but there is also a view that taking
heroin is morally permissible. Other health-
threatening behaviours also attract differing views
about whether they are morally forbidden, allowed or
(in some cases) obligatory or morally neutral. It
cannot be said that taking heroin is immoral with the
same certainty as it can be said that possessing heroin
is unlawful. Z cannot deny the legal and quasi-
contractual responsibility not to take heroin, but he
can take the view that there is nothing morally wrong
with it.18
Second, the consequences for failing to meet legal
and contractual responsibilities are clearly articu-
lated, but this is not the case when failing to meet a
moral responsibility. The relationships between an
agent, his moral obligations, and the consequences of
not meeting them form the basis of the philosophical
concept of moral responsibility. Two versions are
briefly reviewed: reactive attitudes and accountability.
Moral responsibility (1): Strawson and the
reactive attitudes
You cannot go very far into the philosophical litera-
ture on responsibility without encountering Peter
Strawson’s influential lecture and paper, Freedom
and Resentment, first published in 1962. The paper’s
aim is to argue that our normal practices of moral
responsibility are ‘underpinned by reasons that are
immune to the threat posed by determinism’ (Mal-
travers, 2007, p. 34). Determinism is the theory that
everything that happens is determined by the things
that precede it and the natural laws of physics. If true,
this would effect the way we regard the things that
people do, for despite our weighing up options and
reflecting on our choices (both of which are also
determined), we only end up doing the things that we
would have done.Our part in the causal chain is fixed;
choice is illusory,we can only do the things that we are
determined to do. Incompatiblists (Van Inwagen,
1975) argue that if determinism is true, we cannot be
morally responsible for the things we do.19 Compati-
blists, like Strawson, argue that moral responsibility
obtains even if determinism is true.
Fully causal determinism is virtually absent in the
literature on autonomy and responsibility in health
care, possibly because the idea of a fully determined
life is so difficult to comprehend.There appears to be
at least a compatiblist assumption if not an outright
assumption of the falsity of determinism despite what
Wallace (1994, p. 58) refers to as ‘the seductiveness of
incompatiblism’. Nelkin (2007, and see Kane, 2005)
cites several influential sources for the view that intu-
itively we start as incompatiblists: ‘we are incom-
patiblists before we (compatiblists) start studying
philosophy and talk ourselves out of it’ (2007, p. 244).
She proceeds to discuss a number of areas where
intuitions tested empirically are inconsistent, and the
view emerges that we are instead compatiblists by
inclination. In contrast to the absence of causal deter-
mination in the literature, other less complete forms
of determination, for example, genetic, social, and
environmental, are highly visible in the sense that
these influences, whose effect on behaviour is corre-
lated at the societal level (Raphael, 2006), can be
suggested to threaten and impede moral agency and
therefore responsibility. The question must be sug-
gested; if our natural inclination (if we have one) is to
be compatiblist in the matter of causal determinism,
must consistency require that we also be compatiblist
in the matter of genetic, social, and other determinist
mechanisms which fall short of full causation? This is
hinted at in the King’s Fund (2004) report, which is
incompatiblist in its reporting, if not its data. Nelkin’s
17This is not the place to discuss whether there can be moral facts
or whether, if there can, it is true that taking heroin is wrong.
18He cannot deny that the law prohibits possession, but he can
argue that it ought not to. The relationship between law and
ethics is far too complex to discuss in detail here, and I have
taken a very simple line to make the point.
19Here the incompatibility is between free will and determinism,
but as moral responsibility requires free will, moral responsibil-
ity and determinism are also incompatible in this account.
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examples of inconsistency in intuitions support the
view that individually and collectively humans are not
as rational or consistent as we may hope or believe
and this threatens arguments premised on intuition
claims and reflective equilibrium (and see Sutherland,
1992; Thaler & Sunstein, 2009). The often repeated
view that more research is necessary seems for once
to be fully justified.
Strawson’s (1962) paper is relevant not so much
because of its compatiblist emphasis, but rather in the
claims about the purposes and nature of moral
responsibility. Moral responsibility is based on the
reactions of other people to our character and actions.
When we are wronged we feel certain reactive atti-
tudes towards wrongdoers: resentment and indigna-
tion. Generally people care about what others think
of them, and wishing to avoid being thought of badly
is a powerful social regulator of behaviour. The sig-
nificance of the paper, and those that developed the
ideas, lies in the view that individuals are responsible
for those things that elicit the reactive response in the
wronged. Being responsible is understood in the fact
and process of being held responsible. Strawson was
at pains throughout the paper to base his views on
what he called ‘common places’, what we might con-
sider as common morality, something which he says is
easy to forget when we are engaged in philosophy.
Other compatiblists (optimists as he calls them) have
argued from consequentialist calculation that our
practices of holding people responsible operate to
regulate behaviour in socially useful ways, but that is
to over-intellectualize the process:
what is wrong is to forget that those practices, and their
reception, the reactions to them really are expressions of
our moral attitudes and not merely devices we calculatingly
employ for regulative purposes. (emphasis in original)
(Strawson, 1962, p. 93)
His claims about the practices of holding people
morally responsible as well as their compatibility with
determinism (should it be true) are based on onto-
logical rather normative premises. There are excep-
tions in our practices for those, like children, or
expressed in the language of the time, an ‘idiot or a
moral idiot’ (p. 82), and a recognition that a lack of
intention also ameliorates the reactions.
Such reactive attitudes form part of the fabric of
interpersonal relationships, but there are also vicari-
ous attitudes felt by individuals not directly affected
by wrongdoing. Instead of resentment we feel indig-
nant or disapproving.We feel these attitudes of those
who lie, distinct from and weaker than the resentment
that we feel against those who lie to or about us. The
moral demand here is that individuals should refrain
from lying,20 but in the general sense, these vicarious
attitudes speak to the nature of all moral expectation
and define them in terms of an emotional response.
But these attitudes of disapprobation and indignation are
precisely the correlates of the moral demand in the case
where the demand is felt to be disregarded. The making of
the demand is the proneness to such attitudes. (emphasis in
original) (Strawson, 1962, p. 90)
As the author of a relatively short if very influential
paper, Strawson left it to others to develop the ideas
(e.g. Fischer, 1987; Kahn, 2011). R. Jay Wallace (1994,
p. 226) deepened the account in several ways, conclud-
ing that:
It is reasonable to hold agents morally accountable when
they possess the powers of reflective self control; and when
such accountable agents violate the obligations to which we
hold them they deserve to be blamed for what they have
done.
Wallace (1994) also develops the nature of the obli-
gation that is a necessary feature for responsibility in
his account. Having the reactive emotions as a justi-
fiable response to an action relies on the cause of the
emotions having certain moral features such that the
agent ought not to have done it.Or, he has failed to do
something that he ought to have done.21 An agent can
be responsible for a morally neutral act; he is a ratio-
nal candidate for praise or blame even if the act is
worthy of neither. While retaining the link between
the act and a response, Fischer’s (1987) account
emphasizes the features of moral agency which make
a person legitimately blameable. The extent to which
he is held responsible depends on the nature of the
20I put to one side for the moment the issue of whether lying can
be justified or even required.
21See Harris (1980) on the equivalence of acts and omissions.
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act he is responsible for. If it is morally neutral,
holding him morally responsible is inappropriate,
even though he is morally responsible for it in light of
his moral agency.
Moral responsibility (2):The accountability
version
The quotation from Wallace (1994) appears to go
some way towards the accountability version of
responsibility.Korsgaard (1992, p. 306) notes the unat-
tractiveness of taking ‘the assessment of others as the
starting point in moral philosophy’, and Oshana’s
(1997) alternative approach avoids working back-
wards from response. On this ‘accountability’ version
of responsibility, a person is responsible if it is fitting
that she gives an account for her behaviour. This
entails the presumptions that the individual has:
(a) antecedently met the requirements of responsible agency
(b) has performed some act (or has exhibited some charac-
teristic) of the sort subject to certain accepted standards of
morality
(c) typically has fallen short of these standards. (Oshana,
1997, p. 77)
Fittingness implies that it is not necessary for the
individual actually to give an account; it is enough that
it is appropriate. Similar to the reactive attitudes
approach, there are exceptions for those who are not
full moral agents; we could not ask someone with
dementia or a small child to account for themselves
any more than we would appropriately feel resent-
ment towards them. In the case of direct wrongdoing
it seems clear that an account is owed to the wronged,
but it is not so clear to whom the account correspond-
ing to vicarious disapproval in the reactive attitudes
approach is owed. Regardless of whether the account
is actually given, Oshana (1997) claims that the
approach has the advantage of focusing firmly on the
agent and what he has done, placing the burden upon
the actor, regardless of the reactions of others.
There are clear differences between the reactive
attitudes and the accountability versions of the nature
of moral responsibility. Consider Agent A, undertak-
ing behaviour B which elicits responses C. In the reac-
tive attitudes version, the responses <C(ra)> consist
of indignation, or objectively, disapprobation from
others, a consequence of B in the sense that it has
occurred after A has undertaken B, and is a result of
B.A is morally responsible for B because C(ra). In the
accountability version the process follows the other
direction.We say if A has certain properties, and B is
wrong, then he is liable to consequences <C(a)> in the
form of being required to give an account. A is
responsible for B therefore C(a).
There are many caveats in both versions, but for
now it is sufficient to draw attention to the similarities
between the versions of responsibility rather than
identify and unpick the differences. These similarities
do little more than identify the constituent parts, but
this is enough to expose the inadequacy of the
concept in current usage within health care. These
constituent parts or facets (Guttman&Ressler, 2001),
are a person, an act (or omission), and a reaction or a
consequence.Or, a responsible agent who has respon-
sibilities, and can be held responsible. These three
constituent parts are implied in any discussion of any
type of responsibility, although the reactive attitudes
are distinctive features of moral responsibility.
Applying the framework to the
case studies
I considered three examples: teenagers with diabetes,
Canadian women’s magazines, and the Kings Fund
report. Does the three-stage analysis extend under-
standing in these cases? In the first, the teenagers are
on the cusp of full moral agency. The narrative con-
cerns ‘taking charge’ or accepting responsibility.22 The
responsibilities are the obligations detailed in the
questionnaire, turning up for clinic appointments,
remembering to take medication, and so on. Absent
from the account is any consideration of the conse-
quences of failing to meet the obligations, although it
seems plausible that a teenager neglecting to take
medication may be subject to some reactive emotions
at least from her parents. Olinder et al. (2011, p. 6)
briefly consider this but only to the extent that
‘nagging and criticism are not wanted. Sometimes
22SeeWaller (2005) on the difference between ‘take-charge’ and
‘just deserts responsibility’.
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they just want to be reminded, rather than asked why
their blood sugar is high.’ The Canadian magazines’
narrative appears to assume moral agency in their
readers.There is clearly some notion of obligation but
little acknowledgement of consequences, although
the moralist stance employed implies that those
failing in their obligations will be thought less of. The
King’s Fund report considers and rejects the notion of
full moral agency, does not engage in any sense in
what health-related obligations might be, and seeks to
restrict the consequences of failing to meet these
unspecified obligations on the grounds of incomplete
agency.
All we can say from the potential inductive process
is that the three-stage analysis is not inconsistent with
the three examples, and it is unclear how the three-
stage analysis could have been arrived at by an
empirical study of use of the word responsibility.How
does the three-stage analysis illuminate the second
use of responsibility, that is, its use as an action-
guiding concept within health policy?
Applying the framework to
health policy
It is fair to say that there has been some controversy
in the application of the political concept of personal
responsibility in a number of policy areas. As far as
health (and welfare) is concerned, the notion is
perhaps more popular and developed in the Anglo-
American post-war tradition than on the European
continent, although it appears to be gaining ground in
Europe where, paradoxically perhaps, socialized
medicine is less developed than in the UK (Schmidt,
2007; Ter Meulen & Maarse, 2008). As far as the
emphasis on personal responsibility is concerned,
policy appears to assume agency, is confused in the
matter of obligation, and has consistently ruled out
overtly holding patients responsible.We will see that
the ground is characterized by difficulties and appar-
ent paradoxes problematizing each stage of the appli-
cation of the concept. In identifying some of these I
assume that despite the rhetoric, individuals are not
currently held (morally) responsible for their health
or their health-threatening behaviours, and so the
question offered for more detailed analysis elsewhere
is not in what ways are individuals responsible for
their health within the system of socialized medicine,
but why are they not?23 We will look briefly at each
stage in turn.
Moral agency
Workaday application of autonomy in health
care understood minimally as a commitment to
informed consent belies the complexity of the
various conceptions (Oshana, 1998; Coggon, 2007).
Allmark (2008, p. 41) defines individual autonomy as
‘the capacity of the individual to make and act upon
judgments for which he is held morally accountable.’
If this is the case, the result of the equivalence of
autonomy and accountability (or responsibility)
could reasonably be expected to conclude that if a
patient is considered to be sufficiently autonomous
to be allowed to buy cream cakes, or to consent to
weight reduction medication or surgery, then he is
also sufficiently autonomous so as to be liable to be
held responsible for his/her eating and the obesity
which follows, regardless of the multiple factors
which influence eating behaviour, recognized by the
UK government in its foresight report (Butland
et al., 2007).
Oshana (2002) argues that the solution to this
apparent paradox is that the equivalence of
autonomy and responsibility is mistaken. A morally
responsible agent has to be capable of normative
competence as well as being able to act on desires and
intentions. She gives the example of two versions of
Hitler, the first version of which is incapable of rec-
ognizing any moral code which prevents him ordering
genocide. She regards this first version of Hitler as not
being a responsible agent, different from the second
version, who does recognize moral reasons for not
ordering genocide but allows then them to be over-
ruled. Punishment for the first version, that is holding
responsible, must be justified solely by referral to the
23I am confident that many of us are held (morally) responsible
within close interpersonal relationships, but this lies outside the
inquiry on moral responsibility within socialized medicine.
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utilitarian24 approaches that Strawson (1962) and
others opposed. This is an extreme example perhaps,
likely to test the credibility of the reflective equilib-
rium approach, which should capture our25 intuitions
in clear cases (Fischer & Ravizza, 1998). The obese
cream cake eater may not acknowledge the second
helping as a moral wrong, but that does not mean that
she is incapable of doing so. The example of the
Hitlers makes the point that responsibility requires
additional features especially concerning rationality,
and these additional features do not figure in consid-
erations of deciding whether a person is sufficiently
autonomous to consent to treatment. In the UK,
capacity is decided upon by application of tests out-
lined in the Mental Capacity Act (2005), which deter-
mine ability to understand and retain information and
use it to make a decision. The rationality of the deci-
sion lies outside the process, reflected in Lord
Donaldson’s famous observation that the absolute
right to autonomy ‘. . . exists notwithstanding that the
reasons for making the choice are rational, or irratio-
nal unknown or even non-existent’26 (Brazier & Cave,
2011, p. 118). Oshana (2002) claims that the error in
lumping together autonomy and responsibility stems
in part from a conflation of the global state of being
autonomous with a locally autonomous act. The ten-
dency to think of the former as being tied to respon-
sibility results from the close ties between the latter
and being responsible for the act in question.Worka-
day understanding of autonomy in health care very
firmly concerns the latter.
Conversely, in discussing moral autonomyDworkin
(1988, p. 35) states that ‘A person is morally autono-
mous if and only if he bears the responsibility for the
moral theory he accepts and the principles he applies.’
And of interest is the view expressed in the United
Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organi-
zation (UNESCO, 2008) bioethics core curriculum27
that
In ethics the notions of autonomy and responsibility are
mutually related.There is no autonomy without responsibil-
ity; beyond responsibility, autonomy turns to arbitrarity
which means that the person in his/her decisions does not
take into consideration the interests of others. (UNESCO,
2008, p. 27)
The relationship between responsibility and
autonomy is too complex tobediscussed indepthhere,
andmy aim is simply to argue that there is aprime facie
case for the view that if a person is considered autono-
mous then she is also responsible. Nevertheless,main-
stream bioethics and liberal political opinion
acknowledges limitations to responsibility, for
example in genetics (Levitt &Manson, 2007), the neu-
roscienceof decisionmaking (Burns&Bechara,2007),
and the language of addiction wider than drug use
(Foddy, 2011), while simultaneously promoting
autonomy in the same persons. If patients are not held
to account for their (allegedly) autonomously enacted
health-threatening behaviour, then we must look
further than moral agency to enquire why.
Obligation
Williams (2008) argues that philosophers usually
discuss responsibility retrospectively, that is holding
responsible, or consider the features of moral agency.
Strawson’s (1962) account is premised on the relation-
ship between the agent and the response, and the
technique of reflective equilibrium testing intuitions
about clear cases.A clear case, for example tests intu-
ition of, say a cat knocking over a vase. Our intuition
tells us that we do not hold the cat responsible because
it is not a moral agent. We have different reactive
attitudes, and to different extents if a small child
knocks over the vase or if a passer-by twists her ankle
24As far as utilitarian accounts are concerned, it is possible to
punish an innocent person (in the sense that he is not fully
morally responsible) in the pursuit of greatest utility.
25I am never sure when philosophers say ‘our’ as in should
capture ‘our moral intuitions about clear cases’ whether they
mean their individual intuitions, or the intuitions of people in
general – and if the latter what evidentiary support is available.
26The case was Re T (Adult: Refusal of Medical Treatment)
(1992) 4 All ER 649, CA.
27The UK ethics curriculum for medical students includes that
students ‘be able to demonstrate a critically reflective under-
standing of the rights and responsibilities of patients and pos-
sible justifications for limiting their rights’ (Stirrat et al., 2010, p.
57). There is no equivalent curriculum for UK nurses.
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and stumbles into it accidentally;we reserve full indig-
nation for an autonomous person acting recklessly, or
worse, maliciously. The attitudes we feel tell us some-
thing about what we think about the agency of the
person or the circumstances of the action, whether
there was coercion, or constraint or just bad luck, or
whether the vase was appropriately protected by its
owner.The purpose of these thought experiments is to
test our intuitions about moral agency, but there is
another explanation for a failure to experience the
reactive attitudes; the act may be morally neutral, and
this seems important in an attempt to apply the reac-
tive attitudes account of responsibility to healthcare
provision.Many people would fail to feel disapproba-
tion against smokers, not because they doubt agency
(although they might), but because they think that
there is nothing wrong with smoking.
We may conclude from this that the reactive atti-
tudes approach to moral responsibility, notwithstand-
ing Strawson’s ontological claims, does not really help
in understanding the social function of responsibility
for health. Understanding responsibility as requiring
an account is more appropriate in this context
because it proceeds frommoral agency to establishing
what it is people are responsible for. Individuals owe
an account for failing to meet an obligation, but not
for acting in a morally neutral way. Responsibility for
health requires obligation and this presents the major
challenge to the use of responsibility in a social func-
tion, explaining the insipid telling of patient respon-
sibilities seen in the NHS constitution and elsewhere
(Royal College of Surgeons of England, 2005). The
normative tension at the heart of professional
health care is between respect for autonomy and
responsibility.
Although the emphasis of autonomy in Anglo-
American bioethics has been subjected to recent cri-
tique (e.g. Varelius, 2006;Woods, 2007;Walker, 2009),
it remains predominant (Gillon, 2003;Edwards, 2009),
showing little sign of revision in at least its workaday
understanding. Valuing, promoting, and respecting
autonomy above all else is in direct opposition with
the notion of obligation. Dworkin (1988, p. 41) states:
Amoral theory that stresses the supremacy of autonomy will
have difficulties with the concept of obligation. As the ety-
mology suggests, to be obliged is to be bound. And to be
bound is to have one’s will restricted.
The result of this conflict can be seen throughout
health promotion, for example in the health warn-
ings on cigarette packets,28 which are worded in
terms of information giving, rather than direct
appeals to the moral wrongness of smoking. Of the
14 messages printed on the back of cigarette
packets, 11 are written descriptively, offering infor-
mation, for example, ‘smoking clogs the arteries and
causes heart attacks and strokes’. Three are prescrip-
tive: (i) Protect children: don’t make them breathe
your smoke; (ii) Smoking is highly addictive: don’t
start; and (iii) Get help to stop smoking: consult
your doctor/pharmacist. At the risk of stretching the
point a little, (i) merely obliges a smoker to smoke
away from children, not to abstain altogether, (ii) is
apparently addressed to non-smokers and (iii)
obliges the smoker to get help, rather than stop. It
has been argued that campaigns which set out to
educate about health are, unlike other forms of edu-
cation, evaluated not in terms of what people know,
but in terms of how behaviour changes, because the
purpose is an unacceptably morally loaded attempt
to change health values to those of the educator
(Allmark & Tod, 2007). The unresolved tension is
between the giving of morally neutral information in
support of autonomous decision making and the
attempted revision of morally loaded values and
associated obligations.
In the case of smoking these values lead to the view
that health education should be directed at trying to
get people to give up smoking, but a full rationale for
the view that smoking is morally wrong is not offered.
Butler’s (1993) account of the moral status of
smoking is based on harm to others and this also was
given as the rationale for legislation prohibiting
smoking in public places,29 and could be offered for
the child-protecting injunction printed on cigarette
28The list can be found in annex 1 of Directive 2001/37/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001.
29See for example House of Commons Health Committee
(2005); para 41 ‘The justification for the principle of a ban is
straightforward: workers have a right to be protected from SHS
(second hand smoke).’
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packets. These other-regarding considerations are
consistent with Mill’s harm principle, placing justified
restrictions on autonomy. However, putting these to
one side, while noting the beneficial effects to
smokers and non-smokers of banning smoking in
public places (Meyers et al., 2009), we are left with
self-regarding reasons not to smoke (or not to take
drugs30 or eat cream cakes), and it is here where the
imposition of values threatens autonomous decision
making. These values are based on a specific concep-
tion of health, normatively loaded but neither
explained nor justified.
A further problem for ‘responsibility for health’
used in the sense of social policy is that even if the
issue of having obligations in a general sense in the
current environment of valorizing personal autonomy
was accepted for other-regarding reasons, there
remains the problem of identifying and justifying
exactly what the obligations are and how they relate
to a specific conception of health. A full understand-
ing of ‘responsibility for health’ requires detailed
acceptance of the concept of obligation and detailed
justification for its determinative conceptions.
Holding responsible
Both the reactive attitudes and accountability ver-
sions of responsibility require engagement with our
practices of holding individuals responsible.The reac-
tive attitudes account appears to present problems for
professional health care because healthcare profes-
sionals are required by their professional bodies not
to have the sorts of attitudes that Strawson claims are
definitive of moral responsibility, even of its vicarious
expression.31 The ontological nature of Strawson’s
claims (and see Stark, 2004) is in tension with the
normative and regulatory demands made of health
professionals, especially noticeable in nursing litera-
ture and regulatory documentation, for example con-
cerning discrimination discussed earlier. Positive
emotions (Scott, 2000), even love (Stickley & Fresh-
water, 2002), towards patients are lauded in the
nursing literature; negative ones are not, although
neither are fully under conscious control. Regarding
the expression of emotion rather than its experience
as the morally relevant feature may help, but this
seems to undermine a claim that (positive) emotions
are to be cultivated. The NMC (2008) Code requires
that nurses ‘treat people kindly’, and this similarly
leaves unanswered the question of whether a nurse
can treat someone kindly without being a kind
person.32
The accountability version of responsibility must
engage with the question of if and to whom an
account is owed. Just because it is fitting that a person
gives an account, it does not necessarily follow that an
actual account is required or justified (Smith, 2007),
but if there is a reluctance to blame patients for their
behaviour, this may be because of a narrow applica-
tion of what blame means. Martin (2001) starts a
wider categorization of blame with the simple ascrip-
tion of wrongdoing to someone who is morally
accountable.
It is the NHS which has told us, the public, and its
patients that we should take some personal responsi-
bility for our health, and this is accepted by many.As
the provider of potentially avoidable treatments, it
seems consistent that the account is owed to the NHS.
If this were the case it would fall to healthcare pro-
fessionals employed by the NHS to hold people to
account, but this seems to fall outside the bounds of
patient–professional relationship (Kelley, 2005). That
is not to say that all moral evaluation of patients’
behaviour is disallowed. Positive evaluation in terms
of praise could form part of therapeutic relationship,
but negative evaluation, that is blame, is not. This
therapeutic version of the praise–blame asymmetry is
the reverse of that observed in empirical studies
(Nelkin, 2007; Hindricks, 2008). It would also be dif-
ficult for a nurse to accept an account from a recalci-
30In the UK a long-standing radio programme asks guests to
choose what records they would take if they were marooned
alone on a desert island. They are also allowed a single luxury
item. If the guest chose a lifetime supply of cigarettes and the
means to ignite them would or should health promoters attempt
dissuasion?
31There are studies in the literature which have found these
attitudes in nurses (e.g. Brown, 2006).
32This is an expression of the familiar debates between act and
agent-centred approaches to nursing ethics.
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trant patient knowing that she may bump into him in
the smoking area, a problem acknowledged in the
Prime Minister’s Commission.
The area where tangible consequences33 (liability
blame in Martin’s (2001) categories) for failure to
meet health responsibilities are most plausibly
defended is in the suggestion that persons with alco-
holic liver failure be denied liver transplantation, or
be prioritized lower in the waiting list than those
whose disease was not caused by drinking. Although
it can be argued that the disease of alcoholism
restricts agency, holding responsible in this manner is
defended (Glannon, 1998) in certain circumstances
(Brundy, 2007), or as a ‘tie breaker’ where other con-
siderations are equal (Thornton, 2009).However, offi-
cial guidance in the UK from the National Institute
for Health and Clinical Excellence (2008) states that
taking past behaviour into account is relevant only
insofar as its continuation threatens the effectiveness
of the proposed treatment. The forward-looking
nature of the official position supports a view that it
does not amount to holding responsible, instead
merely being one of several criteria that predict the
effectiveness of the treatment.Even in this apparently
clear case where the causal link between behaviour
and disease is settled and the resource is absolutely
rather than relatively scarce, the notion of holding
patients responsible (at least in this way) is not
allowed.34
Conclusion
The discourse of personal responsibility for health is
prevalent in the UK and elsewhere, and is set to
remain as behaviour-related ill health continues its
inexorable increase. The analysis I have offered
breaks down the concept into three constituent parts:
the agent, an obligation, and a consequence, and I
have argued that this overarching approach applies to
each of the various incomplete conceptions found in
the literature. Regarding responsibility for health as
fulfilling a social function within professional health
care is problematic in all three of these constituent
parts,most significantly in its occasionally paradoxical
relationship with personal autonomy, the respect and
promotion of which remains the predominant moral
imperative inAnglo-American bioethics.The analysis
offered here remains largely at the conceptual level,
and more detailed work is required in the application
of the concept of responsibility for health to profes-
sional health care, both socialized and private. I
suspect that this should and will result in a partial and
tentative retreat from thoroughgoing respect for
autonomy, but at minimum it will require a more
nuanced public debate about what the healthy life
consists in, how it ought to be maintained, and what
obligations are owed to whom, for what reasons, and
with what consequences. Currently responsibility for
health is conceptually incoherent and if it is to retain
its visibility in health policy, this is a situation requir-
ing urgent remedy.
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Using tombstoning (jumping from a height into water) as an example, this article claims that public health
policies and health promotion tend to assess the moral status of activities following a version of health max-
imizing rule utilitarianism, but this does not represent common moral experience, not least because it fails to
take into account the enjoyment that various health effecting habits brings and the contribution that this makes
to a good life, variously deﬁned. It is proposed that the moral status of health threatening activities should
instead be deﬁned by a version of act utilitarianism where both maximizing value and method of calculation are
decided by individuals. In this account personal responsibility for health is reduced to the obligation to under-
take calculations effectively, comprising of two duties; epistemic and reﬂective. If there is an individual epistemic
duty, it is plausible to suggest that health promotion should present information in a way which facilitates it, but
despite the prevalent language of autonomous choice, discussion of health promotion messages, for example,
related to drinking and smoking demonstrates that this currently does not happen. Health promotion strategies
should seek to encourage reﬂection about the harm our health effecting behaviour causes others.
Introduction
The practice of leaping from rocks or fixed man-made
structures into the sea has been a recreational activity
around coastlines for many years, but recent increasing
frequency and fatalities1 have brought it to popular at-
tention. Organizations like The Royal Society for the
Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) and Royal National
Lifeboat Institution (RNLI) have issued warnings and in-
formation films about the dangers and offer advice about
how to minimize risks (RNLI, undated). There have been
calls to ban the activity (Walker, 2007); temporary dis-
persal orders have been granted at least in part to prevent
tombstoning (BBC, 2011a) and a youth was charged with
Breaching the Peace following a tombstoning incident
which necessitated lifeboat rescue (BBC, 2007). Many
videos of tombstoning can be found on video sharing
websites, and it has been suggested that these should be
removed or accompanied by warnings (Aiken, 2009).
It is clear that many people undertake tombstoning in
its various guises, while others disapprove of it, and in
some cases this results in attempts to discourage, pre-
vent or punish tombstoners. This article considers the
moral status of tombstoning, and by analogy, other
forms of health threatening behaviour, beginning by
analysing the reported responses to a tombstoning
accident. Three versions of its moral status are identi-
fied, all utilitarian in origin and yet resulting in sharply
contrasting conclusions because the utility calculations
use different variables. Calls to disapprove of or to
prevent tombstoning are consistent with a notion of
responsibility for health based on health-maximizing
rule utilitarianism that does not represent the moral
reality of tombstoners. An alternative act-utilitarian ap-
proach is advanced using individually selected values
and calculations. Responsibility for health, on this
account, results in moral obligations in process rather
than outcome, specifically two duties:2 the epistemic
duty and the reflective duty. These duties are outlined
and their implication for public health discussed.
The Case of Sonny Wells
Aged 20 years, Sonny Wells concluded a Sunday after-
noon drinking with friends by ignoring signs stating ‘No
diving – maximum penalty £500’ and jumping 30 feet
off the pier at Southsea into just three feet of water.
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Pulled unconscious from the water and airlifted to hos-
pital, his neck was broken in three places, and though
surgical intervention restored feeling and movement to
his hands, he remains paralysed from the chest down,
permanently confined to a wheelchair. A week after the
accident, his parents released photographs of him in the
Intensive Care Unit as a warning to others (BBC, 2008a),
and the following month he appeared from his bed in a
video, used by Hampshire police to discourage people
from tombstoning (BBC, 2008b). Further videos featur-
ing Sonny were made by the RNLI (undated) and the
Dover District Community Safety Partnership (2011).
Sonny’s mother is quoted as saying that:
‘[w]e know that we can’t stop all youngsters and
adults from tombstoning but if we can stop just a
few of them from doing it then it would have
been worthwhile. If they could see Sonny they
wouldn’t do it. It takes him half an hour to get
dressed now instead of five minutes because he
has to use his teeth.’
(BBC, 2011b).
The chairman of the Dover Community Safety
Partnership, which funded the video, is quoted in the
same report: ‘We all must play our part in discouraging
this dangerous and potentially fatal activity’. These pos-
itions can be contrasted with that presented by RNLI and
RoSPA. The websites of both organizations take the mark-
edly different line that tombstoning is a high-risk activity,
and should be undertaken having taken steps to under-
stand and minimize the risks. So, for RoSPA, the advice is:
Don’t jump into the unknown. Consider the dangers
before you take the plunge:
 Check for hazards in the water. Rocks or other
objects may be submerged and difficult to see.
 Check the depth of the water. Remember tides can
rise and fall very quickly.
 As a rule of thumb, a jump of ten metres requires
a depth of at least five metres
 Never jump whilst under the influence of alcohol
or drugs
 Check for access. It may be impossible to get out
of the water
 Consider the risks to yourself and others.
Conditions can change rapidly—young
people could be watching and may attempt
to mimic the activity. And, if you jump
when you feel unsafe or pressured, you prob-
ably won’t enjoy the experience.
(RoSPA undated)
These statements are worthy of analysis because they
express views about tombstoning from the viewpoint
of those closest to it—from the parent, the tombstoner
and the chairman of the local public body—rather than
from professional bioethicists or politicians. The views
about the moral status of tombstoning embedded
within the statements are grounded in everyday experi-
ence, more closely allied to common-sense morality
than moral or political philosophy. Archard (2011)
argues that linkage of theory to common sense morality
is inevitable, and that a defencible moral theory, which
though ‘at some distance from common-sense morality’
(2011: 124) must at least be consistent with it. In arguing
against the view that philosophers can be considered
moral experts,3 Archard claims that the role of philoso-
phers should properly be that of advising or coaching
non-philosophers, helping them to recognize the value
of a better judgement. Brassington (2013: 22) defends a
role for philosophy and philosophical technique in
bioethics, though recognizes that it is charged that,
‘in respect of private activity, the input of a moral phil-
osopher is mere moralising’.
There is a significant difference between the outcome
of a moral assessment and the process which arrived at
it, as Archard points out, between the propositional and
the performative. A philosophical analysis that refers to
and builds upon reasoning by the actors concerned has
the advantage of being readily understood and worthy of
application; it is more coaching than moralizing.
However, grounding analysis in the common-sense
morality of the protagonist is not a full inductive ana-
lysis, attempting to build a theory from the comments.
Utilizing a variant of reflective equilibrium neither
builds nor applies theory; the aim is simply to show
that established moral theory or at least more structured
thinking is consistent with common-sense expressions.
The Moral Appraisal of
Tombstoning
It can be argued that everything that we do is a matter
for moral appraisal, at least because we could be doing
something else (Seedhouse, 2009). More realistically, the
view that tombstoning is an act worthy of or even
requiring moral appraisal is contained within Gert’s
(2005: 9) ‘correct’ view of morality which, following
Hobbes, is simply that morality is ‘primarily concerned
with the behaviour of people insofar as that behaviour
affects others’. Bernard Williams (1985: 12) makes a
similar point. If this is accepted then tombstoning is a
moral issue to the extent that it affects others and the
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relevant question becomes, to what extent does it affect
others?
In the video produced by the Dover District
Community Safety Partnership, Sonny said that:
‘[i]t’s not just what it does to you; it’s what it does
to your family . . . your friends, and it’s just the
way everyone has to live, you know . . . I have to
have people on standby, on call, in case things go
wrong. It’s not just my life that’s changed, their
lives changed as well because it all revolves
around me.’
(Dover District Community Safety Partnership
2011)
Sonny’s father Robbie Wells is quoted 6 weeks or so after
the accident as saying: ‘It’s just selfish. It’s the impact on
people around you, not just the injuries; it’s the years to
come’ (BBC, 2008c). The advice from RoSPA and RNLI
includes that the risks for others should be considered,
identifying the possibility of setting a bad example to
younger people as a special concern. These quotations
support the view of tombstoning as a morally apprais-
able activity whose harms lie in its consequences, espe-
cially insofar as they affect others.
Three Moral Positions
Illustrated by the comments above, it is possible to iden-
tify a number of different assessments of the moral
status of tombstoning. The first would be that it is
wrong and should be banned. Sonny passed a notice
forbidding diving (BBC, 2008b) on pain of being fined
a considerable amount of money, and his mother talked
of ‘stopping’ people from doing it. Signs advising (or
requiring—it is not always clear) patrons not to dive
into swimming pools are common but this injunction
does not apply to jumping in, feet first, an activity
assumed to be safe enough into 3 feet of water from
the edge of a swimming pool but not from a 30 foot
pier. It is also not clear whether the prohibition covers
diving from the location of the sign or whether it covers
the whole pier, including the end furthest from the shore
where, though there will be other dangers, shallow water
(the circumstance that injured Sonny) is not one of
them. A ban on diving is not a ban on tombstoning
itself, only jumping in a specified manner (head first)
from that particular part of that particular pier. Other
forms of prevention, such as erecting a barrier or other
means of making unsafe jumping more difficult, do not
appear to have been reported. The intention to prevent
people from injuring themselves has apparently been
treated as justifying the passing of by-laws, but as the
foregoing nitpickery demonstrates, formulating both a
law and its justification presents considerable difficul-
ties, not least in the question of whether the harm is
considered serious enough to warrant criminalization
at all.
The second position is articulated by the Chairman of
the Dover Community Safety Partnership who, signifi-
cantly, claims that individuals should be discouraged
rather than stopped from undertaking ‘this dangerous
and potentially fatal activity’. Detailed inferences cannot
be drawn on the basis of the limited information avail-
able, but the statement is consistent with at least two
understandings of the word ‘discourage’. The first is
because of the potential harm caused, that tombstoning
is a moral wrong, worthy of disapproval as well as dis-
couragement, that is a position from tolerance.4 The
second is that discouragement is merely prudential; in
this case the discouragement is similar to that which
discourages high-risk financial investments. Given that
the wrongness of tombstoning lies in its effects on
others, I am inclined to assign the former interpretation.
The third position is stated outright by RoSPA and the
RNLI, and amounts to saying that there is nothing
wrong with tombstoning, as long as it is undertaken
safely; and if the sensible advice offered is followed,
the risk of possible adverse consequences can be
minimized.
These three positions arrive at markedly different
conclusions, though the moral methodologies share a
significant feature, that is, they agree that the wrongness
of tombstoning rests in risk and occurrence of injury. It
is not stated or implied anywhere that tombstoning is
intrinsically wrong.5 These positions are all consequen-
tialist positions. But a characteristic of the presentation
of the morality of tombstoning as a consequentialist
morality is that it has resulted in three different conclu-
sions; that it is wrong and should be prevented, that it is
wrong but should not be prevented and that it is
permissible.
Utilitarianism, Public Health and Private
Morality
It is widely recognized that the philosophical basis of
public health is utilitarianism6 (Rothstein, 2004;
Holland, 2007). But this is not to say that a single fully
worked up utilitarian theory can be applied to all public
health issues, calculations made and (morally right)
answers revealed and, though I assume that utili-
tarianism of one sort or another provides theoretical
underpinning of public health generally as well as the
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three positions on the moral status of tombstoning, it
does not follow that tombstoning is a matter for public
heath ethical analysis at all.
The quotations at the beginning of the article con-
cerned what ought to be done about tombstoning rather
that saying that Sonny had acted immorally, but it
should not be inferred from the absence of public con-
demnation that tombstoning is regarded by those advo-
cating regulation as morally permissible or that it simply
is not a matter for moral appraisal. It is more plausible
to infer an unstated view that tombstoning is regarded as
morally wrong by those who attempt to prevent it. As I
have argued, and as much as any other activity, tomb-
stoning is a moral matter to the extent that it affects
others and this assessment of private morality should
be prior to any consideration that it is a legitimate
matter for public health intervention. In place of infer-
ences and suspected moralism in transferring public
health ethics into the private realm (and vice versa), it
is suggested that private immorality is a necessary but
not sufficient condition of something being subject to
public health interventions of the sort that coerces be-
haviour to some degree.
At least two problems present themselves with this
sequencing. First, there is the possibility of genuine dis-
agreement about moral status that can apply at the level
of general rules of action, specified application of the
rules and anywhere in between. A simple view that regu-
lations preventing tombstoning are not legitimate be-
cause tombstoning is a private matter could be rejected
as question begging (Coggon, 2012). An attempt to
make anything the subject of public health measures
could be challenged with the response that the activity
is morally permissible and therefore should not be regu-
lated. There is not much unusual in this as political (and
philosophical) disagreement forms the daily backdrop
to public health dilemmas, but it is enough to suggest a
revision of the view that private immorality forms a
necessary condition for something to be a fitting subject
for consideration of public health measures. This revi-
sion would need to be of the form that a plausible de-
fence of the view that something is immoral is required,
and this must be supported by enough people so that
political legitimacy for public health measures can be
claimed. This might be considered imprecise but at
the minimum, a defence of a moral assessment is
required and this in itself would be a considerable
advance.
The second problem is one of consistency of moral
method. As private morality assesses the moral status of
something and public morality assesses the morality,
generally, of preventing that something or a response
to that something, they are doing quite different
things. The moral methodology of public health ethics
does not transfer into the private domain and though
this may frustrate those seeking a single overarching
moral theory, it is an understandable position for
many who regard moral theory as secondary to moral
practice (Sterba, 2005). Even if common morality is seen
as being rooted in utilitarianism,7 the variant which I
claim is predominantly used in public health causes
problems when transferred to the private realm. The
reason why utilitarianism arrives at such contrasting
conclusions in the moral assessments of tombstoning
is that two of the variables used in the calculations are
different.
Acts and Rules
In the matter of health threatening behaviour,
maximizing calculations within public health ethics
tend to operate at the level of rules rather than acts.
There is reluctance for public health bodies to label
(lawful) behaviours as immoral even as they attempt
to reduce or prevent them. The reluctance to moralize
or to override the greater (professed) good of respecting
personal autonomy provides reasons why rules rather
than acts are used because it allows the view to be both
implied and inferred that it is tombstoning that is wrong
rather than my acts of tombstoning or me as a
tombstoner.
The problem for anyone considering going to the pier
in order to jump off it is that the rules that tell him that
he ought not to do it are not his rules. The calculations
have been formulated elsewhere by an unseen, unknown
hand which has not taken his circumstances as much
into account as they should have. The rule has been
formulated, he might think, because people jump off
the pier casually, after drinking, without checking the
depth of water and the strength of the currents or who
are improperly dressed or prepared. None of that applies
to me—I am dressed for it, I have researched the
conditions and have come with support so that if an
unforeseen event occurs I will be easily rescued. I am
not doing this on a whim; it is my main recreation, what
keeps me going through the dreary week, the thought of
gleefully flying through the air anticipating the invigor-
ating shock of the cold briny sea. Who are you, he might
ask, to tell me that I ought not to do it? His indignation
will likely deepen when he realizes that he is not being
told, with justification, what he ought not to do, but
rather what he must not do on pain of payment of a
hefty fine. He is no anarchist—he really does not want to
be in the position of considering breaking what he
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considers a unjust law, he just does not think it applies
to him.
His utilitarian calculation (and I assume that he does
one), differs in at least three ways from that used by
those arguing from a public health perspective. First, it
concentrates on each act of jumping, recognizing that
the advice from RoSPA has been followed so that the
risks have not only been minimized but also to some
extent quantified. It is not an exact calculation, but the
binary calculation of risk, that is, the likelihood and the
severity of the general consequences can both be con-
sidered without necessarily considering the conse-
quences of the consequences, ad absurdum, which has
been offered as an objection to act-utilitarianism
(Streumer, 2003). Second, the calculation does what
the rules cannot by allowing the individual to choose
what to maximize and then to perform the calculation
using circumstances known only to him. When he has
done these things he is able to give an answer not to the
question of ‘what is wrong with tombstoning?’, but
what, if anything, is wrong with me tombstoning from
this place at this point in time, knowing these circum-
stances about my life. Third, the public health calcula-
tion concerns the outcomes of regulation and not
merely a moral appraisal of the regulated act or pastime.
The Maximization of Health
Public health utilitarianism, including as applied to
health threatening behaviour, maximizes health gener-
ally. This health maximization could be either from a
position that health is of intrinsic value (in utilitarian
terms that it is the ultimate utility to be maximized); or
it could be a matter of pragmatic calculation because
using an instrumental account that health is valuable
only insofar as it enables or restricts other activities con-
tributing to the overall good, however defined and mea-
sured is just too difficult to calculate in a rule utilitarian
approach. I assume that it is more likely to be the
former, with health promotion tending to regard
health in a narrow sense, largely physical, rather than
within the World Health Organisation’s famously all-
encompassing definition. For example, a textbook
aimed at nurses and healthcare professionals promotes
not information facilitating autonomous choice, but has
as a key message; ‘Getting people to change their lifestyle
requires them to make unpalatable changes . . .’ [Upton
and Thirlaway, 2010: 19 (emphasis added)], and regards
behaviour choices evaluatively: ‘People in the UK have
always drunk alcohol, sometimes sensibly8 and some-
times stupidly . . .’ (Upton and Thirlaway, 2010: 107).
What Does This Tell Us About
Responsibility for Health?
It will not have escaped many who have read this far
that the discussion about the instance of tombstoning
and the associated responsibilities and views about
moral status are analogous to other forms of health
threatening behaviours, which constitute a significant
threat to health and are subject to a range of public
health measures of various sorts, including health pro-
motion. An advantage of using cases is that they can
be simple and emotionally engaging. Inferential rea-
soning, implied rather than stated, can take the form
of ‘A did x which is commonly judged as a bad action
with bad consequences; therefore a general maxim
forbidding x is a good maxim’ (Adapted from
Spranzi, 2012: 483). A further inferential move from
the good maxim (of forbidding9 tombstoning) to
more general responsibility for health requires an ar-
gument from analogy, a more complex and contro-
versial technique (Macagno and Walton, 2009),
common in bioethics and applied ethics.
The concept of responsibility for health forms a
significant part of public health ethics. Discourse is
frequently concerned with the notion of personal re-
sponsibility for health, and while philosophical analysis
can bring clarity to the confused concept, much of the
debate is political in nature. Despite its many ambigu-
ities the concept personal responsibility for health forms
part of the NHS constitution,10 and is accepted by a
large number of people (King’s Fund, 2004). There are
three parts to responsibility for health (Snelling, 2012):
(i) a moral agent having (ii) responsibilities, and (iii)
liable to be held responsible in failing to meet them. This
article discusses the second part, responsibilities and in
doing so makes some assumptions about the nature of
moral agency (the first part) and virtually ignores the
third part (being held responsible).
Dworkin (1988) suggests that there is an essential
contradiction between autonomy and obligation, and
this is certainly the case where autonomy can mean
simply the supremacy of personal choice and taking re-
sponsibility for health can mean doing what you are
advised to do. However, the concepts of autonomy
and obligation are not necessarily in conflict; the prob-
lem is that in this model obligations are defined by
others. Obligations understood within an individual
moral assessment augment rather than contradict per-
sonal autonomy, forming the process of moral decision
making rather the outcome, externally derived. The ob-
ligations are, principally, private obligations and as the
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objections of the imagined tombstoner show, these are
formulated in terms of acts rather than rules. In
the private domain our responsibility is to use act
utilitarianism effectively and this amounts to two
duties: the epistemic duty and the reflective duty.
These inter-related obligations form our responsibilities
for health.
Epistemic Duty
The epistemic duty is a duty to seek knowledge, to
gather evidence and at least on certain topics, a duty
which stands in need of very little justification (Levy,
2006). The epistemic duty requires moral agents to en-
quire about the likely effects that their behaviour has on
their health and its purpose is to enable and facilitate the
reflective duty.
Reﬂective Duty
(i) Harms
The reflective duty requires an individual to place his
health threatening action(s) in the context not only of
his own life but also the lives of others affected by
them. This includes family and friends but also the
wider community if the behaviour has a financial or
opportunity cost where there is socialized medicine.
Several levels of reflection require consideration under
this duty. The highest level requires deep reflection
about the meaning of the good life and although
the reflective duty encourages this, it certainly does
not require it. It does require, however, some consid-
eration of the effect that health threatening behaviour
has on others. The harms that should be considered
fall broadly into three categories:
(i) Direct harms resulting from the activity itself
including injuring someone by jumping on him
while tombstoning, or exposing others to second
hand tobacco smoke.
(ii) Indirect harms caused not by the activity but by
resultant ill health. These can be suffered (a) by
those immediately affected by poor health or
death, like family members who are disadvan-
taged financially or who are harmed emotion-
ally, and are also suffered (b) by society
generally through a number of mechanisms
including in some cases opportunity costs in
lieu of treatment.11
Reﬂective Duty
(ii) Beneﬁts
It should be noted first of all that there is claimed to be
wide benefit in facilitating autonomous choice, and this is
a reason why respect for autonomy has become so dom-
inant in society generally and particularly so in bioethics.
Gillon (2003) among others makes this point in defence
of respect for autonomy being regarded as ‘first among
equals’ in the principlist scheme. He explains that enjoy-
ment of eating fatty food results in an autonomous deci-
sion to carry on eating despite knowing and agreeing that
giving them up would ‘be better for me’ (Gillon, 2003:
310). He seems to mean here better for his health rather
than better for him generally but it appears to be on the
latter grounds that he determines to continue his indul-
gence of these ‘delectable’ foods. The reflective duty en-
courages clarity over the issues of benefit to avoid the
error of conflating what is good for health and what is
good more generally. As these more general benefits
cannot usually be described as ‘health benefits’, they are
seldom taken into account by health maximizing health
promoters. When he was Secretary of State for Health, Dr
John Reid caused a furore when he was reported as saying
‘As my mother would put it, people from those lower
socio-economic categories have very few pleasures in
life and one of them they regard as smoking’ (BBC,
2004). It is of interest that he is reported as saying that
the rationale for his reluctance to disapprove is that in-
dividuals should not be patronized, but nevertheless it is a
rare acknowledgement that people derive pleasure from
smoking and drinking and eating; and in some cases this
pleasure is more deep rooted, forming a part of character,
desired or otherwise. See, for example, Oliver Reed’s
quotation that ‘I don’t have a drink problem. But if
that was the case and doctors told me I had to stop I’d
like to think I would be brave enough to drink myself into
the grave’12 (Sellers, 2008).
What might be considered an extreme case of the
tensions between risk and pleasure is provided by the
adventures of Andrew McAuley, who left his wife and
small child on the Australian shoreline in December
2006 and paddled into the sea fulfilling a long held am-
bition to kayak unaided to New Zealand. Two months
later he drowned, agonizingly close to reaching his goal.
His widow, Vicki McAuley, wrote a book detailing their
life together as well as the planning and execution of the
expedition. After paddling out of the bay, Andrew
McAuley talks to a bow mounted camera:
‘I’m really worried I’m not going to see my wife
again, and my little boy. And I’m very
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scared . . . I’m very scared. I’ve got a boy who
needs his father . . . and a wife who needs a hus-
band, and I’m wondering what I’m doing here.
I’m wondering why I’m doing this, I really am.
And I don’t have an answer.
People ask me why, and I love adventure.’
(McAuley, 2010: 6)
These examples of lives defined by adventure or hedon-
ism do not extend to the millions of people smoking and
drinking and eating more than recommended, but they
do illustrate that these habits and many others which
threaten health can contribute to a good life variously
defined because they are enjoyable and self-chosen;
something that health promotion aimed solely at chan-
ging behaviour fails to recognize. Kekes (2008: 10) states
the case eloquently:
Moralists forget that morality involves not merely
a set of commands and prohibitions, but also the
pursuit of an enjoyable life. No reasonable person
can deny that we all have responsibilities, but it is
just as important to recognize that enjoyment
must be part of any life that could reasonably
be called good.
Reﬂective Duty
(iii) Calculations - Act or Rule?
A problem for the comparison of tombstoning with the
more general targets of health promotion is that health
promotion is formulated as rules, whereas the tombsto-
ner more readily uses acts in his preferred utilitarian
calculations. Although there are clear differences in
how to calculate right action between acts and rules,
Brad Hooker (2000b), who has advanced a detailed ac-
count of rule utilitarianism, concedes that in ordinary
morality, not only are the outcomes often the same be-
tween act and rule utilitarianism, but also the versions
agree on how, generally speaking, people should go
about their day-to-day moral thinking. As Upton
(2011: 435) points out, we do best by careful deliber-
ation on acts which require it, but that generally the
familiar rules ‘with which we have grown up’ serve as
an effective starting point. Such deliberation results in
the distance between act and rule utilitarianism being
less significant in practice than might be expected, con-
firming that a kind of amalgam version is useful and
workable as an action guide despite the apparently
fatal objections to both theories operated alone.
It is difficult to be clear about what constitutes an act
for the more common targets of health promotion. For
smoking, and moving from the general to the specific,
the act could be (at a pinch) being a smoker or (just)
smoking or smoking a cigarette or even taking a drag
from a cigarette. It would be absurd to require a utility
calculation before each drag or each cigarette, and in any
case they would be identical and could lead to fallacious
reasoning similar to the fallacy of the heap of sand or the
fallacy of the beard (Clark, 2002): this drag on this cig-
arette will not cause me any long term harm, therefore
neither will the next, nor the next . . . therefore smoking
will not cause me any long term harm. Advocating act
utilitarianism for smoking so that it is analogous to
tombstoning requires the act to be conceptualized
more generally, as the act of being a smoker; that is
the thing (like a single act of tombstoning) that is harm-
ful to health. This will apply to established smokers but a
different calculus would apply to those who have never
smoked or those who have smoked and given up but are
vulnerable to restarting. In these cases the act of lighting
or smoking a cigarette may lead to the individual
(re)turning from a being non-smoker into a smoker
(that is, the thing that is harmful) and so the smoking
of a single cigarette or perhaps a few cigarettes over the
course of an evening assumes a greater significance here
than for the established smoker. Arriving at a theoretical
preference for the level of analysis is ambiguous between
and within the practical cases of tombstoning and smok-
ing, but accepting, with Hooker (2000b) that in practice
the approaches are similar, leaves the basic tension un-
resolved. What is needed is a theory that can account for
both levels of evaluation.
R.M. Hare’s Dual Level Account
Hayry’s view (in 1994) was that R.M. Hare’s dual level
account in his book Moral Thinking, offered the best
solution to the debate between act and rule versions of
utilitarianism. Generally, we can be guided by the intui-
tive rules that constitute the first level of moral thinking,
formed by experiences and moral emotions, but con-
forming to a version of general rule-utilitarianism. The
second level, acts, requires critical thinking that has se-
lected the set of prima facie principles for use in intuitive
thinking, and also can be employed when the intuitive
principles conflict. There is potentially some confusion
as to the extent to which the prima facie rules need to be
universalizeable. If they are universal rules then the for-
mulation will be of the sort that ‘people should not
smoke’, whereas an individual is more likely to formu-
late a rule in terms of whether ‘he should smoke’,13 or
perhaps even (recognizing that this is problematic for
utilitarianism) that ‘he is permitted to smoke.’ Hare’s
critical level equates act utilitarian calculations with that
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kind of rule utilitarianism ‘which allows its rules to be of
unlimited specificity and which therefore is not distin-
guishable from act-utilitarianism’ (Hare, 1981: 43). For
practical purposes it does not really matter at the critical
level whether the agent specifies universal rules so that
they apply to his circumstances, or takes an outright
act-utilitarian approach, but both of these approaches
stand in opposition to the rules generated by orthodox
health promotions which are much more general in
orientation.
What to Maximize and How
Having reflected on the wider risks and the benefits of
the act or the behaviour under consideration, utilitarian
moral theories require that a calculation be undertaken,
placing the positive value of the act or behaviour against
the potential harm that injury or death brings to those
affected. The maximized value can be variously chosen;
health, welfare, utility, preference or happiness and
while difficulty in calculation is acknowledged as a sig-
nificant problem with all utiltarian theories, weighing
up pros and cons of decisions, and not only in the moral
domain, is a fundamental part of everyday life. It is clear
what is meant when we say that all things considered this
or that decision is better even though we would be hard
pressed to show our detailed working out.
A problem with this is that if the decision making
process cannot be articulated, neither can it be
scrutinized. In law, decision making processes can be
challenged via judicial review which can find that deci-
sion making processes considered irrelevant criteria or
failed to consider criteria which they ought to have
done, but no appeal process exists in the reflective
duty. It would be difficult to separate an objection,
from a person whose objections matter, that the
wrong conclusion (that I go tombstoning) has been
reached, from an objection that the reflective process
is inadequate (that the interests of my family have not
been given sufficient weight). This might be a matter for
discussion and potentially, blame, but ultimately it is a
matter for the individual, similar to the question of what
property should be maximized. Only a person at the
centre of the decision knows his own thoughts and feel-
ings and is much more able than a disinterested observer
to judge the likely14 consequences of his action on those
who are affected by it. An attempt to prescribe a decision
making process is vulnerable to the same moralizing
critiques as prescribing actions, though the defence of
moral expertise is probably stronger here. The reflective
duty requires a process of calculation and recognizes
that there are many ways to perform it. The choice
and justification of maximizing property and decision
making procedures are matters for the actor and he is
accountable for them.
At the centre of her grief at losing her husband and
father to her child, Vicki McAuley was quoted a week
after his death as saying:
‘These are a few words that I’d like to say to my
most wonderful man. To have the courage to
pursue your dreams and believe that anything is
possible is a rare gift . . . You are our hero. You
live for adventure. You’ve just had one incredible
adventure this time, and we were with you all the
way . . . Ant, you have taught me how to live.’
(Chandler 2007)
It would be easy to characterize his behaviour as selfish
or reckless, and many would. But Vicki McAuley has not
because she alone really knows what it meant to him,
and what it would have meant for him to forgo his am-
bition. His epistemic and reflective duties were per-
formed, and though the result was catastrophic, the
decision was, as far as process is concerned, moral.
Strawson’s (1962) reactive attitudes account of respon-
sibility defines the moral status of an act in terms of its
provoked response, amply demonstrated in the anger of
Sonny’s parents and Vicki McAuley’s pride; Andrew
McAuley met his responsibilities and Sonny Wells did
not.
Policy Implications
Autonomy is (purportedly) valourized within Western
health care systems and autonomous decisions need in-
formation, recognized by the need for sufficient infor-
mation for valid consent for care and treatment.
However, illustrated by the ready adoption of behav-
ioural insight (Cabinet Office, 2011; Yeung, 2012), cur-
rent practice within health promotion is not to facilitate
the epistemic duty, but rather to present information in
a way designed to persuade people to change their be-
haviour. Unlike the process of gaining consent for treat-
ment, the value of behaviour change, predicated upon
the value of health, overrides the value of facilitating
autonomous decisions. As Allmark and Tod (2007)
have pointed out, health education, unlike other forms
of education is evaluated not in terms of what people
know but whether behaviour has changed.
For example, the strategy to reduce drinking is skewed
away from education and towards behaviour change.
Putting to one side the fact the evidence upon which
the recommendations are based will be almost 20 years
old by the time a review is completed (House of
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Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2011)
current guidance, though written for a public audience,
is difficult to interpret. A key document is ‘Your drink-
ing and You’ (NHS, 2012), which gives the lower risk
guidelines as ‘No more than 3–4 units on a regular
basis’. Clarification is offered for the word ‘regular’:
‘Regular in this context means drinking in this way
every day or most days of the week’. It is unnecessarily
unclear why the daily allowance is given as 3–4 U with
no indication as to whether it is 3 or 4 U. Of the 22 other
countries used as comparisons in the House of
Commons Report, only Japan, the USA and Portugal
(unofficially) use a range rather than a single daily
amount. The definition of regular could mean 4, 5, 6
or 7days a week. None of the other countries has this
ambiguity, and only Poland uses anything other than a
daily or a weekly allowance. The guidance (2012:2) goes
on to state that if you are drinking just above the
guidelines,
 Men are twice as likely to get cancer of the mouth,
pharynx or larynx (part of the neck and throat), while
women are 1.7 times as likely.
 Women increase their risk of breast cancer by around
20%.
 Men and women are both 1.7 times as likely to de-
velop liver cirrhosis.
 Men are 1.5 times as likely to develop high blood
pressure, with women 1.3 times as likely
For even higher consumption the same categories, ad-
justed for increased likelihood are given. It is impossible
for anyone to make any sort of risk assessment based on
this information because the likelihoods of developing
the diseases highlighted are given in relative rather than
absolute terms.15 The figures are virtually meaningless,
and in addition the consequences of developing the dis-
eases are not given—my blood pressure may be higher,
but what does this mean for my health? Calculation of
risk requires both understanding of the likelihood and the
consequences of an adverse event occurring.
Information in smoking cessation material is similarly
skewed. Although there is evidence that mass media cam-
paigns have some success in smoking cessation (Bala
et al., 2008; Farelly et al., 2012), the evidence about
how the messages are presented is inconclusive. It has
been recommended that preference should be given to
negative messages (Durkin et al., 2012) and there is
some evidence to suggest that emotionally evocative
advertisements work better than descriptive ones
(Durkin et al., 2009). Farelly et al.’s (2102) study
lumped together emotional and/or graphic anti-smoking
advertising and found this category more effective in
quitting behaviour than comparison advertisements.
The most recent UK advertisement16 graphically shows
a tumour growing on the side of a cigarette as it is being
smoked, and while this obviously reinforces the proven
links between smoking and cancer at the group level, like
the alcohol information discussed earlier, it does nothing
to facilitate epistemic duty and therefore reflective duty,
because risk cannot be calculated.17 Other recent adver-
tisements have invited smokers to consider the effect their
habit has on others, for example, from 2009, the ‘scared
and worried’18 campaign showed a boy explaining to
camera what he was not worried about, but concluded
with a shot of him with his father smoking a cigarette on a
fishing trip: ‘. . . but I am worried about my Dad smoking.
I’m worried that my dad will die’. In an emotionally
challenging way, this advertisement invites the reflective
duty, more consistent with the responsibilities for health
outlined in this article, highlighting that the wrongness of
the father’s smoking is in the pain expressed in the boy’s
visible concern. In a similar vein, an advertisement from
Australia19 shows a young boy aged about 4 years, stand-
ing alone in a train station having been separated from his
mother. His concern turns to distress and as his tears
begin the narrator says: ‘if this is how your child feels
after losing you for a minute, just imagine if they lost
you for life.’
Although of interest, the reworking of mass media
campaigns alone will not satisfy facilitation of responsi-
bility for health as conceptualized by the epistemic and
reflective duties. It would require a wholesale shift from
‘getting’ people to change their negatively evaluated be-
haviour to giving them information to enable an au-
tonomous decision and encouraging them to consider
the interests of others as they make it. The most that can
be hoped for is that the Government and its agencies
embark on a fuller justification of its strategies. This may
mean a renewed commitment with explanation of the
operationalization of the concept of autonomous deci-
sion making and ways of encouraging a more morally
reflective life, though this is clearly a much bigger issue
than health promotion.
This is not to say that regulation and restrictions on
unhealthy food availability or tax regimes that increase
the price of alcohol and cigarettes are necessarily uneth-
ical. Though something being a fitting matter for private
moral assessment is insufficient for it being a proper sub-
ject for public morality, this does not mean that the public
has no interest in behaviour affecting individual health.
But at the very least the essentially private nature of these
behaviours requires public health authorities to provide a
full explanation for policy interventions seeking
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regulation. Something within the sphere of our individual
influence being bad not for us, but our health, narrowly
defined, is not sufficient. Our behaviour causing direct
harm to others probably is enough; though causing in-
direct harm probably is not. Financial reasons alone pre-
sent further difficulties in calculation in a system of
socialized medicine and these provide better reasons for
some measures (tax) than for others (bans).
Conclusions
(i) What is Wrong with Tombstoning?
The account that I have offered is more aligned to the
approach to tombstoning advocated by RoSPA and
RNLI, and the analysis of this article shows that it is
because it focuses upon and facilitates the epistemic
duty. Whether individual cases of tombstoning can be
regarded as morally permissible depends on whether the
framework of facilitation offered has been followed, and
whether there has been adequate reflective attention
given to the facts. If they have, tombstoning is morally
defencible. I say defencible rather than permissible be-
cause the reflection is subject to evaluation and therefore
disagreement and so should be regarded as a necessary
rather than sufficient condition. A search for ‘people are
awesome’20 via the video sharing website YouTube fur-
ther illustrates this. With very few exceptions, the people
undertaking all manner of daredevil feats, tombstoning,
base jumping, tightrope walking and extreme cycling are
properly prepared and equipped, and it is assumed that
what might be called this ‘professional’ approach
implies that they have given the activity serious consid-
eration. It is easy to accept the invitation to marvel at the
skill, courage, enjoyment and sheer verve of the acro-
bats. People really are awesome. Contrast this with a
search for ‘ultimate fails’.21 Among the assorted prat-
falls, confused pets and distracted walking into glass
doors are many examples of people falling off bikes
and skateboards and hurting themselves. Like Sonny
Wells, most ‘victims’ are ill prepared. There are few hel-
mets or protective pads and failure often is the result of
laughingly inadequate preparation though onlookers’
initial mirth often fades with the realization that serious
injury may have resulted. What is wrong with tomb-
stoning? Nothing at all, potentially.
(ii) Responsibility for Health
A change in emphasis from responsibility for health
as following public health advice to a model of
responsibility which instead requires private process is
closer to the espoused predominant value of respecting
autonomy. It will require the giving of information
about health in a more neutral way to facilitate the epi-
stemic duty. The major challenge is in the reflective
duty, which becomes the principal personal responsibil-
ity for health. It will remain the case that decision
making will be influenced by factors outside individual
control, but these will be reduced by a more reflective
approach to deciding what our individual good life con-
sists in and how this impacts on those who share our
lives. Our responsibilities, that is our obligations, will be
more clearly identified but not by the state in various
guises. It probably is the case that most of us do have
moral obligations in respect of our health and that they
are largely unfulfilled. Insufficiently challenged weak-
ness of will in the consumption of tobacco and alcohol
and all manner of health threatening habits possibly are,
for many of us, immoral. And though the end results are
similar, the key difference between this conclusion and
the similar, if unstated, one of orthodox health promo-
tion, is that this account of responsibility for health is
one of individual process rather than collective out-
come. The only duties we all have in respect of our
health are the epistemic and reflective duties, though
other autonomy-compatible responsibilities will follow
for many.
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Notes
1. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents
(undated) state that in the 5 year period 2004–2008,
there were 139 incidents which required rescue,
including 12 fatalities.
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2. To paraphrase Goodin (1995), responsibilities are to
utilitarianism what duties are to deontology. I have
used the word duties because duties denote actions.
3. But see Gordon (2014), for a response.
4. This would be a paradigm example of tolerance gen-
erally understood as ‘putting up with what you
oppose’ (McKinnon, 2006: 3). Toleration requires
disapproval and a failure to stop something when
you could, but a more modest version might include
a failure to attempt to stop that of which you
disapprove.
5. It could be argued that there is something intrinsic-
ally wrong with tombstoning separate from its con-
sequences, that it is simply in itself, a worthless thing
to do, but this will not be considered further here.
6. I do not wish to get bogged down in a dispute about
whether the term ‘consequentialism’ should be used
instead of the term‘utilitarianism’. There is consid-
erable overlap between the terms and standardly
utilitarianism is the paradigm case of a consequen-
tialist theory. Foot (1985) regards consequentialism
as what is wrong with utilitarianism, and Jacobson
(2008) argues that there is such a thing as
non-consequentialist utilitarianism. In his entry in
the Stanford Encyclopeadia of Philosophy, Sinnott-
Armstrong (2012) states that ‘. . . there is no
agreement on which theories count as consequen-
tialist . . .’ and though its broad meaning is known,
shorn of specifying adjectives the naked term ‘utili-
tarianism’ is virtually useless as an action guide. I
have used the term consequentialist to suggest that
the wrongness of tombstoning rests in its conse-
quences and thereafter I have used the term utilitar-
ian as it is more likely to denote
maximizing processes as I suspect that the term
‘utilitarian’ is more readily understood than the
term ‘consequentialist’. Certainly, the term bioutili-
tarian appears in the bioethical literature but the
term ‘bioconsequentialist’ generally does not.
7. See Hooker (2000a) on Sidgwick’s Common-sense
morality and Greene (2013) for a review of the em-
pirical evidence for dual level utilitarianism.
8. The word ‘sensible’ also appears in UK government docu-
ments, for example, Department of Health (2010: 10).
9. To be clear, this is a moral maxim; forbidding means
that tombstoning is wrong. It does not follow that it
should be prevented or that sanctions should follow
its performance.
10. Under the heading ‘Patients and the public – your
responsibilities’ the wording was initially: ‘You
should recognize that you can make a significant
contribution to your own, and your family’s, good
health and wellbeing, and take some personal
responsibility for it’. In the public consultation
just concluded, the word ‘some’ is removed so that
it reads ‘. . . and take responsibility for it’. The ex-
planation is that this is a ‘technical amendment—
minor drafting change’, (Department of Health,
2012), though a more significant reading could be
made.
11. This might be more difficult to apply than might be
thought. In a systematic review of the literature be-
tween 1997 and 2007, Allender et al. (2009) could
find only two studies which calculate the financial
cost of smoking-related UK healthcare costs.
Updating the figures, they suggest that these costs
amount to £5.17 billion in 2005–2006, compared
with a figure from the 2009 budget of £8.1 billion
raised in tobacco taxation and a total NHS budget
of £86.4 billion (H M Treasury, 2009). Similarly, al-
cohol taxation raises £9billion from alcohol receipts
(Collis et al., 2010) and alcohol harm costs the NHS
approximately £3.5 billion annually (National
Treatment Agency for Substance Misuse, 2013).
12. His bravery deserted him in 1987 when he gave up
drinking for a year because of kidney problems, but
nevertheless he died at the age of 61 years from a
heart attack, an acute episode of a disease known to
be associated with high levels of alcohol consump-
tion. There is a line between autonomous choice and
autonomy-restricting addiction, and Oliver Reed
probably stepped over it. This very important
point is not considered here.
13. Universalized, this might take the form of everyone
in circumstances that are the same as mine should
smoke (or is permitted to smoke).
14. Likely rather than actual consequences. A critique of
all forms of utilitarianism is that consequences are
very difficult to predict. Empirical research can di-
minish the strength of the critique. See Lang (2008)
on the cluelessness objection.
15. A point given wider discussion in Fitzpatrick’s
(2001) celebrated polemic
16. Available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-
20805059 (accessed 26 March 2014)
17. For a discussion on how these messages can foster
autonomy see Barton (2013)
18. Available at http://www.theguardian.com/society/
video/2009/feb/18/worried-smoking-children (ac-
cessed 26 March 2014)
19. Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=SfAxUpeVhCg (accessed 26 March 2014)
20. For example, http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=hhKXsLFKYqc (accessed 26 March 2014)
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21. For example, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Uj
wod-vqyqA (accessed 26 March 2014)
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Abstract The World Health Organisation encourages that blood donation
becomes voluntary and unremunerated, a system already operated in the UK.
Drawing on public documents and videos, this paper argues that blood donation is
regarded and presented as altruistic and supererogatory. In advertisements, donation
is presented as something undertaken for the benefit of others, a matter attracting
considerable gratitude from recipients and the collecting organisation. It is argued
that regarding blood donation as an act of supererogation is wrongheaded, and an
alternative account of blood donation as moral obligation is presented. Two argu-
ments are offered in support of this position. First, the principle of beneficence,
understood in a broad consequentialist framework obliges donation where the
benefit to the recipient is large and the cost to the donor relatively small. This
argument can be applied, with differing levels of normativity, to various acts of
donation. Second, the wrongness of free riding requires individuals to contribute to
collective systems from which they benefit. Alone and in combination these argu-
ments present moral reasons for donation, recognised in communication strategies
elsewhere. Research is required to evaluate the potential effects on donation of a
campaign which presents blood donation as moral obligation, but of wider impor-
tance is the recognition that other-regarding considerations in relation to our own as
well as others’ health result in a range not only of choices but also of obligations.
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Introduction
It is a commonplace that health, variously understood, is a good thing and that work
to protect, maintain and restore it is therefore also good. The responsibility, that is the
obligation, to meet the demands this principle requires falls to a number of
individuals and organisations. In the UK, despite the discourse of ‘personal
responsibility’ for health, moral, legal, and professional obligations to patients and
the public rest principally with health professionals within socialised medicine.
Where the notion of personal responsibility is referred to it is predominantly directed
at individuals’ own health, offering self and other-regarding reasons for action. Self-
regarding reasons take the form, to borrow Kantian terminology, of hypothetical
imperatives; if you want to be healthy, you ought to undertake this action (or omit that
action). Categorical imperatives are seen where reasons to protect an individual’s
health are other-regarding, seen for example in health promotion messages which
emphasise harm to others, commonly children, that ill health or early death of the
individual brings.1 Outside caring and professional relationships, the notion of legal
and moral responsibility for others’ health is rarely seen,2 and where it is, it requires
omissions. Legislation to ban smoking in public places was justified in order to
protect the health of others [34],3 recklessly infecting someone with HIV is a criminal
offence[10],4 and more mundanely, patients are exhorted not to attend GP surgeries if
they think that they are infected with swine flu.5
The question of moral responsibility to act for other’s health is seldom addressed
and I shall use the example of blood donation to argue that this responsibility is
plausible in certain circumstances. Within the broader category of tissue and organ
donation, it is possible further to distinguish types of acts and their moral statuses,
from the obligatory to the supererogatory, and though the rule of rescue [60] and
family responsibilities apply and complicate in some instances of donation, they are
seldom seen in one of the commonest donation acts: blood donation. Using
publically available documents and communications material, this paper both
analyses the moral status presented and offers an alternative normative account. I
argue that hitherto, blood donation has been regarded in the UK and elsewhere as
altruistic and supererogatory. I suggest that this position is wrongheaded, and
instead that blood donation should be regarded as morally obligatory for two
reasons. First the principle of beneficence makes donation obligatory where large
1 A recent NHS advertisement has a boy explaining what he is not worried about. ‘But I am worried
about Dad smoking. I’m worried that my Dad will die.’ Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
BmUtR8DcMAc&feature=related (This and all urls last accessed on 9th August 2012).
2 I do not include the obligation to pay taxes which funds, in part, other people’s health care.
3 Smoking, Health and Social Care (Scotland) Act 2005; Health Act 2006. Justification for the legislation
was the harm principle as reported in the House of Commons Select Committee report [46], but see also
Coggon [20, 21] for a discussion of the ban applied to prisoners in Rampton Hospital where prisoners’
own health was also a factor.
4 See R v. Dica 3 A11 ER 593.
5 The advice contained in the NHS leaflet was ‘Do not go into your GP surgery or local accident and
emergency department unless you are advised to do so or you are seriously ill, because you might spread the
illness to others. Ask a flu friend to go out for you.’ Available at http://www.direct.gov.uk/prod_consum_
dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/@en/documents/digitalasset/dg_177903.pdf.
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health gains by recipients are accrued from relatively small costs from donors, and
second, fairness and particularly the wrongness of free riding obliges those who
would accept blood to give, or to offer to give it. The implication for advertisements
and public awareness is discussed, but perhaps the most significant implication of
this analysis is to increase the emphasis of the notion of obligation, challenging the
predominance of individual autonomy in western bioethics.
Analytical Framework
The analytical framework utilised in this paper draws upon two distinctions from the
work of David Hume. First, the separation between the descriptive and the
normative, the is and the ought, is maintained as far as possible, though in places the
absolute distinction is difficult to maintain. Second, though not as celebrated as the
is/ought distinction, Hume [47] also distinguished practical from theoretical
philosophy.6 ‘Theoretical’ philosophy is concerned with explaining human nature,
whilst the aim of practical philosophers is to explain to people what they ought to
do, making
…us feel the difference between vice and virtue; they excite and regulate our
sentiments; and so they can but bend our hearts to the love of probity and true
honour, they think, that they have fully attained the end of all their labours
[47, p. 5].
In this quotation, practical philosophy is aligned more with the normative than the
descriptive domain. The key feature is the difference between a reasoned
philosophical exploration of the moral status of something, in our case blood
donation, and the way that this is presented to those making donation choices.
Theoretical philosophy, inter alia, open-mindedly selects and defends a theoretical
approach, applies it to an issue, anticipates objections and considers alternatives. In
contrast, A Humean practical philosopher presents arguments and conclusions
seeking to persuade, to ‘excite the sentiments’, and ‘bend the heart’ of those to
whom the message is directed. So in the analytical framework, the normative has at
least two dimensions, the theoretical and the practical. Initially at least it is assumed
that these two parts are consistent, allowing a normative position to be inferred from
practical presentation, and also that a fully reasoned normative position should
result in practical presentation reflecting this view. The framework applied to blood
donation addresses these issues;
1. Descriptive. This is primarily an account of why people donate and why they do
not, analogous to Hume’s theoretical philosopher.7
6 He actually uses the terms ‘easy’ and ‘abstruse’.
7 I do not mean to suggest that individuals choose to donate or not to donate for reasons which are
exclusively moral [71]. The issue is highly complex, influenced by many social and psychological factors.
The Theory of Planned Behaviour suggests that moral values are influential in determining the attitudes
and subjective norms preceding an intention to donate [36], but it would be as significant an error to see
donation exclusively in terms of moral reasons as it would be to ignore them altogether.
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2. Normative—theoretical. This consists of an account of the normative status of
blood donation; whether it is required, or supererogatory or merely prudential.8
3. Normative—practical. Communicative strategy principally takes the form of
media advertisements. Embedded within the advertisements are messages;
some subtle and some not so subtle about the moral status of blood donation. By
their nature, the advertisements are a blunt tool, addressed to all; donors, lapsed
donors, and non-donors. Communication with registered donors is more
individually directed, by letter, text and via social networking media, and
insofar as the purpose of television advertisements is to raise awareness widely,
it is most usefully directed at non-donors, offering predominantly moral reasons
for action, persuasive rather than deliberative in nature.
Application of these constituent parts differs between nations but there are also
similarities, coordinated by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and I will use
their documentation in particular as it is consistent with, but wider than UK9 policy.
To be clear; the paper concerns blood donation practice in the UK, though the
analysis is transferable to some extent. The analysis is presented in two parts, each
starting with what I take to be the ‘official position.’ First, descriptive claims are
discussed and those made by the WHO are presented. It is argued that this position
predominantly regards donation as altruistic, and this claim is tested and critiqued
against a brief review of the empirical literature on donor motivation. Second the
presented moral status of blood donation is analysed. A full normative account is
not offered by blood collection agencies in the UK, and so it inferred from UK
communication material which presents blood donation as an act of supererogation.
An alternative account of blood donation as moral obligation is outlined, supported
and illustrated by examples of communication material from blood donation in India
and organ donation in the UK, both of which are plausibly transferable to blood
donation.
Part 1: Description
The ‘Official’ Position
In 2010 WHO published a framework for action with the aim of ensuring that
100 % of donations are voluntary, phasing out paid and replacement donations [94].
In using this document as my primary source, it is necessary to quote at some
length;
A voluntary non-remunerated blood donor gives blood, plasma or cellular
components of his or her own free will and receives no payment, either in the
8 Some, notably those of the Jehovah’s Witness faith, regard blood donation as morally forbidden, but I
do not consider that here as I am interested in blood donation within a system of therapeutic use of blood
and blood products which those who regard its use in this way stand outside.
9 There are separate organisations covering England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, though the
English organisation also covers North Wales. Unless stated, references are to websites and documents
from the (English) National Blood Service, part of the NHS Blood and Transplant Authority.
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form of cash or in kind which could be considered a substitute for money
[94, p. 14].
The rationale for the emphasis on voluntary donation is primarily safety;10
Voluntary donors are recognized to be the safest donors because they are
motivated by altruism and the desire to help others and by a sense of moral
duty or social responsibility. They have no reasons to withhold information
about their lifestyles or medical conditions that may make them unsuitable to
donate blood. They are not placed under any pressure by hospital staff, family
members or the community to donate blood and they entrust their blood
donations to be used as needed, rather than for specific patients. The only
reward they receive is personal satisfaction, self-esteem and pride [94,
pp. 18–19].
Having identified voluntary donation as a consequentialist instrumental good, that is
it is safest, the WHO goes on to claim altruism is what might be considered a
fundamental principle;
A blood donation is a ‘‘gift of life’’ that cannot be valued in monetary terms.
The commercialization of blood donation is in breach of the fundamental
principle of altruism which voluntary blood donation enshrines [94,
pp. 19–20].
It is claimed that donors give for altruistic reasons and out of a sense of social
responsibility;
Voluntary blood donors donate blood for altruistic reasons and receive no
reward except personal satisfaction in helping to save lives and improve the
health of individuals they will never meet. While they choose to donate their
blood out of a sense of social responsibility, recognition of the importance of
their individual donations and appreciation by the blood service and wider
community help to create a sense of belonging to a special group of people
[94, p. 92].
But there is also recognition that donors have self-interest in giving;
Voluntary blood donors themselves benefit from health education and
encouragement to maintain healthy lifestyles as well as regular health checks
and referral for medical care, if needed. Provided that they receive good donor
care when they donate blood, they feel personal satisfaction and self-esteem
which provides a sense of social engagement and belonging that is recognized
and valued by the community [94, p. 20].
10 This argument is derived from Titmuss’ [90] important work. Three arguments for the preference of
voluntary donation are (1) Commercial supply reduces voluntary donation in the ‘crowding out effect’ (2)
paid blood is inherently unsafe, and (3) there is a risk of exploitation and harm to poor donors who sell
blood through economic necessity. Empirical evidence for these positions is scant [33]. For a more
detailed examination of Titmuss’s work, see Sykora [88], and for a critique see Rapport and Maggs [74].
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These quotations are representative of compliant organisations. For example the UK
blood transfusion service states simply that ‘All blood donors in the United
Kingdom are non-remunerated volunteer donors’ [92], and the International Society
for Blood Transfusion (ISBT) has the requirement for voluntary donation as part of
its Code of Ethics, and the promotion of altruism as one if its aims (ISBT, undated).
In the EU, directive 2002/98/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
required member states to encourage voluntary donation.11
The ‘Official’ Position: A Critique
There is a tendency both to conflate altruism with voluntary unremunerated donation,
and to present it as a simple binary choice between the unremunerated and
remunerated. Both of these tendencies significantly oversimplify, and the predom-
inance of the claim to altruism is at the expense of two further positions which are
nevertheless identified in the WHO [94] report. First that blood donation is prudential
and self-interested; that donors’ sense of satisfaction and the receipt of other benefits
is and should be reasons to donate (Voluntary blood donors themselves benefit from
health education and encouragement to maintain healthy lifestyles as well as regular
health checks and referral for medical care, if needed (p. 20)).
Second, that blood donation forms part of a moral duty or social responsibility
(…motivated by altruism and the desire to help others and by a sense of moral duty
or social responsibility (p. 18)). A closer examination of this phrase reveals an
important moral distinction. I will suggest that the tone of communication and the
environment in which blood donation operates presents a predominant discourse of
supererogation, by definition a non-obligatory act (…altruism and the desire to help
others). However the second part of the sentence, preceded by the word ‘and’
suggests that donors also have a sense of duty or responsibility and both of these
words involve the notion of obligation. The sentence appears self-contradictory.
One possible explanation is that even though blood donors are the subject of the
sentence, what is meant is that some blood donors see donation as supererogatory
and some see it as obligatory. But if this is the case there is plenty of untaken
opportunity to make it clear, and the WHO document refers to donors throughout as
a single homogenous group. Noting again the descriptive nature of the claims and
the absence of an unambiguous statement of the moral status of blood donation, a
more plausible explanation is that the position is muddled and contradictory.
Free Will or Legitimate Pressure?
In the light of extensive and continuing philosophical debate about the concept, it is
noteworthy that the expression ‘free will’ is used; it adds nothing to clarify the term
‘voluntary’ or the claim that donors ‘…are not placed under any pressure’, and may
11 The full text of article 20 of directive 2002/98/EC is ‘Member States shall take the necessary measures
to encourage voluntary and unpaid blood donations with a view to ensuring that blood and blood
components are in so far as possible provided from such donations.’ (see Farrell [32] for a review of blood
safety in the EU).
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obscure them. The ISTC code of ethics [50] talks not of pressure but of the absence
of coercion, more defensible normatively and empirically. In comparison,
procedures to obtain valid consent for examination and treatment (see Department
of Health [DH] for example which uses the term ‘freely’), include the criterion that
consent must be given ‘without undue influence12 being exerted’ [25, p. 11]. Blood
donation organisations, for example the American Red Cross (undated), actively
encourage the recruitment of other donors, influence from friends is given as a
reason by a significant proportion of donors [82], and research has been undertaken
to seek the best method of encouraging donors to recruit friends [55]. In making
these observations about the language of statements made by different organisa-
tions, it is not claimed that subtle and contestable differences between the concepts
influence, pressure and coercion were uppermost in the thoughts of either the writers
or their intended audience, nor is it suggested that there is anything necessarily
unethical about recruiting friends or allowing peer group and other pressure to
influence potential donors. But there is a tension between the stated official position
that blood donation is voluntary (of their own free will) and altruistic, and the
recognition that undefined forms of pressure are effective, desirable and morally
acceptable. Conceptually the claim to altruism appears simplistic; can it be
supported by empirical research findings?
A Very Brief Review of Empirical Literature
I do not offer a full discussion of the many empirical studies which assess donor
behaviour and motivation. There are a number of reviews [8, 27, 38, 41, 58] which
discuss factors influencing behaviour. What these and other studies show is that the
area is much more complex than Titmuss’ altruistic model proposes, and this has
been apparent for some time. In 1976, for example, Condie et al.’s study [22]
showed that social pressure and degree of free rider tendency were more important
motivators than altruism, and though much of the research since then has shown
higher levels of altruism in donors, there are a number of methodological problems
and potential biases in the research which is undertaken largely within systems
assuming altruistic donation [14].
Methodological problems reported by Bednall and Bove [8] include a reliance on
self-reported surveys which have the potential for social desirability bias. In
contrast, an Iranian study [56] used physicians to decide on a single predominant
donating motivation based on donor interviews and found that although altruistic
reasons were the biggest group at 39.1 %, almost as many (38.6 %) were primarily
motivated by self-regarding reasons, including perceived health benefits. In this
study, undertaken in a religious society, religious beliefs accounted for 11.4 % of
donations. In the US, Gillum and Masters [39] hypothesised that since blood
donation is perceived as an altruistic behaviour, and religions commonly advocate
pro-social behaviour, there would be a correlation between religious observance and
12 Stewart and Lynch [86, p. 600] report the legal case of Mrs U where undue influence requires
‘…something more than pressure’, but it is unclear whether the DH is using the phrase in a legal or
everyday sense.
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blood donation. The data, when controlled for socio-demographic factors, provided
scant evidence for their hypothesis.
Steele et al. [84] noted that studies use different definitions of altruism and
measure it in different ways. In their study, instead of asking donors why they
donate, a large sample (12,064) of donors recruited at blood donor sessions
completed previously validated scales for altruism, empathetic concern, and social
responsibility motivation. There was no significant difference in altruistic behaviour
score between regular donors and those who subsequently lapsed. Older people had
progressively higher scores on the altruistic measures, contrary to Maghsudlu and
Nasizadeh [56] who found that older people were more likely to donate for self-
regarding reasons. Surveys often report different results than field experiments
which test actual rather than declared behaviour. For example, surveys have
predicted that incentives such as free cholesterol testing will increase donation rates,
but this has not been confirmed experimentally [40, 87].
In Canada, Hupfer [48] found that students identified more closely with an
advertisement emphasising self-interest rather than altruistic messages and in one of
the few UK papers, Ferguson et al. [35] found in three studies that motivation was
more benevolent than altruistic, benefitting both donor and recipient,. They claim
that, though subtle, the shift in emphasis is important because self-interest has not
been highlighted in recruitment campaigns. Steele et al. [84, p. 51] concluded that
‘it may be time to try to appeal to self-interest as younger donors appear to respond
positively to appeals that emphasize how donating blood may help them
personally’.
Research in this area has tended to be quantitative [3], though it is recognised that
qualitative studies can be useful in examining complex behaviour. For example, In a
Spanish study, Belda Suarez et al. [9, p. 1445] used discourse analysis and found that
donors perceived themselves to be the same as other donors and non-donors, and only a
minority attributed to themselves higher awareness and kindness; an image ‘fostered
by the institutions responsible for promoting donation’. It is argued that presenting
messages in this way may discourage some individuals from donating.
There are a great many difficulties and challenges in researching donor
motivation, but for now I simply want to make the point that the empirical
evidence is contradictory and complex, and fails to support the ‘official’ position,
which acknowledges mixed motivations but is clear that predominantly donation is
and should be altruistic.
Part 2: Normative
The separation between the empirical and the normative seems quite straightforward
in terms of factual claims and empirical research findings, though it presents greater
problems in an analysis of the moral status of blood donation. This is because there
is little in the way of ‘theoretical’ discussion from blood collection agencies. There
is, however, ‘practical’ presentation of the moral issues involved in blood and other
tissue and organ donations, and here I analyse some aspects of these, inferring the
‘theoretical’ moral position from the practical presentations.
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The ‘Official Position’: Supererogation Inferred
The Donor Management Manual produced by DOMAIN (Donor Management in
Europe13) states that;
The effect on recruitment will most likely increase when the recruitment
messages focuses on these factors.
• Donating blood is a good thing to do
• It generates social approval
• It can be easily accomplished: ‘yes, I can be a blood donor’
[24, p. 90]
The strategy appears without an evidence base, but the prevailing view, that
blood donation is a good, generating social approval is presented. The most recent
UK14 television advertisement is described below.
A man stands at the gate of a primary school waiting for his daughter. They
see each other and smile. An on screen legend fades in: ‘Motorway pile up.
Thursday 7.52 pm’.
A woman is having her hair cut. In close up she is laughing. An on screen
legend fades in: ‘Chemotherapy starts Monday 10am’.
A man holds an infant in his arms then gently places him in a cot. In a wider
angle shot it is apparent that there are two cots in the room but the second cot
is empty. An on screen legend fades in: ‘Liver transplant. Next Tuesday 7am’.
The man wistfully plays with the mobile above the empty cot.
Narrator; Give blood and you can save someone’s life. Today. Please don’t
leave it to someone else. Type your postcode into blood.co.uk.’
The screen fades to the NHS blood transfusion service logo over their
strapline. ‘Do something amazing.’
The events that require blood transfusion are situated in the near future, and so
potential donors can help the individuals by their actions.15 The everyday nature of
the stories could also be designed with the aim of suggesting to the audience that
they themselves might need blood. But the strap line ‘Do something amazing’
supports the WHO position that blood donation is altruistic and praiseworthy.
Supererogation, both as a concept within and outside normative ethical theories is
underdeveloped and problematic. Urmson’s seminal essay ‘Saints and Heroes’
13 DOMAIN is a European project that focuses on good donor management. Funded by the European
Union, 18 blood organisations from 18 countries are members, including the four UK organisations.
14 Available at http://www.blood.co.uk/video-audio-leaflets/tv-radio-ads/). This advertisement is not
currently being aired but it remains available on the blood transfusion website.
15 The previous campaign in the UK used celebrities who identified individuals who had helped them or a
relative in the past. For example the chef Gordon Ramsay, says that ‘without this man I would have died
from a ruptured spleen.’ (available at http://collection.europarchive.org/tna/20090605173026/http://
blood.co.uk/pages/video_06.htm.
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recognised that the tripartite categorisation of moral acts into the forbidden, the
obligatory, and the permissible is ‘totally inadequate to the facts of morality’ [93,
p. 60], unlike regulation which operates exclusively within these categories [68].
The problem, for morality if not regulation, is that the category consisting of
permitted acts includes those of very different types, united simply by the properties
that they are neither forbidden nor obligatory. The category includes acts that are
amoral or trivially moral as well as morally good acts which exceed that demanded
by obligation; the heroic act.16
Formally, the necessary properties of a supererogatory act are given by Mellema
[61, p. 3]. An act is supererogatory if
1. It is an act whose performance fulfils no moral duty or obligation
2. It is an act whose performance is morally praiseworthy or meritorious
3. It is an act whose omission is not morally blameworthy.
The relationship between the term and its necessary conditions is circular [45]
and the conditions apply to individual acts of donation more than donation in a
general sense. Those whose donation requires overcoming needle phobia or
forgoing something of value might, for example, be regarded as particularly
praiseworthy. The principal concern here is whether blood donation is presented as
morally obligatory or not and since this question forms part of an environment of
supererogation the status of other elements are also of concern. There is little that
addresses the normative question directly and so I propose to infer it from
documents and presentations that are available and in doing so I offer two
justifications for the logical sleights of hand which follow. First I return to Hume’s
two types of philosopher and suggest that the practical philosopher need not adhere
rigidly to logical rules for his purpose is to engage with an audience to whom the
rules are largely unknown. Second I can dilute my claim a little so that instead of
saying that the ‘official’ position is that blood donation is not obligatory, I can say
that this position is consistent with the evidence rather than it is demonstrated by it.
So with caveats in place, and with the intention to acknowledge the sleights of hand
as they occur, how do the necessary features of supererogation apply to blood
donation in the UK?
The first and third conditions share the important feature of being defined in
terms of what they are not rather than what they are. There is no evidence that blood
donation is considered obligatory, and none either that failure to donate is
blameworthy. The sleight of hand here is to accept the absence of evidence for
something as evidence of the absence of something. However, it would be
surprising if there was a clear statement of a moral position in official documents
because this is not their purpose, but also because there is a clear normative tension
in UK healthcare practice between any notion of obligation and the predominant
moral imperative to respect and promote personal autonomy [81].
16 The webpage of the united States organisation ‘Blood centres for the Pacific’ is www.bloodheroes.com
and the system of small rewards for donation in the form of tee shirts and restaurant vouchers is known as
‘hero rewards’.
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The second condition presents a more difficult challenge. The criterion is
positively stated and so some evidence must be offered that donation is
praiseworthy. I do this by offering evidence that donation is praised, and that
donors are regarded as an appropriate recipient of gratitude, ‘generally the mark of
supererogation’ [45, p. 65]. The sleight of hand here is to suggest that because an act
is praised, it is praiseworthy. Gratitude can be appropriately offered for things that
we are required to do17 and care is required when inferring praiseworthiness that the
stated praise and gratitude do not fall within the category of gratitude offered for an
obligatory act.
Gratitude is a positive emotion ‘one feels when another person has intentionally
given or attempted to give, one something of value’ [5, p. 139], and can be regarded
in at least two ways [59]. First as an appropriate response to beneficent behaviour to
the extent that it might be considered that this response is required in order to avoid
being thought ungrateful and second as a motivator of pro-social behaviour.
Recipients of blood might be expected to feel gratitude but unlike the gratitude felt
and expressed by patients for the personal care they receive from staff caring for
them [63], or the gratitude felt towards known donors [37] this cannot be expressed
to the individual.18 However, gratitude can be felt and expressed by recipients to the
pool of donors, and this forms part of the regimen of gratitude fostered by blood
donation organisations.
In the UK, a video19 posted on the webpage of the NHS Blood and Transplant
Authority (NHSBT) starts by offering thanks from the organisation. A maroon
background is seen on screen with a bright red heart shape in the centre, with the
capitalised legend ‘DEEPLY VALUED’. The commentary states: ‘Thank you for
coming today and for giving blood and platelets. Your contribution is important and
deeply valued.’ A later section shows a mother sitting with her daughter describing
transfusions required following childbirth. She contrasts those who give to family
members, which might be expected or required, against those who donate to
strangers. She says ‘I think that they’re really special people’, echoing the language
of the WHO report. A further section shows the chief executive of the organisation
talking to a donor of 140 units;
Thank you so much for coming along today. I understand you’ve made nearly
140 donations? That is fantastic. I’m so grateful because it’s through people
like yourselves (sic) that Blood and Transplant is able to save so many lives,
and without you we would not be able to do our job.
During the writing of this paper, I was in communication with NHSBT. I received a
helpful e mail giving requested information. At the foot of the e mail the writer
thanked me for the nine donations I have made, having clearly looked me up on a
database. This is an example of the role of vicarious gratitude as an intended
17 Driver [28] argues that it is possible for an obligatory act to be considered praiseworthy, and gives
some examples to show that some obligatory acts are more praiseworthy than others that are
supererogatory.
18 This is in contrast to acts of donation where the recipient is known or later identified, for example
living kidney donation.
19 Available at http://www.blood.co.uk/video-audio-leaflets/tv-radio-ads/.
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motivator of pro-social behaviour, more likely to induce a return to Ledbury
Community Centre than pointing out that nine donations in 30 years of adult life is a
pretty meagre return.20 This is not a trivial point as it contributes to the general
milieu of gratitude. Though the emotional gratitude expressed by recipients in the
video is clearly of a different sort to that expressed by my e mail interlocutor and the
Chief Executive, it would be a thin account of gratitude expression which regarded
it solely in terms of a calculation to encourage repeated donation. A more plausible
account is to regard the emotional response felt by recipients and the vicarious
gratitude expressed as genuine responses to acts of perceived supererogation,
expressed simply in the tag line of NHSBT: ‘Do something amazing.’
An Alternative Normative Position
In this section an alternative account of the moral status of blood donation is
advanced in two arguments; those from beneficence and justice. Examples of
television advertisements utilising these arguments support the case that they are
already familiar, though to different audiences or differently applied.
The Argument From Beneficence
The principle of beneficence is familiar to healthcare professionals because of its
inclusion as part of the principles based approach to bioethics [7]. One perceived
strength of the principles is that they can be derived from any of the major moral
theories. This theoretical hedging is also a source of critique from Clouser and Gert
[19] who argue that the theoretical source of the principle of beneficence is Mill and
utilitarianism. An act of beneficence is an act that helps others, but Beauchamp and
Childress [7] are clear that not all acts of beneficence are obligatory and though they
take care to root their system in common morality, its purpose is to guide action
within the special relationships that healthcare professionals have with those in their
care. This relationship can make benevolent acts obligatory that would be
supererogatory in common morality, and the same might be said for other special
relationships, for example within families. As the blood donation video described
earlier acknowledges, I am (ordinarily) obliged to care for and about my family in
ways that I am not for my neighbour or a stranger [80]. This seems to present a
problem for an attempt to define blood donation or any other beneficent act towards
strangers in terms of obligation. Peter Singer has attempted to reset the normative
bar in a field that is similar in many ways; charitable donation to developing
countries. The formal expression of his argument is;
First premise: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter and medical care
are bad
Second premise: If it is in your power to prevent something bad from happening,
without sacrificing anything nearly as important, it is wrong not
to do so
20 And at the risk of expressing ‘shallow gratitude’ [6] for the modest success of writing this paper, I am
happy to thank and acknowledge him in return.
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Third premise: By donating to aid agencies, you can prevent suffering and death
from lack of food, shelter, and medical care, without sacrificing
anything nearly as important
Conclusion: Therefore, if you do not donate to aid agencies you are doing
something wrong [79, pp. 15–16]
The premises can be rearranged so that they apply to blood donation. The first can
be restated as ‘suffering and death from lack of donated blood are bad’. The second
can remain as it is and the third can be similarly amended. The consequentialist
calculation juxtaposes the benefit of donation against cost. In applying these
premises, Singer [79] recognises that the second is vague, but his discussion
concerns a relatively small monetary sacrifice in return for a large gain in health for
the poorest in developing countries. For example, he quotes a figure of
approximately $250 per life saved in a programme to prevent diarrhoea [79, p. 89].
Some advertisements from across the world are robust in presenting an
opportunity to help an identified individual as morally obligatory. For example,
from India, a series of advertisements produced by BBC Media Action21 includes
one about a girl with thalassemia.22 The advertisement does not specifically mention
weighing of costs and benefits, but it obviously invokes an appeal to beneficence.
Daytime in a coffee shop. A man, about 30 sits alone reading a magazine. A
girl, aged about 8, pretty, round faced with long black hair approaches. (After
the initial greeting the script is reproduced from subtitles).
Girl: ‘Hello Uncle’
Man: [Smiles, puts down his magazine and turns to face the
girl].’Hellooooo.’
Girl: ‘I wanted to say thank you to you.’
Man: ‘Thank you! For what?’
Girl: ‘Actually, you see I have thalassemia.’
Man: [looks away, perhaps for a parent?] ‘Oh.’
Girl: And every month an aunty or uncle like you give (sic) blood and help
me.’ [the camera cuts to the man’s face. His smile is dropping] ‘But I
don’t know who they are. So, I say thank you to everyone. So thank
you!
Man: ‘But I have never donated blood.’
Girl: [she wrinkles her nose] ‘Hmmm’. [Pause. Then she smiles] Never
mind. Next time? Bye! [she turns and walks away]
Man: ‘Bye’. [His smile fades further and he watches pensively as the girl
approaches another table]
Narrator: Donate blood from the age of 18. You can save someone’s life.
21 BBC Media Action is BBC’s International charity. It ‘is using media and communication to provide
access to information and create platforms to enable some of the poorest people in the world to take part
in community life, and to hold those in power accountable’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/what_
we_do/governance_and_rights
22 Available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fhoPEUXFcT4.
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The screen fades to a picture of a hanging bag of blood, with the bulleted
legend: ‘You can donate blood every three months. Make sure it is a licensed
and registered blood bank. Does not cause weakness.23’
The final scene is of the girl now being held up by the man who is standing in
front of a building. They are wearing different sets of clothes, so presumably
this is after a donation. The man is looking at the girl.
Girl: [smiling] ‘Try it!’
Man: [Turns to face camera] ‘It feels good’.
I am not suggesting that presentation of blood donation is this way is a central
feature of the campaign. Other advertisements in the series present other perspectives,
not least reassurance that blood donation does not cause weakness. The sleight of hand
here is to attempt to transfer this advertisement from India to the UK, where blood
transfusion services are very different. India aspires to voluntary unremunerated
blood donation, but about 45 % of blood for transfusion is collected from family or
replacement donors [65], and there are a number of web-based organisations which
assist patients and their relatives in their search for suitable donors.24 It is estimated
that 50 % of blood comes from paid donations, and only 5 % of voluntary donors are
repeat donors [70]. Ramani et al. [73, p. 259] state that ‘…blood-transfusion services
in India are a highly-fragmented mix of competing independent and hospital-based
blood-banks, serving the needs of urban populations.’ The Central Drugs Standard
Control Organisation website25 reports that there were 2,517 licenced blood banks as
of July 2011, of which 973 were government operated and 1,544 were private, and Pal
et al. [70] estimated that in total, 34 % of blood banks were unlicensed. The
advertisement would have been seen only by those with access to television and who
had a number of options for donation, including being paid and being directly asked
by the girl’s relatives. This makes donation motivation and the relationship between
donor and recipient significantly different than in the UK. However, the non-financial
costs and benefits of donation are similar, and the arguments implied and emotions
shown in the advertisement are applicable elsewhere, albeit with slight modification,
and so the advertisement is worthy of analysis.
There are similarities and differences between the UK and Indian advertisements.
Costs to donors are not discussed in detail, so it must be assumed that these are
understood by potential donors at least in broad terms; the mild pain and
inconvenience and possibly feeling slightly unwell are placed against the benefit
gained by the recipient, which is always significant and frequently lifesaving. Both
invite donation to save an identified person’s26 life. The Indian advertisement thanks
23 Thanks to Dr Sabita Menon for the translation.
24 For example, see http://www.friends2support.org/.
25 Using data from the Ministry of health and Family Welfare. http://cdsco.nic.in/html/BloodList.html.
26 And of course it is no accident that the individual is an appealing child. Singer [79] discusses studies
which show that the propensity to donate money is increased when the focus is on one rather than many
beneficiaries, and of course the opposite effect was well known in perhaps apocryphal quotation attributed
to Stalin; ‘The death of one man is a tragedy. The death of millions is a statistic.’
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the donor (albeit mistakenly) retrospectively while the UK one looks to future
donations. In the Indian advertisement, there is identification and focus on the
donor, absent from the UK advertisement which focuses exclusively on recipients.
Interestingly the final words in the Indian advertisement, spoken by the man are
self-regarding, a reference to well-known phenomenon that individuals feel a sense
of satisfaction after donation.27 The significant difference is the suggestion from
India, framed in the wrinkle of an innocent nose that failure to donate, for this
individual, is blameworthy, that is donation is something he ought to have done.
The very notion of supererogation is a problem for consequentialism.28 If greater
overall benefit is obtained by donation, then that is what we ought to do. If greater
overall benefit is obtained by not donating then we ought not to do it. The
supererogatory position presented by the UK advertisement, that donation is neither
obligatory nor forbidden cannot easily be reconciled with consequentialist
calculations, even of the everyday sort implied. Because of its everyday nature,
theoretical precision in the definition of what is being maximised and how is not
necessary especially as the balancing is clearly significantly asymmetrical; the
asymmetry between costs and benefits also addresses a common objection to
consequentialism, that it demands too much [62, 66]. Application of a broadly
consequentialist approach regards blood donation as morally obligatory, recognised
in the Indian if not the UK advertisement.
The Argument From Justice: The Wrongness of Free Riding
Famously, Hart [44] and Rawls [75] argue, from fairness, that there is an obligation
to contribute to collective goods that we benefit from, that is we ought not ‘free ride’
on the collective actions of others. The free rider argument is invoked elsewhere
within bioethics, for example in the debates between Harris [43] and Chan and
Harris [18] in favour, and Brassington [11, 12] against, concerning obligation to
support and participate in medical research, and also by John [53] in the question of
vaccination. Subtly different versions are applied in individual circumstances
according to costs of contribution, and the nature and extent of benefit. An
advertisement in the UK utilises the free riding problem in presenting organ
donation as obligatory.29
A woman about 45 years sits comfortably on her legs in an armchair. Her
teenaged son is on the sofa next to her. She looks at him and smiles then turns
her attention back to the television which is out of shot and from where comes
the sound of laughter. The boy is also laughing. The camera focuses on his
27 An advertisement feature from Florida includes an interview with a doctor who suggests that blood
donors have a reduced risk of cancer. The suggestion is that blood donors tend to be individuals who also
consult their doctors more often, but the clear implication is a causal effect between giving blood and
reduced chance of contracting cancer. Even if a more generous interpretation is allowed, this film remains
a direct claim of the personal benefits of blood donation. (available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=8MNmeLaVLdM).
28 And for Kantianism (see [4].
29 Available at http://www.uktransplant.org.uk/ukt/adverts_and_video/adverts_and_video.jsp.
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elbow; he absentmindedly scratches it and when he removes his hand an
intravenous cannula is revealed.
Commentary: If someone you love is offered a lifesaving organ, what would
you do?
The boy’s breathing becomes laboured and he coughs. A drip stand appears
behind the sofa and a bag of intravenous fluid appears connected to the
cannula. The mother watches the television apparently unaware of the
transformation.
Commentary: Nothing?
The boy’s hand rests on the sofa arm. Its colour changes from pink to grey.
The fingers become clubbed.
Commentary: Nearly all of us would take an organ but most of us put off
registering as a donor.
In close up, his healthily bright eye becomes, after a weary blink, bloodshot
and dilated. He sinks back in the sofa rubbing his face unveiling oxygen
cannulae and the paraphernalia of acute illness behind him; oxygen bottle and
bleeping monitors. His mother turns to him and her smile fades.
Commentary: If you believe in organ donation, prove it.
Screen legend: Three people who need a transplant die every day.
Commentary: Register now. [on screen is a screen capture of
www.organdonation.nhs.uk The cursor moves to the on screen button
marked ‘register now’]
Organ donation provides a singular case of the free riding problem. Specifically the
contribution requested by the advertisement is simply that individuals sign up to the
organ donation register, but despite the provisions of the Human Tissue Act 2004,30
which state that removal of organs for transplantation is lawful if the deceased gave
appropriate consent (for example via the organ donation register), in practice
permission is required from relatives [49], and see [78]. Where consent of the
patient to post mortem donation has not been given because, for example, in
common with 70 % of the population, the organ donor register has not been signed,
he can avoid being a considered a free rider if his relatives consent to donation on
his behalf.31 Alternatively if while alive the potential donor has avoided free riding
by signing the register, this can be overridden by his relatives refusing donation and
in this case the accusation of free riding might be more justly aimed at the relatives.
Genuine free riding in this case would be restricted to those who would accept an
30 And the Human Tissue (Scotland) Act 2006.
31 The free riding of the dead person is retrospective, that is the claim is that he would have accepted an
organ.
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organ but have ensured that their wish not to donate an organ is known and therefore
likely to be acted upon.32
It has been argued to derive an obligation to contribute from the fact of obtaining
a benefit commits the is/ought fallacy [42], and further standard objections to the
wrongness of free riding are provided by Nozick [67]. The strongest objection is to
systems enforcing contribution, but this is not the case either for blood or organ
donation.33 A further objection is the cost to an individual in doing his share must be
outweighed by the benefits of the actions of others. The cost/benefit ratio differs
between organs, blood and other acts of donation, and benefits are stratified. Almost
everyone benefits to some extent from the system of blood and organ donation.
Though only recipients receive life saving benefits, these are dependent on the
existence of the system of potential benefits and so they require the lesser benefit to
many, and the lesser benefit to the many exists only so that greater benefit to a few
recipients is possible. So when calculating benefits to the individual of the collective
system, it makes no sense to consider only actual benefits to the many. The gain to
individuals must be assumed to be derived from potential rather than actual benefit,
and since this is significant, the cost/benefit objection is met. Nozick also objects
that it is wrong to give benefits to patients and then demand payment; that is moral
obligations cannot accrue in lieu of unrequested benefits. It is the case that
individuals do not ask for the potential benefit of blood or organ receipt, but this is
not so where individuals seek and consent to receiving organs or blood. Nozick’s
objections to the principle of fairness, particularly the need to avoid free riding can
be answered.
Despite the singularity of its application to organ donation, it is clear that the free
rider argument is used in the advertisement. Though the actual words are expressed
in the hypothetical, ‘if you believe in organ donation…’ this is nearly everyone. The
normativity is unambiguous; you ought to donate your organs. There are differences
between the application of the free rider problem to organ donation and blood
donation, not only in the calculations for cost and benefit but also in process,
principally because of the nature of contributing an organ post mortem and the
decision making processes involved. Blood donation is closer to standard accounts
of free riding [23], complicated by stratified benefit. However, there do not appear
to be any material features of the system of blood donation to distinguish it from the
system of post mortem organ donation such that the free riding argument applies to
the latter and not the former.34 If this is the case, then it is concluded that if the need
32 It is this latter provision which forms the minimal normative expectation in the NHS Constitution (DH
[26] ‘You should ensure that those closest to you are aware of your wishes about organ donation’.
33 A thin version of this would be presumed consent, currently in force in some countries and being
introduced in Wales [30]. True enforceability would mean removal of organs even in the face of refusal to
consent from relatives and prior to death from the deceased. This is seldom suggested; but see Fabre [31].
34 In order to prevent free-riding Jarvis [52] offered the ‘modest proposal’ that only those individuals
signed up as organ donors should be eligible to receive them. A more modest version of this modest
proposal, that those willing to donate should be prioritised for receipt [29, 91] avoids the potential to
waste organs, and has attracted, in the US, some public support [83], and was enacted in Israel in 2008
[54].
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to avoid free riding is a reason to make organ donation morally obligatory, it must
also make blood donation morally obligatory.35
Arguments Extended
In contrast to the ‘official’ position, I have examined two familiar arguments that
blood donation is a morally obligatory act. The first based on the duty to assist
others applies to all adults, and the second, based on the moral obligation to avoid
free-riding applies only to those who would accept blood. Both of these arguments
rely, though in different ways, on weighing up costs and benefits. For the broadly
consequentialist beneficence argument, this calculation includes benefits for others,
and for the free–riding argument, in order to meet Nozick’s objections, the
calculation is restricted to self-regarding benefits. Both of these arguments can be
applied to donation of other tissues. For beneficence, acts become less obligatory
and increasingly supererogatory as the costs and risks to the donor increase. The
free rider argument will not apply where the donor has no chance of ever being a
recipient, for example, sperm donation. The level of normativity can be represented
on a table (see Table 1) where acts are more obligatory at the top and more
supererogatory descending down the table. The table is for illustrative purposes only
and the ordering is open to challenge, but as a heuristic device it is helpful in
stratifying calculations. It is consistent with the view [69, pp. 207–208] that
supererogation ‘…is measured by that which is required: in supererogatory action
the ordinary measures of duty rather than the categories of duty are exceeded.36 On
this account, different acts of donation amount to different amounts of the same
thing, rather than different kinds of things. The question is at what point on the scale
does donation change from being obligatory to supererogatory. At present, the
‘official line’ appears to be drawn between post mortem organ donation and blood
donation, and the argument of this paper is that it should be drawn lower, at least
under blood donation, and probably a lot lower than that, and especially where the
need to avoid free riding applies.37
There remains the question of the specific features and extent of the obligation to
donate blood. Clearly, ought implies can, and so the obligation cannot apply to those
who have received blood38 or, for example, have had a tattoo in the last 4 months.39
The obligation is to give blood if you can, or to offer to give blood. To say that you
35 There is heightened interest in the concept of solidarity, and the arguments from beneficence and
justice that I have offered could be presented within this framework. Further analysis is warranted
elsewhere (see [72, 76].
36 Emphasis in original.
37 In the US in 1978, a man dying from leukaemia asked a judge to compel his cousin to donate bone
marrow to save his life, and in refusing the request the judge left the cousin in no doubt that his refusal
was ‘morally indefensible’ [85]. Regarding the act of donation of bone marrow as an obligation presents
some difficulties, not least because, as in this case, of the complications of the Rule of Rescue [60] and
family obligations.
38 The full list is available at http://www.blood.co.uk/can-i-give-blood/who-cant-give-blood/.
39 It would be going too far to suggest that you ought not have a tattoo because it interferes with your
opportunity to donate.
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ought to give blood is to suggest a number of distinct obligations [95]. Since it is
more than sixteen weeks since I last gave blood, ought I travel to Gloucester to give
again, or can it wait until the mobile unit comes to my small town next month?
What if on that day I cannot attend because I have promised to take my neighbour to
visit her sick relative? I would say that it is clearly a moral ought rather than a non
moral ought, but beyond that there is no need for further analysis here. There are
many contingencies and the normativity of each potential act of donation must be
evaluated in the light of its circumstances. My analysis concerns being a blood
donor generally rather than considering each opportunity or act of donation.40
Following Zimmerman [95]41 the obligation is best regarded as prima facie, but in
any case the importance of the arguments presented rests in their conclusion that
blood donation is obligatory at all rather than in any specific sense.
Advertisements, Nudges and a Threat to the Framework
The most important purpose of an advertising campaign is to increase and maintain
the numbers of donations. Eligible individuals can, of course, decline to give blood,
but the temptation to make it clear that they are not acting in a morally acceptable
way must be tempered by the possibility that this will be widely regarded as
moralistic rather than moral, reducing rather than increasing donation. In this case it
would be a plausible position, though apparently paradoxical, to maintain that on
consequentialist grounds blood donation is morally obligatory, but that advertise-
ments should continue to present it as supererogatory. This would present some
problems for the analytical framework utilised in this paper.
First, the assumption that there is, or should be, consistency between the
theoretical and practical expression of the moral status of blood donation is
challenged questioning the normative inferred from the descriptive. However a
critique of this method and findings does not invalidate the ‘alternative’ moral status
of blood donation which can stand outside the framework if necessary. A more
serious critique would be that focussing on the most effective presentation renders
an analysis of moral status of donation redundant. Nagel [64] perceived ethics as a
branch of psychology, but even if the relative importance of moral philosophy was
to retreat in the face of insights from psychology and neuroscience, it does not
follow that philosophical analysis is of no value at all.
In other fields, negative marketing has been found more likely to result in self-
protection and inaction (for example, [13]) and studies cited earlier suggested that
advertisements should emphasise self-regarding rather than other regarding reasons
to donate. The role of psychological framing is influential; popularised by Thaler
and Sunstein’s [89] book, ‘Nudge’ which has become ‘an instant classic’ [21, p. 12],
Behavioural Insight has become an important part of UK public health policy
40 This analysis will differ for different acts of donation. Signing up to the bone marrow donation register
will be of little value if I find a trivial reason not donate on the one occasion in 20 years when I am asked
to make good on my intentions.
41 Who followed Ross [77].
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[15, 16],42 claiming some success in, for example, required choice for organ
donation, and reducing missed appointments by simple behavioural interventions
[16, 57].43 Despite the claims made for framing, a recent review by the Cochrane
Library [1] found very little evidence of its effectiveness.
Further research into the practical applications of framing and nudging applied to
blood and organ donation may yield interesting and useful insights. However,
though important, the significance of TV advertisements and other public
presentation is not restricted to the narrow matter of procuring the most blood.44
Placed in the wider context of the role of autonomy and choice related to health
enhancing and threatening behaviour, highlighting the normativity of blood
donation could serve to emphasise the general notion that health is a legitimate
matter for public concern, and that other-regarding considerations in relation to
others’ health as well as our own result in a range not only of choices but of
obligations. As I have shown, presenting donation in this light is already a feature of
blood donation advertisements overseas, and organ donation advertisements from
the UK.
Conclusion
Western bioethics reveres personal autonomy and its facilitation above all else.
However, if the concept of responsibility for health is to be meaningfully
operationalized in an age of alarming increase of lifestyle induced ill health, the
notion and extent of obligation must be defined, justified and defended. This
remains problematic for self-regarding reasons for action, more so for normative
consideration of other-regarding acts which are seen as mere supplicants at the feet
of the personal autonomy god. I have argued that individuals have other-regarding
responsibilities for other’s health, where the cost is small and the benefit large, and
where the imperative to avoid moral free riding is clear. Blood donation is a
paradigm example of pro-social behaviour which has hitherto been regarded and
presented as altruistic and supererogatory. However, application of arguments from
beneficence and justice challenge this established moral status, recognised in part by
somewhat inconsistent communicative strategies. Offering blood for donation for
the benefit of others is a moral obligation, and in the absence of evidence of an
42 According to the Cabinet Office [16, p. 4] the cabinet office team has ‘strong links’ to Professor
Richard Thaler, co-author of ‘Nudge’.
43 There are however, differences in the stated motivations between its theory and practice. The UK
Government’s aim is to find ‘intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable people to make better
choices for themselves’ [16, p. 9], which sits uneasily with Thaler and Sunstein’s [89 p. 40] view that
‘framing works because people tend to be somewhat mindless, passive decision makers.’
44 There are seldom media stories explaining that treatment has to be curtailed because of insufficient
supply, so it is assumed that despite occasional pressure the current system, including the advertisements,
meets the needs placed upon it, though blood donation organisations would doubtless prefer the problem
of having too many donors rather than too few [17]. As I write this there is some concern about the
potential for shortages over the olympic summer resulting in more targeted approaches to individual
donors.
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unintended deleterious effect, this should be made visible and unambiguous in
public discussions, documents and advertisements.
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Abstract This paper starts by introducing a tripartite conception of responsibility
for health consisting of a moral agent having moral responsibilities and
being held responsible, that is blamed, for failing to meet them and
proceeds to abrief discussionof thenature of theblame,noting difficulties
in agency and obligation when the concept is applied to health-
threatening behaviours. Insights about the obligations that we hold
people to and the extent of their moral agency are revealed by interro-
gating our blaming behavior, and to facilitate this, my own blaming
attitudes and actions are analysed in respect of an imagined adult sonwho
seeks thrills by jumping from a pier into the sea, an activity common
around coastlines and intended to be analogous in varying degrees to a
range of health-threatening behaviours. I consider my responses to this
imagined act in relation to some features of moralism, the excess of
morality, concluding that blame can be justified when it is proportionate
and within interpersonal relationships. There is evidence that some
nurses hold negative blaming attitudes towards groups of patients con-
sidered to have caused or contributed to their illness, but this is not
justified, not only because of impaired agency, but also because if there is
responsibility for health, associated obligations are owed to those who
share our lives, and it is those people who are entitled to hold individuals
responsible. Nurses who hold negative blaming attitudes towards groups
of patients are invited to identify the status of moral agency, the precise
natures of their (failed) obligations,and of the patient–nurse relationship.
It is concluded that reflectionon thesematters and thedifferencebetween
justified blame andmoralism demonstrates that blaming behaviour in the
context of professional health care is built on nothing stronger than
prejudice.
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Introduction
The concept of personal responsibility for health
forms part of the political and philosophical land-
scape of professional health care, and yet it is poorly
understood. Responsibility can be presented as a tri-
partite concept consisting of (1) a moral agent; (2)
responsibilities understood as obligations; and (3)
being held responsible for them, that is being blamed
in failing to meet them (Snelling, 2012a). Each of
these areas is problematic when the concept respon-
sibility is applied to health, specifically to health-
effecting behaviours. Moral agency, or at least the
capacity for autonomous decision making, is assumed
in professional health care, and yet it is inhibited in
much health-threatening behaviour not only by
so-called weakness of will (Kennett, 2001) but also by
developing insights into behaviour from neuroscience
and psychology. Obligations related to health and
health-related behaviours are stated or implied in
official documents like the National Health Service
(NHS) constitution which asks that patients:
Please recognise that you can make a significant contribu-
tion to your own, and your family’s, good health and well-
being, and take personal responsibility for it.1 (National
Health Service, 2013a, p. 11)
This leaves unclear what exactly the ‘significant con-
tribution’ is and what taking personal responsibility
for it entails. Finally, when we say that we hold
someone responsible for something, for an action or
an omission,what we generally mean is that we blame
her for it (Smith, 2007), but despite being as ‘common
as water’ (Sher, 2006, p. vii), performing a necessary
role in our moral experiences, blame is underexam-
ined within professional health care. Recent events
demonstrate that when things go wrong,2 nurses,man-
agers, and politicians are capable of blaming each
other and being blamed, but blaming patients for
causing their illnesses remains outside professional
health care, even when outcomes are similarly poor.
This paper considers the nature of blame as part of
personal responsibility for health. I will begin by
briefly discussing the nature of blame and its applica-
tion to health-effecting behaviours where both moral
agency and moral obligation are problematic.Despite
this, it is clear that we do sometimes blame others for
behaviour that threatens health, and in order to inter-
rogate this, I question my own blaming behaviours in
the case of my imagined adult son who has jumped off
a pier into the sea, an activity known as tombstoning
and which functions as an analogy for other health-
threatening behaviours. Questioning my own intu-
itions and imagined feelings in this case in relation to
some features of moralism, the excess of morality,
concludes that my blaming practices are proportion-
ate.A discussion of the appropriateness of health care
institutions and practitioners blaming patients for
their health-threatening behaviour follows. It is noted
that Codes of Professional Conduct do not permit
this, though refraining from blaming patients because
of fear of being blamed for unprofessional moralism
requires an impoverished understanding of compas-
sionate nursing. The paper concludes by arguing that
a critical reflective analysis of an instinctive and emo-
tional blaming attitude, which exists in places within
the nursing profession, will challenge assumptions
that health-threatening behaviours are wrong, that
patients are always fully morally responsible, and that
nurses stand in such a relationship to patients1The initial version of this clause of the NHS constitution stated
that ‘You should recognise that you can make a significant con-
tribution to your own, and your family’s, good health and well-
being, and take some personal responsibility for it.’ It is
interesting because the latter version reduced the normative
force of the clause by changing the normative ‘should’ to the
merely requesting ‘please’ at the same time as strengthening
taking responsibility by amending the ambiguous ‘take some
personal responsibility’ to the clearer ‘take responsibility’. See
Schmidt (2009) on personal responsibility for health and the
NHS constitution.
2In the United Kingdom, there has been a series of high-profile
failures of hospitals followed by investigations inevitably leading
for public calls for accountability. The Keogh review into the
quality of care in 14 hospitals identified as a common theme
(Keogh, 2013, p. 5) ‘the imbalance that exists around the use of
transparency for the purpose of accountability and blame rather
than support and improvement’. See also Cooke (2012) on
blame in nursing and health care.
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that blaming is permitted, providing support for regu-
latory injunctions against blaming patients for their
choices.
The nature of blame
Though there is a deep and necessary connection
between the three constituent parts of responsibility,
they can to different extents be considered separately.
We can conceive of the notion of a full moral agent,
probably counting ourselves among their number,
while recognizing difficulties where moral agency is
compromised. We can also make some sense of the
notion of a health-related obligation separate to
issues of agency and blame.At a simple level, a claim
could be advanced that we ought not to smoke ciga-
rettes, that smoking is morally wrong.We know what
this means and what sorts of arguments are required
to defend a claim about the moral status of smoking.
However, the notion of blame is more difficult to
conceive of in isolation because we have to blame
someone for something in a certain manner. It is not
so much an unidirectional and rational process from
agent through (failed) obligation to justified blame as
a complex bidirectional and often emotional interac-
tion between the elements. We do not, initially at
least, generally consider the extent of moral agency
and the nature of an unmet obligation in order to
arrive at a considered blaming regime. When we
blame someone, we make assumptions about unmet
obligations and moral agency, apportioning blame to
agents as a reaction which can be revised in the light
of information about agency and intention.
Blame defies simple definition but can be consid-
ered as a range of responses to perceived wrongdoing
by a responsible agent. Strawson’s (1963) celebrated
paper, Freedom and Resentment, developed by many
(notably Wallace, 1994), conceptualized blame as a
range of reactive attitudes we feel in response to
others’ acts, omissions, or character.We feel indigna-
tion or resentment if someone wrongs us, and more
objectively, we disapprove if the wrongdoing does not
directly affect us. Martin’s (2001) typology of blame
starts with the simple judgement blame, the attribu-
tion of a morally wrong act to a morally accountable
agent. Attitude blame consists of negative attitudes
and emotions including the sort that Strawson
described. Martin’s third category is censure blame,
constituting acts of ‘public criticism . . . to include all
verbal and physical expressions, from snide remarks
and hostile denunciations to shunning and other body
language’ (2001, p. 96). Finally, the fourth category is
liability blame, involving costs in the form of penalties
and punishments. Care is required here not to con-
flate moral responsibility with other forms of respon-
sibility such as contractual responsibility which more
clearly assigns penalties and can do so outside any
notion of moral responsibility.
There are two ideas generally encompassed within
understanding of blame (Scanlon, 2008): assessment
and sanction. In Martin’s scheme, judgement and atti-
tude comprise assessment, and censure and liability
comprise sanction.The component parts are variously
expressed elsewhere though are not exactly cotermi-
nous. Coates & Tognazzini (2013) refer to blame and
expressed blame, or we can refer to an initial
backward-looking, emotional or cognitive assessment
in contrast to a forward-looking response which
follows, or we can refer to a person being blamewor-
thy if we think or believe that he has done a wrong
thing that can be attributed to him and blame if some
action on the part of the blamer follows. Linguistic
confusion is apparent here because on the accounts
that I have offered – judgement and attitude/censure
and liability; blameworthy/blamed; assessment/
sanction; blame/expressed blame – the word ‘blame’
can mean either or both component parts. For clarity,
I will follow Scanlon’s nomenclature, assessment and
sanction. There are two obvious differences in these
orientations: control and purpose.
Assessment blame can respond emotionally to
what has happened, and this part of it at least is gen-
erally not under conscious control.We feel anger, irri-
tation, and resentment; we do not think them. It is
possible that there is no outward manifestation of
these emotional blaming reactions, or there may be
some unconscious facial grimacing or suchlike which
can communicate disapproval to the supposed trans-
gressor and everyone else. In contrast, sanction blame
takes these assessments and acts upon then them in a
variety of ways including Martin’s categories, censure
and liability. These acts are under conscious control,
Who Can Blame Who? 3
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Nursing Philosophy (2014)
or at least they are more capable of being so than
immediate reactions. We choose to remonstrate with
someone we think has wronged us or to use this
wrong as justification for a further act of liability or
even retribution. Policies that define sanction blame
are considered capable of critique and defence. Some
examples of sanction blame, uttering a hasty rebuke
to someone knocking over a drink, may be more of a
reflex action than a considered one, but nevertheless,
this is under conscious control. If instead of remon-
strating we were to threaten or punch someone who
spilt our drink, saying that it was a reflex would cer-
tainly not be considered sufficient defence in law.
The second difference is purpose. At a general
level, it is claimed that there is an evolutionary
purpose for morality (Machery & Mallon, 2010), and
the reactive responses we feel are part of this. As,
generally, we care what people think of us, we want to
avoid being thought badly of, and this has a powerful
effect on social cohesion, encouraging observation of
societal norms. Similarly, we want to be thought well
of.We may seek to avoid these negative assessments,
but they are confirmed and enhanced by expressions
of displeasure, privately or in public. Individual acts of
blaming reinforce the sentiments as a forward-
looking deterrent in a number of ways; by persuading
the transgressor not to repeat his bad act, and as a
warning and motivation to others. It is not suggested
that all acts of blame are devised and undertaken
having carefully considered their purpose, but it is
possible, and having stated a purpose, efficacy can be
considered and, in some cases, evaluated. For
example, Callahan (2013, p. 39) argues for ‘stigmati-
zation lite’ against obesity as part of a series of mea-
sures designed to make obesity socially unacceptable,
with the aim of reducing its prevalence.This may have
some effect on preventing obesity, but it does not
appear to have an effect of those already obese. Sutin
& Terracciano (2013) found that perceptions of dis-
crimination are likely to have the opposite effect.3
The relationship between the elements is complex.
Strawsonian reactive attitudes or more considered
judgements of the moral status of an act might be
considered prior to and necessary for sanction blame,
but the component parts do not necessarily have to
exist together.Negative reactions can be felt or judge-
ment made, but a choice can be made not to voice
them; an agent may be blameworthy but not (out-
wardly) blamed.Alternatively, acts of sanction can be
performed in the absence of a reactive emotion or a
judgement of wrongdoing in pursuit of an overall aim.
Having a purpose which can be evaluated tends to a
utilitarian account of considered blaming behaviour
stated boldly by Smart (1973, pp. 49–50):
A utilitarian must therefore learn to control his acts of praise
and dispraise, thus perhaps concealing his approval of an
action when he thinks that the expression of such approval
might have bad effects and perhaps even praising actions of
which he doesn’t really approve.
On Smart’s thoroughgoing version of utilitarian
blame, it does not follow from it being right to blame
someone that that person is blameworthy (Arpaly,
2000); and seeking a purpose for our blaming actions
does not commit us to a thoroughgoing utilitarian
account of blame, much less a utilitarian morality.
Blaming someone who is not blameworthy may
simply be a malicious or self-serving act.
Blame is clearly a phenomenon which is both
complex and wide ranging, and yet similar to other
concepts like responsibility and autonomy, it stands in
need of an everyday understanding because it forms
such a central part of moral life. Additionally, within
professional health care, an understanding of blame is
needed if only so it can be avoided. For example, in
the literature of health promotion, victim blaming is
often raised only so that it can be dismissed with no
explanation. Downie et al. (1996, p. 31) simply state
that ‘care should be taken to avoid victim blaming’,
and Holland (2007) notes that the problem with
making behaviour modification the focus of health
promotion is that it ‘smacks of victim blaming’, indi-
cating that even the suggestion of blaming is problem-
atic. Draft guidance from the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) on managing
overweight and obesity in adults (National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence, 2013, p. 6) recom-
mends that ‘dialogue is respectful and non-blaming’.
Blame is often paired with what is considered to be
its opposite, praise. There are clear similarities3See also Schafer & Ferraro (2011).
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between processes and elements of praise and blame,
but there is no similar restriction on praising patients
within professional health care. It might be consid-
ered that since praise and blame both generally relate
to a process of assessment, it is the expression of
blame rather than any notion of moral assessment
which is outlawed in health promotion. The NICE
draft guidance recommends that health professionals
be trained to provide ‘support and encouragement’
rather than praise, though there is clearly some
overlap. Praise certainly does follow from blood
donation (Snelling, 2012b), and in the United
Kingdom, a nurse4 was recently honoured for whistle
blowing about poor care, both activities which might
be regarded as obligatory rather than praiseworthy.
Thus far, I have discussed the features of blame
rather than its justification. I take it as axiomatic that
justified sanction blame requires the attribution of a
wrong act to a moral agent, and so it can be objected
to on the grounds that the agent is not morally
responsible or that the act or omission is not morally
wrong. These conditions are both problematic within
responsibility for health.
Moral agency
Unlike the issue of capacity for decision making,
which in practical application at least requires an
binary assessment of capacity, blame depends in
varying degrees on moral agency with full blame
being reserved for those with full agency (i.e. being
fully morally responsible). We blame people differ-
ently, or not at all, depending on their level of agency.
A nurse in an emergency department assaulted by a
person with dementia would regard her assailant dif-
ferently from someone who assaulted her while
drunk, differently again from someone who was
simply impatient or frustrated. Individuals with
dementia are not blameworthy; those who are simply
frustrated are. Those who are inebriated may not
have capacity as defined in the Mental Capacity Act
but may still be regarded as blameworthy for an
assault while drunk because they decided to get
drunk in the first place.5 A person confused because
of a urinary tract infection may not be blameworthy
for an assault, but a person with diabetes equally con-
fused because of hypoglycaemia may be to some
extent; he might have been able and obliged to
prevent the hypoglycaemia.6
Attribution of acts to agents can be further reduced
in the case of health-effecting behaviours in a number
of ways. For example, smoking cigarettes is widely
acknowledged to be an addiction, a state of affairs
defined by impaired control (Kranzler & Li, 2008)
and which results in breaking an addiction being
widely regarded as praiseworthy. It could be said of
course that an individual’s first cigarettes are smoked
from choice before the addiction that will bind him to
his habit takes hold, but in many cases considerable
peer and marketing pressure influences choice espe-
cially in younger people. Some smokers started
smoking before the dangers were fully known to
them. Similarly, obesity and overeating can be char-
acterized as addictive behaviour (Gearhardt et al.,
2012). It is clear that it is more difficult than might
have been expected to attribute agency to behaviour
and thence to ill health and that this impedes holding
people responsible for their health.
The problems of moral agency extend to all people
for all acts. Attribution of responsibility for an act to
an actor has hitherto been regarded in discussions
about free will and determinism in terms of whether
he could have done otherwise, though the ‘new com-
patiblists’ regard this as the ability to decide on the
basis of reasons (Sie & Wouters, 2010). The continu-
ing position of respecting autonomy as the predomi-
nant principle of bioethics may need increasingly
robust defence in light of the challenges from behav-
ioural, cognitive, and neurosciences (Sie & Wouters,
2010) and the view that, particularly when future and
current desires are concerned, different versions of
4http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-25549054.
5It could be that the response would be different if it was a
dependent rather than an infrequent drinker.
6See Rumbold & Wasik (2011) for discussion of a case where a
man who managed his diabetes well was convicted of causing
death by dangerous driving following an unheralded hypogly-
caemic episode. Also, Rumbold (2013) on the legal defence of
automatism.
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autonomy can coexist (Coggon, 2007). That the sim-
plistic image of individuals as free and autonomous
choosers is increasingly being accepted as question-
able is demonstrated by the use of choice architecture
based on behavioural insight (Cabinet Office, 2011,
Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) as well as the presentation
of health promotion information in a way that does
little to facilitate personal autonomy and much to
manipulate choice (Snelling, 2014).
Holding individuals responsible for
their health status
To say that we are responsible for our health could be
read to imply that health per se is the thing that we are
responsible for and that we have failed in our respon-
sibility if our health is bad. It cannot follow that being
well per se is a moral obligation. Likewise, being ill
cannot be morally forbidden, even if it is considered
to be a moral harm, because the range of acts and
omissions relating to health is not fully determinative
of a person’s health status, regardless of how health
is defined. The famously all-encompassing World
Health Organisation (WHO) definition that health ‘is
a state of complete physical, mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infir-
mity’7 is inconsistent with a simplistic version of
‘personal’ responsibility for health.Not only are many
of the determinants of physical and mental health
(environmental, social, genetic, luck, and the avail-
ability of good health care) outside personal control,
but physical and mental health, understood in terms
of the absence of disease, are but one part of health
widely conceived following theWHOmodel or some-
thing like it. Personal behaviour can contribute to
poor health and good health, even on the wide model,
but not to the extent that discourse on personal
responsibility implies, a narrower conception which
tends to regard health as the absence of disease and
personal behavioural influences on health as overrid-
ing. Under a narrow, disease-reducing, life-
lengthening approach, behaviour that threatens
health is wrong; under a wider health and well-being
approach, it might not be if it contributes to well-
being in other ways.
Simple binary distinctions nearly always oversim-
plify but are useful heuristic devices and can identify
the polar extremes of a continuum while acknowledg-
ing that the truth (if there can be one) lies in between.
However, for both positions, the moral appraisal of
health-effecting acts and omissions is only necessary
because they threaten our health.There is little neces-
sarily wrong with smoking, for example – it is wrong
insofar as it harms others and harms our health. It
would be unjust to hold someone morally responsible
for a state of affairs (poor health) unless he is also
causally responsible for it.A problem for smoking and
drinking more than we are told is good for us is that
there is no necessary connection between smoking and
poor health.This does not deny at a population level a
causal relationship between smoking and heart
disease (which would be foolish given the weight of
evidence);but at an individual level,smoking is neither
necessary nor sufficient condition for (say) having a
heart attack, much less smoking this or that cigarette.
Many smokers die in old age having never suffered a
heart attack, and many never-smokers suffer heart
attacks. Some smokers who have suffered a heart
attack would have had one anyway had they never
smoked. The heart attack cannot be attributed solely
to smoking and hence to the agent. Other diseases or
disabilities can be attributed to acts or habits more
readily,but evenhere, it does not followdespite clearer
lines of causality that illness-causing behaviour is nec-
essarily wrong. For example, it may have been under-
taken in the pursuit of a higher value. A fireman
burned rescuing someone fromafirewouldbepraised,
whereas a smoker similarly injured in a fire caused by
smoking in bedwould be blamed.Smoking or drinking
to excess may contribute so much to an individual’s
conception of his ownwell-being that he is prepared to
take the risk of contracting the diseases that his habit
may contribute to.
The concept of personal responsibility for health is
beset with difficulties and inconsistencies. The prob-
lems of moral agency, the ambiguous and individual
value of health and often uncertain causal links
between health-threatening behaviours and an indi-
vidual’s poor health (narrowly defined), make it dif-
ficult to identify each person’s obligations with
respect of his health. It would be easy to dismiss the7For example, http://www.who.int/suggestions/faq/en/.
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very idea that we can be morally responsible for our
health, and therefore we cannot justly be held respon-
sible for it, but this would negate the proven group
correlations between behaviour and health, which
most people value highly. Given the link between a
failure to meet an obligation and being blamed for it,
one way to interrogate the obligations that we have in
respect of our health is to examine the way that we
react to individuals who may have failed in them, that
is how we blame them.
Methodological and reflective
interlude
Philosophy can be seen, by some, as something of a
puzzle divorced from personal or professional expe-
riences and the need or desire to change them and
perhaps this is especially the case in the philosophy
of an essentially practical profession like nursing
whose very existence in the academy is questioned
(Thompson, 2009). Books and papers in academic
philosophical journals use a variety of methods to link
their normative or empirical claims to everyday life
including testing outcomes of analysis against intu-
itions. In applied analysis, factual claims are often
made as I did at beginning of this paper. For example,
Scanlon (2008, p. 123) states: ‘This account seems to
me to fit in with much of what we say about blame’,
but it is not always clear what is meant by this sort of
statement;whether embedded in the ‘we’ is an empiri-
cal claim involving more than one person, a few, a
majority, or nearly everyone. An uncontroversial
explanation would be that a claim is being made here
about plausible rather than actual facts.
Seeking a psychological explanation for blaming
behaviour starts by asking not why but how we blame.
As Korsgaard (1992) suggests, there does seem to be
something unappealing about taking the assessment
of others as the starting point, but on the reactive
attitudes account of blame, that is exactly what we do.
The developing field of experimental philosophy
(Alexander, 2012) offers some insight in establishing
how we blame, but this does not of course settle the
question of how we ought to blame.When presented
with an abstract scenario presenting information
about determinism, people tend towards incompatib-
lism, a position that is reversed when concrete emo-
tional examples are used in experiments (Nicholls,
2011). It is also argued that incompatiblist intuitions
are explained by errors in popular understanding of
what determinism is (Murray & Nahmias, 2014),
which, when addressed, result in compatiblist views.8
These experiments concerned causal determinism,
more complete than the partial determinism influenc-
ing health and behaviour. If the philosophical work
on blame is still in its ‘infancy’ (Coates & Tognazzini,
2013, p. 3), the issues of free will and determinism are
less discussed today than in Strawson’s founding
essay with contemporary work being more inclined to
address the psychology and significance of blame
within moral life (Coates & Tognazzini, 2013).
A blameworthy and analogous tombstoning son
The necessity for blaming judgements forming part of
an overall understanding of responsibility for health
doesmore than offer an opportunity for introspection,
it probably requires it, and in pursuit of this, I have
interrogated my intuition in a case involving health-
affecting behaviour. I imagine that my (adult) son has
jumped 30 feet from a pier into the sea after enjoying
a lunchtime drink. The activity of tombstoning has
been subject to disapproval and regulationbut also has
been defended as an enjoyable outdoor activity whose
risks can be minimized (Snelling, 2014). It can be
regarded as analogous to the whole range of health-
threatening behaviours that are the standard targets of
health promotion and regulation. There are similari-
ties and differences between all these activities – in the
level of enjoyment, addictive nature, the requirements
for preparation, whether harm is accumulated or the
result of a single instance, and the extent of wider
societal harms.The discussions about blaming my son
can be transferred to varying degrees to other sons and
daughters, fathers andmothers, spouses, friends,neigh-
bours, acquaintances, and other individuals more
inclined,perhaps, to amore sedentary lifestyle,a ‘poor’
diet, ‘excessive’ drinking, and smoking.
I think that I would feel some disapproving emo-
tions upon hearing of his behaviour, but even after
8For an excellent overview of asymmetries in blaming behaviour,
see Knobe & Doris (2010).
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detailed consultation with the thesaurus, it is difficult
to capture what these feeling would be. I would feel, I
think, disappointment and exasperation, cross and
concerned that he has put himself at risk.The episode
and the provoked emotions seem to fall between the
categories of reactive attitude given by Strawson.The
harm to me is minimal, and there is no intent, so
resentment seems too strong a response. However,
the dispassionate and uninvolved disapproval of the
objective reaction does not capture the special feel-
ings I would have in virtue of the relationship I have
with my son, though I may simply disapprove of
unknown others doing the same thing in another
seaside town. There would be a feeling that he had
done something that was wrong as well as unwise and
of course overwhelming relief that he had not been
hurt. The next time I saw him, I would certainly
explain in no uncertain terms why I am cross and why
he should not repeat it.
What would I feel had he been harmed? The act
that provoked my negative reaction is the same; what
would be extra here is that moral luck would have
frowned upon him instead of smiled.Now, knowing of
his injury, if I retain the blaming stance (or even if it is
deepened) in light of the injury, would I be blaming
the victim? Robbennolt’s (2000) systematic review
confirmed that we are more likely to apportion blame
for the same act when the consequences are severe.
Thankfully, these are imagined reactions, but Sonny
Wells’ parents had to face this exact issue when their
son was paralysed in an accident after jumping from
Southsea pier into three feet of water. Sonny and his
parents made videos after the accident to publicize
the dangers; his mother spoke of ‘stopping’ (British
Broadcasting Corporation, 2011) others from doing
what Sonny had done, and his father spoke of Sonny’s
‘selfishness’ (British Broadcasting Corporation,
2008a) in seeking his postdrinking excitement in such
a disastrous way.
My instinctive reactions to my imagined tombston-
ing son suggest that I am blaming him, and in large
measure, this guides an account of justified blame
consistent with my intuitions. Having carefully con-
sidered my blaming judgements and sanctions, though
not against an external and objective measure, I think
that my reactions are proportionate. Fairly to blame
not only requires that the blamed person is a respon-
sible agent, but also that he has failed in an obligation,
that the blamer stands in an appropriate relationship
to the actor, and that the blame is proportionate.
Failure in any of these areas renders the blamer
blameworthy, guilty of the ‘vice’ of moralism9 (Taylor,
2012).
Simply, moralism is the excess of morality. Like
many things which are defined in terms of ‘excess’, it
can be difficult to draw the line, and those on the
wrong side of it or deemed to be or accused of being
on the wrong side of it may want to redraw the line or
even deny that there is one. Moralism takes many
forms (Driver, 2005), some of which apply to the case
under consideration.
The nature of the obligation
Moralism is overly demanding, regarding the super-
erogatory as obligatory, the permissible as forbidden.
My concern and displeasure upon hearing of my son
tombstoning must be based on an implicit assumption
that the blaming stance that I have taken means that
I think that he has done something wrong, but it is not
immediately clear what it is.Tombstoning (and cream
cakes and cigarettes and drinking too much) does
threaten health, but it is also undertaken in pursuit of
an individual notion of the good life. Or, at least, I
would hope that it is. If I found out that my son had
jumped just because everyone else had or just to
impress a girl or a gang of lads, my reaction would be
more severe than had he made a cool calculation
about the benefits and risks involved. The obligation
that I hold him to and blame him for not meeting is
one of process rather than outcome (Snelling, 2014).
In arguing that the moral status of tombstoning is not
linked to an absolute view that it is wrong I hope to
escape the charge that I am regarding the sometimes
permissible as always forbidden, that I place too much
emphasis on impersonal and universalizable moral
precepts, seeing them away from their lived experi-
ence. Blaming my son, initially by means of an emo-
tional reaction, invites me to reflect upon and assess
exactly what it is that he has done wrong.
9In a similar vein, Watson (2013) discusses judgmentalism but
points out that nonjudgementalism can be considered a vice.
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The nature of the relationship
There appears to be something of a paradox between
two positions that are taken to be standard in ethical
analysis. First, that ethics is everyone’s business, that
we have at least minimal obligations to other people
just because they are people. Many health care scan-
dals in recent years have arisen and continued
because people knew what was happening and yet did
not intervene.10 Yet ‘minding our own business’ is
widely considered a virtue (Radzik, 2012), and as
every parent knows, you admonish other people’s
children very rarely and only with good reason and
great caution. Understanding whether you are situ-
ated such that an intervention, including taking the
public blaming stance, is permitted or even obligatory,
or an act of moralism is an important part of our
everyday moral fabric. Partly it is concerned with the
nature of the act which is objected to; the more
serious the moral transgression, the stronger the jus-
tification or obligation to intervene, but generally, this
must be tempered by the nature of the relationship or
the standing that the blamer has to the blamed (Bell,
2013; Watson, 2013).
A full account of friendship or kinship is not
required for friends or relatives to understand that, at
least, reciprocated emotional ties and feelings allow
open moral appraisal that would be considered self-
righteous undertaken by a stranger or an acquain-
tance. Friendship and kinship may require the
outward expression of such moral appraisal in order
to conserve the relationship, but repeated blaming
behaviour even in the presence of repeated wrongdo-
ing would probably threaten it.We can make sense of
general rules and categories of friendships, but they
are best considered unique, such that as Williams
(2013, p. 11) claims:
Both parties must, in order to sustain their relationship, find
a mutually agreeable way to deal with whatever wrongs one
or both of them perceive. [. . .] the standing involved is not
quite the authority to hold responsible, but rather to share
responsibility [emphasis in original].
This is not restricted to the wrongs the friends do each
other but also applies to more general wrongs. It is
significant that Williams suggests that the purpose is
sustaining the friendship rather than preventing or
compensating for a wrong act. However, this may not
be possible; Scanlon defines blame it in terms of
impairment of a relationship: ‘to claim that a person is
blameworthy for an action is to claim that the action
shows something about the agent’s attitudes towards
others that impairs the relationships that others can
have with him.’ (Scanlon, 2008, p. 128).
The imagined relationship that I have with my
adult son is of a different order, though of course it
need not be. In the case of a strong relationship at
least, it is easier to conceive of the notion of shared
lives and responsibility. It is not just that the relation-
ship is such that my obligations to him would result in
my caring for him if he was injured, impeding my
ability to realize my own life ambitions. It is substan-
tially that emotionally at least, his interests, success
and pain are shared with me, and it is this stake that
each of us has in the other’s life that partly settles the
obligations in the first place and then makes it allow-
able for each of us to hold the other responsible.11
Those outside our relationship would need compel-
ling justification to blame at all.
The nature and purpose of the
blaming behaviour
Blaming appropriately requires proportionality and
consistency12 within if not between relationships. The
concern that I would feel would proceed to a stronger
and considered remonstration that for his sake and
mine, he should not repeat the behaviour unless he
has undertaken reflective calculations on risk and
10In the United Kingdom, the ‘official’ nursing response to highly
visible episodes of very poor care was the ‘Compassion in prac-
tice’ strategy which includes 6Cs, including Courage, ‘[which]
enables us to do the right thing for the people we care for, to
speak up when we have concerns’ (Cummings & Bennett, 2012).
11I do not claim that the relationship between a father and his
adult son is or should be symmetrical.
12This is more objective in law in sentencing guidelines with
associated appeals by the convicted if the sentence is considered
too harsh or by theAttorneyGeneral if too lenient.‘The Sentenc-
ing Council for England andWales promotes greater consistency
in sentencing, whilst maintaining the independence of the judi-
ciary’ available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/.
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benefit. My purpose here is to encourage that he
make the calculations rather than to prevent him
from undertaking the activity. If he considers that he
has done this, it is open for me to disagree and regard
him unfavourably as a result, but this is likely to rep-
resent an attempted imposition of my values upon
him, something that could be considered moralistic.
My expressed crossness as to the wrongness of his
action and the inadequate reasoning that preceded it
seems enough to do what I require of it, and I would
be justified, I think, if I reminded him of his obliga-
tions the next time he went out on a sunny day.
However, it probably would not be justified if stron-
ger expressions of sanction blame were used – if I
used surveillance to monitor his activity, withheld
what would normally be his due if he continued, or at
the extreme sought to prevent him from going out at
all or to pick and choose his friends and activities for
him. It could be argued that some of these actions are
not properly regarded as blaming actions, but in any
event,my repeated or prolonged censure or the impo-
sition of strong sanctions in respect of his behaviour
would probably fail in their intended purpose and,
worse, cause such resentment that the nature of the
relationship would be impaired. I would be blamed,
and not only by him, for excessive blaming.
If his repeated tombstoning resulted in an injury,
my immediate and unreflective emotions would prob-
ably be similar if not deeper than I would have expe-
rienced previously, exacerbated no doubt by his
failure to heed my pleas. This might extend to uncon-
scious expression of this attitude in what would be a
highly emotional hospital visit. On reflection, it would
be clear to me that the considered and expressed
blame I previously subjected him to has failed, that
what I was trying to prevent has materialized, and so
further sanction blame would serve no forward-
looking purpose in changing my son’s behaviour. It
might be argued, similarly to Callahan in relation to
obesity, that even though there is no prospect for
purposeful blaming in this individual case, it never-
theless is justified or required pour encourager les
autres. In effect, this is what SonnyWell’s father did in
giving the interview cited earlier. The difference is
that Callahan seeks prevention of obesity through
individuals wishing to avoid stigma, whereas the
stated intention of both Sonny and his father is to
educate others (British Broadcasting Corporation,
2008b) in the midst of what must have been a devas-
tating and deeply emotional time for the family.
The examples of what I regard as justified blame
offered in this paper have highlighted that unless the
moral wrong is severe, blaming attitudes and behav-
iour are best justified proportionately and within
interpersonal relationships.Within the criteria identi-
fied, some variables admit to wide gradation and sub-
jective interpretation, diminishing the prospect of a
simple and generalized account of justified blame.
Consulting my intuitions in an emotionally driven
case has helped identify some features of justified
blaming which can be considered rather than applied
elsewhere. There are analogies to be found between
my blaming my imagined tombstoning son and the
apportion of blame elsewhere, but the normative
force of comparisons often lies in differences rather
than similarities between cases (Mertes & Pennings,
2011).These differences can only be identified on con-
sidered reflection, which, it is to be hoped, forms a
significant part of professional health care. What I
have considered this far is how individuals may be
blamed for failures in relation to their responsibility
for health, and I conclude the paper by considering
whether the blaming stance can legitimately be taken
within professional health care.
Blaming and health care practice:
institutions
In England, it is the NHS, via its constitution, which
sets the normative ‘request’ that people accept
responsibility for their health, and it is implied in
policy documents concerning the health of the nation
and the role that behaviour has upon it.We can con-
ceive of such a thing as institutional blaming, but this
is more meaningful in contractual or legal responsi-
bility as this is restricted to considered sanction
blame. The socialized nature of most health care in
the United Kingdom, and the constant pressure
placed upon it,means that there are opportunity costs
for every intervention, so that wasting the time of
health care professionals (e.g. by not turning up to an
appointment) risks not only poorer health outcomes
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for the individual but also missed opportunities to
improve the health of others.13 Fees for cancellation
of appointments are made in some places,14 but gen-
erally, despite setting the expectation, it is difficult for
the NHS as an institution to hold individuals respon-
sible for their health-threatening behaviour.
One way in which this could be considered is in
institutional policies which exact sanction blame, for
example in denying treatment to smokers for lung or
heart disease on the grounds that the patients have
caused the disease themselves and so are less entitled
than ‘blameless’ patients. There is some discussion in
the literature about the ethics of denying or depriori-
tizing treatment to individuals (normally categorized
into groups) deemed to be responsible for their poor
health15 though currently policy is that this cannot be
considered. Public attitudes have been reported in
favour.16 As well as identifying procedural problems,
Harris (1995) argues that this would constitute double
jeopardy by punishing people twice – once by them
contracting a disease linked to their habit and then
again by refusal to treat it. It may look sometimes that
overweight people, for example, are being prioritized
minimally or even denied treatment, but care is
always taken to defend decisions on the basis of
forward-looking considerations outside desert, that is,
outcomes are poorer.17 It seems clear that in an
increasingly litigious environment, any attempt to
deny treatment or to reduce its priority on the basis of
desert would likely be resisted by individual patients
and their advocates making open discussion and clear
policy making key. In contrast, using positive desert as
an acknowledged criterion for advanced priority
seems less problematic to policy makers. In 2007, the
UK government made it clear that service veterans
should be afforded priority for conditions caused by
military service while attempting to retain priority for
clinical need (Donaldson, 2010), and the recent strat-
egy document from National Health Service Blood
and Transplant (NSBT) (2013) recommends a
national discussion about prioritizing prior registered
donors for receipt of organs (Jarvis, 1995), as is
already law in Israel (Lavee et al., 2010).
Blaming and health care practice:
health care practitioners
Blaming is more likely to be undertaken by individual
health professionals through both assessment and
sanction. Research over many decades and in many
countries has found that a persistent minority of
nurses holds negative attitudes to groups of patients,
for example to substance misusers (Howard &
Chung, 2000a, 2000b), obese people (Poon & Tarrant,
2009; Mold & Forbes, 2013), and people who self-
harm (McAllister et al., 2002; Saunders et al., 2012).
Negative attitudes may contribute to feelings of stig-
matisation for example in lung cancer (Chambers
et al., 2012), obesity (Puhl and Heuer, 2009; Creel and
Tillman, 2011) and HIV (Nyblade et al., 2009). All of
these conditions are to large extent caused by per-
sonal behaviour. Holding blaming attitudes and
acting upon them is clearly identified as being unpro-
fessional by the UK nursing regulator, the Nursing
and Midwifery Council (NMC) (2008) which states in
its professional code that:
• You must treat people as individuals and respect
their dignity.
13According to the Health and Social Care Information Centre
(2012), there were 6.7 million missed appointments in the year to
September 2012, representing 7.3% of all appointments. It is
claimed that this costs hospitals £600 million per year (Dr Foster
Intelligence, undated). It is worthy of note that Section 5 of the
Criminal LawAct makes it an offense to cause wasteful employ-
ment of the police, and the Fire and Rescue Services Act makes
raising a false fire alarm also unlawful.
14Fees for missed appointments are allowed by dentists in Scot-
land but not in England. See http://www.scotland.gov.uk/
publications/2011/01/25085008/1 and http://www.nhs.uk/chq/
Pages/1789.aspx?CategoryID=74.According to the King’s Fund,
the extension of this measure has public support (Galea et al.,
2013).
15For example, Buyx (2008), Feiring (2008), Sharkey & Gillam
(2010), Buyx & Prainsack (2012). In addition, research funding
(United States) for lung cancer is considerably lower per death.
See Wilson (2013) for a discussion.
16For example, in the United States, Gollust & Lynch (2011), and
see Bowling (1996).
17See, for example, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/southern
_counties/4717764.stm, and see Salih & Sutton (2013) for a
review.
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• You must not discriminate in any way against those
in your care.
• You must treat people kindly and considerately.18
(Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2008, p. 2)19
These statements appear to rule out disapproval and
blame because to do so would not (arguably) be
respecting dignity, might result in discrimination, and
would not be treating people kindly or considerately.
The medical code of practice in the United Kingdom
deals with the issue of blame more directly:
You must not refuse or delay treatment because you believe
that a patient’s actions or lifestyle have contributed to their
condition. (General Medical Council, 2013, p. 19)
As if to emphasize the importance, this is restated on
the following page:
You must not unfairly discriminate against patients or col-
leagues by allowing your personal views* to affect your pro-
fessional relationships or the treatment you provide or
arrange. You should challenge colleagues if their behaviour
does not comply with this guidance. (General Medical
Council, 2013, p. 20)
The ‘*’ is elaborated upon in a footnote: ‘This includes
your views about a patient’s or colleague’s lifestyle,
culture or their social or economic status’.
The NMC Code also requires that nurses advocate
for their patients; MacDonald (2007) goes so far as
arguing that it is a universally held moral obligation.
Advocacy itself is contested and complex, but it is
clearly connected with arguing for personal choice.20
If a patient wants to stop smoking or lose weight,
then blaming him within the professional relationship
is very unlikely to facilitate it, and if he does not want
to change his behaviour, then blaming him is the
opposite of advocating for his self-determination.
However, it would be a thin and ironic compassion
that dissuaded health care professionals from unpro-
fessional blaming simply for fear of being blamed.The
injunctions from professional bodies cover sanction
blame only, and it is possible that individual practitio-
ners retain blaming assessments while being careful
to avoid giving them outward expression.This behav-
iour complies with the letter of the codes and yet falls
short of what most people take a good nurse to be, an
account which includes reference to character as well
as acts (Sellman, 2011), requiring open-mindedness
(Sellman, 2003) in challenging their attitudes.A good
nurse not only follows the code’s injunctions against
discrimination but also understands why she should.21
An initial critical interrogation of any emotional or
unconsidered response should start with asking what,
exactly, the person has done wrong such that they are
blameworthy for doing it.This requires detailed think-
ing about the nature of obligation in relation to their
own and others’ health. Simply uncritically accepting
the mantra that health is an intrinsic good to be priori-
tized and valorized above all else is insufficient, and it
provides a challengeable initial premise from which
procedurally correct but nevertheless similarly criti-
cizable conclusions follow,and stands in tension with a
further valorized principle in health care, the
supremacy of personal autonomy. If a case can be
made that a wrong act has been undertaken, consider-
ation is also needed as to the extent to which it can be
attributed to the agent, and health care professionals
are in a better place than the public (or at least they
should be) to understand the social, genetic, and
pathological determinants of health and behaviour.
If the case of attribution can be made, then it may
be that the agent is blameworthy, but it does not
follow from this that blame by any health care prac-
titioner is justified because the standing of the rela-
tionship does not allow it. Patients are simply not
18Of interest is the corresponding clause in the General Medical
Council document ‘Good Medical Practice’ which is ‘you must
be polite and considerate’ (my italics) (General Medical Council,
2013, p. 16).
19Addressing the issue more directly, the previous version of the
code of conduct stated that ‘you are personally accountable for
ensuring that you promote and protect the interests and dignity
of patients and clients irrespective of . . . lifestyle’ (Nursing and
Midwifery Council, 2004).
20See, for example, the NMC’s Guidance for the Care of Older
People (Nursing and Midwifery Council, 2009).
21This argument is strikingly similar to Clouser & Gert’s (1990)
much-cited critique of ethical principlism. Practitioners respect
autonomy because the principle tells them to, but without theo-
retical justification, they do not know why they should.
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accountable to health care professionals. Justified
blame of sorts does contribute to close relationships
as I have described, but the albeit emotional and
caring relationship that can characterize professional
nursing excludes blaming attitudes. The relationships
are fundamentally asymmetrical, and blame is as ille-
gitimate within them as it is within similarly asym-
metrical but more hierarchical relationships between
doctors and patients.While I would consider it appro-
priate that my injured tombstoning son may apolo-
gize for his actions, any apology would be offered to
me because I (and certain others) would be harmed in
light of the harm to him, but it would make no sense
for him to apologize to his carers, apart perhaps from
a cursory apology more associated with politeness
rather than genuine moral behaviour.22 Similarly, it
makes no sense for him to seek forgiveness from the
nurse for his actions (Allais, 2008).
Finally, brief mention is needed where it might be
appropriate for health care staff to blame patients,
where the wrongdoing is to them directly, when
patients are violent and abusive towards them.
Though the relationship is asymmetrical, it is not that
asymmetrical, and it seems perfectly reasonable for
nurses to feel the resentment that would characterize
an assault outside professional health care. Much of
the incidence and literature about violence to health-
care staff occurs within mental health services and
accident units, and here the question of impaired
moral agency may be expected to lessen the force of
the reactive attitudes.As far as sanction blame is con-
cerned, in addition to standard options to prosecute
abusers through the criminal law system, the hand-
book to the NHS Constitution makes it clear that
though violent and abusive patients can be expected
to be denied treatment by local policies, these ‘should
reflect that violent and abusive patients can only be
denied access to NHS services if it is clinically appro-
priate to do so’ (National Health Service, 2013b, p.
88). As an example, the policy from the University
Hospitals Birmingham NHS Trust (2012) states that
denial of treatment lasts for a year, excludes emer-
gency treatment, and that arrangements are made to
transfer care elsewhere.
Conclusion
To deny that people cannot be held responsible for
their health-effecting decisions is to deny that there is
such a thing as responsibility for health, to say that
there are no health-related obligations. However,
obligations for individuals’ own health are best under-
stood and defined within interpersonal relationships
and derive their strength from mutual obligations
within shared interests and individual versions of the
good life.This must mean that the obligations for each
of us are individual in strength and, importantly, direc-
tion. We owe obligations of various sorts and in
varying strengths to those who share our lives, and it
is to these companions that we owe an account,
because we fail them when we fail to meet our obli-
gations. There are blameworthy acts in relation to
responsibility for health, and taking the blaming
stance within and as part of interpersonal relation-
ships may be justified if proportionate.
This account inevitably results in inconsistency
because of a variety in relationships and accounts of
the good life, and this means that there can be no
universalizable rules beloved by overzealous health
promoters (Fitzgerald, 2001). Analysing the features
of health-related obligations and of justified blaming
should explain why there is no place, in this account,
for the notion of nurses and other health care profes-
sionals blaming patients for their health-effecting
behaviour by their attitude and/or actions.At the risk
of perpetrating an ‘education reflex’ (Paley, 2007), an
appropriate response to the minority blaming atti-
tudes and behaviour in respect of individuals deemed
to have caused their own poor health and not fully
deserving of health care is to mount an education
challenge which will expose the simplistic ‘philoso-
phy’ of much professional health care practice which
values health for itself rather as part of a good life
chosen according to the (allegedly) overriding prin-
ciple of respect for personal autonomy.The challenge
is first to identify what, exactly, individuals are doing
wrong by undertaking behaviour that harms their
health and the extent to which it can be attributed to
the them.A further examination of the nature of the
relationships in professional health care and of the
difference between justified blame and moralism will22See Smith (2005) for a detailed analysis of apology.
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help practitioners to the view that the reactive emo-
tions and their consequent blaming behaviours are
built on nothing stronger than prejudice.
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